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ABSTRACT 
Joseph D. Bryan: Dazzled, Blinded, & Numb: 
The Body and Society in Eighteenth-Century France 
(Under the direction of Jay M. Smith) 
 
One of the defining features of eighteenth-century France was a pervasive anxiety over 
the possible collapse of the hierarchical and corporate social order. Although influenced by a 
variety of political and cultural crises, contemporaries often channeled blame for the tenuous 
state of society to the increase in commercial activity and the effects of luxury.  While historians 
have recently used this anxiety as a key to explore innovative social thinking, they have often 
neglected two fundamental aspects of eighteenth-century culture.  First, opponents of luxury did 
not simply put forward abstract moral critiques; their criticisms stemmed from the increasing 
availability of “superfluous” material goods, the noticeable expansion of social activities, such as 
public leisure and shopping, and new understandings of social interaction through practices of 
civility, taste, and refinement.  The attention given to unprecedented forms of behavior is 
indicative of a larger point: the notion of society itself as a realm of human independence and 
interdependence was being invented.  Religious and political boundaries circumscribing the 
"social" had been loosened.  Commerce challenged the foundations of Old Regime society, 
luxury confused the symbols that represented the Old Regime socio-political hierarchy, and a 
wide range of writers envisioned new roots for society based either on the harmonizing capacity 
of individual interests, the innate human quality of sociability, or the vague concept of social 
utility.   
iv 
 
Second, and more important, historians have neglected the critical physiological aspect of 
contemporary confrontations with the increasingly-unsteady social order.  There is a marked 
presence of physiological language in eighteenth-century socio-political writing; science, 
however, was more than a convenient idiom. In attempting to understand novel human 
interaction, writers appropriated evidence about the passions, the sensibility of nerves, and the 
organisation of the body.  I propose that it was through the body, and the body’s capacity to 
“feel,” that many thinkers understood, argued over, and ultimately constructed new social 
institutions and forms of social interaction.  Explaining the relationship between bodies—human 
bodies, material goods, specks of matter—became the key to understanding society.   
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Introduction 
From Metaphor to Ontology: the Bodies of Eighteenth-Century France 
In 1789, the anonymous author of Principles of Government simplified and reduced to 
seven natural units, conditions for a good Constitution reimagined French politics through a 
body-politic metaphor:  
What we call the constitution of the human body is the totality, the intimate union of all 
the parts; they say that a man is ‘well-constituted’ when he enjoys a healthy, vigorous 
organization, without deformity...It must be the same for a political body.  But the human 
body has only one head to watch over the preservation of all its limbs…Thus it is the 
nation, which created the head that it has given itself, that should determine the laws that 
this head should follow in directing the national interests.1 
 
By reversing the traditional image of the body politic, as a divine and rational king-head 
directing the state-body, the author used a metaphor to direct readers’ attention to the 
inefficacious political system still governing France.  The author also marshaled contemporary 
physiological and medical terminology—constitution, organisation, nerfs, sensibilité—to blend 
political authority with the immutable laws of nature.   
 The anonymous author’s metaphor is representative of the rhetoric of the Revolution.  
Yet, even though the pervasive use of body-politic metaphors has been an important vehicle for 
describing subtle and dramatic political change, historians have been too captivated by them.  
Revolutionaries made extensive use of body-politic metaphors to transmit their political 
messages, but metaphor was not the only expression of the corporeal.  Revolutionaries such as 
                                                          
1Quoted in Antoine de Baecque, The Body Politic: Corporeal Metaphor in Revolutionary France, 1770-1800, trans. 
Charlotte Mandell (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1997), 104.   
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Pierre-Louis Roederer and the physician J.-L. Alibert sought to ground French socio-political 
institutions in the body itself.  According to Roederer, the “spring” of social organisation could 
be found in “the physical, intellectual and moral faculties,” and “it is necessary to know man 
himself, that is to say the qualities that can ensure the action of the social machine.”2  For 
Alibert, sensationalism was the “universal key to the human mind.”3  Society must necessarily 
function according to the ability of each individual to “feel” sociability through sympathy.4  
Where did Roederer and Alibert gather materials to build a new society from a corporeal 
foundation?  Their sources were sturdier than metaphor.  In order for the revolutionaries to know 
their body politic, they believed, the French had to know their own bodies.    
Bodies beyond Metaphor 
One of the defining features of eighteenth-century France was a pervasive anxiety over 
the possible collapse of the hierarchical and corporate social order. Although influenced by a 
variety of political and cultural crises, contemporaries often channeled blame for the tenuous 
state of society to the increase in commercial activity and the effects of luxury.  While historians 
have recently used this anxiety as a key to explore innovative social thinking, they have often 
neglected two fundamental aspects of eighteenth-century culture.  First, opponents of luxury did 
not simply put forward abstract moral critiques; their criticisms stemmed from the increasing 
availability of “superfluous” material goods, the noticeable expansion of social activities, such as 
public leisure and shopping, and new understandings of social interaction through practices of 
                                                          
2P.-L. Roederer, Cours d’organisation sociale, in Oeuvres du Comte P.-L. Roederer, ed. A.-M. Roederer, 8th tome 
(Paris: Typographie de firmin didot frères, imprimeurs de l'institut, 1859), 131. 
 
3J.-L Alibert, “Discours sur les rapports de la médicine avec les sciences physiques et morales,” Mémoires de la 
Société d’Émulation, vol. 2 (1798), i-cxii, here lxxv. 
 
4Ibid., lxxxiii.   
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civility, taste, and refinement.  The attention given to unprecedented forms of behavior is 
indicative of a larger point: the notion of society itself as a realm of human independence and 
interdependence was being invented.  A wide range of writers captured these changes by 
envisioning new roots for society based either on the harmonizing capacity of individual 
interests, the innate human quality of sociability, or the vague concept of social utility.   
Second, and more importantly, historians have neglected the critical physiological aspect 
of contemporary confrontations with the increasingly unsteady social order.  There is a marked 
presence of physiological language in eighteenth-century socio-political writing, especially 
metaphors of the body politic.  Yet, a corporeal vocabulary was more than a convenient idiom.  
In attempting to understand the burgeoning world of commerce and the ramifications for the 
corporate social order, writers appropriated and applied evidence about the passions, the 
sensibility of nerves, and the organisation of the body.  I propose that it was through the 
corporeal that many thinkers understood, deliberated over, and ultimately constructed new social 
institutions and forms of social interaction.  Explaining the relationship between bodies—human 
bodies, material goods, specks of matter, etc.—became the key to understanding society.  By the 
middle of the eighteenth century, the French began to approach socio-economic problems and 
the nature of social interaction through the physiological capacity of bodies to “feel.”  
As Antoine de Baecque has written, eighteenth-century writers and revolutionaries 
“thought abstractly by means of metaphor and…gave to their comprehension of the individual, 
and of the human community, and even the universe, the figure of the human body.  Their 
language, even at its most philosophical and legalistic, was charged with these images.”5  The 
                                                          
5De Baecque, The Body Politic, 2. For “society’s” reliance on the king for its own existence, see Brian C. J. Singer, 
Society, Theory and the French Revolution: Studies in the Revolutionary Imaginary (New York: St. Martin's Press, 
1986), chp. 5. 
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vision of organic unity that heralded this introduction was the product of eighteenth-century 
investigations into the cohesive arrangement of physical bodies into a larger metaphorical entity, 
the “body politic” or “social body.”6  Alongside frequent usage of physiological language, the 
often politicized metaphor that individual bodies are constitutive of something more powerful 
pervaded eighteenth-century France.7  Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s concept of the general will, 
Théophile Bordeu’s view of the body as a confederation of organs, and the insistence in political 
economy that the circulation of commodities sustained the body politic all attest to linguistic 
overlap and a shared set of conceptual tools.8     
Eighteenth-century metaphors of the organic unity of the body politic and the social body 
indicate the desire to re-establish the relationship between the monarchy and its subjects on new 
                                                          
6See Judith Schlanger, Les Métaphores de l’organisme (Paris: Vrin, 1971); Barry Barnes and Steven Shapin, eds., 
Natural Order: Historical Studies of Scientific Culture (Beverly Hills and London: Sage Publications, 1979); de 
Baecque, The Body Politic: Corporeal Metaphor in Revolutionary France, 1770-1800; Sabine Maasen, Everett 
Mendelsohn, and Peter Weingart, eds., Biology as Society, Society as Biology: Metaphors (Dordrecht, Boston, 
London: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1995); Catherine Packham, “The Physiology of Political Economy: Vitalism 
and Adam Smith’s Wealth of Nations,” Journal of the History of Ideas, vol. 63, No. 3 (July 2002): 465-481. Two 
recent works delve into the interaction of politics and society:  Jean Terrier, Visions of the Social: Society as a 
Political Project in France, 1750-1950 (Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2011), and David Bates, States of War: 
Enlightenment Origins of the Political (New York: Columbia University Press, 2011), chp. 5. 
 
7Jonathan Sheehan and Dror Wahrman have recently used the flexible “language of self-organization,” or the 
“family of self-organizing conceptual moves,” as an explanatory framework for the Enlightenment writ large.  
Sheehan and Wahrman, Invisible Hands: Self-Organization and the Eighteenth Century (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 2015), xii, 249. 
   
8According to Charles T. Wolfe and Motoichi Terada, “[Bordeu’s] celebrated image of the bee-swarm expresses this 
structural-functional understanding of living bodies quite well: ‘One sees them press against each other, mutually 
supporting each other, forming a kind of whole, in which each living part, in its own way, by means of the 
correspondence and directions of its motions, enables this kind of life to be sustained in the body’ (Ménuret, 1765c, 
Encyclopédie, “Observation”, XI, 319).”  Wolfe and Terada, “The Animal Economy as Object and Program in 
Montpellier Vitalism,” Science in Context 21.4 (2008): 537-79, here p. 550.  See also Peter Reill, Vitalizing Nature 
in the Enlightenment (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005), 133.  For Rousseau’s concept of the body 
politic, see Bates, States of War, chp. 5, and Terrier, Vision of the Social, pgs. 5-9 and 54-56.  Turgot acknowledged 
the ubiquity of the organic metaphor of circulation:  “It is this advance and this continual return of capitals which 
constitute what one must call the circulation of money; that useful and fruitful circulation which gives life to all the 
labors of the society, which maintains movement and life in the body politic, and which is with great reason 
compared to the circulation of blood in the animal body.”  Turgot, Reflections on the Formation and the Distribution 
of Riches, trans. William J. Ashley (New York: Augustus M. Kelley Publishers, 1971; originally published in 
Ephémérides du citoyen, in three parts: Nov. and Dec. 1769, and Jan. 1770), 63.  
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grounds, but they competed with the persistent, traditional metaphors of a stratified society, 
hierarchically-arranged and based on privilege.  The body politic found in these images 
resembled Hobbes’ Leviathan in which the king served as the head, or control center, ordering 
his parts and organs through his will.9  The body politic itself was eternal, but its immortality 
resonated in opposing ways in the eighteenth century: the king’s two bodies (Le roi est mort.  
Vive le roi!) versus the regeneration of the body politic through the organization of its parts (the 
“body” directs the “head”).  Whichever metaphor best expressed one’s political allegiance or 
social vision, the body nevertheless stood at the center.   
While corporeal metaphors served as important tools to disseminate traditional or 
controversial socio-political ideas, often appropriating the authority of nature to justify hierarchy 
or exclusion, historians have focused too intently on the metaphorical value of the corporeal.  
Contemporaries used not only the language of the body to add a natural stress to their arguments, 
but they also claimed that the body had ontological value in society.  The new primacy of the 
corporeal and the role of the individual’s body in society stemmed from two innovations of 
French life in the late-seventeenth and eighteenth centuries: the spread of commerce and luxury 
and the invention of “society.” 
Challenges to the Corporate Social Order: Commerce and “Society” 
Body-politic metaphors were more than just cognitive devices to explain forms of 
government; they equally entailed a set of expectations and limitations for individuals and 
                                                          
9See Terrier, Visions of the Social, chps. 1-3, and Andreas Musolff, Metaphor, Nation and the Holocaust: The 
Concept of the Body Politic (New York: Routledge Press, 2010), chps. 6-8.  Metaphors of the body politic also 
generally carried gendered expectations and expressed fears of both female sexuality and insidious social threats.  
See Lynn Hunt, ed., Eroticism and the Body Politic (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1991); Joan B. 
Landes, Visualizing the Nation: Gender, Representation, and Revolution in Eighteenth-Century France (Ithaca, NY: 
Cornell University Press, 2001); Jonathan Gil Harris, Foreign Bodies and the body politic: Discourses of social 
pathology in early modern England (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998). 
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bodies.  Metaphors expressed social structures, and social structures circumscribed lived 
realities.  In early-modern France, stratification of ranks and corporate privileges carried 
expectations of morality, behavior, and conduct, as well as symbols of status.   The semiotic 
world was stable when the body was a viable metaphor for, and representation of, political power 
and social position.  When these symbols were confused, however, “semiotic chaos” ensued, and 
this is precisely what happened.10   
The eighteenth century felt a pervasive anxiety brought on by commerce, luxury, and the 
increasing realization that the corporate social order did not reflect the reality of social 
intercourse. Commercial exchange, the luxury industry, and the unpredictability of fashion 
emerged under the tight grip of Louis XIV and his minister of finance Jean-Baptiste Colbert.  
Together, the king and minister encouraged urban growth, domestic manufacturing, and 
international trade in mercantilist hopes of overflowing coffers and autocratic control of the 
French economy.  Through sumptuary laws, they sought to extend the king’s control from 
economy to culture, limiting both the production of illegal goods and the consumption of 
imported luxury items.11  The growing trade in licit and illicit luxury goods, nevertheless, 
circumvented sumptuary laws and eluded the grasp of the monarch and his minister.   
Because of a long-term “consumer revolution” in France, consumption was not reduced 
or limited to état.  The production and consumption of fashionable luxury items—e.g. watches, 
                                                          
10The phrase “semiotic chaos” comes from John Shovlin, "The Cultural Politics of Luxury in Eighteenth-Century 
France," French Historical Studies, vol. 23, no. 4 (fall 2000): 577-606.  For another examination of the function of 
the corporeal in the social order, see Katsuya Hirano, “Politics and Poetics of the Body in Early Modern Japan,” 
Modern Intellectual History, vol. 8, n. 3 (2011): 499-530. 
 
11On the king’s attempts to control fashion, see Clare Crowston, Fabricating Women: the Seamstresses of Old 
Regime France, 1675-1791 (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2001); Jennifer Jones, Sexing “La Mode”: 
Gender, Fashion and Commercial Culture in Old Regime France (New York, NY: Berg, 2004); Natacha Coquery, 
Tenir Boutique à Paris au XVIIIe siècle: luxe et demi-luxe (Paris: Éditions du Comité des travaux historiques et 
scientifiques, 2011), 182-3. 
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jewelry, silks, furniture, hygiene products, and cosmetics—found a welcome home in Paris.  By 
the middle of the eighteenth century, the market for “cheap copies of aristocratic luxury items,” 
or “populuxe goods,” flourished.12  In her recent work on Parisian boutiques, Natacha Coquery 
has shown how boutiques embodied a fledgling “society”: “The boutique is at the same time a 
place of selling, buying, and fabrication, but it is also a place of crédit, sociability, spectacle, 
tourism, leisure, fantasy, etc.  It is a place where a culture of consumption is constructed.”13  
Boutiques, in Coquery’s analysis, demonstrate the ambiguity of French commerce and culture in 
the eighteenth century.  Balanced between archaism and modernity, boutiques represented the 
former through a continued respect for traditional practices, rules, networks, bartering, and older 
modes of production, while expressing the latter by their ability to adapt rapidly to changes in 
fashion, to direct those same fashions, to take advantage of new advertising opportunities, as 
well as encourage a new urban, social practice: shopping.14  The increasing availability of 
“populuxe” goods, new spaces of sociability, and the international “culture of consumption” 
                                                          
12Cissie Fairchilds, “The Production and Marketing of Populuxe Goods in eighteenth-century Paris,” in 
Consumption and the World of Goods, eds. John Brewer and Roy Porter, 228-248 (London and New York, 
Routledge, 1993), 228. 
 
13Coquery, Tenir Boutique à Paris au XVIIIe siècle, 24. Regarding crédit, Coquery’s analysis implies the dual nature 
of this term.  During the eighteenth century, it meant both credit as we understand it today, which allows her to 
detail who needed to purchase items on credit, as well as the esteem or clout one acquired and the uses to which one 
applied that reputation.  The latter definition, bound up with the ancien régime social hierarchy and obligations of 
interest and moral value, would be slowly overshadowed by the former by the end of the eighteenth century.  See 
Jay M. Smith, “No More Language Games: Words, Beliefs, and the Political Culture of Early Modern France,” The 
American Historical Review 102 (1997): 1414-1440, and Clare Haru Crowston’s critique in both, “Credit and the 
Metanarrative of Modernity,” French Historical Studies, vol. 34, no. 1 (Winter 2011): 7-19, and Credit, Fashion, 
Sex: Economies of Regard in Old Regime France (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2013). 
 
14Ibid., 301-2.  See also Amalia D. Kessler, “Enforcing Virtue: Social Norms and Self-Interest in an Eighteenth-
Century Merchant Court,” Law and History Review, vol. 22, n. 1 (Spring 2004): 71-118, esp. 100-118.  For a recent 
general work on economic developments that situates the essentials of confidence, crédit, gift, and debt between 
competing, but often overlapping, “aristocratic” and “bourgeois” economic cultures, see Laurence Fontaine, 
L’Economie morale. Pauvreté, crédit et confiance dans l’Europe préindustrielle (Paris: Gallimard, 2008).  For an 
analysis of shopping and the empowering possibilities of consumption for women, see Dena Goodman, Becoming a 
Woman in the Age of Letters (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2009), chp. 5. 
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enhanced the glamour of the French capital, as writers such as Voltaire, Montesquieu, and Jean-
François Melon touted the social and economic profitability of le doux commerce.  However, 
these changes tested the socio-economic order by giving birth to new consumers sans état.   
The explosion of material goods, the excessive expenditures of the ultra-elite, and the 
fears of “bourgeois” emulation led to a debate over luxury.  Consumer culture spread through the 
ranks of society; it disrupted the socio-political hierarchy, which was based on expensive 
symbols designating ranking, and fed arguments over the role of commerce in France’s political 
economy.  Fears of social collapse abounded as a panoply of social and political crises threatened 
the once stable, tripartite social structure, and a new conceptual vocabulary challenged previous 
meanings of honor, virtue, patriotism, public opinion, and nobility.15  The development of 
commerce and the extension of luxury crystallized growing problems within the traditional, 
corporate social order.      
The relationships between the three estates, subjects and their monarch, and believers and 
their god, were no longer the only relationships existing between individuals.  The notion of 
society itself as a realm of human independence and interdependence was being invented.  In 
Keith M. Baker’s words, “the Enlightenment invented society as a symbolic representation of 
collective human existence and instituted it as the essential domain of human practice.”16  The 
                                                          
15Regarding fears of social collapse as a result of depopulation, see Carol Blum, Strength in Numbers: Population, 
Reproduction, and Power in Eighteenth Century France (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2002), and 
Leslie Tuttle, Conceiving the Old Regime: Pronatalism and the Politics of Reproduction in Early Modern France 
(New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010).  Among a multitude of texts on political culture, see Jay 
Smith, “Social Categories, the Language of Patriotism, and the Origins of the French Revolution: The Debate over 
noblesse commerçante,” Journal of Modern History, vol. 72, no. 2 (June 2000): 339-374, and his Nobility 
Reimagined: The Patriotic Nation in Eighteenth-Century France (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2005); 
Marisa Linton, The Politics of Virtue in Enlightenment France (New York: Palgrave, 2001); David Bell, The Cult of 
the Nation: Inventing Nationalism, 1680-1800 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2001); John Shovlin, 
The Political Economy of Virtue Luxury, Patriotism, and the Origins of the French Revolution (Ithaca, NY: Cornell 
University Press, 2006). 
 
16Keith Michael Baker, “Enlightenment and the Institution of Society: Notes for a Conceptual History,” in Main 
Trends in Cultural History: Ten Essays, eds. Willem Melching and Wyger Velema, 95-120 (Amsterdam and 
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decades surrounding the turn of the eighteenth century saw an ontological space open up as 
religion slowly came to be interiorized and the material world, which operated by natural laws, 
distanced from an omnipresent deity.  David Bell has concluded that “[t]he intellectual 
achievements of the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries, by so clearly delineating the 
terrestrial sphere, also demanded a new vocabulary to describe it and to help human beings 
discern and maintain order and stability in the face of the terrifying absence of God.”17  What 
Bell labelled “foundational concepts” (société, civilisation, patrie, nation, and public) replaced 
the authority of religion and the unquestioned subjugation of subjects to their sovereign.  The 
bonds that linked humans together in society preceded the political.   
By the mid-eighteenth century, therefore, religious and political boundaries 
circumscribing the "social" had been loosened, commerce challenged the foundations of 
traditional society, and luxury confused the symbols that represented the corporate socio-political 
hierarchy.  Consumer culture and new sociable practices were the material referents in the 
process of being constituted semantically as “society.”  They were natural, necessary, and 
autonomous.   
                                                          
Atlanta, GA: Rodopi, 1994), 96.  See also Dan Edelstein, The Enlightenment: A Genealogy (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 2010), chp. 4; Yair Mintzker, "'A Word Newly Introduced into Language': The Appearance and 
Spread of 'Social' in French Enlightenment Thought, 1745-1764," History of European Ideas 34 (2008): 500-513; 
Amalia D. Kessler, A Revolution in Commerce: the Parisian Merchant Court and the Rise of Commercial Society in 
Eighteenth-Century France (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2007), chp. 4; Dena Goodman, “Difference: An 
Enlightenment Concept,” in What’s Left of Enlightenment? eds. Keith Michael Baker and Peter Hanns Reill, 129-
147 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2001); Colin Jones, The Great Nation: France from Louis XV to 
Napoleon, 1715-1799 (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002), 174, 177, 198; Daniel Gordon, Citizens 
without Sovereignty: Equality and Sociability in French Thought, 1670-1789 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1994).  For “intellectual companionate and collaborative marriages” as spurs to sociability and social utility, see 
Meghan K. Roberts, “Philosophes Mariés and Epouses Philosophiques: Men of Letters and Marriage in Eighteenth-
Century France,” French Historical Studies 35.3 (Summer 2012): 509-39. 
 
17Bell, The Cult of the Nation, 29.  Beginning in the second half of the eighteenth century, according to Charles 
Taylor, the “modern” social imaginary consists of a society “disembedded” from a metaphysical order and created 
and populated by legally-autonomous, individual beings.  Taylor, Modern Social Imaginaries (Durham, NC: Duke 
University Press, 2004), chp. 4. 
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The novelty of commercial life—the wider distribution of wealth, luxury, and social 
mobility—forced writers to reconsider the bases of the corporate social order.  Supporters of the 
traditional order, who sought new foundations for the system of corps, and opponents of the 
traditional order both employed a new social understanding of “commerce.”  By the eighteenth 
century, “commerce” was a polysemous term that “came to refer not only to the activities of 
merchants…but to an increasingly resonant image of civil society as a whole, as in phrases such 
as ‘an agreeable commerce,’ ‘an easy commerce,’ the ‘commerce of letters,’ or the ‘commerce 
between the sexes’.”18  Commerce was not simply the transportation and exchange of goods or 
activities of the market, according to the Marquis de Mirabeau (1756); it was akin to sociability: 
“Commerce is the useful and necessary connection of all sociable beings with each other.  In this 
sense, the territory of commerce is moral as well as physical; all is commerce here below.”19  
Commerce brought material bodies and material goods together to constitute incipient society, 
which provided contemporaries with the key to understanding both “economic” commerce and 
“social” commerce.  Critics of commerce and luxury and theorists of “society” focused their 
efforts on the corporeal component of society.  In his dialogue Physique de la Beauté (1748), for 
example, É-G Morelly’s charming character Thémire proclaimed to her lover-interlocutor 
Théramène, “Yes, I know that we have five senses.  They are the organs that create a certain 
commerce between us and exterior objects.  But it is necessary that you explain to me how this 
happens.”20 The importance of the body as sense receptor registered across a variety of debates, 
                                                          
18Henry C. Clark, Compass of Society: Commerce and Absolutism in Old-Regime France (Lanham, MD: Lexington 
Books, 2007), xiii.   
 
19Mirabeau, L’Ami des hommes ou traité de la population, 2 vols. (Darmstadt: Scientia Verlag Aalen, 1970; reprint 
of Avignon edition of 1756–8), II.I.5. 
 
20Étienne-Gabriel Morelly, Physique de la Beauté, ou Pouvoir naturel des ses Charmes (Paris: Presses 
Universitaires de France, Éditions Coda, 2004; written in 1748 but unpublished), 215.   
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journals, and texts during the second half of the eighteenth century, all of which explained just 
how the sensory organs created “a certain commerce between us and exterior objects.”  
The Primacy of the Corporeal 
The growth of the public sphere, illustrated by an expansion of print media and 
intellectual cosmopolitanism, coupled with new, urban institutions of sociability and new 
commercial practices demonstrates to us that “society” was throwing off political, religious, and 
hierarchical restrictions.  Through an increased distribution of the periodical press, Parisians and 
those in provincial urban locations could learn about products filling the new stores on Rue St. 
Honoré or being produced in the faubourg Saint Antoine.  In this dissertation, I will argue that it 
was only a few decades into the eighteenth century that the French began to think through the 
changes taking place.  I take seriously Michael Kwass’ challenge that historians should begin  
to assess the cultural and intellectual transformations that accompanied the proliferation 
of consumer goods in this period.   How did men and women living in what remained, in 
many ways, a highly traditional social and political order come to understand the upward 
spiral of consumption? How did the expansion of the world of goods influence the social 
imagination of the French in the decades before the French Revolution?21   
 
The idea that there was an abstract and physical space inhabited by human bodies, characterized 
by “commerce,” and adorned with material goods came to exercise the minds of French writers.  
Metaphors of the body politic were not enough to understand the multitude of changes that took 
place in the eighteenth century.  Their gauge, their tool of measurement, was the human body 
itself.   
                                                          
21Michael Kwass, “Consumption and the World of Ideas: Consumer Revolution and the Moral Economy of the 
Marquis de Mirabeau,” Eighteenth-Century Studies, vol. 37, no. 2 (Winter 2004): 187-213, here p. 187.  Kwass 
repeated this challenge to historians in his “Big Hair: A Wig History of Consumption in Eighteenth-Century 
France,” American Historical Review, vol. 111, n.3 (June 2006): 634. 
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 By the mid-eighteenth century, the primacy of the corporeal had proceeded from three 
developments.  First, challengers of the mechanical philosophy and Cartesian dualism, both of 
which viewed matter as inert and lifeless, produced new hypotheses of the inherent activity of 
matter.  Isaac Newton’s analysis of gravity and the “active forces” of matter lent natural 
philosophical majesty to the idea that matter possessed various forms of inherent mobility (e.g. 
attraction and repulsion).22  Human bodies and matter were part of nature and subordinate to 
nature’s laws, whether providential or not; both were conceived as not only being affected by 
exterior objects, as in the case of the mechanical philosophy, but effecting change in exterior 
objects as well.  In society, humans absorbed and responded to the passions, emotions, or 
behaviors of others.  The mechanical philosophy could not account for the ability of bodies to 
self-organize via active properties in either the natural world or society.   
Second, and closely following the first development, the human body filled the space 
slowly evacuated by the immaterial human soul and God, as noted by David Bell above.  Late-
seventeenth and eighteenth-century natural philosophers, physicians, and doctors debated the 
physiology and materiality of the soul.  The enhanced physicality of the human body, alongside 
the decreasing belief in an immaterial and spiritual realm, primed contemporaries to credit socio-
economic interaction as the space to perform ethical behavior and achieve moral rectitude.  That 
is to say, if the soul was physiological or tied in some physical way to the body, then corporeal 
performance was equivalent to moral performance.23   
                                                          
22Chapter two will discuss this material in far more detail. 
 
23For the materiality of the soul, see Ann Thomson, Bodies of Thought: Science, Religion, and the Soul in the Early 
Enlightenment (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), chps. 4-5, and Charles T. Wolfe and Michaela van Esveld, 
“The Material Soul: Strategies for Naturalizing in an Early Modern Epicurean Context,” in Conjunctions of Mind, 
Soul and Body from Plato to the Enlightenment, ed., Danijela Kambaskovic, 371-420 (Dordrecht: Springer, 2014). 
For problems with Cartesianism and the role of God, see Sheehan and Wahrman, Invisible Hands, chps. 1-2.  
Although their canvas is much broader than mine, our scopes are similar in that we want to unearth and explore an 
analytical framework shared by contemporaries of all religious, political, social, and economic types.  We both seek 
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The recognition of active properties within matter and the ebbing of the explanatory 
power of providence was part of a larger trend.  Jonathan Sheehan and Dror Wahrman have 
recently argued that the turn toward “self-organization”—the ability for inanimate matter to 
become animate or an aggregate system to be born from individual objects—became an ordering 
principle and directing force for late-seventeenth- and eighteenth-century thought.  Sheehan and 
Wahrman define the “language of self-organization” as the “notion that even if God was no 
longer the active hands-on guarantor of order, complex systems, left to their own devices, still 
generated order immanently, without external direction, through self-organization.”24  They 
suggest that the turn-of-the-century application of the principle of self-organization to “human 
systems…required a concomitant investment in imagining individuals as if they were free 
agents, self-moving and unpredictable in their actions.”25  I find their argument quite suggestive, 
and, when applied to France, the potential for self-organization was reflected in visions of a 
society guided by commerce and no longer anchored by the system of corps and états.  The 
possibility of individuals as “self-moving agents” or “autonomous moral subjects” transcending 
their états drew attention, then, to the active properties of corporeal matter.26 
It was indeed the fear of “free agents” or the praiseworthy awareness of one’s own 
agency that led contemporaries to disapprove or approve the self-organizing capacity of 
individuals in society.  To either counter the effects of free agency or extend their role in social 
                                                          
a pervasive undercurrent that gave shape to seemingly disparate thought.  We argue that “the corporeal” or “self-
organization,” respectively, could solve a multitude of contemporary problems, while being promulgated in vastly 
different ways. 
 
24Sheehan and Wahrman, Invisible Hands, 9, xi too. 
 
25Ibid., 76. 
 
26The two quotes are from Ibid., 77. 
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interaction, contemporaries turned toward the third development that announced the primacy of 
the corporeal: the flexible language of sensibility and sensationalism.  Sensationalism was an 
empirical-linguistic philosophy, a physiological theory, and a set of moral values.  A “sensible” 
body was one that absorbed or “felt” external sensory data and reacted by exhibiting sympathy 
and empathy.  The ability to empathize and sympathize not only characterized accepted behavior 
but also came to ground social interaction.  As material bodies came increasingly into contact 
with other bodies in new socio-economic spaces, contemporaries became attuned to and fearful 
of the physiological ramifications of commerce, luxury, and sociability.27  Bolstered by the 
principles of natural philosophy and the dual language of commerce and sensibility, corporeal 
actions could be measured and predicted.  Fanciful flights of the imagination and overwrought 
senses were just two foreseeable ways that defects in the human body could arise from socio-
economic activity outside of the corporate social order.  The language of the senses and the new 
attention toward the corporeal would bring order to the anticipated chaos of autonomous bodies 
in physical spaces. 
Alongside philosophical arguments over the corporeal and new socio-cultural behaviors, 
my argument uses the extensive metaphors that color eighteenth-century texts, but it does not 
focus on them.  Instead, I hope to show that eighteenth-century writers framed their 
understandings of society— new forms of social interaction pre-existing “the political”—through 
the physical body itself.  Metaphors are important linguistic and rhetorical devices to transform 
one’s ideas into more comprehensible formats.  Metaphors also, as Lorraine Daston has argued, 
                                                          
27In an analysis of André Morellet and abbé Pluquet, Henry C. Clark correctly challenged the notion that salon 
culture most recognizably advanced the “public sphere” of the eighteenth century and shifted attention to commerce.  
Clark, “Commerce, Sociability, and the Public Sphere: Morellet vs. Pluquet on Luxury,” Eighteenth-Century Life 
22.2 (May 1998): 83-103.   
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“demand a chasm to bridge...It is because we are persuaded that such a chasm yawns between 
the natural and the human that we so often dignify (or revile) the concourse between the 
biological and social sciences as ‘metaphorical’.”28  Linguistic choices, then, reflect more than 
just rhetorical tools or unconscious idiomatic usage; they are tracers, markers, or signposts of 
cultural shifts and assumptions.29  The fact that metaphors of the body pervaded eighteenth-
century texts proves to us that the body became a crucial tool used to link the world of physics, 
medicine, and natural laws to the world of society, politics, and economic structures.  Terms 
such as organisation, constitution, circulation, sensible/sensibilité, and monstreux alert us to a 
particular frame of mind consistently mixing the “natural” and the social or political.   
The eponymous terms used for the title of this dissertation also represent a commitment 
by diverse eighteenth-century writers to enunciate the corporeal foundations of social interaction.  
Contemporaries made repeated use of the words “dazzled,” “blinded,” and “numb,” which united 
the new sensationalist language of the senses with the perceived deleterious physiological effects 
of material culture.  To be “dazzled” and “blinded” was to be transfixed by both the material 
glitter of luxury and “populuxe” goods and the elevated social capital gained by ownership.  To 
become “numb” to both moral and physical sensibility was a physiological process of 
habituation.  The Physiocrats and opponents of luxury promulgated a “corporeal critique of 
luxury” alongside the ideas of their contemporaries that humans must “feel” sociability and 
                                                          
28Lorraine Daston, “How Nature Became the Other: Anthropomorphism and Anthropocentrism in Early Modern 
Natural Philosophy,” in Biology as Society, Society as Biology: Metaphors, eds. Sabine Maasen, Everett 
Mendelsohn, and Peter Weingart, 37-56 (Dordrecht, Boston, London: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1995), 37. 
 
29For a succinct case for “historical semantics,” see Jean Starobinski, Action and Reaction: The Life and Adventures 
of a Couple, trans. Sophie Hawkes with Jeff Fort (New York: Zone Books, 2003; orig. pub. Editions de Seuil, 1999), 
13-19.  I follow too Susan Reynolds in her discussion of the words surrounding the term “feudalism”: “But it may be 
more rewarding not to attempt definitions until after one has looked at usage and thought hard about what is being 
discussed (the phenomena) and about what may be implied about the notions of the time.”  Reynolds, Fiefs and 
Vassals: The Medieval Evidence Reinterpreted (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994), 13.   
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sentiment to ensure social fluidity.  Both feared that if individual French corps developed habits 
that dulled their senses—either through social isolation, a rigid corporate system, or the 
excessive pursuit of luxury—then French society would become weak, lifeless, and unnatural. 
In essence, I reinforce a traditional understanding of the Enlightenment as defined by the 
application of physical laws to human behavior; but, in many texts and documents something 
more complex than analogy was happening.30   Bodies were not simply like physical objects in 
motion; they were physical objects whose physiology embodied a set of socio-moral principles.  
For example, in his 1788 work De la morale naturelle, Jacques-Henri Meister argued that the 
laws of government and religious institutions were built upon necessary and anterior 
connections.  Meister described the sentiments bolstering society in the following way: “Upon 
self-reflection, I perceived that that which determined all my actions are either purely physical 
and nearly involuntary impressions or an initial feeling which is hardly less, or the memory of a 
series of reflections to which experience and habit have given fervor.”31  For Meister, the 
physical body served as a conduit for social interaction.  Or, to put it another way, the physical 
body was a sieve through which the necessary and important forms of behavior were sifted.  
Physical impressions from material stimuli could either blunt or heighten that premier sentiment 
so crucial to social interaction.  In addition, the cognitive faculties of habit and memory, 
                                                          
30For example, see John Marks, Science and the Making of the Modern World (London: Heineman, 1983), 105-6: 
“The universal laws of motion and gravitation set out by Newton in his Principia had an enormous impact on 18th-
century thought...Instead of being mysterious, nature was now seen as an orderly and predictable system which 
could be known and understood.  And such knowledge could provide the basis for prediction and for control...Men 
like Voltaire, Diderot, and Condorcet enthusiastically devoted themselves to spreading new ideas and knowledge.  
And they went on to try to apply the scientific approach to the study of society.  As Condorcet put it ‘What we can 
do for bees and beavers, we ought to do for man’.” Or, equally illustrative are the words of abbé Galiani: “the laws 
of commerce correspond with no less exactness to the laws of gravity and the laws of fluids.  The desire for gain, or 
the desire to live happily, is to man what gravity is to physics.”  Quoted in Clark, Compass of Society, 179.  The 
latter idea can be found also in Baron d’Holbach’s Système de la nature (1770).   
 
31Jacques-Henri Meister, De la morale naturelle suivie Du Bonheur des Sots (Breinigsville, PA: Kessinger Legacy 
Reprints, 2011), 10. 
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corporeally imprinted, often determined actions; sensations of too strong or too long a duration 
could form incurable habits detrimental to the fluidity of social commerce.  To learn about the 
body was both powerful and indispensable.  P.-L. Roederer and J.-L. Alibert discovered this, as 
did Meister: the most basic definition of morality “is knowledge of the means which can assure 
us enough of an empire over our faculties, in order to make the best usage possible of them; it is 
the science of the habits proper to perfect our being, to conduct us to the state of the most 
constant happiness.”32 
The cultural changes rooted in the late-seventeenth century reached their climax by the 
mid-eighteenth century and produced robust documentation of the human body in a changing 
world.  Society was the “world of all human interaction.”33  It could be independent of the legal 
and moral imperatives of both church and crown, but it nevertheless required an organizing 
principle.  My dissertation will show that fears of luxury, open commerce, and the destabilizing 
effects of a faltering corporate order were all channeled through the body.    
*** 
My analysis begins at mid-century when the pace of commercial life intensified and 
when it became clear to authors that commerce and luxury would dictate the future direction of 
France.  It will end with the French Revolution, though the themes on which I focus persisted.  
Political economists, moralists, clerics, philosophers, social reformers, and guild masters all 
identified the corporeal as the primary place where socio-economic changes manifested.  I argue 
that individuals with different perspectives and different intentions nevertheless agreed that it 
was through the physical body that the positive and negative consequences of change could be 
                                                          
32Meister, De la morale naturelle, 19. 
 
33Edelstein, The Enlightenment, 32.    
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located.  I have attempted to avoid simply teasing out every use of the term corps or organisation 
or sentiment as the substantive evidential base for my argument.  Language is not the only 
constituent of life, and visions of society are not solely constructed from metaphors and 
representations.  The choice of terms by eighteenth-century authors is nonetheless indicative of a 
cognitive shift.  By the middle of the eighteenth century, growing material and social changes 
related to commerce and the instability of the corporate order overlapped with a new theoretical 
understanding of the human body.  Sensationalism provided contemporaries with the tools to 
digest socio-economic changes and articulate responses.  I do not, therefore, identify a specific 
chronological turning point, nor will the following chapters necessarily build from each other as 
chronological cause and effect.  Instead, I will present a problématique novel to the eighteenth 
century—the increase in social and commercial life—and the solution: the corporeal must be 
used to measure the consequences of both.   
To clarify this point, I rely on the concept of the “social imagination.”  My argument 
analyzes a cognitive shift that took place in the second half of the eighteenth century, and the 
social imagination helps to frame this widespread change.  Succinctly stated, the social 
imagination comprises "the cultural elements from which [individuals] construct [their] 
understanding of the social world."34  The social imagination refers to the shared set of 
assumptions that undergird the social order, provide meaning to the interactions of citizens or 
subjects, and are represented in social and political institutions.  The eighteenth century saw a 
decisive shift away from the merely metaphorical use of corporeal imagery toward sweeping and 
                                                          
34Sarah Maza, The Myth of the French Bourgeoisie: An Essay on the Social Imaginary, 1750-1850 (Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard University Press, 2003), 10.  See also, Taylor, Modern Social Imaginaries; Eileen Hunt Botting, 
“Mary Wollstonecraft’s Enlightened Legacy: The ‘Modern Social Imaginary’ of the Egalitarian Family,” American 
Behavioral Scientist, vol. 49, n. 5 (January 2006): 687-701, here 687; Samuel Moyn, “Imagining Intellectual 
History,” in Rethinking Modern European Intellectual History, eds. Darrin M. McMahon and Samuel Moyn, 112-
130 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014); Bronislaw Baczko, Les Imaginaires sociaux (Paris: Payot, 1984).  
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systematic attempts to reconceptualize the social frameworks of human interaction through 
knowledge of the physical body and its sensory network.  The body became the key source of the 
social imaginary, even as it provided the language with which to describe society.   
For historians, the concept of the social imagination improves upon the notion—
employed consciously or not—that certain ideas were “in the air.”  To find a principle that 
unifies a past society, even in discordant ways, can easily lead historians to retrospectively apply 
modern concepts rather than allowing the sources to generate a conceptual framework.  The 
totalizing project of constructing the social imagination of the eighteenth century is 
overwhelming for a single scholar.  It is still a crucial, and hopefully fruitful, task because it 
“anchor[s] representations in practice.”35  To accurately depict the social imagination, historians 
must not simply place a set of philosophical texts in dialogue with each other, for example, or 
analyze solely the efforts of journeymen to undermine the corporate order through subversive 
labor practices.  Instead, the traditional approaches of social and intellectual history must 
communicate and work in tandem.  It is important to understand not only how individuals in a 
given era lived, but also how they interpreted their own behavior and interaction.  “The essential 
purpose of the category [social imagination],” according to Samuel Moyn, “is that 
representations help constitute the social order, to the point that there is no choosing between the 
study of one and the other.”36  To this end, I have culled from a variety of primary sources and 
attempted to comprehensively depict the socio-economic changes that occurred during the 
eighteenth century.   
                                                          
35Moyn, “Imagining Intellectual History,” 114. 
 
36Ibid., 117.  Daniel Wickberg’s observation is equally thoughtful: “What distinguishes the ontological status of a 
railroad timetable from that of a novel?  One is not a social history document, and the other an intellectual history 
document.  Both texts record or constitute a pattern of mental organization; neither gives us an unmediated set of 
facts about the objects to which they refer.”  Wickberg, “Intellectual History vs. the Social History of Intellectuals,” 
Rethinking History, 5:3 (2001): 391. 
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The two Parts that follow move from a deep analysis of context to thorough readings of 
diverse sources.  Part I demonstrates the multiple ways that contemporaries used physiology and 
the language of the senses to either construct new images of society or to prop up the social 
order.  Chapter one focuses on the structure of the corporate social order, the expectations of 
French subjects in their different états, and the metaphorical language of the body politic used to 
represent social and political relationships.  Corporeal language was embedded in the traditional 
social order, but it changed with revisions in medical knowledge.  Chapter two reveals two 
critical themes: the invention of “society” as a plane of human interaction prior to political and 
religious strictures and the growth of sensationalism.  The latter provided contemporaries with a 
new theory of the human body that linked physical sensibility to moral sensibility.  Individuals 
experienced social change physically, which affected their interaction with others, and the 
French began to conceive sympathy, empathy, and sociability as embodied categories.  Chapter 
three explores the application of sensationalist principles to social intercourse in the works of 
three, disparate French writers: Dominque-Joseph Garat, Jacques-Henri Meister, and Abbé 
Pluquet.  Chapter four broadens out from the texts of intellectuals to public health debates and 
the crisis of Turgot’s 1776 abolition of the guilds.  The “Remonstrance” by the Parlement of 
Paris against Turgot’s “Six Edicts” and a number of petitions written by guild masters reveal 
updated corporeal foundations of the corporate order, as supporters of the traditional social order 
justified their positions by appealing to the language of the senses. 
Part II shifts from an analysis of society itself to an analysis of changes brought on by 
commerce and luxury—both real and perceived.  Chapter five examines the growth of the French 
economy, particularly the social implications of the consumer revolution.  In new social and 
economic spaces, more bodies interacted with each other and material goods.  Critics of luxury 
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and of the porousness of the system of états approached these changes through the perceived 
degenerative effects on the human body.  Chapters six and seven make up the densest parts of 
this dissertation, as I treat the “corporeal critique of luxury” and the political economy of the 
Physiocrats.  Opponents argued that the pursuit of luxury and populuxe goods effeminized men, 
corrupted the practice of représentation, in which material symbols served to represent social 
état, and habituated the body to sensible decay.  Critics of luxury drew deeply from 
sensationalist physiology to argue for the dependence of both moral character and social stability 
on the health of the physical body.  The Physiocrats approached the problem of luxury and 
commerce similarly, but they did so within the context of a grandiose political economy.  
François Quesnay, the marquis de Mirabeau, and their acolytes built Physiocracy from an 
understanding of the corporeal that linked socio-economic processes to epistemology.  
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PART I 
Embodying Society:  
From Social Structure to Social Bodies 
The purpose of Part I is to layer contexts and analyses of primary sources to instantiate 
the centrality of the body in the eighteenth-century French social imagination.  In order to clearly 
demonstrate the conjoining of new ideas about the body to the creation of “society,” as the 
conceptual framework to analyze human interaction, it is imperative to begin chapter one with 
the theoretical and corporeal underpinnings of the traditional, corporate social structure.  I will 
move in chapter two to the invention of society as a response to the growing instability of the 
social order, then overlay an analysis of sensationalist physiology and the language of the senses.  
A new medical understanding of the body and the feared physiological consequences of social 
change provided social critics with a way to examine social interaction and pronounce moral 
judgments.  Chapters three and four will delve into different sets of primary sources that put 
forward corporeal principles to ground the social order: philosophical treatises; guild petitions to 
the Parlement of Paris (1776); and, debates over public health issues found in the burgeoning 
press. 
In chapter one, I will present the traditional image of the French social structure 
alongside the principles that supported it (e.g. honor, rank, état).  The purpose of this is to 
indicate how comprehensively the social structure was expected to anchor the identities of 
subjects and thus how fundamental the challenges to the traditional organization of society were.  
The body was crucial to the structuring principles of corporate society prior to and during the 
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eighteenth century.  The French social structure incorporated the bodies of Third Estate laborers 
as ontologically inferior and therefore necessarily destined for physical labor.  Yet, the body was 
also embedded linguistically in terms such as “corporation” and “constitution,” concepts such as 
the king’s “two bodies,” and the multitude of body-politic metaphors that reiterated or criticized 
the social structure.  The constant appeal to body-politic metaphors indicates the connection 
between socio-political structures and the human body, which changed over time in response to 
changing medical theories.  Once the principles of sensationalist physiology became widespread, 
however, metaphors were no longer powerful enough to prove the deep connections between 
individual bodies interacting in society.   
The body politic metaphor was one vital ingredient to the traditional socio-political 
hierarchy.  Supporters and opponents of traditional society built from and expanded the tradition 
of using the human body as a model for political relationships, social structures, and economic 
theories; however, as I argue in chapter two, contemporaries imagined “society” as an 
autonomous space of human interaction freed from the stratified social structure, and metaphors 
were simply not stable enough to ground and ensure social cohesion.  Writers thus moved 
beyond metaphors and envisioned the body as a physical substance capable of pulling 
individuals together to form an organized society (whether in support of or as a challenge to the 
corporate order).  The shift from using metaphors of the body politic to an understanding of the 
human body itself as an organizing principle reflected changes in both cultural understandings of 
the body and new medical theories.  In chapter three, I examine the works of three discrete 
writers to demonstrate the principles developed in chapter two (Abbé Pluquet, Dominique-
Joseph Garat, and Jacques-Henri Meister). These writers appropriated the language of the senses 
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and conceptions of the body as inherently sensual and sympathetic to redefine or reaffirm the 
bonds that unite individuals.   
As I show in chapter four, the eighteenth-century social imagination associated social 
reform, or even a new society, with corporeal principles.  Whether in treatises on the morality of 
nature or debates on urban renewal, the social imagination was channeled through the entire 
human body rather than simply its rational faculty.  The 1776 guild petitions and debates over 
public health reveal a concern for the body politic that transcended metaphor by embodying 
French subjects.  The guild petitions particularly reinforced the established understanding of état 
via new medical theories.   
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Chapter One 
The Structure of Society and the Body Politic 
The Social Structure of Early-Modern France 
 Early-modern French society was characterized by a three-tiered, social hierarchy.  The 
structure of French society—three estates (ordres, états), guilds, corporations (corps), and 
privileges—circumscribed the lives of individuals and solidified hierarchical relationships from 
the celestial to the mundane and a multitude of layers in between.  Power and privilege were 
classified and ordered, and the social organization was a taxonomy of distinction and rank.37  
The expectations of individuals and their contribution to the state were determined by birth and 
social position.   
 France was organized into three estates: clergy, nobility, and the remainder of the 
populace (Third Estate).  The First and Second Estates represented a minority of the French 
population but enjoyed the majority of tax exemptions, privileges, and social reverence.  The 
nobility was not a static group consisting solely of centuries-old families; many members of the 
Second Estate purchased nobility through judicial or financial posts and, by the eighteenth 
century, wielded enormous economic power.  The honor and rank of the centuries-old nobility 
nevertheless stemmed from their ancient legacy as warriors, advisors to the king, and their purity 
                                                          
37Steven Laurence Kaplan, “Social Classification and Representation in the Corporate World of Eighteenth-Century 
France: Turgot’s ‘Carnival’,” in Work in France: Representations, Meaning, Organization, and Practice, eds. 
Steven Laurence Kaplan and Cynthia Koepp, 176-228 (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1986). The question 
whether this idealized conception matched reality is integral to early-modern French scholarship.  For a succinct 
summary of the historical debates about and attributions of a society of orders (e.g. honor, symbolic actions, 
incorporation), see Gail Bossenga, “Estates, Orders, and Corps,” in The Oxford Handbook of the Ancien Régime, ed. 
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of blood, perpetuating an ethos of natural superiority and moral rectitude.  The Third Estate 
possessed its own internal, though only customary, hierarchy, as doctors, lawyers, men of letters, 
and wealthy merchants expected respect and deferential treatment from manual laborers.  
Within the Third Estate, there existed two urban groups, both legally-defined categories: 
trade corporations and the bourgeoisie.  The latter were most generally known as town-dwellers 
who enjoyed some privileges and rights for owning property and paying taxes in a town.  The 
bourgeoisie was an expansive group, which led to the ambiguity of the term during the 
eighteenth century; it excluded as many individuals as it included.38  More important were the 
guilds (jurandes) and trade corporations that employed the bulk of the French urban body politic.  
A corporation could be any number of legally-defined institutions, consisting of mixed-état 
membership: universities, parlements, professional groups, town councils, or the 120 recognized 
trade corporations.  The trade corporations detailed and monitored the lives of their members 
(nearly two-thirds of the adult male population in Paris) and were essentially a hierarchical 
community government within the Third Estate.39   
French society through the eighteenth century, then, consisted of privileged groups rather 
than autonomous individuals.  The conventional explanation and justification for such a 
hierarchy came from nature and religion.  In order to achieve social harmony, the natural, but 
disruptive and sinful, passions of individuals required a chain of command beginning with the 
                                                          
38David Garrioch, The Making of Revolutionary Paris (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002), 103-108. 
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39Some members of the Six Corps—drapers, grocer-apothecaries, furriers, silk merchants, goldsmiths, and 
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sovereign and guaranteed by god.  As the Parlement of Paris wrote in 1776, mixing metaphors of 
the unbreakable chain and the micro/macrocosm: 
The justification for corporations has been sought in their [historical] origins, when it 
ought to have been sought in nature.  From the greatest [corps], which are empires, to the 
least, which are families, men have always united to protect themselves, always 
commanded or been supervised by parents, responding to general calm with internal 
calm.  It is a chain, all the links of which are joined to the first, the authority of the 
Throne, which it is dangerous to break.40 
 
The structure of society guaranteed by a natural, unbreakable chain of dependence was 
reinforced by a set of cultural meanings embedded in the social vocabulary.  Defining one’s état, 
meeting the expectations of one’s ordre, or performing one’s appropriate organological function 
in the body politic bridged the theoretical and practical act of living in a society in which one’s 
body and mind were fixed.41  The term état encapsulated both legal and abstract definitions of 
life in early-modern France.  Structurally, état equated to “estate” or “order,” and, in the 
overlapping categories within the three Estates, one’s état consisted of a number of other legal 
categories (e.g. married, journeyman, bourgeois).  Included in the multiple meanings of état was 
a cultural understanding of rank, esteem, or “condition of being.”  One’s état was defined by the 
social order, certainly, but one was also expected to live out one’s état in a “culture of 
appearances.”42  To be a member of the bourgeoisie and wear the crested escutcheon, for 
                                                          
40“Remontrances sur l’édit supprimant les jurandes... (2-4 March 1776),” in Jules Flammermont, ed., Remonstrances 
du Parlement de Paris au XVIIIe Siècle, vol. 3, 293-324 (Paris: Imprimerie Nationale, 1898), 309.   
  
41For the ancien régime’s “social vocabulary,” see William H. Sewell, Jr., “Etat, Corps, and Ordre: Some Notes on 
the Social Vocabulary of the French Old Regime,” in Sozialgeschichte Heute: Festschrift für Hans Rosenberg zum 
70 Geburtstag, ed. Hans-Ulrich Wehler, 49-68 (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck and Ruprecht, 1974), and Work and 
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Taste for Comfort and Status: A Bourgeois Family in Eighteenth-Century France (University Park, PA: 
Pennsylvania State University Press, 2000). 
 
42“Culture of appearances” comes from Daniel Roche, France in the Enlightenment, trans. Arthur Goldhammer 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1998, orig. pub. 1993), 548-9, 666.  
28 
 
example, was a privilege, a mark of distinction.  The état of a member of the Second Estate 
consisted of dignity, proper social behavior and leisure activities, and a certain amount of éclat in 
one’s appearance and possessions to signify one’s rank.  
Bodies of individuals were not just scaffolding upon which to hang the appropriate 
adornments, however; what one did with one’s body was equally important to état.  In fact, the 
ordre of French society, a frequently used term connoting arrangement or hierarchy of groups 
and corresponding legal privileges, demanded that some use their bodies for labor and some not.  
The état of a nobleman forbade his participation in physical labor, and the state legally forbade 
his participation in commerce (the result of which would theoretically be dérogeance, or 
deprivation of nobility).   
Labor was reserved for members of the Third Estate; it was menial, mundane, base, and 
undignified.43  According to Charles Loyseau, whose Traité des ordres et simples dignitez 
(1610) was the most authoritative and comprehensive text on the organization of French society, 
those trades that “resided more in bodily strength than in the practice of commerce or in mental 
subtlety...are the most vile...[And,] those engaged neither in manufacture nor commerce, and 
who gain their living only by the labor of their arms, whom we call gens de bras, or mercenaries, 
such as porters, masons’ laborers, carters, and other day laborers, are the most vile of the 
common people.”44  Moreover, the bodies of laborers imbibed the particular smells of their 
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44Loyseau, Traité des ordres et simples dignitez, quoted in Laura Mason and Tracy Rizzo, eds., The French 
Revolution: A Document Collection (Boston and New York: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1999), 23.  Echoing 
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trades and transported this identifying mark throughout the city.  In his “Mémoire sur les odeurs 
que nous exhalons” (1789) for the Société Royale de Médecine, Dr. Jean-Joseph de Brieude 
asked, “Who could not tell a cesspool clearer, tanner, candlemaker, butcher, etc. solely by the 
sense of smell?...A certain quantity of those volatile particles which penetrate the workers is 
expelled from their bodies almost intact, along with their humor, with which they probably partly 
combine.”45  The body was an ordering principle for French society; laborious activity was a 
visual cue for social rank and disparate smells were olfactory markers. 
There was no honor in working with one’s hands and no dignity in the corporeal moniker 
gens de bras.  Within the Third Estate, working with one’s mind in the liberal arts was superior 
to that of the mechanical arts, a division captured in totalizing body-politic metaphors with the 
king as the head and mind.  “Taxes, industry, and les travaux corporels,” according to the 
Parlement of Paris’ “Remonstrance” of 1776, were the fate of the majority of the French.46  The 
body, therefore, was a tool of labor or a container and transmitter of the Second Estate’s 
sanguinary lineage; it was at the center of French society, and the uses to which it was put 
depended on one’s ordre and the proper expression of one’s état.47 
                                                          
in their soul...those of the third estate always have weak constitutions...and never elevate their thoughts [above] 
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45Quoted in Alain Corbin, The Foul and the Fragrant: Odour and the Social Imagination, trans. Miriam Kochan 
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The royal incorporation of a trade, the membership of an artisan in a trade corporation, 
and the ordination of a clergyman fixed the états of all three.  In the social vocabulary of the 
period, état and ordre implied permanence and stability in the daily lives of individuals and in 
the entire social structure.  The order of the state demanded inequality and subordination, and, 
according to the prolific Jesuit writer Père Claude Buffier, even though the pursuit of happiness 
made all humans equal, their specific “conditions” and état channeled their activities toward the 
harmony of the greater whole:  
Indeed, without the degrees of subordination that are found in mankind, each would want 
to take for his own that which he believed would contribute to his own happiness, not 
being disposed to cede anything to others.  And, all being independent, each would refuse 
the mutual aid that comes from the different états. The Prince is served by his subjects, 
and his subjects are defended by the Prince; such is their mutual connection.  One 
contributes in his own manner to the common happiness and others in a different manner.  
They must contribute to the happiness of society, in their own way according to the 
institution of États, to which they have an equal right being of the same nature.48 
 
Although Buffier praised happiness and sociability, a subject explored in chapter two, he 
nevertheless reinforced the necessity of conforming to one’s état.  The organization of society 
and expectations of French subjects conveyed by the terms état and ordre were invested with 
even more authority through the innumerable images of the body politic.  Body-politic 
metaphors were just as crucial to early-modern understandings of society—linking nature, 
politics, and religion to legally-defined roles—as the division of physical labor contained in the 
language of états. 
The Human Body and the Body Politic 
 Using the human body as a grid on which to map social orders, political arrangements, 
economics, and urban geography extends at least as far back as ancient Greece.  Images of the 
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state as a political organism can be found in Aristotle’s Politics and Nicomachean Ethics, 
particularly his view of the natural connectivity between humans, the polis, and slavery.  In The 
Republic, Plato divided the state in a manner corresponding to metaphysical and medical 
conceptions of the human body; through the voice of Socrates, he offered up the tri-partite 
division of the human body—rational, irascible, and appetitive “souls”—as an analogy for the 
state.  The “souls” of the state, or classes, needed to function harmoniously in order to achieve 
stability and justice.49  Italian Renaissance theorists extended the Classical glorification of the 
human body by applying corporeal ratios and proportions to architectural constructions.50   
In early-modern France, Classical body-politic metaphors persisted, but to that tradition 
was added medieval conceptions of the corps mystique (or corpus mysticum: “mystical union of 
all Christians in Christ”) and the king’s “two bodies” (one “natural,” one “divine” and 
“immortal”).51  The famed “touch” of the king supposedly cured scrofula, uniting the healing 
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powers of the king’s physical body to the metaphorical, eternal regeneration of the monarchy 
(“The King is dead; long live the king!”). Metaphors of the body politic, or in some cases the 
“social body,” proliferated during the eighteenth century, and the human body served as “the 
ultimate visual compendium, the comprehensive method of methods, the organizing structure of 
structures.  As a visible natural whole made up of invisible dissimilar parts, it was the organic 
paradigm or architectonic standard for all complex unions.”52 
 Jean-Jacques Rousseau provided a representative description of the body politic worth 
quoting at length:  
The body politic, taken individually, can be considered to be like a body that is 
organized, living and similar to that of a man.  The sovereign power represents the head; 
the laws and customs are the brain, source of the nerves and seat of the understanding, the 
will and the senses of which the judges and magistrates are the organs; the commerce, 
industry and agriculture are the mouth and stomach which prepare the common 
subsistence; the public finances are the blood that is discharged by a wise economy, 
performing the functions of the heart, in order to distribute nourishment and life 
throughout the body; the citizens are the body and members that make the machine move, 
live and work, and that cannot be harmed in any part without a painful impression 
immediately being transmitted to the brain, if the animal is in a state of good health.53 
 
Rousseau’s comprehensive image of the body politic covers the gamut of socio-political 
functions and corporeal features.  His illustration, though, contains elements specific to the 
eighteenth century, much like other depictions of the body politic preceding his era.  As Otto 
Mayr pointed out, metaphors differ from concepts and ideas because they are not the “subjects of 
the discourse but only auxiliary devices adduced for emphasis and illustration.”54  In early-
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modern France, metaphors served as vehicles to transmit assorted political messages; however, 
metaphors were more than literary conventions.  Even though the trope of the “body politic” 
could take uninspired forms or reflect an unconscious reliance on Greco-Roman devices, 
metaphors consistently reinforced the significance of the human body to the social imagination.  
Rousseau often expressed his conception of the general will through metaphors of the body 
politic, for example, but his subversive efforts updated the metaphor and adapted contemporary 
medical knowledge to changing political scenarios.   
*** 
Prior to the eighteenth century, the French Wars of Religion (1562-1598) and the 
subsequent foundation of the absolutist state gave rise to unique applications of anatomical and 
medical theories to the body politic.  Metaphors of the body politic could be marshaled either to 
advance politics as a distinct science, and thus “naturalize” politics, or for purely rhetorical and 
polemical purposes.  Whatever the authors’ intentions, corporeal metaphors gained intensity and 
relevance throughout the late-sixteenth and early-seventeenth centuries.  Civil war had disrupted 
the balance and harmony of the organs that only a political doctor could assuage.  And, before 
the images of nature as a grand machine became widespread in the seventeenth century, the link 
between the body politic and the natural, human body transcended heuristic value to achieve an 
ontological one; metaphors could reflect more than analogy, expressing a material relationship 
between parts.55  The increased availability of anatomical knowledge from the early-fourteenth 
century, which culminated in Andreas Vesalius’ De humani corpora fabrica (1543), provided an 
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“ever clearer vision of the inner architecture of the body and its organs.”56  This extensive new 
detail allowed political and religious commentators to assume the ontology of the body politic 
and pursue more specific, clinical descriptions of the state’s condition.57 
The Wars of Religion elicited a visceral reaction from Protestants and Catholics, and the 
animosity between the two manifested in violent encounters to cleanse the body politic of 
pollutants, infections, and gangrenous members.58  To Catholics, Protestants were not only 
heretics, they were also a plague, an illness, a parasite, and a cancer, corrupting and rotting the 
corps mystique from the inside.  Contemporaries appealed to the Galenic and Hippocratic 
traditions of humors, seeking to balance the fluids of the body politic and return a diseased body 
back to health either through political resistance or surgical expurgation.  Authors also used the 
Classical perspective, updated by Machiavelli, that the state experienced the same organic cycles 
as humans: birth, growth, decay, and death.59  Civil war was perhaps necessary to stave off 
infection or sever a decaying limb before sepsis set in.60  Metaphors were further employed to 
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support either the continuation of warfare to excise recalcitrant organs or the cessation of 
violence to heal the social body.  The St. Bartholomew’s Day Massacre (1572) would be the 
most extreme example of purification through amputation.  The zealous preacher Simon Vigor 
inflamed Parisians’ passions and fears by commanding the king, as divinely-appointed 
sovereign, to “cast out the putrid infection of heresy” lest the entire Catholic social body face the 
sinful charge of harboring heretics.61 
Political theorists, theologians, priests, and even some physicians competed over the 
locus of political power: the head (king) or the body (parlements, nobility, and constitutions).62  
For the latter, the French “constitution” necessitated a mixed monarchy in which the “limbs” 
balanced out the will of the “head.”  Or, in the words of Jacques de Silly, the “human 
body...[has] two principal parts, the head, which represents to us the king, and the heart which is 
the noble part, which if one or other is injured, it is no longer possible for the man to live...[the 
nobles] defend and preserve him, and are always the first to assist him: as is commonly said, the 
good blood always flows to the injured part.”63  As the head becomes too engorged, it distorts 
humoral balance and siphons off life-giving fluids.  Some critics of the king went so far as to 
prescribe regicide to “bleed” the body politic and return to stasis.64   
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For supporters of the monarchy, especially royal doctors, the king was likened to a 
physician, possessing the singular ability to heal the body politic.65  The royal doctors and 
preceptors Rodolphe Le Maistre, Abraham-Nicolas de La Framboisière, and Jean Héroard all 
seamlessly transferred their knowledge of the human body to the state.  By applying their 
training in observation and medical history, they became advisers to French kings about the 
health of the royal family and the body politic.  Le Maistre “prescribed” history as a diagnostic 
method and cure to a disorderly body politic, and La Framboisière prescribed natural philosophy 
and medicine so that the king and ministers of state could learn “‘the Anatomy that shows the 
eye the admirable construction of the body’.”66  Héroard insisted that the king use “‘Empiricism 
of State’” and argued that the “‘body of a State...is composed in the same way [as the human 
body]: and maintains its integrity by an exact observation of the good and diverse laws, and falls 
just as quickly by ambition, avarice, and prodigality, or by some other similar cause, one sees 
their forces failing, and their vigor fading, and slipping away in decadence according to the 
weakness, or strength of the body’.”67  The desire of these doctors to empower the king with 
medical knowledge, rather than divine powers, reflected three features of the early-seventeenth 
century: the increasing knowledge of nature and the human body; the persistent belief in the 
natural relationship between animal bodies and political bodies; and the unique ability of the 
king to heal the wounded body politic.  After the Wars of Religion, peace and unity could be 
achieved through the unifying force and therapeutic touch of sovereign power.     
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 The political and confessional divisions that rent the organic unity of the French body 
politic were partially mended by investing the king with increased power.  The centralizing, 
supra-confessional tendencies of the monarchy that resulted in the absolutism of Louis XIV 
emerged out of the French Wars of Religion.  Even though the metaphor of the body politic 
could be used ontologically as much as heuristically, the analogy of the state as a political 
organism was no longer sufficient; instead, the state required an artificial assemblage of parts 
that resembled the human body but also improved upon it.  This could be found in theories of the 
social contract and the mechanical philosophy. 
Thomas Hobbes provided the most well-known version of the artificial body politic 
(social contract) headed by an absolute sovereign.  The engraved title page of his Leviathan 
(1651) illustrated precisely this understanding.  Brandishing a sword and scepter, the head of a 
monarch, with arms and a torso consisting of a collective “body” of individuals, stands over the 
countryside.  This image conveyed Hobbes’ “social physics,” a philosophy deeply embedded in 
the context of the English Civil War (1642-49).  For Hobbes, a sovereign is necessary for 
civilized society because humans are incorrigible and desirous of power; it is in their best interest 
to transfer their individual power to a sovereign to ensure protection from other individuals.  The 
subjects and structures that composed the body politic were symbiotic because any imbalance or 
disturbance would disrupt the entire body.  Hobbes proposed the following analogy in the first 
pages of Leviathan, returning the body-politic metaphor to its heuristic value: “For by Art is 
created that great LEVIATHAN called a COMMON-WEALTH, or STATE, which is but an 
Artificiall Man…in which, the Soveraignty is an Artificiall Soul, as giving life and motion to the 
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whole body.”68 Art enhanced nature, and the body politic incorporated the passions, physiology, 
and fundamental nature of humans.   
In the seventeenth and early-eighteenth centuries, body-politic metaphors merged with 
efforts in natural philosophy to describe the universe as a detailed conglomeration of matter in 
motion.  The French state came to be understood as a rational mechanism directed by a prime 
mover, or “sun” in the case of Louis XIV, and body-politic metaphors continued to emphasize 
the harmony of structure: mechanical, anatomical, or cosmic.  Metaphors of the clock, the watch, 
or Bernard de Fontenelle’s “backstage of the theatre” gained in popularity in the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries.69  Henri Duc de Rohan likened the Spanish state to a “huge machine 
composed of divers parts,” and La Framboisière envisioned a “doctor-architect” both healing and 
repairing the body politic.70  In Traité des Systèmes (1749), Abbé Étienne Bonnot de Condillac 
perpetuated the view of the machinery of state with the ruler at the helm:  
A people is an artificial body; it is up to the legislator...to maintain the harmony and the 
strength of its members.  He is the mechanic who must adjust the gauges, and put the 
machine back into working order as often as circumstances require...To lead the people, 
one must establish a discipline which maintains a perfect balance among all orders, and 
which thus makes each citizen identify his interest as the interest of society.  The citizens 
must...conform necessarily to the views of the general system.71  
                                                          
68Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, intro. C. B. MacPherson (New York: Penguin Books, 1981), 81. For a study of how 
physiological and psychological theories of the body were directed toward ideas of the polity in the Dutch Republic, 
see Harold J. Cook, “Body and Passions: Materialism and the Early Modern State,” Osiris, 2nd Series, vol. 17, 
Science and Civil Society (2002): 25-48, and his Matters of Exchange: Commerce, Medicine, and Science in the 
Dutch Golden Age (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2007). 
 
69In Conversations on the Plurality of Worlds (1686), Fontenelle compared the universe to an opera; observers are 
unable to see the intricate mechanisms that make a performance succeed (“First Night”).  Craig Koslofsky has 
recently noted the importance of light/dark contrast in theatrical performances to enhance the power of the ruler.  
Koslofsky, Evening’s Empire: A History of the Night in Early Modern Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2011), chp. 4.  
  
70Rohan quoted in Mayr, Authority, Liberty, and Automatic Machinery, 102-3, and La Framboisière quoted in Soll, 
“Healing the Body Politic,” 1275.  The “sovereign’s gaze” was both a metaphor for the king’s “panoptic” ability to 
govern his subjects and an expression of elite cultural codes necessitating the presence of the king to “see” one’s 
merit.  See Smith, The Culture of Merit, chps. 1-2. 
 
71Quoted in Julia V. Douthwaite, The Wild Girl, Natural Man, and the Monster: Dangerous Experiments in the Age 
of Enlightenment (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2002), 80.  For mechanical understandings of society and 
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Condillac spoke essentially of the need to discipline the bodies of subjects.72  Even if not 
the central focus of Condillac’s metaphor, the human body never failed to serve as a useful guide 
to theorists of politics and society.  Metaphors of the body politic as a grandiose machine or an 
enlarged anatomical structure were mixed through the eighteenth century.  We can, however, 
identify a transition.73  Corporeal language saw a general shift in the second quarter of the 
eighteenth century from the body as a machine, with anatomical pulleys, springs, and pipes, to 
the body as a composition of potentially-autonomous organs, functions, and characteristics that 
together formed an “organized,” living being.74  The principles of new medical theories—
sensibility, irritability, attraction—resided in each independent subject, limiting the accuracy of 
centralized, mechanical analogies in body-politic metaphors.  Bringing the body politic to life 
required the unity of already sentient creatures rather than the vivifying powers of a directing 
                                                          
the state, see Otto Mayr, Authority, Liberty, and Automatic Machinery; George A. Kelly, “Mortal Man, Immortal 
Society?”; M. Norton Wise, “Mediations: Enlightenment Balancing Acts, or the Technologies of Rationalism,” in 
World Changes: Thomas Kuhn and the Nature of Science, ed. Paul Horwich, 207-258 (Cambridge, MA: The MIT 
Press, 1993).  For an understanding of Louis XIV’s state as an “instrument of monarchical power [and] a model of 
its functioning,” see Jean-Marie Apostolidès, Le roi-machine: Spectacle et politique au temps de Louis XIV (Paris: 
Les Editions de Minuit, 1981), 125, and, for the number of ways that power was enacted upon bodies, see the essays 
in Sara E. Melzer and Kathryn Norberg, eds., From the Royal to the Republican Body: Incorporating the Political in 
Seventeenth- and Eighteenth-Century France (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998). 
 
72Approaching citizens/subjects/workers as cogs or automata and sovereigns as omniscient and omnipotent 
mechanics transcended national boundaries.  See Mayr, Authority, Liberty, and Automatic Machinery, and Simon 
Schaffer, “Enlightened Automata,” in The Sciences in Enlightened Europe, eds. William Clark, Jan Golinski, and 
Simon Schaffer, 126-167 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999). 
 
73As George A. Kelly observed, after Montesquieu’s Esprit des lois and the Montpellier vitalists’ attack on 
iatromechanism, politics was no longer “the engineering science of building the frictionless machine, [but] the art 
and practice of ministering to a body aging or disordered in some particular vital function.” Kelly, “Mortal Man, 
Immortal Society?” 21.  
74The narrative of the displacement of mechanism has a long history.  Here are four notable, recent works and one 
classic: Jonathan Sheehan and Dror Wahrman, Invisible Hands: Self-Organization and the Eighteenth Century 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2015), chps. 1-2; Stephen Gaukroger, The Collapse of Mechanism and the 
Rise of Sensibility (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010); Peter Hanns Reill, Vitalizing Nature in the 
Enlightenment (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005); Roselyne Rey, Naissance et Développement du 
vitalisme en France, de la deuxième moitié du 18e siècle à la fin du Premier Empire (Oxford: Voltaire Foundation, 
2000); Sergio Moravia, “From Homme Machine to Homme Sensible: Changing Eighteenth-Century Models of 
Man’s Image,” Journal of the History of Ideas, vol. 39, n. 1 (January-March, 1978): 45-60.  
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head.  The application of novel principles to the body politic represented an increased 
commitment to think about society through the body and “incorporated” challenges to the socio-
political structure. 
*** 
The social vocabulary of états, ordre, and corps combined images of the human body 
with the mechanistic structure of the mechanical philosophy.  Corporate society consisted of a 
number of smaller corps (“organs”) that operated with their own unique guiding principles, 
which, when examined in totality, formed a harmonious and unified corps.75  From the king to 
the gens de bras, each subject and corporate body had its place and function in the body politic, 
which corresponded to a physical “embodiment” of individuals and metaphorical “incorporation” 
of corps.  Members of the Third Estate were expected to use their physical bodies (embodiment) 
to nourish and maintain the entire corps (incorporation).76  The king served as the head, will, or 
soul of corporate society, as well as the point through which the mundane met the divine (the 
king’s “two bodies”).  By the eighteenth century, commentators articulated new metaphors that 
challenged corporate society, and the king’s physical body came under much scrutiny as it 
occupied a dual role in the body-politic metaphor that sustained monarchical rule.   
                                                          
75The term corps and a number of derivatives occupied a central position in the early-modern French lexicon.  The 
Encyclopédie provided entries for corps, corporation, corporeity, incorporation, corporal, and corpulence, all of 
which ranged in meaning but ultimately converged on the overlap of human bodies and the social structure of the 
body politic. 
 
76La Fontaine’s fable Les Membres et L’Estomac reinforced the social hierarchy in which the “limbs” labored in 
order to fill the “stomach,” which necessarily directed the entire body politic.  According to Loyseau, French society 
reflected the ordered arrangement of the heavens: “Since the people is a body with several heads, it is divided by 
orders, Estates, or particular occupations...But each one of these three orders is again subdivided into subordinate 
degrees, or subalternate orders, following the example of the celestial hierarchy.”  Loyseau, Traité des ordres et 
simples dignitez, in Mason and Rizzo, The French Revolution: A Document Collection, 17. Loyseau’s 
extraordinarily rigid stratification of ancien régime society was a reaction to political theorists like Philippe 
Duplessis-Mornay, who, during the Wars of Religion, empowered the people to elect and depose kings based on 
their timelessness as a singular corporate body (corps). 
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The legal fiction of the king’s “two bodies” carried rhetorical ambiguities for a living 
king.77  The health of the king’s physical body became an expression of the health of the body 
politic.  If the king behaved irrationally, then he neglected his duty as head or mind of the body 
politic; if the king did not properly tend to the welfare of his subjects, then he was not the caring 
paterfamilias that his subjects expected (and his supporters extolled); and, if the king was not 
virile and masculine, then he could be charged with weakness, effeminacy, or cuckoldry.  Thus, 
any mistreatment of the king’s body exposed the frailty of the metaphors of the king’s “two 
bodies” and body politic.  This is precisely what occurred in the eighteenth century. 
Louis XV’s libertinism and sexual promiscuity drew the ire of critics and excitement of 
caricaturists.  Addicted to pleasures of the flesh, Louis XV was portrayed as a prisoner of desire, 
and, through his debauched body, the French state was both debilitated and effeminized.  To 
critics, Louis XV’s reign exhibited idleness, a lack of ambition, and an unseemly affection for 
women (even three sisters), which reached an apex with the arrival of his most famous mistress, 
Madame de Pompadour.  The power she wielded through her network of clients—financial, 
political, and supposedly sexual—cinched the argument that the king-cum-body politic was 
lethargic, spent, and governed by uncontrollable passions.78  Pornographic libels about Madame 
                                                          
77For the long-term “desacralization” of the king, see Jeffrey Merrick, The Desacralization of the French Monarchy 
in the Eighteenth Century (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1990), and Dale K. Van Kley, The 
Religious Origins of the French Revolution: From Calvin to the Civil Constitution, 1560-1791 (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1996). 
 
78Thomas E. Kaiser, “Louis le Bien-Aimé and the Rhetoric of the Royal Body,” in From the Royal to the Republican 
Body, eds. Melzer and Norberg, 131-161. For a look at the influence of Madame de Pompadour and Marie 
Antoinette and the politically-explosive inversion of gender roles at the royal court, see the essays by Thomas E. 
Kaiser (“From Fiscal Crisis to Revolution: The Court and French Foreign Policy, 1787-1789”) and Jeffrey Merrick 
(“Gender in Pre-Revolutionary Political Culture”) in From Deficit to Deluge: The Origins of the French Revolution, 
eds. Thomas E. Kaiser and Dale K. Van Kley (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2011).  Robert Darnton 
published a translated excerpt from a particularly scandalous libelle about another of Louis XV’s mistresses, 
Madame du Barry (Anecdotes sur Mme la comtesse du Barry, 1775): The Forbidden Best-Sellers of Pre-
Revolutionary France (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1996), 337-390. 
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de Pompadour’s voracious sexual and political appetite abounded, and rumors spread that Louis 
XV was a blood-craving King Herod abducting children to cure leprosy, a form of divine 
punishment for concupiscence.79  Louis XV’s confidant and adviser, the maréchal de Noailles, 
feared the “enervation, indolence, and numbness” of the head of the body politic.80  As Louis 
XV had his vital forces drained, so too did the body politic, leading at mid-century to a series of 
debates regarding the extent of royal power and the possibility of bisecting the king’s “two 
bodies.” 
While Louis XV was unable to curb his desires, Louis XVI had the opposite problem: he 
was supposedly unable or unwilling to consummate his marriage to Marie Antoinette for eight 
years.81  Images of an emasculated king cuckolded by his Austrian queen flourished in the two 
decades before the Revolution.  Once again, the fear that female excesses governed France 
transformed the rational, protective father/king into a politically- and sexually-impotent 
simpleton incapable of fulfilling either his wife or his kingdom.  In conjunction with the sacred 
half of the king’s two bodies, the mortal body was expected to be virile, fertile, and physically 
active.  The necessity of giving France a dauphin haunted the king and queen’s sexual life, and 
the health of the body politic took a turn for the worse when scurrilous libels, bawdy drinking 
songs, sexually-explicit images, and even diplomatic correspondence promoted the image of an 
unsatisfied wife finding comfort in the arms and bed of other members of the royal family.  A 
                                                          
79Arlette Farge and Jeffrey Ravel, The Vanishing Children of Paris: Rumors and Politics before the French 
Revolution, trans. Claudia Miéville (London: Polity Press, 1991). 
 
80Kaiser, “Louis le Bien-Aimé and the Rhetoric of the Royal Body,” 145. 
81This has been the assumption since the late-eighteenth century, but David Andress noted that it was Marie 
Antoinette who required “a minor surgical intervention” to ensure coitus.  Andress, The Terror: The Merciless War 
for Freedom in Revolutionary France (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2005), 13. 
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cuckolded king left France to the whims of Marie Antoinette’s insatiable sexual craving, which 
potentially put affairs of state in the hands of the Austrian Habsburgs.82   
According to deputies at the Estates-General, and other civilian “doctors” of the state, by 
1789 the body politic of France had been desiccated by a parasitic nobility, eviscerated by two 
successive kings, and debauched by Marie Antoinette, whom Revolutionaries even accused of 
sexual indecency with her son.83  The corporeal language of the body politic helped pre-
Revolutionary writers and Revolutionaries interpret the socio-political problems confronting 
France and shape the future of France with a new set of images.  As J.-P. Brissot de Warville 
wrote in his periodical Le Patriote français in March 1791: “If by ‘head’ [chef] one understands 
caput, the head, it is the legislative body that is the head of the body politic—that is where the 
thinking of the nation is formed, the general will, in a word the law.  The executive power is only 
the arm of the body politic.”84  Brissot reduced the king to a mere appendage and placed the 
directing force of the state in the general will; the “body” replaced the “head” as the people 
                                                          
82For the impotence of Louis XVI and Marie Antoinette’s sexuality, see Antoine de Baecque, The Body Politic: 
Corporeal Metaphor in Revolutionary France, 1770-1800, trans. Charlotte Mandell (Stanford: Stanford University 
Press, 1993), chp. 1, and the essays by Sarah Maza (“The Diamond Necklace Affair Revisited (1785-6): The Case of 
the Missing Queen”) and Lynn Hunt (“The Many Bodies of Marie Antoinette: Political Pornography and the 
Problem of the Feminine in the French Revolution”) in Eroticism and the Body Politic, ed. Lynn Hunt (Baltimore: 
The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1991). 
 
83Abbé Sieyès used the metaphor of France as a diseased body and the nobility as parasites to the best effect in his 
Essay on Privileges and What is the Third Estate?.  For example, in the latter, he wrote: “In the end it is not worth 
asking what kind of place there should be for privileged classes [corps] in the social order.  It is like asking what 
kind of place a malignant tumor should have in the body of someone who is ill, as it devours and ruins its health.  
But you seem to have been told that you are not yet ready for good health, and you accept this pearl of aristocratic 
wisdom...Keep, then, ill!”  At the moment of reconceptualizing French politics, Sieyès had recourse often to 
metaphors of the body politic: “It is impossible to create a body for an end without giving it the organization, forms, 
and laws it needs in order to fulfill the functions for which it has been established.  This is what is meant by the 
constitution of that body.” Emmanuel Joseph Sieyès, Political Writings, trans. and intro. Michael Sonenscher 
(Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, Inc., 2003), 162 and 135.  See also de Baecque, The Body Politic: 
Corporeal Metaphor in Revolutionary France, chp. 2. 
 
84Quoted in de Baecque, The Body Politic: Corporeal Metaphor in Revolutionary France, 62. 
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displaced the king.  The language of the general will stemmed primarily from Jean-Jacques 
Rousseau, an expert at body-politic images.85 
From the extended quote above, it is clear that Rousseau easily integrated comparisons of 
the human or animal body to the political body.  The body was primary in Rousseau’s critique of 
luxury and modernity, but he also used a number of medical terms to describe the state of society 
and politics.  Rousseau spoke of the “natural dispositions” of social bodies, feared the imbalance 
of organs and internal systems, and examined political societies as they experienced birth, 
growth, decay, and death.  He invoked the polysemous concept “constitution” and the 
physical/moral dyad that viewed morality as contingent upon a properly-functioning 
body(politic).86    
Rousseau cultivated an image of the general will and the body politic especially through 
the problem of organisation: the notion that life itself is a product of an “organized body” (corps 
organisé) and the method of transforming individual parts into an active, collective body.  The 
idea of an “organized body,” or organisation, was at the center of mid-century debates about the 
origins and processes of human animation and political bodies. Like Théophile de Bordeu’s 
model of organisation, the swarm of bees, Rousseau argued that each individual in the body 
politic possesses its own “life,” but the concurrence of each creates a coherent, organized body.87  
                                                          
85Rousseau was, of course, not the creator of the notion of a “general will” but merely its most famous promulgator.  
See Patrick Riley, The General Will before Rousseau: The Transformation of the Divine into the Civic (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1988), and his “Social Contract Theory and its Critics,” in The Cambridge History of 
Eighteenth-Century Political Thought, eds. Mark Goldie and Robert Wokler, 347-378 (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2006).  
 
86For the physical/moral, see Sergio Moravia, “‘Moral’ – ‘Physique’: genesis and evolution of a ‘rapport’,” in 
Enlightenment Studies in honour of Lester G. Crocker, eds. Alfred J. Bingham and Virgil W. Topazio, 163-174 
(Oxford: The Voltaire Foundation, 1979).   
 
87For Bordeu, “the organs of the body [bees] are linked one to another; they each have their own district and action; 
the connectivity of these actions, and the harmony which results from them, equate to one’s health.”  From Bordeu’s 
Recherches anatomiques sur la position et l’action des glandes (1751), quoted in Charles T. Wolfe, “Organisation 
ou Organisme? L’Individuation organique selon le vitalisme Montpellierain,” Dix-Huitième Siècle, n. 41 (2009): 99-
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In On the Social Contract, the body politic was vivified and sustained by the aggregation of 
bodies committed to the preservation of the common “self.”88  The confederation of individuals 
and associations, in Rousseau’s understanding, complete with the “reciprocal sensibility and the 
internal coordination of all the parts,” forged a body politic whose general will “always tends 
toward the conservation and well-being of the whole.”89  Although the act of the social compact 
was artificial, Rousseau appropriated the image from contemporary notions of an “organized 
body.”90   
For Rousseau, there was no representative sovereign, as in Hobbes’ work, who contained 
political knowledge and directed political action through his will; instead, unity was the result of 
an ongoing production of will culled from the many experiences of citizens.  The concept of the 
“general will” empowered citizens, not subjects, and depicted the nation as a political 
                                                          
119, here 108 (trans. mine).  For recent perspectives on Bordeu and vitalism, see Wolfe, “Sensibility as Vital Force 
or as Property of Matter in Mid-Eighteenth-Century Debates,” in The Discourse of Sensibility: The Knowing Body in 
the Enlightenment, ed. Henry Martin Lloyd, 147-170 (New York and London: Springer International Publishing, 
2013); Alexandre Wenger, Le Médecin et le philosophe: Théophile de Bordeu selon Diderot (Paris: Hermann-
Essais, 2012); Caroline Warman, “La vie et l’âme de l’organe dans la pensée vitaliste de Bordeu, Diderot et Bichat,” 
in Repenser le Vitalisme, ed. Pascal Nouvel, 157-165 (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 2011).  I will discuss 
organisation in more detail in subsequent chapters.   
 
88Rousseau, On the Social Contract and Discourses, 24. 
 
89Rousseau, Discourse on Political Economy, in On the Social Contract and Discourses, 166. 
90Rousseau’s model of the general will contained an even more detailed application of contemporary medical theory.  
His reorganization of the political resembled a “cybernetic” form of order, which, according to David Bates, 
emphasized the artificial nature of Rousseau’s political arrangement based on eighteenth-century conceptions of the 
nervous system.  Rousseau envisioned a communication (nervous) system that mediated between the artificial 
general will (“soul”) and the embodied citizens to form a unified body politic that perceives and feels.  Rousseau 
looked to replicate on a grander scale a sensorium commune (common sensorium) that made of an individual more 
than the sum of its parts.  David Bates, States of War: Enlightenment Origins of the Political (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 2011), 172, 193 (sensorium commune).  For a similar perspective from Scotland, see Christopher 
Lawrence, “The Nervous System and Society in the Scottish Enlightenment,” in Natural Order: Historical Studies 
of Scientific Culture, eds. Barry Barnes and Steven Shapin, 19-40 (Beverly Hills and London: Sage Publications, 
1979).  For the common sensorium, see Anne C. Vila, Enlightenment and Pathology: Sensibility in the Literature 
and Medicine of Eighteenth-Century France (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998), esp. 28-37.  In this 
instance, Rousseau’s imagery reflected that of certain doctors and médecins-philosophes who found the “soul” to be 
either the “principle” of motion or thought, and thus material rather than spiritual, or distributed throughout the body 
instead of centralized.  As Thomas L. Hankins succinctly put it, materialists “distributed the soul throughout matter 
in order to get rid of it.”  Science and the Enlightenment (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 127. 
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construction, which stripped the monarchy of any inherent sacredness and the nobility of any 
inherent glorious character.91  Rousseau was engaged with the mid-century medical community 
and found theories of human physiology profitable to express his vision of the body politic.  
Although Rousseau was uncommonly influential in the eighteenth century, his contribution to 
the corporeal-centered social imagination was only one of many. 
*** 
The body-politic metaphor was a crucial ingredient to eighteenth-century understandings 
of the socio-political structure; linguistically, it could reinforce or subvert the “corporate” order 
and expectations of états, and aesthetically it could represent either nature itself (hierarchically or 
through confederations) or improvements upon nature (Hobbes’ artificial sovereign and 
Rousseau’s general will).  The corporate order of French society was challenged by yet other 
metaphors during the eighteenth century.  Rousseau’s notion of the general will was the key 
political competitor to body-politic metaphors that emphasized the traditional hierarchy and 
harmony of organs, but economic and financial metaphors equally emphasized policies anathema 
to corporate society. On the eve of the meeting of the Estates-General, P. Le Maître “examined” 
France and concluded that “France is now very sick...[it is necessary that] we probe everywhere, 
and that we dwell mainly on the most painful places in its great body, particularly close to that 
gravest of the crises affecting intestinal difficulties, that overabundant evacuation called 
deficit.”92   
Le Maître’s diagnosis of the French body politic in crisis drew from the work of his 
predecessors.  The deficit had exhausted the French body politic in the 1770s and 1780s and was 
                                                          
91Bell, The Cult of the Nation, 39. 
 
92Quoted in de Baecque, The Body Politic: Corporeal Metaphor in Revolutionary France, 81, see also 93-4. 
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a recurring theme since at least the reign of Louis XIV; yet, before the acute financial crisis of 
the late 1780s, the study of political economy matured alongside the increasing importance of 
commerce to the economic health of the body politic.  Political economists had at their disposal a 
number of metaphors linking commerce and trade to nature and the human body: circulation, 
equilibrium, and balance.  The deficit, according to Le Maître, blocked circulation, created a 
financial imbalance, and ultimately led to hemorrhage.  
At the turn of the eighteenth century, Pierre Le Pesant de Boisguilbert put forward a 
financial representation of the body politic to argue for the necessity of taxing the privileged: 
“The poor, in the body of the State, are the eyes and skull, and are, therefore, the most weak and 
delicate parts; the rich are the arms and the rest of the body.  The blows that strike the body for 
the needs of the state are nearly imperceptible when they fall on the strong and robust parts, but 
fatal when they reach the weak areas, which represent the impoverished.”93  Expressing an idea 
that would fully flower in the eighteenth century, Boisguilbert sought to cure the “gangrenous” 
self-interest of the privileged by expanding taxation.  His analysis of the critical condition of the 
French economy struck at the heart of corporate society and, before Vincent de Gournay coined 
the term, challenged the king to laissez agir la nature and laissez faire la nature.     
Boisguilbert altered the traditional body-politic metaphor that depicted the Third Estate 
as the arms and laboring hands, opting instead to conceptualize it as the more delicate eyes and 
skull.  He saw the degradation of the body politic as a consequence of an inordinately-
imbalanced system of taxation.  Similarly, Louis-Sébastien Mercier praised the Third Estate as 
                                                          
93From Boisguilbert’s Factum de la France (1705), quoted in Michael Kwass, Privilege and the Politics of Taxation 
in Eighteenth-Century France: Liberté, Égalité, Fiscalité (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 226. 
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the creators of wealth.  Unlike the financiers and parasitic nobility, who sent their money off to 
India or China in pursuit of luxury, the body politic would “languish, decay, and die” without les 
hommes de travail.94  In his L’An 2440, Mercier’s guide condemned luxury as a “burning acid” 
that had turned “gangrenous the healthiest parts of your state and covered the entire body politic 
in ulcers.”95  Political economists and social commentators feared that the French economy 
would become stagnant as Paris and the court nobility resembled a swollen head.  If all of the 
financial and natural resources, alongside taxation, fed the capital, then the entire body politic 
would be sapped of life-sustaining fluids.  What was needed in France was the proper movement 
of resources.   
The philosophe and short-lived Controller General of France (1774-1776), Anne-Robert-
Jacques Turgot, acknowledged precisely this point through the ubiquity of the organic metaphor 
of circulation:  “It is this advance and this continual return of capitals which constitute what one 
must call the circulation of money; that useful and fruitful circulation which gives life to all the 
labors of the society, which maintains movement and life in the body politic, and which is with 
great reason compared to the circulation of blood in the animal body.”96  The utility of 
circulation as a metaphor for the unobstructed mobility of goods, resources, taxes, or blood 
stemmed from the Aristotelian tradition of the perfection of the circle and was given added 
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95Mercier, L’An 2440 (1786 edition), preface Alain Pons (Paris: F. Adel, 1977), chp. 8, “Le nouveau Paris,” pg. 64.  
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96Turgot, Reflections on the Formation and the Distribution of Riches, trans. William J. Ashley (New York: 
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impetus through William Harvey’s experiments on the circulation of blood.97  Before modern 
disciplinary divisions were established, concepts like circulation were seen as “natural” to the 
functioning of both human and political bodies.  The extension of circulation to both fields was 
made possible, too, by the term “economy.”  In the eighteenth century, there was no “economy” 
that represented a discrete aspect of modern life.  Instead, “economy” generally meant the “wise 
and legitimate government of the household, [then the state],” as well as the “order, mechanism, 
and the ensemble of functions and movements that sustain the lives of animals.”98  Just as the 
principles that governed the structure and function of animal bodies and bodies politic were 
natural, so too were those that governed the growth and distribution of wealth.   It was only by 
the end of the eighteenth and early-nineteenth centuries that “economic theorists [came] to posit 
and identify an economy as a distinct entity and maintain that it was subject, not to natural 
processes, but to the operation of human laws and agency.”99  
In France, François Quesnay and the Physiocrats presented the stoutest argument that 
“nature” demanded the removal of restrictions on trade, as Adam Smith would in Great Britain.  
Their laissez-faire/laissez-passer approach emphasized the nourishing effects of circulation on 
                                                          
97Exercitatio Anatomica de Motu Cordis et Sanguinis in Animalibus (On the Motion of the Heart and Blood), 1628.  
Georg Ernst Stahl renewed the importance of circulation by making it the vivifying principle preventing stasis of the 
blood through secretion and excretion.  Stahl’s vital force (anima) conserved life through circulation (Theoria 
medica vera, 1708). 
 
98The first quote comes from Rousseau, Discourse on Political Economy, in On the Social Contract and Discourses, 
163, and the second from Jean-Joseph Ménuret de Chambaud’s entry in the Encyclopédie, “OEconomie animale 
(Médecine),” XI, 362: Encyclopédie, ou dictionnaire raisonné des sciences, des arts et des métiers, etc., eds. Denis 
Diderot and Jean le Rond d'Alembert. University of Chicago: ARTFL Encyclopédie Project (Spring 2013 Edition), 
Robert Morrissey (ed), http://encyclopedie.uchicago.edu/. For an analysis of Ménuret’s and others’ understandings 
of animal economy, see Charles T. Wolfe and Motoichi Terada, “The Animal Economy as Object and Program in 
Montpellier Vitalism,” Science in Context 21.4 (2008): 537-79. 
 
99Margaret Schabas, The Natural Origins of Economics (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005), 2.  See also 
the essays in Margaret Schabas and Neil de Marchi, eds., Oeconomies in the Age of Newton (Durham, NC: Duke 
University Press, 2003), and Emma C. Spary, "Political, natural and bodily economies," in Cultures of Natural 
History, eds. N. Jardine, J. A. Secord and E. C. Spary, 178-196 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996). 
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the body politic, and they grounded their argument in nature itself: “In nature everything is 
intertwined, everything runs through circular courses which are interlaced with one another.”100  
According to the Physiocrats, hoarding wealth and restricting the flow of goods and money, 
through privileges, customs, and duties, was an unnatural act that stymied the “circulation and 
recreation of capital.”101  The famous zig-zags of the Tableau Économique gave quantitative and 
visual expression to the circulation of wealth and its foundation in agriculture, renewed naturally 
and perennially by the sun and rain.  The social order envisioned by Quesnay correlated to the 
circulatory system—veins, arteries, capillaries, and heart—and he replaced the corporately-
ordered, body-politic metaphor with a body politic inseparable from natural processes.  Quesnay 
and a number of Physiocrats sought to centralize power in a “legal despot,” whose authority 
would be limited by nature rather than enlarged by providence and the king’s “two bodies.” 
Urban planners also appealed to the purifying effects of constant movement in their 
creation and design of cities.  In his La Métropolitée (1682), Alexandre Le Maître equated 
metropolitan cities with “heads” of state, both responsible for the welfare of rural towns and 
subjects.102  One of the more curious eighteenth-century examples came from Pierre Ier 
                                                          
100Quesnay, “Dialogue on the Work of Artisans,” in Ronald L. Meek, The Economics of Physiocracy: Essays and 
Translations (London: Allen and Unwin, 1962), 204. I will detail Physiocracy in chapter seven. Circulation 
metaphors pervade the work of the Physiocrats.   
 
101Liana Vardi, The Physiocrats and the World of the Enlightenment (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2012), 53.  For Quesnay’s naturalistic approach to economics, see Vernard Foley, “An Origin of the Tableau 
Economique,” History of Political Economy 5 (Spring 1973): 131-150; H. Spencer Banzhaf, “Productive Nature and 
the Net Product: Quesnay’s Economies Animal and Political,” History of Political Economy 32:3 (2000): 517-551; 
Paul P. Christensen, “Fire, Motion, and Productivity: The Proto-Energetics of Nature and Economy in François 
Quesnay,” in Natural Images in Economic Thought, ed. Philip Mirowski, 249-288 (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1994); Schabas, The Natural Origins of Economics, 45-50. 
 
102“What the head is to the body...a metropolitan city is to towns and townships, villages and hamlets.  The head 
works to preserve all the other members, and all the parts of the body cooperate and act in concert to sustain the 
head.  The prince sacrifices his rest and energy to protect the honor, life, and belongings of his subjects, who are 
obliged, if need be, to immolate their possessions and their blood for the life and glory of their prince, and who are 
like small veins pouring their money into his treasury, which the prince then pours back into all the parts of the 
state.”  Quoted in Roche, France in the Enlightenment, 641. 
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Rousseau’s architectural “Plan de la Ville de Nantes et des projets d’embellissement” (1760).103  
In order to deal with the urban problems of congestion and overcrowding, and ensure the 
stability of a prosperous, sea-faring, commercial city, Rousseau drew a diagram of Nantes in the 
shape of a heart with a second, smaller heart enveloping the crowded city center.  The human 
heart provided the best reflection of form and function to circulate material goods and material 
bodies.  Despite Pierre Lelièvre’s pejorative characterization of Rousseau’s imagination as 
“fertile” and “completely arbitrary,” his plan nevertheless reinforces the perceived parallel 
between the principles of nature and human society.104   
Body-politic metaphors and the application of anatomical and physiological principles to 
the social body of France often blurred the line between heuristic device and sustained 
commitment to the ordering power of nature.  As medical knowledge became more precise, the 
authority of nature cemented analogies between social, political, and human/animal bodies.  
After all, one of the defining characteristics of the Enlightenment was a commitment to nature as 
a totalizing force, replacing the divine. 
*** 
The influential works of Jean-Jacques Rousseau and the Physiocrats indicate that new 
visions of politics did not hinder the use of the human body to chart socio-political relationships.  
In fact, from the French Wars of Religion through the demise of the “absolutist” state, writers 
applied changing conceptions of the human body in a multitude of ways.  The traditional 
metaphor of the king as the head directing the various organs of the body politic persisted well 
                                                          
103Rousseau’s plan can be found in Pierre Lelièvre, Nantes au XVIIIe siècle: Urbanisme et Architecture (Nantes: 
Durance, 1942), 88.  See also Michel Foucault, Security, Territory, Population: Lectures at the Collège de France, 
1977-8, ed. Michel Senellart, trans. Graham Burchell (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2004), 17 and 26 n. 32. 
 
104Lelièvre, Nantes au XVIIIe siècle, 90 (see also 205). 
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into the eighteenth century but met fierce resistance.  The social vocabulary of the ancien régime 
reinforced the corporate hierarchy of the state both metaphorically and physically: one’s état was 
equivalent to one’s organological functioning.  Body-politic metaphors that emphasized the 
unobstructed circulation of goods could be expressed simply, without veiled language.  The 
Physiocrats, proponents of laissez-faire economics, Turgot, and other critics of the corporate 
system publicly challenged both the metaphorical underpinnings of society and the legal 
principles of social organization: individual subjects and goods necessitated freedom from 
privilege.  They envisioned new, though different, social orders and put forward their ideas in an 
age-old, body-politic format but with different instruments.   
Turgot espoused an artificial construction of society bereft of naturalistic impulses 
connecting the hierarchy of human bodies to a universal, divine scheme.105  For him, human 
nature, and thus society, was defined by liberty, and inequality was a natural development of 
socio-economic forces.  In his Encyclopédie entry “Fondation,” Turgot wrote:  
Citizens have rights, and rights to be held sacred, even by the body of society—they exist 
independently of society, they are its necessary elements; they enter into society only to 
place themselves, with all their rights, under the protection of these same laws which 
assure their property and their liberty.  But particular corporate bodies do not exist of 
themselves, or for themselves; they have been formed for society, and they must cease to 
exist immediately after they cease to be useful.106   
                                                          
105Turgot particularly challenged what Jean Terrier labeled the “personalist” metaphor that compared society 
“specifically with the living beings humans are,” rather than emphasizing the anatomical structure of society.  The 
personalist metaphor attributed “will” and psychological characteristics to the body politic, as revealed in Hobbes 
and Rousseau.  And, as Edmund Burke argued, “instead of living in the mind of individuals as an abstract collection 
of individuals, society should be imagined as a concrete person,” leading to affection, dedication, social cohesion, 
and loyalty (e.g. the king’s “two bodies”).  Terrier, Visions of the Social: Society as a Political Project in France, 
1750-1950 (Leiden: Brill, 2011), 81 and 181. 
 
106Quoted in Keith Michael Baker, “Enlightenment Idioms, Old Regime Discourses, and Revolutionary 
Improvisation,” in From Deficit to Deluge: The Origins of the French Revolution, eds. Kaiser and Van Kley, 165-
197, here 172.  Earlier in his entry, Turgot subtly criticized the limitations of ancien régime France and argued for 
the historical specificity of societies, an approach both historically sensitive and secular-minded: “Society does not 
always have the same needs...the proportion of its needs changes often and with them disappears or diminishes the 
utility of the foundations destined to meet them...What the state owes to each member is the removal of every 
obstacle that may impede their industry or disturb the enjoyment of the fruits which are the recompense of it” (trans. 
mine). Encyclopédie, ou dictionnaire raisonné des sciences, des arts et des métiers, etc., eds. Denis Diderot and Jean 
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The “body” of society, for Turgot, did not consist of corporations or privileged groups that 
naturally and absolutely corresponded to human organs; instead, Turgot used “body” neutrally 
here, recognizing the artificiality of social cohesion based on utility.  Once freed from the 
sinews, tissue, organs, and fluids that forged the corporate body, individuals could exercise their 
naturally-occurring rights in an arena unrestrained by cultural codes or the assumptions of 
natural hierarchy.   
 By the late-eighteenth century, the traditional social order no longer seemed capable of 
holding together the body politic.  Metaphors no longer sufficed to illustrate the realistic 
interactions of individuals, and the corporeal system of états came under attack.  Turgot’s vision 
of society was a culmination of at least three decades of political-economic thought, but it was 
only one vision of several in the eighteenth century.  Metaphors of the body politic and social 
body persisted through the French Revolution, but we will see in the next three chapters that, 
much like the corporeal duties of the Third Estate, opponents and supporters of the traditional 
social structure found the human body to contain other principles necessary for social cohesion.  
Writers continued to draw on the long-term application of the human body to socio-political 
structures, but the linking together of sensationalist physiology and the invention of “society” 
produced a novel and pervasive understanding of the importance of the body to human 
interaction. 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
le Rond d'Alembert (University of Chicago: ARTFL Encyclopédie Project,Spring 2013 Edition), Robert Morrissey 
(ed.)  http://encyclopedie.uchicago.edu/  
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Chapter 2 
Inventing and Embodying Society 
Under the corporate order of early-modern France, “society” was not an independent 
zone of human interaction.  It was instead organized as a series of legal privileges and socio-
cultural états that attempted to curtail the mixing of ranks and ensure economic productivity.  
Even if the rigid, social hierarchy was more porous in reality than in theory, it still served as a 
template according to which most economic, social, political, and cultural activities adhered. 
By the second half of the eighteenth century, the traditional understanding of society 
came under fire as outdated, immoral, exploitative, and unnatural.  Commerce and the luxury 
industry undermined the corporate order and the system of symbols that represented each état.  A 
number of political crises saw the birth of utility and natural rights as categories to challenge the 
distribution of socio-political authority via privileges and états.  Critics of the traditional order, 
and even many supporters, authored new images of society, culling from a variety of sources: 
nature, gender, and history.  As Turgot’s vision of society in the previous chapter shows, one 
priority of reformers was to free the individual from the constraints of social stratification.  
Traditional body-politic metaphors and the social structure limited the human capacity for 
advancement and contained individual identity within corporate culture.   
Once individuals were recognized as autonomous, “feeling” entities, however, their 
ability to interact and affect each other outside the social structure threatened an already unstable 
social order.  Many writers put forward the individual body as the organizing principle for 
society; social bonds were to be found in individual corps rather than the collective harmony of 
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privileged corps.  In what follows, I will deepen our understanding of the discursive invention of 
society by linking it to changing economic, cultural, and medical contexts.  The desire to classify 
past forms of human interaction, criticize contemporary forms, and prescribe forms for the future 
led to numerous perspectives on socio-economic relationships.  By mid-century, social 
commentators moved beyond body-politic metaphors to depict social interaction as a form of 
human connectivity forged through the sensations of the body: sensibility, sentimentality, and 
sympathy.  New interpretations of the human body as physically and morally sensitive to 
external sensory data provided writers of all types with a perspective to conjoin nascent society 
and human nature.  The capacity of the human body to “feel” became the critical framework to 
understand society.  This perspective challenges posterity’s belief in the Enlightenment as an age 
of “reason.”   
Inventing Society 
 Historians of the Enlightenment have thoroughly parsed the intellectual, cultural, and 
social history of the late-seventeenth and eighteenth centuries in order to obtain a comprehensive 
understanding of the flowering of critical thought across Europe.107  In spite of the complexity of 
the changes unfolding, one principle fastened the attention of historians: eighteenth-century 
efforts to reform society.  Convinced of the universality of reason and nature, French philosophes 
“rose up against a state of society in which the liberties of an earlier day had turned into 
privileges, and privilege was accepted as a principle of social organization, dividing men, by 
                                                          
107For useful summaries of Enlightenment historiography, see Dan Edelstein, The Enlightenment: A Genealogy 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2010), and John Robertson, The Case for the Enlightenment: Scotland and 
Naples 1680-1760 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 1-43.  In a recent trinity of works, Jonathan 
Israel has proposed a new set of principles to organize Enlightenment thought.  The reviews of his Radical 
Enlightenment (2001), Enlightenment Contested (2006), and Democratic Enlightenment (2011)—all published by 
Oxford University Press—are exciting places to gather the heightened tensions of historiography and the continued 
importance of the Enlightenment to conceptions of “modernity.”   
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birth or occupation, into classes fixed by the laws of the country.”108  Political progress would 
only be the result of a top-down reorganization of society.109  The “Enlightenment,” in toto, was 
“a response to the dilemmas of a society standing at the confluence of the static, the traditional 
norms, with the rapid changes, fluidity, and pluralism so typical of modernity.”110  If there ever 
was an “Enlightenment Project,” then it was a simultaneously mellifluous and discordant effort 
to construct a “philosophical language implying a reorientation of human thinking and action in 
the world.”111 
The philosophical languages of individual happiness and social utility coexisted 
alongside the more well-known concepts freedom, liberty, nature, and reason and were oriented 
toward apolitical and nonreligious human interaction.  Their articulation was compounded by 
“the commitment to understanding, and hence to advancing, the causes and conditions of human 
betterment in this world.”112  In his entry “Idleness” (Oisiveté) for the Encyclopédie, for instance, 
the Chevalier de Jaucourt criticized the aristocratic honnête homme for eschewing labor and 
                                                          
108R. R. Palmer, Catholics and Unbelievers in Eighteenth-Century France (New York: Cooper Square Publishers, 
Inc., 1961, orig. pub. 1939), 3. 
 
109Charles Frankel, The Faith of Reason: The Idea of Progress in the French Enlightenment (New York: King’s 
Crown Press, 1948), 61. 
 
110Israel, Democratic Enlightenment, 3. In Part II, I analyze commerce, luxury, and political economy as both the 
“rapid changes, fluidity, and pluralism so typical of modernity,” as Israel stated, and the growing articulation of 
“society” as unbounded by the traditional social structure.  Israel summarily dismissed any importance of social 
practices and spaces or concepts of sociability to the “Enlightenment” (4-5, 23-24). 
 
111Keith Michael Baker, “Enlightenment Idioms, Old Regime Discourses, and Revolutionary Improvisation,” in 
From Deficit to Deluge: The Origins of the French Revolution, eds. Thomas E. Kaiser and Dale K. Van Kley, 165-
197 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2011), 168.  The notion of an “Enlightenment Project,” which reduced the 
complexity of the Enlightenment to a singular, rationalistic ethic, was made famous by Alasdair MacIntyre, After 
Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1981). 
 
112Robertson, The Case for the Enlightenment, 28.  Carl Becker famously likened the philosophes’ efforts to 
construct a secularized version of heaven, with “more up-to-date materials,” to medieval philosophers’ “heavenly 
city.”  Carl Becker, The Heavenly City of the Eighteenth-Century Philosophers (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
1932), 31.  Frankel, The Faith of Reason, also took up Becker’s language. The classic text on Enlightenment 
understandings of happiness is Robert Mauzi, L’idée du bonheur dans la Littérature et la Pensée françaises au 
XVIIIe siècle (Paris: A. Colin, 1960). 
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defined work through its utility to society.  From the backrooms of the Parisian merchant court to 
erudite, natural-philosophical texts to the interpretation of married intellectuals as socially-
productive, social utility surged to the forefront of contemporary ideas outlining the contours of 
society.113  Nature enjoined humans to seek out happiness, and society was to be a means of 
ensuring its pursuit.  The Marquis de Chastellux supplied his contemporaries with a two-volume, 
historical examination of happiness that used a number of indices du bonheur to measure and 
determine “the greatest happiness of the greatest number of individuals.”114  He concluded that 
with an increase in population and agricultural productivity and a decrease in prejudice and 
superstition the eighteenth century would become the happiest age yet.  Chastellux believed that 
intellectual innovations of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries galvanized the quest to 
uncover the laws of society and provided the tools. By foregrounding utility and happiness in 
debates over the place of commerce in the French economy or the toleration of Protestants, for 
example, contemporaries extracted the “social” from the socio-political hierarchy and elevated 
the individual over the structure.115  Just as the concept of the general will depicted the nation as 
a political construct, new perspectives of “society” relied only on the interaction of individuals.       
                                                          
113For shifting understandings of commerce—from a socio-political status symbol to a contributor to “social 
utility”—and the merchant corps’ place in the corporate hierarchy (one of the “Six Corps”), see Amalia D. Kessler, 
A Revolution in Commerce: the Parisian Merchant Court and the Rise of Commercial Society in Eighteenth-Century 
France (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2007).  For “intellectual companionate and collaborative marriages” as 
spurs to sociability and social utility, see Meghan K. Roberts, “Philosophes Mariés and Epouses Philosophiques: 
Men of Letters and Marriage in Eighteenth-Century France,” French Historical Studies 35.3 (Summer 2012): 509-
39.   
 
114Chastellux, De la félicité publique, ou Considérations sur le sort des hommes dans les différentes époques de 
l’histoire (1772).  For analyses of Chastellux’ work, see Frankel, The Faith of Reason, 61-68; Darrin M. McMahon, 
Happiness: A History (New York: Grove Press, 2006), 214-217; Michael Sonenscher, Before the Deluge: Public 
Debt, Inequality, and the Intellectual Origins of the French Revolution (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
2007), 290-302.  See also Jean-François Melon, Essai politique sur le commerce (1734), who argued that the pursuit 
of happiness via the passions should replace military glory as the motor of society, and Madame du Châtelet’s 
Discours sur le bonheur (1746-7). 
 
115According to Daniel Gordon, “the novel aspect of French social egalitarianism was not the affirmation of equality 
per se but the invention of the social as a distinctive field of human experience...Defenders of royal sovereignty did 
not formally recognize the existence of a social realm in the sense of a sphere of activities separate from the 
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Attempts to reform society set in motion a new understanding of human interaction and 
thus human nature.  The Enlightenment “invented” society as the “ontological frame of our 
human existence” and the “autonomous ground” upon which individuals stood before the bonds 
created by political or religious authority.116  Society became “the basic form of collective 
human existence, at once natural to human beings and instituted by them, a corollary of human 
needs and a human response to those needs.”117 Alongside “foundational concepts” such as 
civilisation, patrie, nation, and public, société provided a way for eighteenth-century French 
authors to envision human interaction as a product of neither divine will nor monarchical fiat.118  
“Society” became terrestrial and mundane, which elevated the material colliding of human 
bodies to a central place in the study of the social. 
Enlightenment thinkers did not coin the word “society,” and there was no singular 
moment when “society” was invented.  It is clear, though, that by the end of the seventeenth 
century, “society” came to mean more than friendship, goodwill, or partnerships for a joint 
venture often based on contract.  The invention of society as the bedrock of human existence 
occurred in reaction to a number of seventeenth- and early-eighteenth century social, political, 
                                                          
supervision of the monarch.” Gordon, Citizens without Sovereignty: Equality and Sociability in French Thought, 
1670-1789 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), 5.  Gordon develops further his perspective in “Le 
principe de dématérialisation: Sociabilité et circulation au XVIIIe siécle,” in L’invention de la société: Nominalisme 
politique et science sociale au XVIIIe siécle, eds. Laurence Kauffman and Jacques Guilhaumou, 77-98 (Paris: 
Éditions de l’EHESS, 2003). 
 
116Keith Michael Baker, “Enlightenment and the Institution of Society: Notes for a Conceptual History,” in Main 
Trends in Cultural History: Ten Essays, eds. Willem Melching and Wyger Velema, 95-120 (Amsterdam and 
Atlanta, GA: Rodopi, 1994), 96, 119.  For Bernard Mandeville’s moral, economic, and medical contribution to the 
creation of “society,” see E. J. Hundert, The Enlightenment’s Fable: Bernard Mandeville and the Discovery of 
Society (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994). 
 
117Ibid., 108. 
 
118David Bell, “Nation et Patrie, Société et Civilisation: Transformations du vocabulaire social français, 1700-1789,” 
in L’invention de la société, eds. Kauffman and Guilhaumou, 99-120.  See also Bell, The Cult of the Nation: 
Inventing Nationalism, 1680-1800 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2001), 1-50, and George Armstrong 
Kelly, “Mortal Man, Immortal Society? Political Metaphors in Eighteenth-Century France,” Political Theory, vol. 
14, n. 1 (February 1986): 5-29. 
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religious, and cultural developments: the Bourbon pursuit of centralized authority; the 
Augustinian and Jansenist vision of sinful humans nearly abandoned by god to the terrestrial 
sphere; the increasing material and infrastructural unification of France; and, the interiorization 
of religion.  Order in the material world could be reliably had without recourse to divine-cum-
political authority, as indicated by the rise of the “scientific” method (empirical and experimental 
procedures) and the willingness of natural philosophers to espouse epistemological modesty in 
the face of metaphysical quandaries (e.g. Isaac Newton’s famous hypotheses non fingo).  
Moreover, in the last quarter of the seventeenth century, the editor of the French periodical Le 
Mercure galant, Jean Donneau de Visé, helped to transform a passive literary audience into an 
active and critical “public” empowered by the democratization of judgment and taste.  Visé 
created a self-reflective and autonomous public sphere through literary engagement, which 
became enlarged and politicized by the tense cultural crisis of la Querelle des Anciens et des 
Modernes.119   
All of these processes set in motion during the seventeenth and early-eighteenth centuries 
converged around the mid-eighteenth century to produce a focus on society as the realm of 
human interdependence and interaction.  Historians have recently analyzed this shift in 
conceptions of society both qualitatively, as new interpretations of human interaction clustered 
around a number of concepts and practices (e.g. sociable, sociabilité, social), and quantitatively 
by charting the appearance of these terms across eighteenth-century texts.  The use of “society” 
and its lexical associates emerged in the 1670s and 1680s, leaped in the 1730s, and then grew 
exponentially during and after the 1750s.  The same is true with “social,” which was most 
prominently introduced by Diderot to describe “passions” and “virtues” in his translation of 
                                                          
119Joan DeJean, Ancients against Moderns: Culture Wars and the Making of a Fin de Siècle (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1997), chp. 2. 
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Shaftesbury’s An Inquiry Concerning Virtue or Merit (1711, trans. 1745).  By the early 1760s, 
however, “social” came to be attached to nouns that “did not designate human characteristics, but 
related, implicitly, to society itself” (e.g. institutions, lois, confédération).120  The implication is 
that “society” had shifted from a constricted realm of hierarchical relations to an independent 
arena of sociability; society thus necessitated a proper adjective to describe its facets.  The 
radical nature of this shift lay in its potential to challenge the entire socio-political hierarchy by 
prizing happiness and utility as the criteria by which to judge individual behavior rather than 
simple conformity to an état.121   
After mid-century, the new language of society flourished.  “Social” was a “word newly 
introduced into the language in order to designate the qualities that render a man useful to 
society,” according to the Encyclopédie.122  And, according to César Dumarsais, les philosophes 
touted “civil society” as “a divinity...on earth.”123  The collective social imagination of 
Enlightenment thinkers focused undeniably on (re)vivifying “society” itself.  The spaces that 
Jurgen Habermas described as the “bourgeois public sphere” (e.g. coffeehouses, salons, journals, 
new literary forms, Masonic lodges), propelled by commerce and the early stages of capitalism, 
                                                          
120Yair Mintzker, "'A Word Newly Introduced into Language': The Appearance and Spread of 'Social' in French 
Enlightenment Thought, 1745-1764," History of European Ideas 34 (2008): 500-513, here 510.  Gordon, Citizens 
without Sovereignty, 67, observed a similar process in Baron d’Holbach’s La Morale universelle (1776): In contrast 
to seventeenth-century courtesy literature directed at small, elite audience, “Holbach defined politeness and the other 
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121Yet, throughout the eighteenth century, as society came to be the central feature of human interaction, it could 
nevertheless be grounded on either secular, natural, or religious principles. Writers as diverse as Claude Buffier and 
Baron d’Holbach could agree that a system of états was still a necessary component of society.  So, the invention of 
“society” was not necessarily incompatible with hierarchy; my argument is that even tradition-minded thinkers had 
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122Unknown, “Social,” in Encyclopédie de d’Alembert et Diderot, vol. XV (1765), 251.  In Mintzker’s words, "'A 
Word Newly Introduced into Language',” 501: “The word ‘social’ was so marginal in French philosophical 
discourse before the mid-eighteenth century that its sudden introduction to enlightened philosophy after 1745 can be 
treated, for all practical purposes, as a new appearance” (501). 
 
123Dumarsais, “Philosophe,” in Encyclopédie de d’Alembert et Diderot, vol. XII (1765), 510. 
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provided examples of what “society” could become.124  Modern “society” began to take shape 
within absolutist political culture and provided an impetus for thinkers to theorize it into 
existence.  Although “civil society” and the “public sphere” were constitutive of “society” writ 
large, Enlightenment thinkers articulated views of human interaction that anteceded and 
undergirded the public sphere.  Like “public opinion,” “society” was an abstract category 
brought to fruition linguistically but with a material, though amorphous, referent; it could be 
used for rhetorical purposes or deployed to express and obtain one’s interests, but it could not be 
separated from the intellectual, economic, and cultural changes taking place in late-seventeenth 
and eighteenth-century France.125  Contemporaries located “society” both inside the traditional 
social order, through a restricted, elite understanding of le monde, and outside of and anterior to 
any socio-political formation.  In the process, they created a new set of conditions for 
understanding human interaction.    
A number of discrete and overlapping approaches to social organization took center stage 
in the eighteenth century and challenged the traditional social order.  French writers, such as 
Turgot, Rousseau, and Condorcet, and the Scottish writers Adam Ferguson, William Robertson, 
and John Millar put forward “conjectural” histories to explain the development of civilizations.  
                                                          
124Jurgen Habermas, The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a Category of Bourgeois 
Society, trans. Thomas Burger and Frederick Lawrence (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1989).  Generally, 
Habermas was right to say that “with the growth of a market economy arose the sphere of the ‘social’,” but he is 
uncritical of the category of “society” when he argued that the “bourgeois public sphere evolved in the tension-
charged field between state and society” (141).  Out of hundreds of works on Habermas and the public sphere, I 
have found the following helpful: Keith Michael Baker, “Defining the Public Sphere in Eighteenth-Century France: 
Variations on a Theme by Habermas” and Lloyd Kramer, “Habermas, History, and Critical Theory,” both in 
Habermas and the Public Sphere, ed. Craig Calhoun, 181-211, 236-258 (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1993); 
Laura Lee Downs, Writing Gender History (London and New York: Bloomsbury Publishing, 2004), chp. 8; Annie 
K. Smart, Citoyennes: Women and the Ideal of Citizenship in Eighteenth-Century France (Newark, DE: University 
of Delaware Press, 2011), 10-16. 
 
125For the notion of public opinion as a linguistic invention, in contrast to Habermas, see Keith Michael Baker, 
“Public Opinion as Political Invention,” in his Inventing the French Revolution, 167-202 (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1990). 
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These examinations often took the form of “rational reconstructions” of the state of nature that 
traced the emergence of society and politics and charted the growth of modernity, generally 
intertwining modes of subsistence and the arts and sciences as the motors of change.  Instead of 
looking to a medieval past to strengthen the conventional roles of the nobility and monarchy, 
they found in the “four-stage” model of history a more suitable description of human interaction 
and the concomitant growth of political organization.  From hunter-gathering to shepherding to 
large-scale agriculture, European civilization had progressed to a commercial stage accompanied 
by novel moeurs, cultural spaces, and social practices.  Proponents of the stadial theory both 
lauded and criticized their own final stage of social and economic commerce.126 
Alongside rational reconstructions, various interpretations of “natural law” grounded 
society in the necessary existence of inherent rights: property, freedom, ownership of one’s 
labor, and moral equality.  John Locke’s Second Treatise on Government (1690) and Rousseau’s 
Discourse on Inequality (1755) presented thorough images of pre-political man in order to reveal 
the fundamental nature of human relations before the growth of political authority and 
subsequent inequality.127  Adherents of social contract theory envisioned forms of government 
                                                          
126The classic text is Ronald Meek, Social Science and the Ignoble Savage (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1976).  See also Silvia Sebastiani, The Scottish Enlightenment: Race, Gender and the Limits of 
Progress (New York: Palgrave-Macmillan, 2013); Sylvana Tomaselli, “Civilization, Patriotism, and Enlightened 
Histories of Woman,” in Women, Gender and Enlightenment, eds. Sarah Knott and Barbara Taylor, 117-135 
(Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave MacMillan, 2005); Johnson Kent Wright, “Historical Thought in 
the Era of the Enlightenment,” in A Companion to Western Historical Thought, eds. Lloyd Kramer and Sarah Maza, 
123-142 (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 2002); DeJean, Ancients against Moderns, chp. 4; Robert Wokler, 
“Anthropology and Conjectural History in the Enlightenment,” in Inventing Human Science: Eighteenth-Century 
Domains, eds. Christopher Fox, Roy Porter, and Robert Wokler, 31-53 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
1995); Larry Wolff, Inventing Eastern Europe: The Map of Civilization on the Mind of the Enlightenment (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 1994).  
 
127Rousseau’s Discourse was written as a response to the Academy of Dijon’s question “What is the origin of 
inequality among men, and is it authorized by natural law?”   
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that would guarantee natural rights.128  They constructed robust arguments for voluntary political 
action by members of society to fabricate a political system to protect individuals.129  
Conjectural history, natural law, and social contract theory, then, revealed the unstable and 
artificial foundation of France’s social hierarchy, challenged political authority, and demanded 
economic innovation.  
In addition to recreations of the state of nature, theorists of natural law in France and 
Scotland debated the primacy of sociability or self-interest as the driving characteristic of human 
nature.130  Politically, eighteenth-century writers linked sociability to human dignity and liberty 
and used it to classify “citizens” as contributing members of society and to ridicule “subjects” as 
representative of an unnatural socio-political hierarchy.  This subversive political perspective 
was coupled with the possibility that natural rights required no supernatural being to ensure 
them, thus releasing individuals from both royal and divine control.  In commerce, sociability 
became a purifying agent, cleansing self-interest and the passions of their unsavory flavor and 
                                                          
128Yair Mintzker pointed out that neither Hobbes nor Locke used the term “social contract,” and therefore, in those 
cases, it is an anachronism.  Mintzker, "'A Word Newly Introduced into Language',” 508. 
 
129The extent to which members of society were free and equal and the form of government chosen depends on 
which author one is analyzing.  As mentioned briefly in chapter one and to be analyzed in more depth in chapter 
seven, the Physiocrats put forward the most comprehensive argument for nature and natural law as the prime movers 
of socio-political institutions. 
 
130This debate began in the seventeenth century with the works of Samuel Pufendorf, Hugo Grotius, and Thomas 
Hobbes.  Jean Barbeyrac’s translation of Samuel Pufendorf’s writings on natural law—Les Devoirs de l’Homme et 
du Citoyen (1707) and Le Droit de la Nature et des Gens (1706)—made available to French readers Pufendorf’s idea 
that humans are naturally weak and vulnerable; thus, for Pufendorf, sociability was a natural-historical, though not 
innate, expression of their self-interest to associate for protection.  In a state of nature, human needs and desires 
surpassed those of animals, who could sate themselves through instinct.  Pufendorf argued that sociability was the 
solution to meet the unlimited growth of desires, in contrast to Hobbes’ assertion that political organization was 
contractual.  See Istvan Hont, “The Language of Sociability and Commerce: Samuel Pufendorf and the Theoretical 
Foundation of the ‘Four-Stage’ Theory,” in The Languages of Political Theory in Early-Modern Europe, ed. 
Anthony Pagden, 253-276 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987).  For recent analyses of Grotius, 
Pufendorf, Hobbes, Christian Thomasius, and Locke, see David Bates, States of War: Enlightenment Origins of the 
Political (New York: Columbia University Press, 2011), chps. 2 -3, and T.J. Hochstrasser, Natural Law Theories in 
the Early Enlightenment (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000).      
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sinful taint.  Adam Smith immortalized this process of the social satisfaction of economic needs 
through the natural, self-interested behavior of the butcher, brewer, and baker.131  In the 
eighteenth century, “commerce” lived a double-linguistic life as the practice of merchants and 
traders and as an expression for social engagement: “an agreeable commerce,” “an easy 
commerce,” or the “commerce between the sexes.”132  For social reformers, sociability and 
mutual cooperation channeled self-interest and other passions in socially-, economically-, and 
ultimately politically-productive ways, shredding the arguments that the corporate hierarchy 
represented nature’s intentions.   
Beyond the political and commercial traditions of natural law, which highlighted 
sociability as an inherent impetus to social organization, sociability played a key role in le 
monde.  Sociability was not inherently anti-hierarchical, as proven by salon culture.  The socio-
cultural spaces of the salons and the guiding spirit of mondanité grounded interaction in a more 
pleasant, often socially-elevated, understanding of sociability.  Even if salons were not 
laboratories of equality based on intellectual exchange and literary production, as historians once 
thought, sociability nevertheless stood as a central principle and expected goal in these spaces; 
attendees traded in “social commerce” in spaces often located outside the tentacular reach of the 
                                                          
131Adam Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, ed. Edwin Cannan and Preface 
George J. Stigler (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1976), Vol. I, Book 1, Chp. 2, 18.  For links between 
sociability and “character,” see the essays in Thomas Ahnert and Susan Manning, eds., Character, Self, and 
Sociability in the Scottish Enlightenment (New York, NY: Palgrave MacMillan, 2011). 
 
132Henry C. Clark, Compass of Society: Commerce and Absolutism in Old-Regime France (Lanham, MD: Lexington 
Books, 2007), xiii.  See also, Gordon, Citizens without Sovereignty, 150-160, on Jean-Baptiste Suard’s translation of 
William Robertson’s History of the Reign of the Emperor Charles V (1769, Suard published his translation in 1774), 
which highlighted “commerce” as the motor of civilization. Joan DeJean has pointed out the role of Father Etienne-
Simon de Gamaches’ Système du coeur (1704) in the consolidation of a new “science of the heart” that 
conceptualized the “emotions” as relational, establishing the function of sensibility in a “law of reciprocal 
commerce” between humans and objects and humans and other humans.  DeJean, Ancients versus Moderns, 89. 
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royal court.133  Sociability therefore carried a multitude of definitions and applications.  It could 
be a leveling principle that expressed the universal nature of all humans (e.g. chevalier de 
Jaucourt’s Encyclopédie entries “Sociabilité” and “Égalité naturelle”), or it could be a principle 
espoused by members of le monde to express their claims to natural, spontaneous, and exclusive 
interaction.   
Finally, a new view of society based on the gendered division of labor and the natural 
division of physiological organisations emerged in the eighteenth century.  Social commentators, 
médecin-philosophes, and philosophers recast the Biblical injunction that original sin 
commanded the superiority of men over women, and thus bolstered the sexual hierarchy, by 
appealing to the authority of nature.  Female and male guild members, for example, proclaimed 
that women were naturally gifted at tasks that required finesse and dexterity.134  This gender 
ideology further defined women’s work as a form of protection from poverty and prostitution.  
The emerging modern society that allowed women and men new spaces for sociability, 
shopping, employment, and commercial exchange, however, elicited deep-seated fears of 
women’s susceptibility to the salacious advances of male customers and their inability to resist 
luxury and fashion.  Rousseau most notably signaled a reprisal of the Classical public/private 
divide in which women performed their civic duties as mothers and wives, only educated enough 
                                                          
133For seventeenth-century salons, see Carolyn Lougee, Le Paradis des Femmes: Women, Salons, and Social 
Stratification in Seventeenth-Century France (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976).  And, for the eighteenth 
century, see the conflicting accounts of Dena Goodman, The Republic of Letters: A Cultural History of the French 
Enlightenment (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1994), and Antoine Lilti, Le monde des salons: Sociabilité et 
mondanité à Paris au XVIIIe siècle (Paris: Fayard, 2005).  And, for an expanded chronological and geographical 
approach, see the essays in Annie Antoine and Julian Mischi, eds., Sociabilité et politique en milieu rural (Rennes: 
Presses Universitaires de Rennes, 2008). 
 
134“Réflexions des Marchands et Maîtresses Lingères de Paris, sur le projet de détruire les Jurandes,” Bibliothèque 
nationale de France, Collection Joly de Fleury, vol. 596, folio 101.  I discuss this evidence further in chapter four.  
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to control their passions, oblige their husbands, and complete domestic chores.135  Rousseau’s 
follower Pierre-Joseph Boudier de Villemaire similarly domesticated virtue and naturalized the 
relationship between men and women, exposing the complementary characteristics of the sexes 
and claiming that one sex was not superior to the other.136     
Boudier’s conception of the sexes’ natural complementarity represented a transition from 
a Classical, vertical model of the sexes—males were superior to females and females were 
inversions of males—to an horizontal model in which each sex had its specific set of 
physiological and socio-moral characteristics (gender and sex were constructed).137  Although 
the latter model was not so strictly rigid, it still found expression in the gendered division of 
labor and politics noted above and in views of women’s intellectual capabilities.  The entry 
“Femme [Morale]” in the Encyclopédie gave voice to the principle of complementarity: “nature 
has set on one side strength, majesty, courage, and reason; on the other, grace and beauty, finesse 
and feeling.”  Eighteenth-century writers argued that women’s physical and moral ability to 
“feel” and their biological responsibility to reproduce cemented their place in society.  For 
Antoine Léonard Thomas, “Society needs direct and spontaneous human compassion to buffer 
                                                          
135In his entry “Citoyen” for the Encyclopédie, Diderot did not extend citizenship to women, children, and servants.  
In Citoyennes: Women and the Ideal of Citizenship in Eighteenth-Century France, Annie K. Smart has questioned 
the public/private divide and underscored the importance of the home as a political space of civic education in 
Rousseau’s and his contemporaries’ works.   
 
136Boudier de Villemaire, L’ami des femmes (1758).  Boudier clearly found women’s intelligence to be inferior to 
men’s (pgs, 57, 65-66).  See the Preface and “Question préliminaire” to the 1788 version of L’ami des femmes, ou 
morale du sexe. 
 
137Thomas Laqueur, Making Sex: Body and Gender from the Greeks to Freud (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press, 1990).  For an analysis of Laqueur’s work and various scholarly applications and criticisms of it, see Dror 
Wahrman, “Change and the Corporeal in Seventeenth- and Eighteenth-Century Gender History: Or, Can Cultural 
History be Rigorous?” Gender & History, vol. 20, n. 3 (2008): 584-602. The following are the major eighteenth-
century sources circumscribing women’s intellectual capacities: Antoine Léonard Thomas, Essai sur le caractère, 
les moeurs et l’esprit des femmes dans les differens siècles (1772); Pierre Roussel, Système physique et moral de la 
femme, ou tableau philosophique de la constitution, de l’état organique, du tempérament, des moeurs, et des 
fonctions propres au sexe (1775); Denis Diderot, Sur les femmes (1772, enlarged 1777 and 1780). 
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the consequences of competition.”138  Supporters of women’s natural occupations, inside or 
outside the corporate order, competed with supporters of women’s domesticity on the plane of 
“nature.”  And, as new commercial, intellectual, and cultural developments helped to usher in 
competing visions of “society,” a totalizing anthropology created spaces for women based on 
both biology and utility.139 
Certainly not all reformers argued for a universal, horizontal set of social relations to 
replace the vertical and hierarchical relations of French society.140  Reference to the natural laws 
of human sociability, for example, could undergird theories of absolutism while simultaneously 
fueling criticisms of the repressive policies of throne and altar.  Similarly, as society became the 
“world of all human interaction,”141 the particular form of government became less important 
than its protection of unconstrained social interaction.  “Society” was not simply an abstract, 
linguistic construction; instead, it was a field of social interaction made increasingly problematic 
because of commerce and consumer culture.  Economic changes brought to the fore the 
instability of the traditional social structure and provided the impetus for a wide-ranging 
discursive space to assess social interaction (as will become clear in Part II).   
                                                          
138Lieselotte Steinbrügge, The Moral Sex: Woman’s Nature in the French Enlightenment, trans. Pamela E. Selwyn 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), 92. 
 
139Ibid., chp. 2. In her magisterial Sexuality, State, and Civil Society in Germany, 1700-1815 (Ithaca, NY: Cornell 
University Press, 1996), Isabel Hull acknowledged the primacy of gender in defining society: “What was a man?  
This question could not, by definition, be answered in any other way than by reference to what he was not, namely, a 
woman...[T]he fiction of natural universals (such as gender) seemed a logical extension of natural law and thus 
could both dissolve the old social status groups and ground the new in a single, efficient stroke.  Gender was 
therefore a powerful tool in the self-creation made necessary by and contingent on the larger moral-political 
endeavor of creating civil society” (225). 
 
140For an analysis of the changing conceptions of “society,” weighing heavily on the nineteenth century, see Jean 
Terrier, Visions of the Social: Society as a Political Project in France, 1750-1950 (Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2011). 
 
141Edelstein, The Enlightenment: A Genealogy, 32. 
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Changing perspectives of society led to an expansion of the social imagination.  
Reformers, social critics, moralists, political economists, and reactionaries all adjusted the lenses 
through which they viewed society.  I challenge the presumption that during the Enlightenment 
“the social was envisaged as an artificial construct resulting, at least in an ideal situation, from 
the voluntary decisions of natural individuals.”142  On the contrary, to many eighteenth-century 
thinkers, society was itself a product of the natural constitution of the individual, not an 
“artificial construct.”  Contemporaries placed human nature and human interaction in a new 
ontological framework.  The increasing contact of physical bodies and the emergence of a new 
language to discuss those bodies (sensationalist physiology) positioned the human body at the 
center of new, or recycled, visions of society.  The new concepts of happiness and utility became 
embedded in human physiology.  On the one hand, individual happiness and social utility could 
be found when one pursued one’s passions and sought to procure “agreeable sensations and 
sentiments.”143  On the other, critics of luxury and the new social spaces of commerce feared that 
too much sensory stimulation would lead to the illusory happiness of materialism and thus blunt 
the feelings of sociability.   
The idea that society was an “artificial construct” clearly indicated a distinct tradition of 
body-politic metaphors, which depicted humans together in society as a part of a grander whole.  
Scholars have often been distracted by the metaphorical language used to describe society and 
neglected the deeper meaning in contemporaries’ use of medical and physiological language.  
They envisioned a properly-functioning human body as necessary for “society,” giving 
                                                          
142Terrier, Visions of the Social, 81. 
 
143Madame du Châtelet, Discours sur le bonheur (1746-7), préface Élisabeth Badinter (Paris: Editions Payot & 
Rivages, 1997), 32-33.   
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“ontological primacy” to the individual’s body.144  The human body itself was fitted perfectly for 
society.  It is important to dwell on sensationalism, which provided a new set of epistemological 
and physiological instruments with which to investigate social interaction. 
The Language of the Body and the Senses 
Society emerged as a conceptual framework to analyze human interaction alongside 
sensationalist philosophy and physiology.  Those who elaborated new visions of society and 
those who sought to reconstruct the traditional social hierarchy both adopted and adapted the 
language of the senses as a particular and universal explanation for human interaction: each 
individual had a unique, organic disposition, but bodies universally operated according to the 
reception and transmission of sensory data.  The universality of feeling preceded the hierarchical 
arrangement of corps and états, and those who upheld the corporate order renegotiated its bases 
by accounting for sensationalism and sensibility.  “Feeling” was as much a characteristic of the 
Enlightenment as “reason,” and the grounding of society in this corporeal property was a 
defining feature of the eighteenth century.145   
                                                          
144I adopted “ontological primacy” from Baker, “Enlightenment and the Institution of Society,” 109. 
 
145There are countless texts that deal with various facets of sensationalism.  In this section, I have profited from the 
following works: John Spink, “ ‘Sentiment,’ ‘sensible,’ ‘sensibilité’: Les mots, les idées, d’après les ‘moralistes’ 
français et britanniques du début du dix-huitième siècle,” Zagadnienia Rodzajow Literackich, 20, n. 1 (1977): 33-47; 
G. J. Barker-Benfield, The Culture of Sensibility: Sex and Society in Eighteenth-Century Britain (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1992); Ann Jessie Van Sant, Eighteenth-Century Sensibility and the Novel: The Senses 
in Social Context (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993); John C. O’Neal, The Authority of Experience: 
Sensationist Theory in the French Enlightenment (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1996); 
Anne C. Vila, Enlightenment and Pathology: Sensibility in the Literature and Medicine of Eighteenth-Century 
France (Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998); Jessica Riskin, Science in the Age of 
Sensibility: The Sentimental Empiricists of the French Enlightenment (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2002); 
Lynn Hunt, Inventing Human Rights: a History (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 2007); Catherine Packham, 
Eighteenth-Century Vitalism: Bodies, Culture, Politics (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012).  The best and most 
recent place to start for sensationalism and sensibility in Enlightenment thought is Henry Martin Lloyd, ed., The 
Discourse of Sensibility: The Knowing Body in the Enlightenment (New York and London: Springer International 
Publishing, 2013). 
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The origins of modern sensationalism lie primarily in the work of John Locke, 
specifically his Essay Concerning Human Understanding (1690).146  Locke posited two 
epistemological positions that would shape the eighteenth century: the generation of knowledge 
through the senses and the need to establish, or commit to, a vocabulary that accurately 
represented reality and matched words to ideas.  Locke sought to purify language of linguistic 
misuse and erroneous associations that stymied cognitive processes.  To do this, he put forward a 
comprehensive epistemology.  Locke argued that, first, the mind was a blank slate born into the 
world without innate ideas, and, second, the body was equipped with sensory receptors, which 
take in impressions from the external environment, and mental faculties that reflect on 
sensations.   
Locke’s Essay created a paradigm for succeeding philosophers and doctors to analyze the 
far-reaching ways that bodies interact with environments (including other human bodies).  He 
referred often to the motion of animal spirits as the cause of our sensations and the impressions 
made on the brain as responsible for memory.  Through Locke, the Cartesian emphasis on 
“animal spirits” and “impressions,” as a result of the impact of matter, would be blended with a 
focus on the nervous system and cerebral autonomy.  The internal operation of reflection, part of 
Locke’s “dualism,” could only manufacture thoughts and images based upon previously-received 
sense data.  “And if these organs, or the Nerves which are the Conduits, to convey them from 
without to their Audience in the Brain, the mind’s presence room (as I may so call it) are any of 
them so disordered, as not to perform their Functions,” Locke noted, “they have no Postern to be 
admitted by; no other way to bring themselves into view, and be perceived by the 
                                                          
146I use “modern” because Aristotle put forward the well-known position that “Nothing is in the intellect that was 
not first in the senses" ("Nihil ist in intellectu quod non prius fuerit in sensu").  Aristotle was not a “sensationalist,” 
but many early-modern thinkers credited him as an empiricist. 
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Understanding.”147  Without a properly-functioning body, the power of the mental faculties 
would be limited.  The senses that absorbed and transmitted sensations had to be appropriately 
“sensible.”    
An abridged, pirated translation of Locke’s Essay appeared in the Bibliothèque 
universelle et historique in 1688, but it was Pierre Coste’s translation twelve years later that 
provided French speakers with Locke’s groundbreaking epistemology.148  There were at least 
seven printings of an abridgment of Locke’s Essay and five translations in the eighteenth 
century.  The gradual dissemination of Locke’s epistemology received impetus from Voltaire’s 
Lettres philosophiques (1734), which contained a chapter dedicated to the man who established 
that “all our ideas come to us via the senses [and who followed] the human mind in all its 
operations.”149  By midcentury, abbé Étienne Bonnot de Condillac had put forward three key 
texts that disseminated, engaged, and criticized Locke’s ideas: Essai sur l’origine des 
connaissances humaines (1746), Traité des systêmes (1749), and Traité des sensations (1754).  
The influence of sensationalism on all forms of knowledge (linguistics, natural philosophy, 
aesthetics, etc.) was complete by the mid-eighteenth century.   
Two examples can make this point.  In his provocative De l’esprit (1758), Claude-Adrien 
Helvétius opened his detailed table of contents with an overarching argument: “The object of this 
discourse is to prove that physical sensibility and memory are the singular causes of all our 
ideas.”  He then explained in the first section that humans have two faculties or passive powers: 
                                                          
147Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, ed. and intro. Peter H. Nidditch (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1975), 121 (II.iii.1).  
 
148There were at least seven printings of an abridgment of Locke’s Essay and five translations in the eighteenth 
century.  For the dissemination of Locke on the continent, particularly France, see John W. Yolton, Locke and 
French Materialism (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991). 
 
149Voltaire, Letters on England, trans. Leonard Tancock (London: Penguin Books, 1980), 64. 
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“One is the faculty of receiving the different impressions that exterior objects make on us, which 
is called physical sensibility.  The other is the faculty of preserving the impressions caused by 
these objects, called memory; and memory is nothing more than a continued, but weakened, 
sensation.”150  Helvétius reduced all mental operations to sensibility, and, through the optic of 
pleasure/pain, he detailed our capacity to judge, act, and behave in socially-useful or avaricious 
ways. 
Two entries for “Sensibilité” in the Encyclopédie provide a second example of the 
extensive usage of sensibility.  The chevalier de Jaucourt briefly explained the moral resonance 
of sensibility (or “sensitivity”) as the “Delicate and tender disposition of the soul that makes it 
easily moved, touched.”151  The Montpellier vitalist Henri Fouquet wrote the lengthier medical 
entry in which he defined sensibilité as  
the faculty of sensing, the sensitive principle, or the sentiment even of the parts, the basis 
and conserving agent of life, animality par excellence, the most beautiful and singular 
phenomenon of nature, etc.  Sensibility is in the living body a property that certain parts 
have of perceiving the impressions of external objects and of producing in consequence 
movements proportional to the degree of intensity of this perception.152   
 
                                                          
150Helvétius, De l’esprit (1758), 1-2.  In his De l’homme (1773), Helvétius extended his analysis of sensibility and 
framed his text largely around the question whether one’s education or organisation shaped one’s intellect more.  He 
concluded the former.  Diderot wrote a famous Réfutation of Helvétius’ Lockean-inspired approach, arguing that 
individual bodies influenced one’s abilities more.  Helvétius criticized Locke for not reducing “thought/reflection” 
to feeling or sensing, but he perhaps upheld Locke’s claim to analyze well-organized bodies. 
 
151Jaucourt, “Sensibilité,” Encyclopédie, XV (1765), 52. Charles T. Wolfe has recently suggested that “sensitivity” is 
a better translation of sensibilité, since the form specifically means “the property of organic beings to sense and 
respond to stimuli or impressions.”  Wolfe, “Sensibility as Vital Force or as Property of Matter in Mid-Eighteenth 
Century Debates,” in The Discourse of Sensibility, ed. Lloyd, 147-170, here 148, n. 3. 
 
152Fouquet, “Sensibilité, Sentiment” (Médecin), Encyclopédie, XV (1765), 38.  See also Capucine Lebreton, “Être 
vivant, Être sensible: Le Rôle de la Sensibilité dans le Vitalisme des Lumières,” in Repenser le Vitalisme, ed. Pascal 
Nouvel, 145-156 (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 2011). 
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Sensibility in Fouquet’s understanding incorporated both the ability to receive sensations and act 
on or respond to those sensations.  Locke’s quest to clarify cognitive processes and ground 
epistemology in the senses quickly grew to involve nearly all facets of human existence. 
Although Locke’s influence on the eighteenth century was matched only by Isaac 
Newton’s, it is true that the moral and physiological language of the senses had an alternative 
history.  Literary works by Madeleine de Scudéry and the comtesse de LaFayette initiated a 
conceptual shift in the language and psychology of the passions.  Joan DeJean has argued that in 
France a new “affective vocabulary and a revised vision of emotional structure” came to fruition 
in the second half of the seventeenth century.153  She observed that “émotion and affection 
acquired medical significance only once their implantation in the psychological realm had been 
assured.”154  Scudéry and LaFayette fixed “sentiment” and “tenderness” into a semantic cluster 
that redefined the passions and affections psychologically as part of an individual’s interior and 
exterior experiences.  The “emphasis on shared experience” created in the process of reading 
novels grew to define “sentiment,” which soon found expression in medical theory that linked 
the “impressions” made by external objects on the senses to the activities and feelings of the 
soul.155  In this case, Locke’s work was not the catalyst.  More importantly, both Locke’s 
                                                          
153DeJean, Ancients versus Moderns, 109. 
 
154Ibid., 82. DeJean’s pitch contrasts G.S. Rousseau’s argument that Locke’s Essay Concerning Human 
Understanding achieved paradigmatic status and allowed for the application of the physical sciences to aesthetic, 
social, and moral realms. Aesthetic sensibility and sentimentalism were posterior to Locke and other medical doctors 
such as Thomas Willis. G. S. Rousseau, “Nerves, Spirits, and Fibres: Towards Defining the Origins of Sensibility,” 
in Studies in the Eighteenth Century, III: Papers Presented at the Third David Nichol Smith Memorial Seminar, 
Canberra 1973, eds. R. F. Brissenden and J. Eade (Canberra: Australian National University Press, 1976).  For an 
analysis of sensibility as a new set of cognitive standards in natural philosophy, more thoroughly encompassing 
“nature” than previous mechanical and micro-corpuscular models, see Stephen Gaukroger, The Collapse of 
Mechanism and the Rise of Sensibility (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), chps. 6, 11.  Gaukroger accepts 
DeJean’s view of the role of the mid-seventeenth century novel in this shift. 
 
155For a recent conception of the “relational self,” see Jerrold Seigel, The Idea of the Self: Thought and Experience 
in Western Europe since the Seventeenth Century (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005). 
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epistemology and the literary analysis of the passions and the senses resounded with social 
repercussions. 
The notion that human beings were feeling entities shaped natural philosophy, 
physiology, medicine, and theories of morality.  Sensationalism imbricated different realms of 
knowledge and entwined the physical body and morality.  From the 1740s, the human 
characteristic of sensibility was part of a “more dynamic notion of man, man as a unified 
biological organism...Thought and feeling (in all their modes) take their place alongside 
properties such as irritability, muscular contractions, blood flow, and numerous physical 
processes, taking place in organs, nerves, and brain.”156  Pierre-Louis Moreau de Maupertuis, 
Julien Offray de la Mettrie, Charles Bonnet, and Denis Diderot, among innumerable others, 
constructed different roles for sensibility within grand metaphysical questions about the nature of 
the human body and the properties of matter.  Following Newton’s work on gravitation and 
attraction, natural philosophers recalibrated their positions regarding the forces internal or 
external to matter.  The discovery of Trembley’s self-reproducing polyp in 1744 demonstrated 
that matter itself could possess the qualities of autogeneration or automobility, and the “thinking 
matter” debate, which stemmed from a provocative query by Locke, put defenders of an 
immortal and immaterial soul further on their heels.157  Natural philosophers sought to 
understand the stages and vital processes of life—generation, development of the organs, 
senescence, sensibility, thought—and, through a variety of experiments and philosophical 
                                                          
156Yolton, Locke and French Materialism, 205. A great place to start for medical and metaphysical debates on the 
body and soul is Thomas S. Hall, Ideas of Life and Matter: Studies in the History of General Physiology, 600 B. C. 
– 1900 A. D. 2 vols. (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1969). 
 
157Locke’s statement: “God can, if he pleases, superadd to matter a faculty of thinking.”  John Yolton, Thinking 
Matter: Materialism in Eighteenth-Century Britain (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1984), and, for the “thinking matter” 
debate in France, see Yolton, Locke and French Materialism, and Jonathan Israel, Radical Enlightenment, chp. 37 
and Enlightenment Contested, chps. 29, 33. 
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conjectures, many thinkers found in the notion of organisation a way to account for these 
processes.  Organisation became both a mechanical means of describing the arrangement of the 
organs and a more active way of linking that arrangement to larger vital properties in humans 
and animals (e.g. Bordeu’s metaphor of the swarm of bees).158  To uncover the process of 
organisation or explain the ways in which a conglomeration of organs, nerves, muscles, and 
tissues gave rise to thought and sensibility was the key to understanding human life, morality, 
and society.   
The implications of new medical and philosophical speculation brought to the fore a 
number of critical questions about the vivifying principles of human life.  Where did sensibility 
fit in corporeal organisation?  Was sensibility a product of organisation, or did it inhere in 
matter itself?  Could the sensibility of matter explain the generation of life without spiritual 
infusion?  Could a natural, non-religious ethics be derived from the sensibility of an organized 
body?  These questions increased the pressure on religious thinkers to demonstrate the location 
and function of the soul in a body clearly organized, activated, and mobilized by natural 
procedures.   
                                                          
158Although there is a growing recognition of the importance of organisation (alongside matière organisée and 
corps organisé) to the vocabulary of the eighteenth century, it has not yet received a thorough treatment that 
analyzes its semantic evolution from the seventeenth century and use in a wide range of metaphysical, medical, 
religious, and socio-moral arenas.  See Karl Figlio, “The Metaphor of Organization: An Historiographical 
Perspective on the Bio-Medical Sciences of the Early Nineteenth Century,” History of Science 14 (1976): 17-53; 
Joseph Schiller, La notion d'organisation dans l'histoire de la biologie (Paris: Maloine S. A. éditeur, 1978); 
Geneviève Rodis-Lewis, "Limitations of the Mechanical Model in the Cartesian Conception of the Organism," in 
Descartes: Critical and Interpretive Essays. ed. Michael Hooker, 152-170 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University 
Press, 1978); L.S. Jacyna, “Immanence or Transcendence: Theories of Life and Organization in Britain, 1790-
1835,” ISIS 74 (1983): 311-329; Roselyne Rey, Naissance et Développement du vitalisme en France, de la deuxième 
moitié du 18e siècle à la fin du Premier Empire (Oxford: Voltaire Foundation, 2000); Harmut Hecht, ed., Julien 
Offray de La Mettrie: Ansichten und Einsichten (Berlin: BWV, Berliner Wissenschafts-Verlag, 2004); Peter Hanns 
Reill, Vitalizing Nature in the Enlightenment (Berkeley, Los Angeles, and London: University of California Press, 
2005); Ann Thomson, Bodies of Thought: Science, Religion, and the Soul in the Early Enlightenment (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2008); Charles T. Wolfe, “Organisation ou organisme?  L’individuation organique selon le 
vitalisme montpelliérain,” Dix-huitième siècle 41 (2009): 99-119; Jonathan Sheehan and Dror Wahrman, Invisible 
Hands: Self-Organization and the Eighteenth Century (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2015), esp. chps. 4-5. 
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Sensibility figured prominently in the work of medical doctors too.  Newton’s 
understanding of active matter and Trembley’s polyp showed that mechanical descriptions of the 
body were incapable of explaining vital processes.  Medical doctors looked to forces or 
properties inherent in the organs themselves to explain growth and development, ratiocination 
and the formation of sensory networks.  Antoine Le Camus (1753) ostensibly conceived a 
mechanical body, but he endowed the body’s fibers with three inherent properties—tonic force, 
elasticity, muscular force—and observed that sensibility was the defining property of life (“the 
aptitude to receive impressions from objects”).159  Albrecht von Haller's (re)discovery of the 
irritability of muscular fibers and the sensibility of nerves provided a framework for subsequent 
medical doctors and natural philosophers to link anatomical structure, physiological function, 
and metaphysical speculation (1752).160  Organic parts were irritable if they contracted upon 
physical provocation, and sensible parts were responsible for transmitting external impressions to 
the soul within the brain, according to Haller. 
The most well-known medical response in the debate over which vital forces animate the 
body arose in Montpellier with a loose confederation of “vitalists,” who defined sympathy in 
physiological terms.161  For vitalist physicians Théophile de Bordeu, Paul-Joseph Barthez, Henri 
                                                          
159Mary Terrall, “Material Impressions: Conception, Sensibility, and Inheritance,” in Vital Matters: Eighteenth-
Century Views of Conception, Life, and Death, eds. Helen Deutsch and Mary Terrall, 109-29 (Toronto: University of 
Toronto Press, 2012), 119. 
 
160The inherent mobility and activity of matter was advanced in the seventeenth century by Francis Glisson.  See two 
works by Guido Giglioni, "Anatomist Atheist? The 'Hylozoistic' Foundations of Francis Glisson's Anatomical 
Research," in Religio Medici: Medicine and Religion in Seventeenth-Century England, eds. Ole Peter Grell and 
Andrew Cunningham, 115-135 (Brookfield, VT: Ashgate Publishing Company and Aldershot, England: Scolar 
Press, 1996), and "Panpsychism versus Hylozoism: An Interpretation of Some Seventeenth-Century Doctrines of 
Universal Animation," Acta Comeniana 11 (1995): 25-45.  Haller’s work was contested by Robert Whytt in 
Edinburgh for positing a principle of consciousness in the brain and by the Montpellier vitalists who objected to 
experimental procedures because they disrupted vital processes and created an artificial environment. For Haller, see 
Hubert Steinke, Irritating Experiments: Haller’s Concept and the European Controversy on Irritability and 
Sensibility, 1750–90 (Amsterdam and New York: Rodopi, 2005). 
 
161See Elizabeth Williams’ two works, The Physical and the Moral: Anthropology, Physiology, and  
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Fouquet, and Jean-Joseph Ménuret de Chambaud, sensibility was the foundational and 
spontaneous property of life, from organic fibers to organs.  They did not find Haller’s 
distinction between irritability and sensibility to be a productive one.  Sensibility alone 
accounted for both the reception of sensory data and reaction of internal organs to stimulation.  
The universality of sensibility allowed for a materialist conception of humans necessitating no 
spiritual principle to guide morality or vitalize bodies.162   
In Bordeu’s view, the nerves were constantly tense, ready to receive an impulse that they 
transformed and transmitted throughout the interior fibers, tissues, organs, and glands.  Bordeu 
considered organs to be independent; they were sensible and possessed an ability to “feel” their 
own unique directives.  Sympathy became the means of achieving organisation for the 
Montpellier vitalists, another polysemous term in their medical lexicon that overlapped with 
socio-moral understandings of sensibility.  Sympathy was the ability of internal organs to 
perceive the movement of neighboring organs.  Sympathy was also the action that held together 
and perpetuated human life, as illustrated by the swarm of bees metaphor.  But, organs that were 
overly sympathetic created a constant state of heightened sensibility and thus affective 
disorder.163  Whether as one of at least two corporeal attributes, according to Haller, or the 
                                                          
Philosophical medicine in France, 1750-1850 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), and A Cultural 
History of Medical Vitalism in Enlightenment Montpellier (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2003); Rey, Naissance et 
Développement du vitalisme en France; Reill, Vitalizing Nature in the Enlightenment. 
 
162See Dominique Boury, “Irritability and Sensibility: Key Concepts in Assessing the Medical Doctrines of Haller 
and Bordeu,” Science in Context 21.4 (2008): 521–535.   
 
163Elizabeth Williams, The Physical and the Moral, described Bordeu’s overall approach in the following way: “Life 
was not, then, a unitary phenomenon of the body but the end result of the activities and the interdependent properties 
of the individual organs.  The ‘lives’ of all the organs of the body functioned in constant reciprocal relations” (38).  
See also, Charles T. Wolfe and Motoichi Terada, “The Animal Economy as Object and Program in Montpellier 
Vitalism,” Science in Context 21.4 (2008): 537-79, and Philippe Huneman, “Montpellier Vitalism and the 
Emergence of Alienism (1750-1800): The Case of the Passions,” in Ibid:  615-647.   
Sympathy was most famously and thoroughly explored by Adam Smith in The Theory of Moral Sentiments 
(1759, updated a number of times through 1790).  The faculty of sympathy, for Smith, relied on the disposition of 
each individual’s body and their imaginative capacity to place themselves in the bodies of others.  Sympathy was 
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fundamental principle of life, as for the vitalists, sensibility linked interior organs, exterior 
sensations, and physical contact between humans. 
 The natural and spontaneous ability to feel was key to the development of literature in 
the late-seventeenth and early-eighteenth centuries.  As philosophers searched for a moral sense 
or interior sentiment, derived in part from Locke’s view of reflection as an “interior sentiment,” 
novelists created memorable and identifiable characters whose fictional experiences elicited 
emotion and sympathy from readers.  Novels from Madeleine de Scudéry’s Artamène, ou le 
grand Cyrus (1649-1653) to Samuel Richardson’s Clarissa (1748) and Rousseau’s La Nouvelle 
Héloïse (1762) were characterized as “sentimental,” pertaining to their affective qualities 
operating through the senses and binding the moral to the physical.164  Especially in the 
epistolary novels of Richardson and Rousseau, readers shared the experiences of the characters 
and, in the process, constructed their own subjectivity as sensual beings by recognizing the 
emotional autonomy of others (empathy).165  In contrast to the prevailing framework of the 
emotions provided by Descartes—solitary, internal disruptions of the soul or passion—emotions 
                                                          
therefore a social necessity.  See Part I, sections 1-2.  See Evelyn L. Forget, “Evocations of Sympathy: Sympathetic 
Imagery in Eighteenth-Century Social Theory and Physiology,” in Oeconomies in the Age of Newton, eds. Neil De 
Marchi and Margaret Schabas, 282-308 (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2003). 
 
164Jessica Riskin, Science in the Age of Sensibility, defined “sentiment” as an “emotional ‘movement’ in response to 
a physical sensation” (1) and used it to characterize a distinct strand of empiricism that relied upon sentimental 
responses alongside, or in contrast to, methodological procedures.  Sarah Knott has recognized that physicians too 
were supposed to display the proper amount of moral sensibility in their profession: Sensibility and the American 
Revolution (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press and the Omuhundro Institute, 2008), chp. 2. 
 
165DeJean, Ancients versus Moderns, chp. 3; O’Neal, The Authority of Experience, Part II; Hunt, Inventing Human 
Rights, chp. 1.  DeJean highlighted the second half of the seventeenth century as the rise of subjectivity through 
reading, whereas Hunt argued that it was the particular narrative form of epistolary novels and their often socially-
inferior characters that gave birth to empathy.  To the latter point, in an analysis of reader responses to La Nouvelle 
Héloïse, Robert Darnton noted a “young woman [who] wrote that she could identify with Rousseau’s characters, 
unlike those in all the other novels she had read, because they did not occupy a specific social station but rather 
represented a general way of thinking and feeling, one that everyone could apply to their own lives and thus become 
more virtuous.”  Darnton, “Readers Respond to Rousseau: The Fabrication of Romantic Sensitivity,” in his The 
Great Cat Massacre and Other Episodes in French Cultural History, 215-256 (New York: Vintage Books, 1984), 
247. 
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became relational and interactive, the internal became externalized and the external 
internalized.166   
“Sentiment” and “sympathy” became moral guides in sensationalist physiology, rather 
than the erratic passions, which deepened the connection between the well-organized, feeling 
body and a refined, elevated, or sociable morality.  Although sensibility, compassion, sympathy, 
and fellow-feeling were considered natural in humans, these qualities still needed to be 
cultivated.  This education could take place either at home, in le monde, or even privately by 
reading sentimental novels.167  The moral realm of feeling was as instrumental to 
“enlightenment” as reason.168 
Through three distinct paths—Locke’s epistemology, the new “affective vocabulary” 
propounded by late-seventeenth-century novelists, and medical conceptions of organisation—the 
ability to feel became the sine qua non of epistemology and morality.  In 1746, Marquis 
d’Argens challenged the Cartesian heritage and proclaimed: “I believe that one could just as 
easily prove existence by saying I sense, therefore I am, as by saying I think, therefore I am.”169  
The moral and epistemological centrality of “feeling” merged with the embryonic concept of 
society by the 1750s.  Linking the two not only prioritized the corporeal aspects of the social 
                                                          
166DeJean, Ancients versus Moderns, 92.   
 
167It should be said that the latter evoked fears that young girls would create idealistic illusions and perform reading 
practices in solitary environments away from society.  Jan Goldstein, The Post-Revolutionary Self: Politics and 
Psyche in France, 1750-1850 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2005), 55-59, and Hunt, Inventing 
Human Rights, 50-58.  For one example, Abbé Charles Batteux found novels to be dangerous to young girls because 
they powerfully stir the passions: Les Beaux arts réduits à un seul principe (1746).  
 
168The Enlightenment’s most influential polymath, Diderot, wondered “How unfortunate would those children be 
who had never seen their parents’ tears flow at the recounting of a generous action.” Diderot’s entry “Locke, 
philosophie de” in the Encyclopédie IX (1765), quoted in Terrall, “Material Impressions: Conception, Sensibility, 
and Inheritance,” 110-111. 
 
169Quoted in David W. Bates, Enlightenment Aberrations: Error and Revolution in France (Ithaca, NY: Cornell 
University Press, 2002), 42. 
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hierarchy and états, and reinvigorated images of the body politic, but the combination also forced 
the human body to the forefront of social thought.  If society was to be the fundamental ground 
of human interaction, then each individual’s sensory experience constituted the origins of their 
ability to interact.  Society was an empty space that necessitated embodiment; the organizing 
principle, so to speak, of society came to be organisation itself.   
Embodying Society: Diderot, the Blind, and Natural Law 
Denis Diderot merged a new understanding of society with the human body, and his work 
serves as a representative vignette of the changes articulated in this chapter.  Not only did he 
have a life-long interest in all aspects of the “feeling” body, but he nearly single-handedly 
brought the word “social” into the French lexicon.170  Like many of his contemporaries, Diderot 
struggled with the question whether sensibility was a product of organisation or a property of 
matter.  He nevertheless linked matter, thought, and social action through sensibility: “Assuming 
that sensibility were indeed the first germ (or seed) of thought, if it were a general property of 
matter; if, distributed unequally through all of nature, it acted with more or less energy according 
to the variety of organization.  What disturbing consequence could we draw from that?  None at 
all.  Man will always be what he is, judged by the good and the bad uses he makes of his 
faculties.”171  Diderot would go on to conclude in his unpublished Le Rêve de d’Alembert (1769) 
that the ability to feel and perceive were the radical properties of organic matter and corporeal 
components of humans.  He thus made an argument similar to that of Théophile de Bordeu, who 
was the primary character in Le Rêve.  Human life resulted from the interdependence of sensible, 
                                                          
170Mintzker, "'A Word Newly Introduced into Language',” 508-513.    
 
171Diderot’s entry “Locke, philosophie de” in the Encyclopédie IX (1765), quoted in Terrall, “Material Impressions: 
Conception, Sensibility, and Inheritance,” 111. 
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organic parts; human thought and social commerce were forged simultaneously through the 
interaction of the senses with different environments and through internal mechanisms of 
communication converting sensory data into cognitive thought and moral action.172  
Early in his literary career, Diderot was already focused on the necessary relationship 
between a healthy, sensual body and the circulation of social passions and virtues.  In his Lettre 
sur les aveugles (1749), Diderot addressed the long-standing Molyneux problem—whether a 
person blind from birth, who became suddenly capable of sight, could recognize objects having 
had no sensory experience of them or innate ideas.  Diderot slipped into his analysis a social 
interpretation of the blind.173  Much of his text is taken up with two blind men, notably the 
savant Nicholas Saunderson (Lucasian professor of Mathematics at Cambridge).174  The blind, 
Diderot concluded, reasoned like geometers, abstractly and in solitude.  Caught up in a solipsistic 
world exemplified by the disembodied Cartesian “ego,” the blind were capable of sensations but 
not “feelings.”  They lacked the ability to convert external, physiological sensations into the 
moral realm of sensibilité. Their antisocial disposition and absence of imagination as a cognitive 
faculty deprived them of empathy.175   
At a moment when Diderot and French thinkers in general increasingly worried about the 
nature of “society,” the blind seemed to combine the worst features of sensory deprivation and an 
                                                          
172The “internal mechanisms of communication” were conceptualized by the action/reaction dyad.  For the place of 
action/reaction in eighteenth-century philosophy and physiology, see Jean Starobinski, Action and Reaction: The 
Life and Adventures of a Couple, trans. Sophie Hawkes (New York: Zone Books, 2003). 
 
173This paragraph owes much to Riskin, Science in the Age of Sensibility, chp. 2. 
 
174I have used Diderot’s Letters on the Blind contained in Diderot, Thoughts on the Interpretation of Nature and 
Other Philosophical Works, intro. and annotated David Adams (Manchester: Clinamen Press, 1999).  In 1782-3, 
Diderot appended a short “Addition to the preceding letter” in which he discussed the blind niece of his lover Sophie 
Volland, Madamoiselle Melanie de Salignac. 
 
175Ibid., 158, 197. 
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overly-rationalistic, mathematical mind. The Molyneux problem became transformed in the 
hands of Diderot and his French contemporaries.  The problem of blindness revolved around the 
dual meaning of sensibility—linking moral sensibility to physical sensibility—and hinged on the 
importance of both for social interaction.  The blind were often “inhumane,” even though their 
other senses were abnormally heightened.176  As Diderot moved toward a Vitalist-tinged 
materialism and non-religious ethics, he hinted that “the state of our organs and our senses has a 
great influence on our metaphysics and our morality…Our virtues depend so much on the 
sensations we receive and the degree by which we are affected by external things.”177  Deprived 
of sight, the blind operate at both a sensory and moral deficit.   
The ability to feel linked the physical and the moral together, replacing the previous 
binary of mind(soul)/body.178  Instead of two separate substances or two separate faculties 
working in tandem, sensibility united the physical and the moral on one epistemological and 
moral spectrum.  Blindness or deafness impaired one’s sensory experience and thus limited the 
cultivation of sympathy or social propriety.  Although philosophes, and often a number of their 
religious opponents, touted reason as the tool of reform and path to truth, “feeling” was an 
equally important corporeal instrument.   
                                                          
176Ibid., 156, 194.  For heightened senses of the blind, see 154, 171, 195.  Diderot interviewed a man from Puisaux 
“born blind” who, despite a rambunctious and pleasurable youth, spent his days shut up at home, preferring to keep 
waking hours opposite his kin so as not to be in the way (150). 
 
177Ibid., 155-156. 
 
178Sergio Moravia, “‘Moral’ – ‘Physique’: genesis and evolution of a ‘rapport’,” in Enlightenment Studies in honour 
of Lester G. Crocker, eds. Alfred J. Bingham and Virgil W. Topazio, 163-174 (Oxford: The Voltaire Foundation, 
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The Encyclopédie articles “Droit naturel” (Diderot) and “Loi naturelle” (unknown) 
illustrate the tension of balancing both corporeal properties.179  “Droit naturel” is generally 
considered important to eighteenth-century political thought because Diderot put forward an 
interpretation of the general will prior to Rousseau’s Du contrat social (1762).  Within his vague 
description of the general will and its role in clarifying natural rights, he signaled his 
commitment to both “reason” (as the “means for discovering truth”) and “feeling.”  Diderot 
appealed to the “general will” to define the parameters of natural rights.  Human choices and 
actions were not the product of “incorporeal substances” but of the passions and needs that 
humans feel (se sentir).  Those who do not conform to “truth” once it is discovered through the 
application of reason are “mad” (insensé), according to Diderot.  And, the unfeeling enemy of 
the human race “listens” only to his private will, while “the general will is in each individual a 
pure act of understanding that reasons in the silence of the passions about what man can demand 
of his fellow man.”  Diderot’s sensual language here belied his insistence on reason.  In his 
opening paragraph, he suggested that “natural law” was a term familiar to all because it was an 
“interior feeling” (sentiment intérieur).180  Diderot naturalized a previously spiritual concept to 
assert that natural law was virtually innate.  Humans “felt” social bonds, and Diderot expected 
                                                          
179Diderot, “Droit naturel” (morale), Encyclopédie, ou dictionnaire raisonné des sciences, des arts et des métiers, 
etc., vol. X (1755): 115-116, eds. Denis Diderot and Jean le Rond d'Alembert (University of Chicago: ARTFL 
Encyclopédie Project, Spring 2013 Edition), Robert Morrissey (ed), http://encyclopedie.uchicago.edu/. 
 
180The term sentiment intérieur was not specific to sensationalist philosophy and was used from at least the late- 
seventeenth century to the early nineteenth.  Its meaning changed depending on user and context, but essentially it 
connoted a locus of emotion, selfhood, or conscience (either divinely or naturally drawing individuals toward the 
good).  By midcentury, the notion of a sentiment intérieur embraced both spiritual and sensual understandings.  See 
Hunt, Inventing Human Rights, 26-7, 56.  The Chevalier de Jaucourt used the same phrase in his article to describe 
civilité (an “interior feeling consistent with reason”): “Civilité, Politesse, Affabilité” (Grammaire, Morale), 
Encyclopédie, ou dictionnaire raisonné des sciences, des arts et des métiers, etc., vol. III (1753): 497, eds. Denis 
Diderot and Jean le Rond d'Alembert, (University of Chicago: ARTFL Encyclopédie Project, Spring 2013 Edition), 
Robert Morrissey (ed), http://encyclopedie.uchicago.edu/.  Jacques-Henri Meister, to be discussed in chp. 3, defined 
“conscience” as the “interior sentiment” that agrees or disagrees with the nature of our being.  Meister, De la morale 
naturelle, Du Bonheur des Sots (Kessinger Legacy Reprints, 2011), 69. 
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the arguments he put forward to be acceptable to “sensible men” (hommes sensés).  While 
Diderot seemed to harness the power of reason as a superior weapon against the intractable and 
dangerous passions, his position is less clear when we observe the consistent appeal to the senses 
and an interior feeling.  Like the blind and deaf, humans who resisted the powerful, rational call 
of natural law were lacking in sense; the ability to feel manifested selfhood and recognition of 
the autonomy of others. 
The author of the Encyclopédie article “Loi naturelle” similarly mixed reason and feeling 
to arrive at a moral truth.181  The truth of natural law could be found through reason, according to 
the unknown author; it was written at “the bottom of our soul” and engraved on our hearts “in 
characters so beautiful, expressions so strong, and traces [traits] so luminous that it cannot be 
rendered unrecognizable.”182  The body is metaphorically imprinted with the tenets of natural 
law, but the author’s vocabulary subtly slid from metaphor to ontological supposition.  In 
translating a passage from Cicero’s De Legibus (On the Laws), the author used a specific phrase 
connoting a physiological process that did not appear in Cicero: “Natural law is not an invention 
of the human mind, nor is it an arbitrary establishment made by the people [les peuples]; natural 
law is the impression of eternal reason that governs the universe.”  By invoking the concept of an 
“impression,” the author called to mind one process by which external sensory data was thought 
to be transmitted to the brain via the animal spirits or an ethereal fluid, which create grooves, 
traces, or impressions on the brain.  Natural law as a moral principle, then, required the body to 
                                                          
181Unknown, “Loi naturelle” (morale), Encyclopédie, ou dictionnaire raisonné des sciences, des arts et des métiers, 
etc., vol. IX (1765): 665-666, eds. Denis Diderot and Jean le Rond d'Alembert, (University of Chicago: ARTFL 
Encyclopédie Project, Spring 2013 Edition), Robert Morrissey (ed), http://encyclopedie.uchicago.edu/. 
 
182One of the definitions for “trait” put forward in the Dictionnaire de l'Académie française (fourth edition, 1762) 
was “une ligne qu’on trace avec la plume.”  The Dictionnaire also accessed through the ARTFL site. 
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receive and access impressions.  Even if strong passions can hide or render numb the impression 
of eternal reason, the author declared, the impression itself was ineffaceable.   
As a brief survey of Diderot’s work demonstrates, instead of a shift from rationalism to 
sensationalism, or “sensualism,” it is perhaps better to depict the eighteenth century as a period 
of overlap.183  The key was the new language of “feeling” that united the physiological, moral, 
and social.  Philosophers, moralists, political economists, and doctors developed an “alertness to 
the sensory environment” unique to the eighteenth century.184  The bodies moving in society 
received and sent out sensory transmissions, and their material interaction affected all of the 
senses.185  Those same bodies, as we will see in Part II, were also affected by the plethora of 
material objects that characterized commercial society.  Passions were no longer considered 
inherently irrational, and opinions differed as to how one controlled the passions: from a 
rationalist’s ability to will them away to a materialist’s acceptance that certain organisations 
simply “felt” at an accelerated rate or in an abnormal manner.186  Thinkers unwilling to abandon 
either institutionalized religion (Catholic or Protestant) or some form of spirituality navigated 
                                                          
183Steinbrügge, The Moral Sex.  Like sensationalism, there was never a singular “rationalism” either.  As with 
Diderot, Jean-Baptiste-Antoine Suard condensed the activities of reason and feeling: “There are virtues that are the 
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184Alain Corbin, The Foul and the Fragrant: Odour and the Social Imagination, trans. Miriam Kochan (London: 
Picador, 1994), 5-6. 
 
185For an analysis of corporeal functions and the senses in support of and in contrast to a Cartesian paradigm, see 
Erec Koch, The Aesthetic Body: Passions, Sensibility, and Corporeality in Seventeenth-Century France (Newark, 
DE: University of Delaware Press, 2008). 
 
186For example, Julien Offray de La Mettrie wrote: “For what equity is there to take the life of a wretch, who is the 
slave of the blood galloping in his veins, as the hand of a watch is the slave of the works which make it move?”  
Anti-Seneca, or the Sovereign Good (Discours sur le bonheur), in Machine Man and other writings, ed. and trans. 
Ann Thomson (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 143.  For a recent look at the pessimism regarding 
the rational ability to control passions, see E. C. Spary, Eating the Enlightenment: Food and the Sciences in Paris, 
1670-1760 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2012), chp. 5.   
86 
 
through corporeal properties to account for an “internal feeling” and to demonstrate the 
relationship between society and the body.  Even supporters of the social hierarchy could not 
dismiss the language of the senses and the necessity of a well-organized body to ensure the 
fluidity of social interaction.       
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Chapter 3 
The Natural Law of Feeling Beings 
With the pervasive influence of sensationalist physiology and the language of the senses, 
the realms of cognition and morality became indivisible.  From midcentury to the 1780s, 
attention to sensibility generated a variety of opinions regarding social interaction.  The plane of 
contention shifted to the corporeal, as knowledge of the body became integral for thinkers who 
wanted to populate society with sympathetic, sensible bodies.  As Diderot indicated in “Droit 
naturel,” natural law was not only a clear and distinct idea, but it was also a “feeling” that human 
beings shared.  Diderot’s contemporaries Abbé François-André-Adrien Pluquet, Dominique-
Joseph Garat, and Jacques-Henri Meister similarly argued that natural law could be felt.  For 
them, nature intended humans to be happy, which they defined as feeling the benefits of social 
commerce.  The “natural law of feeling beings” was to seek out happiness in the company of 
others.  This process, though, grew from the connection between moral and physical sensibility.  
Without a body calibrated to properly absorb the verbal and non-verbal forms of social 
interaction (e.g. kindness, empathy), society would deteriorate into a set of disorganized beings. 
The bedrock of the social order and social interaction was the sensible body. 
*** 
Although Pluquet, Garat, and Meister were intellectually disparate, they highlighted the 
primacy of the corporeal in the new thinking about society.  In fact, their distinctiveness lends 
credence to the argument that the corporeal became the contested terrain of social interaction.  
Additionally, none of these thinkers were trained doctors, nor could they be considered 
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médecins-philosophes.  Their willingness to marshal corporeal evidence cannot be viewed as a 
product of medical training.  Therefore, their knowledge of physiology and the senses, and their 
application of that knowledge to society, is a sign that eighteenth-century social thought had 
come to be rooted in the human body.   
Abbé François-André-Adrien Pluquet (1716-1790) cast the natural pursuit of happiness in 
the guiding hand of a Supreme Being.187  Pluquet’s extensive De la sociabilité (1767) laid a 
corporeal foundation for social interaction that transcended potential religious and political 
disagreements and blurred the line between “feeling” and “reason.”  De la sociabilité also 
garnered much attention as an implied critique of Rousseau’s view of man as not naturally 
sociable in Discours sur l’origine et fondemens de l’inégalité parmi les hommes (1755).  
Pluquet’s most famous works, however, attacked heterodox thought: Examen du fatalisme, ou 
Exposition et réfutation des différents systèmes de fatalism, 3 vols. (1757) and Dictionnaire des 
hérésies (1762).188  By the time he published De la sociabilité, Pluquet had become a well-
respected man of letters, even refusing an offer to contribute to the Encyclopédie, and was 
appointed professor of moral theology at the Collège de France (1766).189  Pluquet would later 
                                                          
187See De la sociabilité, Vol. I, Section II, chp 2, article XI, 380-399. 
188See Jonathan Israel, Enlightenment Contested: Philosophy, Modernity, and the Emancipation of Man, 1670-1752 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006); Ann Thomson, Bodies of Thought: Science, Religion, and the Soul in the 
Early Enlightenment (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 212-3; Patrick Coleman, "The Enlightened 
Orthodoxy of the Abbé Pluquet," in Histories of Heresy in Early Modern Europe: For, Against, and Beyond 
Persecution and Toleration, ed. John Christian Laursen, 223-238 (New York, NY: Palgrave MacMillan, 2002).  
Pluquet was certainly not alone in his fears of seventeenth- and eighteenth-century philosophy.  See also the classic 
work of R. R. Palmer, Catholics and Unbelievers in Eighteenth-Century France (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton 
University Press, 1939); Darrin M. McMahon, Enemies of the Enlightenment: The French Counter-Enlightenment 
and the Making of Modernity (Oxford University Press, 2001); Guy Chaussinaud-Nogaret, Comment Peut-on Être 
un Intellectuel au Siècle des Lumières? (Brussels: André Versailles, 2011), 83-97. 
189The “invitation” is still speculative.  According to Patrick Coleman, Pluquet’s Dictionnaire des hérésies 
resembles the organization and cross-referencing strategy of the Encyclopédie.  Coleman, "The Enlightened 
Orthodoxy of the Abbé Pluquet," 224.  Pluquet was certainly not an opponent of natural philosophy; he praised 
Bacon, Gassendi, and Descartes (De la sociabilité, II, 6). 
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bring the weight of his crusade against materialism and his passionate plea for providential, 
corporeally-grounded sociability to bear on the problem of luxury in Traité philosophique et 
politique sur le luxe (1786).  De la sociabilité signifies Pluquet’s initial efforts to portray his 
criticisms of materialism and the burgeoning philosophes in a social frame, but it also 
demonstrates how he adapted contemporary theories of the body to instantiate his fears of social 
disorder.  By collapsing together theological, metaphysical, social, and physiological ideas, abbé 
Pluquet sought to take back the principles of sensibilité and organisation so crucial to his 
materialist counterparts.190  
In contrast to Pluquet, Dominique-Joseph Garat (1749-1833) and Jacques-Henri Meister 
(1744-1826) argued that the goal of society should be the happiness of individuals, eschewing 
the need for supernatural guidance or a divinely-sanctioned hierarchy.191  Garat’s notable Éloges 
to abbé Suger (1779) and Michel de l’Hôpital (1778) represent the early socio-political thought 
of a future revolutionary; they represent too his process of using the corporeal to work through 
elements of the French past and present.  During the French Revolution, Garat served in two 
ministerial roles under the Republic and was a member of the Idéologue group after the 
establishment of the Directory.192  In this capacity, Garat created and briefly taught a course at 
                                                          
190For Pluquet on luxury and sociability, see Henry C. Clark, Compass of Society: Commerce and Absolutism in 
Old-Regime France (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2007), chp. 8, and his “Commerce, Sociability, and the Public 
Sphere: Morellet vs. Pluquet on Luxury,” Eighteenth-Century Life, 22.2 (May 1998): 83-103.   
 
191Jacques Necker’s name appeared on the 1788 cover of De la morale naturelle (“M. Necker”), but Michael 
Sonenscher has argued that it was written by the Swiss Jacques-Henri Meister the previous year.  Sonenscher, Sans-
Culottes: An Eighteenth-Century Emblem in the French Revolution (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008), 
221, note 42.  Meister published a new, extended edition in 1788.  I will consider Meister the correct author and am 
using the following text, which disseminated the 1787 version: De la morale naturelle, Suivie du bonheur des sots 
(1788) (Breinigsville, PA: Kessinger Legacy Reprints, 2011). 
 
192David Andress, The Terror: The Merciless War for Freedom in Revolutionary France (New York: Farrar, Straus 
and Giroux, 2005).  Andress does not mention Garat’s role with the Idéologues or his schematic educational plan 
noted next.  See too Jeremy Popkin, “Saint-Domingue, Slavery, and the Origins of the French Revolution,” in From 
Deficit to Deluge: The Origins of the French Revolution, eds., Thomas E. Kaiser and Dale K. Van Kley, 220-248 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2011), 319, n. 88 (see also 244-5, 248).   
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the École normale (1795) that analyzed epistemological stages of the “understanding” 
(entendement).  Garat’s course formed a link with the sensationalist program of the Idéologues 
and the Class of Moral and Political Sciences created by the French National Institute.  Garat 
claimed to have meditated on this material for twenty years, thus marking the Éloges as central 
to his early understanding of society and the body.193   
Meister’s esoteric work, De la morale naturelle (1787), crystallizes the trends found in 
Garat, Pluquet, and the writers from chapter two.  By the late 1780s, this “Cosmopolitan Swiss” 
was, at various times, both a follower and opponent of Rousseau and Voltaire, friend of Diderot, 
Melchior Grimm, Jacques Necker, and Germaine de Staël, and editor of the Correspondance 
littéraire (1773-1813).194  Although generally considered a literary man of letters, Meister wrote 
critically of religion in 1768 (De l’origine des principes religieux), critically of the early stages 
of the French Revolution in a 1790 pamphlet (Des premiers principes du système social 
appliqués à la révolution présente), and critically in 1795 of the violence of the Republic (Mes 
souvenirs personnels du commencement de la révolution).  He would look back at the causes of 
the Revolution and judge la philosophie, les philosophes, and the increased dissemination of 
knowledge as having been responsible for subverting religion and co-opting public opinion 
                                                          
193Caroline Warman, “Les Éléments de physiologie de Diderot: inconnus ou clandestine?  Les cas de Garat,” in Les 
Lumières en mouvement: La circulation des idees au XVIlle siècle, ed. Isabelle Moreau, 65-89 (Paris: ÉNS, 2009), 
76.  According to Warman, Garat drew on and replicated parts of Diderot’s unpublished Éléments de physiologie.  
See also Sophia Rosenfeld, A Revolution in Language: The Problem of Signs in Late Eighteenth-Century France 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2001), 187-194, 210-216, and Jonathan Israel, Revolutionary Ideas: An 
Intellectual History of the French Revolution from The Rights of Man to Robespierre (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 2014). 
194Yvonne de Athayde Grubenmann, Un Cosmopolite Suisse: Jacques-Henri Meister (1744-1826) (Geneva: Librarie 
E. Droz, 1954), and Simone Zurbuchen, “Les philosophes et la révolution : L'analyse de Jacques Henri Meister,” 
Carrefour, v. 24, n. 1 (2002): 85-98. Later in life, Meister would return to his earlier religiosity and reject aspects of 
Voltaire and Rousseau that he previously admired. 
 
91 
 
(1806, Des causes générales et particulières de la puissante influence obtenue par la philosophie 
dans le dix-huitième siècle).195  On the eve of the French Revolution, though, Meister argued that 
the corporeal should replace the supernatural and would serve as a better grounding for society 
than the “hydra with twenty million heads, as incapable of willing as of obeying, of acting as of 
thinking” that the revolutionaries sought to generate.196     
These three authors—a philosopher/theologian, a socio-political thinker and future 
revolutionary, and an itinerant literary philosophe critical of his intellectual milieu—display the 
struggle of Enlightenment thinkers to balance the role of reason with that of the corporeal 
constraints of a “feeling,” sensitive body.  More than that, they grounded sociability and moral 
sensibility in the “well-organized” body.  By analyzing their works in three stages, we get a 
sharper image of this method in action.  Their conceptions of humans as naturally sociable, their 
interpretations of “human nature” as a series of corporeal processes, and their efforts to rethink 
the role of états according to organisation reveal that individual bodies were the key to social 
intercourse. 
*** 
As we saw in the previous chapter, two concepts shaped eighteenth-century goals of 
society: the pursuit of happiness and social utility.  The former could only take place in society, 
and, for Garat, Meister, and Pluquet, the natural, sociable disposition of humans incorporated 
both.197  Meister’s De la morale naturelle was geared toward l’homme social (63), the individual 
                                                          
195For this point, see Zurbuchen, “Les philosophes et la révolution : L'analyse de Jacques Henri Meister.” 
 
196From Meister’s Des premiers principes du système social appliqués à la révolution présente, quoted in Michael 
Sonenscher, Before the Deluge: Public Debt, Inequality, and the Intellectual Origins of the French Revolution 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007), 35. 
 
197In what follows, I will cite page numbers for Meister and Pluquet’s works within the text. 
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necessarily connected to others.  “Man can no longer be considered as an isolated being,” 
Meister proclaimed, “his moral existence depends on his relations with his fellow man, and this 
existence can only become happier in the milieu of our grand societies” (61-2).  Garat’s Éloges 
to abbé Suger (1779) and Michel de l’Hôpital (1778) are rife with concerns for le bonheur 
public.  Even though nature “made man a social being,” Garat concluded, six-hundred years had 
elapsed since the life of abbé Suger with no advancement in the happiness of society.198  In both 
Éloges, Garat emphasized the positive attributes of Suger and Hôpital that resonated with his 
contemporaries; he used the Éloges to criticize the eighteenth century, drawing perhaps too from 
his own experiences in le monde as a frequent guest in the household of J.B. Suard and in the 
well-known Masonic lodge Neuf Soeurs.  Garat found contemporary society to be addicted to 
luxury, marks of distinction, and the distribution of symbols according to état.  In contrast, he 
defined “virtue”—a term with renewed importance after Montesquieu’s political/moral typology 
in De l’esprit des lois (1748)—as simply a passion for the happiness of individuals brought 
together in society.199  “Man is born in order to be happy and good, not in order to astonish and 
strive for celebrity,” Garat implored, and the desire for happiness is the “first natural law of all 
feeling [sensible] beings” that leads individuals to associate.200  Meister and Pluquet shared the 
premise that the human body registered natural happiness in accordance with social commerce. 
                                                          
198Garat, Éloge de Suger...Discours qui a remporté le prix au jugement de l’Académie Française, en 1779 (Paris, 
1779), 45.  Garat originated from the Basque region, but he came to Paris in 1777 where he quickly established 
literary notoriety (writing for the Journal de Paris and Mercure de France) and social acceptability through the 
Suard household and the Masonic lodge Neuf Soeurs.  Garat’s governmental experiences during various phases of 
the Revolution and Napoleonic period cemented his legacy.  For his pre-Revolutionary work, with which I am 
concerned, see Michel Duhart, Dominique-Joseph Garat (1749-1833) (Biarritz: Atlantica, 2009, orig. pub. 1994), 
27-63. 
 
199Garat, Éloge de Michel de l’Hôpital (Paris, 1778), 11.  For another reading of this text, see Sonenscher, Sans-
Culottes, 273-282. 
 
200Ibid., 78. 
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Pluquet opened his wide-ranging De la sociabilité with a rational reconstruction of the 
state of nature to illustrate the principles of social organization, and he placed natural sociability 
at the base of all interaction.  The principles of natural sociability should precede all disciplines 
of knowledge and legislative thought.  Humans could only achieve happiness by following 
nature, which “conducts all humans to the peace and happiness for which she has destined them 
by the principles of sociability interior to all” (xviii).  Nature created humans weak in order to 
force them to unite together and forge reciprocal links; the ability to create societies, alongside 
the capacity to reason, made humans unique and superior to animals (I, 32, 88-90, 153).  Over 
two volumes, Pluquet addressed the state of nature, the socially-useful and socially-harmful 
passions, and the role of the sovereign in channeling the activities of subjects toward society.  
His refrain, however, was always the irreducibility of sociability as a natural part of corporeal 
organisation. 
Garat, Meister, and Pluquet shared a second framework that coupled the body and 
society.  When they invoked the power of nature (la nature de l’homme or la nature humaine), 
they implied something less abstract and more material: the human body.  The process of 
transforming society required knowledge of corporeal properties, particularly the ability to feel 
and the interrelated moral and physical realm characteristic of sensationalism.  According to 
Garat, the legislator must “know the nature of man...[and] must have especially...a good theory 
of all the sensations that are converted into sentiments, in order to distinguish those that are 
proper to produce social affections and those on the contrary that awaken in hearts passions that 
are socially-disruptive [des passions funestes à la société].”201  Morality for Garat began with the 
                                                          
201Garat, Éloge de Michel de l’Hôpital, 81.  Garat wrote this for another concours sponsored by the Académie 
Française, but he was unable to submit it in time.  Nearly half of the text consists of “Notes,” which are more 
engaging than the éloge itself.  The “note” from which this quote was extracted dealt specifically with the definition 
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senses and the impressionability of humans; the ability to feel grounded morality in the physical 
body and demanded a social environment characterized by virtue, sociability, and empathy.202   
Garat found a common, yet debilitating, link between pre-civilized man and many of his 
own contemporaries: they were both led just by their sensations.  The only lively sentiments 
experienced by pre-civilized man were for physical needs, and modern man experienced desires 
only for the egoistic and dazzling pleasures of luxury.203  A society of individuals whose bodies 
were bound to their individual sensations lacks “all the sentiments that nature inspired in them to 
render them sociable,” a simultaneous principle of reason and interior feeling.204  In dissecting 
the interaction between the legislator and citizens/subjects, Garat invoked three of the 
eighteenth-century’s key words: nature, happiness, and society.  Nature created humans to be 
social and to desire happiness; the latter was to be found through the former, and both were 
contingent on the ability to feel.  Garat claimed that, in contrast to the ancients, the eighteenth 
century had uniquely discovered that “all the links that constitute the social order” were 
corporeal.205  This was especially true of children, whose physical bodies and moral capacities 
were shaped by their education and environment.  Inveterate habits forged at a young age 
                                                          
of “la nature de l’homme” and “la nature des choses.” Garat recognized that the terms were abstract but necessary, 
and he proceeded to define them.  
 
202Ibid., 78.  In a discussion of jurisprudence and the work of Cesare Beccaria (On Crimes and Punishment, 1764), 
Garat deepened his argument that legislators needed knowledge of human nature because they would be able to 
foresee the circumstances in which passions reign and because relying on the memory and testimony of witnesses 
(based on sensations and character) could endanger legal procedures (63-69).  Garat also agreed with Beccaria that 
the letter of the laws should be followed, not interpreted by jurisconsultes, but he added the importance of the 
legislator in creating laws and social institutions based on human nature that would severely curtail crimes. 
 
203For luxury, see Garat, Éloge de Suger, 17, and Éloge de l’Hôpital, 23, 88, 91. 
 
204Garat, Éloge de l’Hôpital, 4.  
 
205Ibid., 11-12, 78. 
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become corporeally ingrained, and a society that prized self-interest and wealth blunted natural 
sentiments early in life.   
Like Garat, Meister’s vision of society was a product of contemporary understandings of 
the body.  Meister equated eighteenth-century society to a whirlwind (tourbillon) of prejudices, 
tastes, opinions, vain disputes, and politically-sanctioned religious customs that distracted its 
members from the fundamental basis of human interaction: “Upon self-reflection, I perceived 
that that which determined all my actions are either purely physical and nearly involuntary 
impressions, or an initial feeling [premier sentiment] which is hardly less, or the memory of a 
series of reflections to which experience and habit have given fervor” (9-10).206  The ability to 
feel physically and thus morally, with which all humans were endowed, should determine social 
interaction, according to Meister.  Reflecting on his own corporeal experiences led Meister to 
depict the “order of nature” through the human body (16-8): ideas derived from sensations, and 
habits formed from the physical repetition of activities.  In order for social interaction to be 
smooth and fluid, individuals must test their sensibility and find the proper balance.  The 
extremes of feeling too much or too little either harden the body to social commerce or weaken 
the body to the point of delicacy and fragility (56, 125-126).  We can know our obligations and 
duties to society rationally, but feeling the premier sentiment is the most basic definition of 
morality: “knowledge of the means which can assure us enough of an empire over our faculties, 
in order to make the best usage possible of them; it is the science of the habits proper to perfect 
[perfectionner] our being, to conduct us to the state of the most constant happiness” (19).207  
                                                          
206It is worth noting that tourbillon was the term used by Descartes to describe the motion of the universe filled with 
matter (no void).  In the 1788 edition, Meister extended his complaint that modern society had corrupted the natural 
disposition and sentiments of individuals (see chp. VI, “Morale du sentiment”). 
 
207Meister argued not only that forging the proper habits was necessary to an individual’s and society’s growth, but 
that each person must exercise her faculties and avoid languor through physical labor (54, 133, 143). 
96 
 
Sensibility preceded humans’ rational capacity, but the two faculties worked in tandem to ensure 
that the passions (or natural sentiments)—the love of liberty, shame, modesty, empathy, 
ambition—corrupted neither society nor one’s internal disposition (66). 
Pluquet wielded an entire corporeal vocabulary to elaborate la nature humaine: 
disposition, tempérament, constitution, and, most importantly, organisation.  All of the tenets of 
“nature” and the characteristics necessary for “society” could be found in the human body.  
Although Pluquet noted regional variations in bodies—climate, education, and moeurs—he 
argued that humans possess a universal organisation capable of registering and fulfilling basic 
physical needs, translating sense data into impressions (information), storing this information in 
memory, and reflecting upon it (I, 82, 287).208  Reason was the “torch” or “lights” that guided 
humans to understand their reciprocal relationships (I, 91); yet, the most important attribute of 
human bodies was the ability to feel social connections.  Individuals were naturally-constituted 
for sociability.  Not only did they need each other to defend from animal aggressors and obtain 
sustenance in early societies, but nature built human bodies sensitive to the moral existence of 
others: “In order to distinguish actions that are useful or harmful to others, man received from 
nature an organisation which makes him feel [ressentir] the good and the bad that they feel 
[éprouver]” (I, 123; II, 13-14).  Human bodies were the sources of sociability, just as nature 
intended.  This interior feeling could be blunted or stifled in bodies hardened by destructive 
                                                          
208The human organisation was not self-activating, however; it did not possess any inherent motion or sensibility but 
relied for its movement and life on active, intelligent, immaterial beings (I, 361-2; II, 4-9).  Pluquet’s conception of 
the relationship between sensibility and the soul may have been influenced by Haller (see chp. 2), since Pluquet 
argued too that the ultimate destination of impressions is the soul.  Bodies were constructed by a Supreme Being and 
possessed an immaterial soul.  The Supreme Being gave existence to all men, “submitted them to all the needs that 
they feel, and arranged on the earth everything needed to satisfy them. [It] deposited in man’s heart the germ of all 
the social virtues, and the desire for immortality; [it] gave to man the faculty of memory and the ability to reason, 
the desire to know, and arranged all the phenomena of nature.”  All of this the Supreme Being placed “in the 
organisation of man’s bodies and in the multitude and development of his needs and inclinations” (II, 2-3).   
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corporeal habits, as Pluquet feared in a world of materialist philosophy and luxury, but it could 
not be totally erased (I, 348; II, 53, 308-311).  What Pluquet defined as une loi naturelle (I, 346) 
was timeless, corporeal, and should serve to undergird society.209  Yet, it would be undermined 
by neo-Epicureans, materialists, and fatalists, such as Bernard Mandeville, Thomas Hobbes, 
Spinoza, and La Mettrie, who claimed to find utility in the most ignoble passions.  Pluquet 
repeated often that nature gave to mankind the ability to reason and the inherent drive to find 
happiness in benevolence (bienveillance) and goodwill (amitié), characteristics that were on the 
brink of extinction when mankind turned toward luxury and corporeal pleasures.   
Pluquet paired a moral vocabulary of the social virtues with a corporeal vocabulary.  The 
social virtues (or le sentiment de l’humanité, I, 116; II, 13) were embodied, but they could only 
flourish in a body whose organs and sensory network were properly disposed.  The physiology of 
corporeal conservation processed sensations similar to the way it processed social interaction:  
The disposition of the organs is such that it carries to the brain all the impressions from 
exterior bodies.  The creative intelligence united to this part of the human body a soul, 
and it established that the impressions made on the brain would produce in the soul either 
pleasurable or painful feelings, according to whether or not the impressions were useful 
or contrary to the conservation of the body” (II, 12-13).210   
 
Pluquet argued throughout De la sociabilité that sentiments derived from sensibility.  Individuals 
communicated their emotions through all of the senses, and, just as the touch of a hot stove 
initiates a series of sensory operations, by the connection of the organisation and sensibility 
                                                          
209Pluquet provided a general definition of society in vol. II, chp. IV. 
 
210This position is similar to that of Albrecht von Haller, who argued that sensible parts transmitted external 
impressions to the soul.  See chapter two.  Pluquet claimed that humans did not process the images of an agreeable 
fruit, for example, in the same way they did a suffering individual; nature’s organisation equipped humans with a 
sentiment or sensibility that somehow felt social interaction differently (II, 14-15; I, 107).  Pluquet struggled, 
though, to clearly articulate this difference, and it remains clear that bodies were affected by stimuli in one manner.  
For Rousseau’s similar differentiation between “feeling” and “sensing,” see John C. O’Neal, The Authority of 
Experience: Sensationist Theory in the French Enlightenment (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University 
Press, 1996), 86-87. 
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humans express their happiness and pain.  In the process of expression, they communicate with 
and to their spectators (I, 119):  
Cries, moans, and tears act on the organs of other humans, and their organs shaken 
[ébranlés] by this stimuli convey the impressions to their soul.  Their soul is found 
affected by the image of pain, so to speak, as wax is stamped by the imprint of a seal.  
Such is the nature of the human soul and of its union with the body that it cannot be 
moved by the image of pain without itself feeling the sentiment.  In this way, by the 
corporeal organisation, if one suffers, his soul acts not only on the organs in order to 
manifest the feelings, but also on the souls of all others, which makes those who hear his 
cries or see his tears feel his pain (I, 109). 
 
Individual bodies record and share the pleasures and pains of others, linking the 
immaterial soul and material sensations of one organized body to another in an empathetic 
relationship and a totalizing social web of empathy.  The transmission of such emotion and the 
corporeal reception by neighboring bodies describes the principles necessary to society that 
Pluquet labeled amitié and reconnaissance.  Essentially, amitié “is the pleasure produced by the 
resemblance that a man perceives between himself and others,” which generates universal, moral 
harmony just as gravitational attraction does in the physical universe (I, 214-216).  Feeling 
amitié is the natural state of organisation, and reconnaissance is “the sentiment of attachment 
and zeal produced by the memory of a kindness or service” (I, 164-165).  We are naturally 
compelled to please others and strive to earn their esteem; nature, therefore, placed within us a 
corporeal reward for doing so.  Our cognitive faculty of memory recompenses our beneficent 
actions, or those actions of which we were the beneficiary, by reproducing the sensory elation 
when we recall the bienfait or bienfaiteur.  Pluquet linked the metaphor of the rebirth of 
sentiments in one’s heart (I, 164) with the physical retracing of the impression on the brain 
during the process of reconnaissance.  The image of an individual with whom we are in perfect 
amitié makes on our brain “an impression more profound than all other objects; the animal spirits 
accustomed to circulating in the traces that represent it to us do not permit us to forget.  The idea 
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exists always in our memory as one of kindness and fellow-feeling, which cannot be effaced 
from our memory and continues to exist in our mind and heart” (I, 213).  Our organisation, then, 
is programmed to be sociable and love all members of society.  When individuals stray from this 
path by engaging in self-interested or voluptuous activities, they suffer the pain of a disordered 
corps; the fleeting sensations of pleasure cannot compare to the enduring sentiments of 
sociability (I, 154).211 
Although Meister’s De la morale naturelle could be considered a set of meditations 
compared to Pluquet’s sweeping De la sociabilité, Meister nevertheless advocated a similar set 
of corporeal-social principles; he still envisioned human nature as corporeally bound.  We do not 
need to rationalize the fact that we “feel,” according to Meister, and he named des premiers 
sentiments our inherent ability to empathize with others (chp. 2).  In a manner reminiscent of 
Condillac’s famous statue, Meister described the process by which we form an individual 
identity separate from the objects that surround us and strike our sensory organs.  Yet, instead of 
releasing individuals from the flurry of sense data, Meister perpetuated the incorporation; the 
collision of individual bodies blurs the physical and the moral, exposing compassion and 
empathy as involuntary, physiological reactions (14-15).  The problem for Meister was that 
contemporary society forged corrupt and prejudicial habits: individual bodies had become 
habituated to degrading sensations to the point of either becoming numb and languorous or 
needing constant repetition of sensations (24).  To return to the morality intended by nature—
finding happiness through social interaction and the exercise of our forces and facultés (55)—
these habits must be corporeally reformed.  Meister argued that our natural disposition is to share 
in the suffering of others (compatir): “it is to identify with the object that strikes [our senses] or 
                                                          
211Garat put forward a similar point in Éloge de l’Hôpital, 91. 
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interests us; it is to confuse, so to speak, its existence with our own” (31).212  What Meister 
defined as compatir and sympathie was the physical interaction of individuals striking each 
other’s sensory organs in the same way as material objects.  Society cohered because moral 
principles were grounded in involuntary, physical sensations that could be molded and perfected. 
Garat, Meister, and Pluquet claimed, therefore, that sociability was fundamental to 
human nature, and they repeatedly depicted human nature through physical, bodily processes.  In 
the third shared theme, they sought also to redefine états by naturalizing them based on their new 
physiological principles.  The term état signified one’s condition of being, the socio-cultural 
significations of one’s occupation, and ultimately one’s place in the hierarchical and privileged 
three estates.  None of the three authors explicitly stated the need to perpetuate the social 
hierarchy, nor did they explicitly state the need to entirely tear down the social hierarchy.  To do 
the latter would certainly have gained the unwanted notice of royal officials.213  They did, 
however, engage the question of hierarchy: whether or not nature intended a hierarchy or form of 
subordination based on corporeal principles.  The idea that individuals were largely 
predetermined by their état came under fire as sensationalist pedagogy opened up the possibility 
of shaping individuals through education and environmental factors, possibly even perfecting 
them.  Although Rousseau is credited with coining the term “perfectibility,” maximizing human 
                                                          
212It is likely that Meister had in mind Rousseau’s conception of pity from Discours sur l’origine et fondemens de 
l’inégalité parmi les hommes (1755), which was one of two natural impulses, along with self-preservation (amour de 
soi) in Rousseau’s explanation of the mankind’s natural state.  See chapter six for more on Rousseau’s conception of 
modernity and rational reconstruction of nature.  
 
213Meister did challenge dueling as a preposterous cultural practice based on perceived slights of honor incongruent 
with one’s social état (118-119).  Garat faulted his contemporaries for lauding birth and fortune and greedily using 
venality to leap over the boundaries of états, but he couched his positions as a commentary on the sixteenth century 
(Éloge de Michel de l’Hôpital, 10-13).  As Duhart noted, prior to the Revolution, Garat was cosmopolitan in 
orientation; he disdained prejudices within and between nations and balanced support for the principles of British 
liberty and the notion of the French king as beneficent.  Duhart, Dominique-Joseph Garat, 35, 39-40. 
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potential became the quest of a number of thinkers, as revealed in the title of Charles Augustin 
Vandermonde’s Essai sur la manière de perfectionner l’espèce humaine (1756).  Not only 
Enlightenment physicians like Vandermonde but social critics found that the significance of 
sensible beings “could only truly be conceived in terms of his or her relation to the greater, 
resonating whole of which he or she was a part.”214  
Garat recognized the crux of the problem of sensible bodies: “Put two men in front of the 
same tableau of nature, either a work of art or society itself.  In a single instant, one of these two 
men is able to receive five or six lively and different impressions, whereas the other will feel 
only a single, cold, and slow impression.”215  The two individuals would approach each other 
suspiciously.  The first would view the second as an unfeeling automaton, and the second would 
view the first as experiencing excessive sensations to the point of convulsion.  Bodies presented 
a new concern for eighteenth-century thinkers; if the social hierarchy was considered unnatural 
and weighted against the majority of French citizens, then building society up from the human 
capacity to feel certainly seemed meritocratic.  This, however, was not always the case.  As 
Garat observed, every individual felt differently, and inequality of organisation potentially 
prepared the way for new forms of subordination.216 
                                                          
214Anne C. Vila, Enlightenment and Pathology: Sensibility in the Literature and Medicine of Eighteenth-Century 
France (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998), 88.  For Vandermonde, see also Julia V. 
Douthwaite, The Wild Girl, Natural Man, and the Monster: Dangerous Experiments in the Age of Enlightenment 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2002), 6-7, 224 n. 11, and Mary Terrall, “Material Impressions: Conception, 
Sensibility, and Inheritance,” in Vital Matters: Eighteenth-Century Views of Conception, Life, and Death, eds. Helen 
Deutsch and Mary Terrall, 109-29 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2012), 115-118. 
 
215Garat, “Lettre aux auteurs du Journal de Paris, sur la notice qu’ils ont donnée de la vie de Sénèque,” Mercure de 
France (15 February 1779): 180.  Vandermonde’s project of “good breeding” demanded that children have “‘no vice 
of conformation, either in the parts essential to the two sexes, or in the organization of the rest of the body’...they 
must be free of deformities (like ‘hollow eyes’ or ‘excessive portliness’).”  Vila, Enlightenment and Pathology, 89. 
 
216For Garat, society could not be managed by idealistic, philosophical principles; society required knowledge of the 
human body so that the legislator could channel human nature in socially-productive ways.  Aside from the 
sensations that generate social affections, the legislator must have “a good theory of all the sensations that are 
converted into ideas in order to distinguish those that give to man just ideas of all that which surrounds him, of all 
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Baron d’Holbach provides a provocative example of the socially conservative aspect of 
materialism.  In his Système de la nature (1770), d’Holbach argued for the existence of a natural 
inequality among individuals based on the diversity of physiological organisations.  He built a 
social system on this inequality, emphasizing the social utility of different natural abilities, and, 
in doing so, he showed that organisation could be the organizing principle of metaphysics, 
physiology, and society.  Politically, d’Holbach asserted equality before the law and between 
men, but, socially, he used “the inequality which nature or industry may have made between 
[individuals’] respective powers” as the basis for a stratified social sphere. “The diversity found 
among the individuals of the human species,” d’Holbach proclaimed, “creates inequalities 
between them: this inequality constitutes the structure of society.”217  D’Holbach based his social 
and political theory on reciprocal utility.  The variation of organisations and faculties suggests 
that what one human excels in, another may be deficient, and vice versa.  People would have no 
need for each other if their bodies were constituted in the same manner: “Thus, the diversity and 
inequality of the corporeal, mental, and intellectual faculties render man necessary to his fellow 
man, makes him a social being, and incontestably proves to him the necessity of morals.”218  In 
d’Holbach’s conception, some individuals were more suited to become legislators or cobblers, 
which clothed subordination in social utility and the authority of nature.   
                                                          
the links that unite him to his fellow man, and those that carry to the understanding only false notions.”  Éloge de 
Michel de l’Hôpital, 81.  On the question of natural equality/inequality, see Darrin M. McMahon, Enemies of the 
Enlightenment, chps. 1-2; John Robertson, The Case for the Enlightenment: Scotland and Naples, 1680-1760 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), chps. 5-7; Michael Sonenscher, Before the Deluge. 
 
217D’Holbach, Système de la nature (1775, new edition), chp. IX, 139.  
 
218Ibid., 140.  Even the Marquis de Condorcet, so famous for his “progressive” thinking, argued that the natural 
inequality of corporeal faculties necessitated specific social institutions.  See Keith Michael Baker, “Political 
Languages of the French Revolution,” in The Cambridge History of Eighteenth-Century Political Thought, eds. 
Mark Goldie and Robert Wokler, 626-659 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 641-642.  
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Meister drew upon his “reason” to identify the principle of order established by nature in 
which all the parts form a harmonious whole (47).  Society could achieve similar order by 
following the path that nature gave individual bodies.  Meister envisioned a social order in which 
chance did not necessarily place one in a particular état (58).  He even criticized certain cruel and 
violent états that seemed to suffocate the natural sentiment of compassion and sensibility (29).  
Furthermore, Meister found the passions of individuals to be natural and necessary to social 
commerce and the pursuit of happiness, in contrast to the corporate order and its defenders 
exemplified in the 1776 petitions to overturn the abolition of the guilds (66-67).219 
Instead, Meister argued, social institutions should either be made to develop all of the 
faculties of an individual together (strength, sensibility, imagination, etc.)—pointing toward the 
perfectibility of humans and the beauty of order (16-17, 49-51)—or society should create 
concord by capitalizing on the unequal distribution of organisations:  
At the heart of such a multitude of combinations, there is formed a universal mass of 
strengths, [corporeal] gifts, and rational capacities in which each can exchange what they 
have too much of, with more or less advantage, for what they are lacking.  The best 
organized society is perhaps the one in which this sort of exchange is made with the most 
justice, ease, and good faith (59).   
 
Meister located le bonheur public in the bodies of feeling individuals colliding in society, and he 
used the term état to describe both the “state” and its laws and the desired condition of being of 
individuals in society (60).  If sage laws protected the liberty of citizens/subjects, they would be 
able to develop and perfect their new état alongside others, which would be “born from social 
influences” (62-63, 120-121).  Meister did not extend his vision far enough to illustrate the 
results of a newly-naturalized état, as did d’Holbach, but he did restrain his optimistic rhetoric 
enough to plead with those who had been granted a superior état to repay their debt to nature and 
                                                          
219I will treat these documents in chapter four.  
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society by helping those less fortunate (124).  Nevertheless, the rhetoric of a mutual exchange of 
corporeal endowments could be marshaled to undergird subordination, similar to Père Claude 
Buffier’s belief that social happiness required social hierarchy, as we saw in chapter one.220 
This is precisely what we find in the abbé Pluquet’s conception of society.  Pluquet 
challenged certain aspects of the traditional social hierarchy, but he nevertheless found états to 
be a useful, divinely-sanctioned, ordering principle.  Happiness could be found by feeling the 
interior sentiments of amitié and reconnaissance that linked individual bodies in society, and 
reason tells us, according to Pluquet, that grandeur, élévation, and crédit are either distributed by 
chance or appropriated through base behavior (II, 117).  Yet, happiness could not be found in 
attempting to elevate one’s état by wearing the symbols of a superior rank (II, 118, 170-172), 
and Pluquet lamented the untoward displays of wealth and the unnecessary violence 
accompanying slights of honor (I, 274-276).  Pluquet did not argue that universal organisations 
necessitated a leveling of society or a redistribution of états.  In fact, Pluquet calculated that our 
habits formed at a young age added to our natural dispositions equaled our “social character.”  
Through this formulation, Pluquet justified stratification: “one could render the practice of social 
virtues necessary to an individual’s happiness in the état they would be placed” (II, 183-184).  
Despite the use of the conditional tense, we have no reason to believe that Pluquet imagined 
tearing down the traditional états; after all, he maintained the early-modern analogy between 
sovereigns/monarchs and fathers, who ruled singularly but tenderly in their domain (II, 250-253), 
and he praised the noble, hereditary distinctions of virtuous families.   
                                                          
220Meister leaned politically toward this point in Des premiers principes du système social appliqués à la révolution 
présente: “The nation really exists only among an elite of men chosen from among the different classes who 
compose it, chosen freely on the trust of public opinion or of those who have acquired the right to guide it.”  Quoted 
in Michael Sonenscher, Before the Deluge, 36. 
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Pluquet repeated that individuals find happiness in the social virtues and that nature 
crafted the organisation specifically for social commerce, but the uniformity of body did not lead 
him to demand a society of equals.  He still defined the social destiny of members of the Third 
Estate by the robustness of their bodies rather than their natural sentiment: “All individuals [les 
hommes] are not born with equal dispositions for cultivating the earth, for managing herds, or for 
hunting down ferocious animals… It would be necessary for some public authority to assign 
individuals to their class and their functions” (II, 250).  Pluquet did question the foundation of a 
society of distinctions and privileges, arguing that distinction should be a product of social 
function or utility, and alluded to a reshuffling of useless members of various états; yet, Pluquet 
claimed to have demonstrated that “humans are not naturally envious and jealous, and that nature 
attaches happiness to the practice of social virtues in whichever état or conditions an individual 
finds himself; [therefore,] the equality of happiness can exist with the difference that 
subordination puts between men in a society” (II, 264).  Pluquet diagnosed individuals who 
assert their superiority and scorn inferiors as suffering from a blunted and numb sentiment 
d’humanité (I, 276).  This was similar to the Marquis de Mirabeau in his wildly-popular L’ami 
des hommes (1756-1758); both presented a case for a moral revolution but not a social one. 
*** 
Despite the marked social, political, and religious differences between Garat, Meister, 
and Pluquet, all three sought to ground society and social interaction in inherent corporeal 
properties.  They appealed to the language of the senses as a natural foundation for the 
association of peoples and articulated a “natural law of feeling beings” that bound happiness to 
the corporeal nature of social commerce.  The interior sentiment or premier sentiment was not a 
disembodied spirit identified only by rational meditation; it was consubstantial, affected by 
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external objects, and invigorated through social interaction.  Human nature did not exist outside 
the organisation, which was naturally-constituted to feel pleasure by assembling in society.  
Abbé Pluquet recognized the potency of sensationalism as a moral and epistemological 
philosophy, but he attempted to undercut its physicality by clinging to an immaterial soul and 
Supreme Being.  Ultimately, though, he relied on physiological and cognitive processes within 
the body to explain natural sociability and its moral resonance.  If “society is bonds [and] society 
is human order,” as Keith M. Baker noted in his analysis of the invention of “society,” then the 
bonds were not artificially-construed but naturally-occurring.221  The human body contained all 
the principles necessary to secure social bonds by the transmission and reception of sensations 
and the activation of interior feelings.  It was the être désorganisé who upset society.  As we will 
see next, proponents of the traditional social hierarchy feared the consequences on the collective 
and individual corps if the principles of corporate order were eliminated.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
221Keith Michael Baker, “Enlightenment and the Institution of Society: Notes for a Conceptual History,” in Main 
Trends in Cultural History: Ten Essays, eds. Willem Melching and Wyger Velema, 95-120 (Amsterdam and 
Atlanta, GA: Rodopi, 1994), 100.  For the artificiality of society, see Jean Terrier, Visions of the Social: Society as a 
Political Project in France, 1750-1950 (Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2011), 81. 
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Chapter 4 
The Social Imagination 
In the minds of many eighteenth-century writers, feeling and the transmission of 
sensations between individuals underlay a healthy society.  The corporeal parameters of society 
were not merely the imaginative constructions of a handful of intellectual elites, however.  On 
the contrary, the human body was central to a variety of debates surrounding efforts to reform 
both the social order and the city of Paris.  Conceptions of the body were integral to the 1776 
reactions to Turgot’s laisser-faire/laisser-passer “Six Edicts” and merged metaphorical notions 
of the body politic with ontological concerns for individual bodies.  Following the humiliating 
defeat of France in the global Seven Years War (1756-1763), the dissolution of the Parlement of 
Paris by Chief Minister Maupeou (1770-1774), and the recent ascension of Louis XVI, Turgot’s 
“Six Edicts” renewed anxiety that the socio-political structure of France was imperiled.  As we 
saw in chapter one, economic principles were inseparable from the system of états and corps, 
and, by uprooting this system, the “Six Edicts” invalidated centuries of French history and the 
religious basis of French society.  1776 marked a crucial moment in which leaders of the 
Parlement of Paris and the trade corporations were forced to match the “modernity” of Turgot’s 
proposals with contemporary physiological ideas; they were forced to provide new grounding for 
ancient doctrines.  Guild petitions to the Parlement of Paris exhibited the concern of maîtres and 
maîtresses that without the corporate social order the bodies and minds of laborers would no 
longer be restrained.  Even though the individual corps of each subject was metaphorically 
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“incorporated” into the larger body politic, the physical bodies of individuals were thought to 
suffer from Turgot’s “Six Edicts.”     
In addition to the primacy of the corporeal in the 1776 debates, reformers of public health 
and government-sponsored public hygiene programs appealed often to medical authority to meet 
a plethora of insalubrious urban conditions.  This “medicalization of society,” though, was not 
simply about reforming public health.  The condition of the body became the locus of social 
order and provided contemporaries with a matrix to think through the problems of society.  The 
efforts of the Parlement of Paris, guild petitioners, urban reformers, and the writers discussed 
previously helped forge a specific eighteenth-century social imagination, at the center of which 
was the physical body.  For society to be healthy, according to opponents of Turgot’s “Six 
Edicts,” the collective and individual corps had to be preserved; for reformers of public health, a 
healthy society necessitated a healthy body. 
The Corporate Body Unravels: Abolition of the Guilds (1776) 
When Turgot became Controller General in 1774, there was an air of excitement among 
the community of philosophes.  Turgot’s impulse to reform France was marked by his quest for 
economic freedom: “The freer, the more animated and the more extensive trade is, the more 
swiftly, efficaciously and abundantly can the people be supplied.”222  Turgot was sympathetic to 
the laisser-faire/laisser-passer ideas put forward by Vincent de Gournay and the Physiocrats.  
He advocated lifting restrictions, privileges, and customs, particularly on the grain trade.  These 
principles would limit the movement of goods and resources and abolish the guilds as privileged, 
corporate entities that obstructed the movement and occupations of French subjects.  This was 
                                                          
222Quoted in Colin Jones, The Great Nation: France from Louis XV to Napoleon 1715-99 (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 2002), 295-296. 
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precisely what he did in 1776.  In what was known as the “Six Edicts,” Turgot replaced the 
corvée with a new property tax, from which the clergy was exempt, and, most notoriously, he 
eviscerated corporate society by abolishing the guilds.223 
In the furious debate elicited by the “Six Edicts,” the Parlement of Paris’ “Remonstrance” 
and a number of petitions issued by various guild masters reinforced the certainty and customs of 
corporate society (the Parlement was itself a corporation).  Aside from the metaphors of the 
unbreakable chain and micro/macrocosm noted in chapter one, the Parlement argued that the 
guilds served to police the capital and monitor commerce.  An attack on the guilds and abolition 
of the corvée were blows to the entire corporate system of concentric and overlapping corps and 
ordres.  Parlementaires appealed additionally to the language of natural rights and the 
prerogatives congenital to one’s état.  The harmony maintained by the gradation of powers and 
distinctions “holds in place and keeps all états from falling into confusion,” according to the 
“Remonstrance.”  The source of the socio-political order was in “divine institutions,” and the 
necessity of an “inequality of conditions” stemmed from the “infinite and immutable wisdom in 
the plan of the Universe.”224  Despite a handful of dissident masters and parlementaires, both 
viewed Turgot’s edict as “a kind of apocalypse.”225 
Guild petitions, drawn up by the masters, equally subjected Turgot’s edict to a critical 
and panicked reading.  They argued that the system of corporations ensured the quality of goods 
from fraudulence and exorbitant prices, protected the public welfare through internal discipline 
                                                          
223The Corps of goldsmiths and apothecaries were exempted from this legislation. 
 
224“Remonstrances sur l’édit supprimant les corvées (2-4 March 1776),” in Remonstrances du Parlement de Paris au 
XVIIIe Siècle, vol. 3, ed. Jules Flammermont, 275-293 (Paris: Imprimerie Nationale, 1898), 279.   
 
225Steven Laurence Kaplan, “Social Classification and Representation in the Corporate World of Eighteenth-Century 
France: Turgot’s ‘Carnival’,” in Work in France: Representations, Meaning, Organization, and Practice, eds. 
Steven Laurence Kaplan and Cynthia Koepp, 176-228 (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1986), 182.  
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and control of laborers, and maintained the cultural systems of honor and état concomitant with 
each organ in the body politic.226  “It is clear,” wrote one petition, that the “system of 
unrestricted liberty...can only destroy and is incapable of edifying; by dissolving the union of all 
Corps, it will weaken all the individuals who compose it.”227  The abolition of the guilds would 
debase the elevated social identity of masters.  “This terrible revolution,” according to the 
“Marchands et Maîtresses Lingères de Paris,” would erase the “indestructible social character” 
imprinted on merchants, artists, and traders.228  And, “la communauté des Fruitiers-Orangers” of 
Paris accused egoistic modern philosophers of no longer respecting “religion, subordination, and 
the essential differences that characterize les états.”229   
The guild hierarchy necessarily mirrored that of the social hierarchy, and the foreseeable 
expectation of confounding ranks, so central to the luxury debate to be discussed in Part II, 
heightened the rhetoric and urgency of these supplications: masters would be cast “without 
honor” into “an immense void” with the dregs of society.230  Masters would be reduced to gens 
                                                          
226Similar to the sovereign’s gaze, the masters’ petitions and Parlement’s “Remonstrance” acknowledged the gaze of 
the masters, inspectors, and confrères as a principle of discipline and emulation. “Parlementary Remonstrance,” 313; 
“Réflexions sur l’edit concernant la suppression des jurandes, par les Maîtres et Marchands Tissutiers-Rubbaniers 
Frangers, Ouvriers en draps d’or, d’argent et soie de la ville, Fauxbourgs & Banlieue de Paris, plus connus sous de 
titre de Fabriquans de Galons d’or et d’argent,” Bibliothèque nationale de France, Collection Joly de Fleury, vol. 
596, folio 98 (hereafter BNF, Coll. Joly), “Observations présentées par les Maîtres composant la communauté des 
Graveurs, Ciseleurs de la Ville et Fauxbourgs de Paris sur l’édit de Suppression des Corps des Marchands et des 
Communautés des Arts et Métiers,” BNF, Coll. Joly, vol. 596, folio 108. 
 
227“Réflexions sur l’edit concernant la suppression des jurandes, par les Maîtres et Marchands Tissutiers-Rubbaniers 
Frangers, Ouvriers en draps d’or, d’argent et soie de la ville,” BNF, Coll. Joly, vol. 596, folio 992. 
 
228“Réflexions des Marchands et Maîtresses Lingères de Paris, sur le projet de détruire les Jurandes,” BNF, Coll. 
Joly, vol. 596, folio 101. 
 
229“Observations pour la communauté des Fruitiers-Orangers de la ville de Paris,” BNF, Coll. Joly, vol. 596, folio 
103. 
 
230“Mémoire A Consulter, sur l’existence actuelle des Six Corps, et la conservation de leurs privileges,” BNF, Coll. 
Joly, vol 462, folios 151-153, here 153.  Like the observations of the Fruitiers-Orangers, this memoir found fault 
with the dominant philosophical “system” (l’esprit de système).  For Enlightenment debates over the “spirit of 
systems” versus the “systematic spirit,” see Ernst Cassirer, The Philosophy of the Enlightenment, trans. Fritz C. A. 
Koelln and James P. Pettegrove (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1951, orig. pub. 1932), and Jessica Riskin, 
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de bras, a corporeal moniker for those who worked with their hands.  No longer the legal, 
official head of their tiny corps, they would be arms and hands with no directing will other than 
the nebulous, yet leveling, “market.”  Furthermore, the circulation of crédit—the reputation and 
personal relationships that constituted the “soul of commerce” and the “aliments of 
workshops”—would dry up, supplanted by unreliable monetary currency, greed, and 
competition.231  The fear that une liberté indéfinie would render both masters and journeymen 
equal and “isolated beings” (un être isolé) is palpable throughout the petitions.  The same fear is 
reflective of a deeper complexity over the abolition of the guilds.  The petitions reveal how 
concerns for the body were fundamentally embedded within arguments over social structure.   
Even though guild masters and parlementaires sought to protect their interests and 
reinforce the traditional social structure, the corporeal language through which they expressed 
themselves is illuminating.  The “maîtres queulx, cuisiniers, porte-chapes, et traiteurs” warned of 
“pernicious ragouts” made by untrained hands, which endangered public health.  Knowledge of 
animal bodies and vegetables was necessary to properly prepare food, and the masters claimed 
that their trade was as important and precise as apothecaries.232  In some instances, food 
preparation was as artful as creating medicines or restoring the body to health.  To add authority 
to their petition, the masters put forward an image of the body consistent with the mechanical 
philosophy: “The human body is a hydraulic machine that is composed of solids and fluids.  It is 
                                                          
“The ‘Spirit of System’ and the Fortunes of Physiocracy,” in Oeconomies in the Age of Newton, eds. Margaret 
Schabas and Neil de Marchi, 42-73 (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2003). 
 
231“Réflexions des maîtres tailleurs de Paris,” BNF, Coll. Joly, vol. 462, folio 173-174, here 1731.  For the diverse 
meanings of crédit, see Clare Haru Crowston, Credit, Fashion, Sex: Economic of Regard in Old Regime France 
(Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2013). 
 
232The Corps of wine merchants and parfumeurs made a similar argument. “Représentations du corps des Marchands 
de Vin,” BNF, Coll. Joly, vol. 596, folio 105, and “Observations pour la communauté des Maîtres et Marchands 
Gantiers...parfumeur de paris,” BNF, Coll. Joly, vol. 596, folio 114. 
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therefore necessary that the cook knows how to properly season ragouts in order not to put the 
machine in disorder and to maintain an equilibrium of fluids and secretions.”233  The masters 
continued to compare food preparation with medicinal remedies, claiming that it was a danger to 
society to have untrained cooks poorly preparing, seasoning, or storing meats.  The policing 
mechanism of the guild corps guaranteed protection from that oversight, and unprofessionalism 
would not be a public health hazard. 
The human body was of central concern to petitioners from other guilds as well.  The 
linen merchants argued that the system of corps restrained the potentially unruly mob of “robust 
individuals” made powerful by their intense labor.234  Workers perfected their trade and état 
through “daily exercise,” and the forging of hardened, skilled bodies could only come through 
the habit of work in a single corps.  If the corps were destroyed, the Six Corps of Paris argued, 
then workers would acquire no unique abilities; they would be “eternally novice[s],” and their 
bodies “would arrive at the age in which the organs are deprived of their flexibility, no longer 
permitting them to acquire new knowledge [lumières].”235  Moreover, a man without an état 
would choose a life of “sterile libertinage” and “voluntary bachelorhood,” preferring a “shameful 
debauchery” to the modest, secure, and sexually-unadventurous married life.236 
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Sciences in Paris, 1670-1760 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2012). 
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The most prominent attention given to the body came in the documents considering 
female work, as women of all états were determined by their biology.  Both Turgot and his 
parlementaire opponent avocat-général Séguier founded their concerns on female sexual morality 
and a “natural” division of labor, fearing that “female unemployment would lead to prostitution,” 
destitution, and social disorder.237  The petition drawn up by the “Marchands et Maîtresses 
Lingères de Paris,” a group of female linen-drapers and –sellers, expressed women’s état as a 
natural product of femininity.238  Whereas men were considered naturally, physically superior 
and forceful, women were dexterous.  The lingères were “modern Amazons” whose weapons 
were the needle and scissors, skills learned from childhood; their exclusivity rested on the 
exactitude of their functions and the maintenance of decency and honnêteté.239  The need to 
preserve and supervise women’s modesty served as the crux of the lingères’ arguments, 
especially those women of “lively desires and a pleasant figure.”240  The “Marchands et 
Maîtresses Lingères de Paris” argued without hesitation for their corporate privilege based on the 
natural skills of the female body, constantly reinforcing the point: “The commerce of 
fabrics...offers an honest sanctuary [for women], [whose occupations are] relative to their tastes, 
their character, and their natural faculties...[and who] fear the dangers and insidious gentleness of 
seduction.”241  Without the watchful eye of a maîtresse and corps, women’s individual corps 
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would be released into the lascivious hands of men and their own capricious desires.  The natural 
domesticity of women, advocated by Jean-Jacques Rousseau and Pierre-Joseph Boudier de 
Villemaire, had its parallel in the legal documents and guild petitions that established women’s 
occupational corps and demanded their continuance.  
The Parlement’s “Remonstrance” and guild petitions reveal a final, vital ingredient of 
eighteenth-century corporeal conceptions of the social structure: the epistemological 
suppositions undergirding the debate over Turgot’s “Six Acts.”242  The corporate social order not 
only disciplined and controlled the physical behavior of its laborers, but it also served to 
circumscribe their mental operations.  Finding and committing to an état connected individuals 
to, and maintained order among, the larger body politic by ensuring that each corps was directed 
by the hierarchical head.  In so doing, it buttressed social, cultural, and economic status.  With 
Turgot’s abolition of the guilds, however, the knots cinching one’s self-interest to one’s 
imagination would be severed.  The imagination, according to Jan Goldstein, “was the most 
vulnerable component of the person, the one that would unfailingly wreak havoc...if certain 
kinds of alterations in the social fabric were undertaken.”243  The events of 1776 provided the 
catalyst to unleash imaginations, and both the Parlement and guild masters took notice. 
The journeymen, apprentices, and other day-laborers no longer bound to a determinant 
hierarchy and état would fantasize about their new prospects and be guided by the uncertain 
epistemological faculty of the imagination.  Inhabitants of nearby villages would flock to the 
capital expecting to find profitable jobs and become the equals of former masters.  They would 
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be “seduced” and “dazzled” by the luxury of the cities—terms that connoted a sensationalist 
epistemology—and their mental faculties would be unconstrained by état.  They would rush 
madly to the supposed plethora of easily-accessible jobs when “the barrier that stifles their 
imagination” is lifted.244  Liberty would overwhelm workers who then flit from job to job, 
imagining that they would be happier and more prosperous elsewhere.  Yet, reason does not obey 
interest, the “Six Corps” proclaimed, and the unhappy laborer will stew in a life of mediocrity 
and indigence.245  In the traditional corporate order, tested and sustained through centuries, both 
bodies and minds were channeled in a structurally profitable direction.  Under a regime of 
unlimited liberty, though, laborers’ bodies would no longer restrict their minds, and their newly-
unfettered minds would soon direct their bodies.  To supporters of the corporate order, “mental 
fixity” and “social/physical fixity” were coterminous.246  The epistemological associations 
linking socio-economic success and happiness to being sans état would lead to social disorder.  
Laborers would be incapable of working according to social utility, thus rendering society 
unstable, because they could not receive and properly act on external sensory data.   
These justifications for perpetuating the traditional corporate order were novel.  They had 
been conditioned by anxiety over commercial modernity and fear of an anchorless society and 
channeled through sensationalist epistemology.  While Charles Loyseau and his successors spoke 
of the natural, moral, and legal necessity of the French social hierarchy, which exemplified 
divine order and privileged certain physical bodies, the Parlement of Paris and guild petitioners 
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rationalized hierarchy in a new way.  Elements of the body-politic metaphor certainly persisted, 
and commitment to the naturalness of gens de bras was maintained, but the language of the 
senses and the homogeneity of corporeal matter drove the arguments of Turgot’s opponents.  By 
applying sensationalist language, opponents of the “Six Edicts” shifted the emphasis from social 
structure to the corporeal in considering the Third Estate.  Whereas Loyseau’s model linked what 
one did with one’s body to one’s état, the model emerging in 1776 analyzed the experiencing 
body.  That is to say, in Loyseau’s model the social hierarchy served as the organizing principle 
for society, but in the 1776 model the corporeal preceded the social structure. 
Overly-passionate laborers no longer constrained by an état would become “volatile 
beings,” according to the master tailors.  During the Lit de Justice held to force registration of the 
edict, the Parlement succinctly summarized the epistemological degeneration of the worker: 
“each worker will regard himself as an isolated being, depending on himself alone, and free to 
give space to an often disorderly imagination.”247  This conception of the “self” bound the 
human body to “corporate classification and social stratification.”248  The Parlement of Paris 
expected that simply relaxing corporate strictures would unleash “the most dangerous passions” 
of the workers whose tempestuousness was “less suppressed by education [and] joined to a brute 
energy” intensified by arduous labor.249  The guild masters and Parlement of Paris, therefore, 
organized corporate society around, and defended corporate society by, a sensationalist 
epistemology.   
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The Parlement of Paris’ “Remonstrance” and the petitions of guild masters attest their 
commitment to the corporate order as a restraint on the bodies of workers.  Turgot’s “Six Edicts” 
constituted an act as revolutionary as any of the summer of 1789, and its repeal after only six 
months indicates that the social structure was expected to connect the lowliest gens de bras to the 
king through a series of concentric ordres and corps.  Each possessed a certain degree of honor 
according to one’s état, constantly kindled by the invigorating rays launched from the head of the 
body politic and “weakened but not altered” by their descent.250  Whether bound by corporate 
shackles—the Parlement’s “indissoluble chain”—or released into socio-economic independence, 
it was clear that the physical body was fundamental to the maintenance of the social order.  
Corporeal Concerns and Public Health 
Advocates of the traditional social hierarchy may have still viewed bodies through the 
prism of états, but, as the debate surrounding the 1776 abolition of the guilds and the previous 
chapter showed, there was no ignoring the reoriented perspectives regarding the body and 
society.  The concept of the social imagination allows historians to bridge representations of 
social anxieties and practical applications of corporeal knowledge elicited by those fears.  The 
social imaginary “is a common set of social expectations and practices that enables ordinary 
persons of a given community to imagine how their interactions with each other in a particular 
aspect of life should work and, thus, shape how they do work.”251  The articulation of ideas about 
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the body did not work singularly to construct the social imagination; instead, they were brought 
to action by contemporaries responding to changing social practices and lived experiences.  
Philosophical tracts and legal discourses coexisted with broader changes in the daily lives of 
French men and women.  The desire to reform society by considering the corporeal effects of 
Paris’ urban environment provides further proof that bodies came to define the eighteenth-
century social imagination.     
Jean-Baptiste Moheau’s masterpiece of demography (“political arithmetic”), Recherches 
et considérations sur la population de la France (1778), drew attention to the effects of urban 
civilization on French bodies.  The Recherches was co-authored with the intendant Antoine-
Jean-Baptiste-Robert Auget, Baron de Montyon.  Montyon spearheaded the research and 
marshaled governmental resources to calculate the French population.  Moheau’s tables and 
figures put forward a clearer method of tallying the number and distribution of individuals than 
previous models.252  Importantly, Moheau began the Recherches by not only appealing to the 
beneficence of the king in adopting his work and applying it to ameliorate le bien public through 
administrative reform (Avertissement), but he also argued that humans in society had lost their 
natural force: their senses of sight and hearing degenerated.253  Moheau suggested that touch, 
taste, and smell had been perfected in society; yet, the human body was more than ever 
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susceptible to either decline or perfectibility, depending on the manner in which the government 
created institutions or environments that increased the health of individual bodies.  More 
thoroughly than Montesquieu in De l’esprit de lois (1748), Moheau explored the “physical 
causes that influence populations”: climate, air quality, mountains and forests, alimentation, 
availability and quality of water, and the necessity of labor for the human body.254  Bodies in 
society were particularly affected by cesspools of stagnant water that collected and contained 
putrid matter and released vaporous odors and miasmas.  The insalubrious conditions of urban 
societies would further deplete the health and sensory capacities of human bodies if governments 
did not enact change (e.g. public baths to ensure proper transpiration).255 
Before Moheau implored the French government to create public baths, the weekly 
newspaper Avantcoureur (1759-1773) ran announcements for public bath systems, alongside 
innumerable other public health programs and concerns.256  The Avantcoureur dedicated a 
section to this purpose, “Médecine-Cosmétique,” which could often be qualified as in the 8 
December 1760 entries under “Médecine-Cosmétique-Orthopédie.”  In the 29 September 1760 
issue, an author advertised a system of public baths to be installed on the Seine with hot and cold 
water, and he sought the expert eyes of Académiciens and government officials to scrutinize the 
health risks and rewards.  As the project advanced, the Avantcoureur provided more space in its 
pages, noting the importance of public baths to promote cleanliness, decency, and salubrity (6 
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April and 18 May 1761) and acknowledging the support for the project given by the Paris 
Faculté de Médecine (11 April 1763).  The proposed public bath system was one instance of 
many in which the Avantcoureur disseminated medical and health information and attuned its 
public to the interaction of human bodies with their sensory environment. 
In other ways, the importance of the body to society absorbed the social imagination.  
Alongside the Mercure de France and Avantcoureur, medical advertisements (Affiches) appeared 
throughout Paris and the provinces, publicizing myriad courses in the “life sciences,” available to 
the public, and touting not only the commercial value of health products but also their curative 
properties: de santé became a fixed qualifier for items only tangentially related to the 
maintenance of public and private health.  In the printed spaces of the Affiches, consumers from a 
variety of socio-economic brackets also read about concitoyens and compatriotes and the 
ubiquitous goal of social utility.257  The “great chain of buying” that connected consumers, 
sellers, producers, and the press thus capitalized on the increasing interest in the human body and 
grounded a burgeoning society in “human sociability and [commercial] exchange, [positing] an 
open and relatively egalitarian social organization.”258  Moreover, an entire journal was founded 
that devoted its pages to health issues (Gazette de santé), and the success of smallpox 
inoculations by the late 1760s placed new significance on knowledge of and authority over the 
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body.  “By the 1780s,” as David Garrioch stated, “when someone collapsed in the street the 
passers-by were as likely to call a doctor as a priest.”259 
Urbanites were confronted with a number of public health hazards that drew their 
attention to the corporeal effects of city-living.  Debates on hospital reform in Paris (the Hôtel-
Dieu), breast feeding and midwifery, public baths, poor relief, urban development, sanitation, 
effluvia from slaughterhouses, the cleanliness of the Seine, and especially the location of 
cemeteries in town galvanized the public and glued the corporeal to the social imagination.260  
Responding to a petition from Parisians to halt the construction of a cemetery in their quartier, a 
member of the Parlement of Paris (M. le Peletier de Saint-Fargeau) addressed the physiological 
dangers to Parisians rather than Catholic strictures or superstitious beliefs: “The fetid odor that 
cadavers exhale is a warning from nature to keep our distance...Their impure exhalations...are 
today concentrated by the buildings that prevent the winds from dissipating them.”261  Prior to 
the nineteenth century and Pasteur’s germ theory, scents carried by the air were thought to be the 
primary culprits of disease.  The potential contagions and miasmas emanating from cemeteries 
were thought to infect the bodies of Parisians via their respiratory system, resulting in clogged 
senses, inflamed throats, high fevers, and adulterated blood.  Death resonated among the living 
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as a public health concern as much as a period of mourning or spiritual rebirth.262  As a 
consequence, medical experts became “social surgeons” or “officiers de santé” whose expertise 
played an increasingly key role in conveying medical information through controversies over 
public health.263  Bodies were therefore considered susceptible to a variety of effluvia, particles, 
odors, and miasmas that penetrated in virtually unobserved ways, creating an intense awareness 
of the effects of matter visible and invisible on the body.  As individuals in society came to be 
seen as linked by reciprocal physical-cum-moral sentiments, they were also linked by “social 
emanations” emitted from their own bodies.264 
The interaction of environmental corruption and human bodies led doctors and writers to 
attempt to reform society.  We saw in chapter one Pierre Rousseau’s representation of Nantes as 
a heart in order to ensure the efficient circulation of goods, individuals, water, and air, especially 
when “‘some of the diseases that afflict mankind...arise from the fact that the air we breathe is 
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infected with the smell of decaying bodies’.”265  Circulation in human bodies and cities was a 
purifying and disinfecting agent.  The putrefaction of excrement also sparked anxiety among 
Parisians who feared the human inhalation, or absorption by meats, of decomposing matter 
lodged in the streets, gutters, pipes, and even in homes with internal plumbing.  To avoid the 
congestion, unhygienic conditions, and moral dissipation of the city, contemporaries heralded the 
virtues, particularly aerial, of the countryside—e.g. Marquis de Mirabeau’s L’ami des hommes 
(1756-8) and Saint Lambert’s poem Les Saisons (1769)—or sent their children to a rural wet 
nurse supposing that the environment better suited children’s growth.  Others sought to recreate 
natural spaces in urban environments, thus helping disperse “bad air” and toxic exhalations and 
allowing both humans and cities to breathe well.266   
Moheau’s claim that the sense of smell had become keener in modern society 
accompanied other accounts of the alertness of individuals to the invasive odors of the city that 
crippled social welfare.267  Smells could be insidious agents sabotaging the body; water in both 
liquid and gaseous form could do the same.  While Moheau and associates of the journal 
Avantcoureur sought to clean the public via baths, medical authorities like Théophile de Bordeu 
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argued that water in general, and baths in particular, was not a panacea.  Extended submersion in 
water could render the body’s fibers languid and its humors thinned, and constant bathing 
deadened the senses and weakened transpiration.268  Perfumes and aromatics used to mask 
smells, excessive ablutions, and cosmetics all augmented the delicacy of the senses and rendered 
bodies either numb to external sensations or dizzied by them.269   
Historians have come to call the extension of medical knowledge to public health and 
social reform the “medicalization of society.”270  This is certainly a valuable description of the 
second half of the eighteenth century, but I suggest that the “medicalization of society” was not 
just about the growth of scientific authority.  It can be extended further to include the application 
of the language of the senses to a society under immense pressure.  Knowledge of the body was 
used not simply to diagnose the maladies of urban life but to demonstrate how the physical body 
shaped one’s morality and social commerce.  In the social imagination of the eighteenth century, 
“every danger became apparent through the senses,” but so did opportunities for, and the 
necessity of, sociability, empathy, and sensibilité.271 
*** 
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The eighteenth-century social imagination shared a language of the body that was 
characterized by shades of opinion.  Whether or not Bordeu and Moheau agreed on the purifying 
process of bathing, or Diderot and Pluquet disagreed that interior feelings were a product of 
organisation or an immaterial attachment respectively, all sought to ground social interaction in 
the physical body.  The new language of sensationalism collapsed the physical and the moral and 
allowed, or forced, thinkers to describe a fledgling society through the human capacity for 
absorbing external sensory impressions and transforming them into moral actions.   
The physical body became immersed in a new environment replete with other bodies of 
differing états, new consumer goods and material objects, and the corporeally-destructive 
emissions of unsanitary cities.  Medical theories of sensibilité spread to programs of public 
welfare and became embedded in arguments for the foundation of society.  Discussions of the 
human ability to feel were met with fundamental changes in feeling itself.  Contemporaries 
became more aware of their bodies and the necessity of privacy and hygiene.  Readers across the 
continent interacted with novels in new ways, writing to book publishers and authors themselves 
to express the physical ways in which their bodies were affected.  And, the language and spaces 
of “sentimentalism,” represented by laudatory and effusive expressions of emotion, came to be 
an “emotional refuge” within the hierarchical “emotional regime” constitutive of Bourbon 
France.272  The eighteenth century witnessed the emergence of “society,” defined by one 
contemporary as a “theatre of bodies.”273  The fusion of incipient society and the human body 
characterized the social imaginary.  A shared set of assumptions about the corporeal undergirded 
                                                          
272William M. Reddy, The Navigation of Feeling: A Framework for the History of Emotions (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2001), chp. 5. 
 
273Quoted in Farge, Effusion et tourment, le récit des corps, 125. 
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the social order, provided meaning to the interactions of subjects, and shaped debates in social 
and political institutions. 
Part I has shown the social hierarchy as it existed in theory, with concomitant privileges 
and legal jurisdictions, but also noted the grey areas in which états were perpetuated or 
challenged.  The reform of society at the heart of the Enlightenment took a multitude of forms 
and efforts to amend traditional society joined at midcentury with a new language of the senses.  
Metaphors of the body politic cultivated the centrality of the body and adapted to shifting 
medical conceptions, but contemporaries pursued a deeper physiological analysis.  Perspectives 
as seemingly divergent as those of d’Holbach and Pluquet converged on the body, crafting new 
ways to conceive subordination and refound états.  The social imagination of the second half of 
the eighteenth century observed society through the human ability to feel and the mental faculties 
of memory and imagination.  The guild petitions of 1776 and the Parlement’s “Remonstrance” 
highlighted the necessary role played by the corporate order in reining in human bodies.  The 
hierarchical, collective corps that dictated socio-economic behavior was imperiled by the 
destabilized imaginations and material addictions of individual bodies.  From dense texts like 
Garat’s Éloges to municipal debates over cemeteries and cesspools, individual bodies rather than 
privileged corps emerged as the ordering principle of society.  As we will see in Part II, 
commerce and luxury played a unique role in calling into question the traditional social structure, 
and the anxiety produced by these economic changes further buttressed the link between the 
body and society. 
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Part II 
Political Economy and the Corporeal Critique of Luxury 
A new social imagination emerged by midcentury.  The traditional social structure and 
metaphors of the body politic placed radical restraints on the ability of subjects to transcend their 
états and corps.  The “invention” of society, though, challenged the corporate order, and the 
language of sensationalism provided contemporaries with a theory to populate society with 
“feeling” bodies.  The diverse sources of Part I grounded the social imagination in a new 
language of the senses and the pervasive role of the body in social interaction.  Part II will build 
from all facets of Part I through two case studies: la querelle du luxe (the luxury debate) and the 
comprehensive political economy put forward by the Physiocrats.   
The invention of society was propelled in large part by changes in the French economy.  
In response to these changes, the discipline of political economy grew exponentially in the 
eighteenth century.  Practitioners sought to understand both the various ways in which wealth 
was created and the significance for the traditional social order of a shift in the distribution of 
wealth.  Integral to the discipline of political economy and the multifarious debates over the 
French economy was the question of luxury.  The trade in luxury goods gave rise to fervent 
debates over morality, the basis of the socio-political order, the role of commerce, the extension 
of material culture, and the position of the nobility within these changes.  The anxiety elicited by 
luxury helped forge the discipline of political economy and give impetus to new ideas about 
society, both of which were inseparable from the human body.  Disciplinary divisions that 
characterize modern thought were blurred in the eighteenth century, and an understanding of 
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human nature and corporeal faculties were as essential to political economy as the circulation of 
money or the monetary value of labor. 
In chapter five, I examine the expansion of French commerce from the late-seventeenth 
century through the 1750s.  During this period, the increase in global and local commerce 
engaged French subjects in new ways, which threatened the order of corps and états that defined 
the roles of individuals in society.  Supporters of either unrestrained or mitigated commerce 
sought to realize visions of “society” unrestricted by throne and altar; commerce provided a new 
means of structuring society by profitably channeling human passions and altering the 
relationship between birth and social clout.  Commerce did not just challenge the corporate 
social order by redistributing wealth, though; it also fundamentally changed the daily interaction 
of individuals.  Shops and markets provided new arenas for sociability, and as the plethora of 
objects available for purchase decreased in price they became attainable to more individuals.  
This “consumer revolution” destabilized the social hierarchy, and the perceived unity of politics, 
society, and economy experienced constant tension and instability. 
The anxiety produced by changes in the French economy led to a welter of political- 
economic texts addressing the problem of luxury.  The corporeal-social linkage examined in Part 
I pervaded la querelle du luxe.  Having constructed social, economic, and medical/physiological 
contexts in previous sections, in chapters six and seven I treat a range of political-economic 
texts.  Chapter six focuses on la querelle du luxe.  From a general analysis of the debate, I move 
to a detailed study of what I call the “corporeal critique of luxury.”  For critics, luxury 
effeminized men, turning their bodies soft and flabby (la mollesse).  By confusing the symbols 
that represent social états, luxury also corrupted the practice of représentation.  The visual 
sensory information communicated by external ornamentation could create cognitive error when 
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an individual of a lower état donned the garb of a higher état.  Finally, critics of luxury specified 
the processes through which luxury habituated the body to sensible decay, rendering bodies 
languid and incapable of feeling the proper form of sociability.  This was especially evident as 
more and more individuals had access to cheap, knock-off luxury products and began to socialize 
en masse in shops selling baubles and trinkets.  In attempting to solve socio-political problems 
engendered by luxury, then, writers thought through the deleterious physical effects of luxury 
using sensationalist concepts and medical theories. 
The last chapter is dedicated to the Physiocrats, particularly the Marquis de Mirabeau and 
François Quesnay.  The political-economic system of Physiocracy was the most thorough of the 
eighteenth century, and, even though short-lived, Physiocracy exerted a huge influence over 
government administrators and the population writ large.  The Physiocrats disdained the pursuit 
of luxury, and their system was grounded on a corporeal critique of luxury.  In chapter seven, I 
burrow deeply into Mirabeau’s popular L’ami des hommes (1756-1758) and the unpublished 
“Traité de la monarchie” (1758-1760), which he wrote under the tutelage of Quesnay, to connect 
body-politic metaphors back to chapter one and to extract the corporeal bedrock of their critiques 
of luxury.  The arguments that undergirded early physiocratic texts persisted into other works by 
Mirabeau, Quesnay, and their followers.  The Physiocrats pivoted an entire political economy on 
the nature of the human body and the degenerative effects of abjuring “natural law” by 
succumbing to luxury.  The nascent society born of increased commerce was as unnatural to the 
Physiocrats as the traditional social hierarchy with privileges and états.  The social imagination 
that emerged in the second half of the eighteenth century, therefore, invented competing visions 
of social interaction, socio-political institutions, and processes of creating wealth all through the 
human body. 
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Chapter 5 
The French Economy and Consumer Culture 
In L’An 2440, Louis-Sébastien Mercier envisioned a futuristic Paris without rampaging, 
ostentatious carriages, without “imbecilic fops” wasting their not-so-hard-earned wealth, and 
without constricted bodies forced into unnaturally-designed, but utterly fashionable, outfits.  
Mercier’s Paris of the future served as an obvious critique of eighteenth-century Paris, and his 
denigration of luxury was one of many criticisms against the excesses of men and women of all 
social classes.  Every recognizable philosophe voiced his or her opinion on luxury, and for each 
celebrated man or woman of letters there were numerous others participating in la querelle du 
luxe.  But, did opponents of luxury actually have anything to fear?  Were their cries of semiotic 
confusion and consumer frivolity as baseless as their concerns over depopulation?   
In fact, France experienced rapid commercial growth and a booming consumer culture 
during the eighteenth century.  In what follows, I will expand upon this affirmation by 
demonstrating the growth of French commerce, beginning with Louis XIV, and subsequent 
controversies, such as the noblesse commerçante debate.  I will then construct an image of 
French consumer culture, the goods desired by a growing consumer base, and the spaces in 
which consumers interacted in order to illustrate the extent to which there was a “consumer 
revolution.”  Critics of luxury always had in mind, and perhaps in hand, the physicality of 
objects—trinkets, clothing, mirrors, human bodies, etc.—and they dwelled on the tangible effects 
of consumer and product interaction.  Luxury goods and human bodies met in “society,” as they 
simultaneously interacted to become one of the driving forces of “society.”   
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The Political Economy of France 
Historians have demonstrated that France experienced economic growth comparable to 
that of England in the eighteenth century.  Luxury items were at the center of what historians 
sometimes call a “consumer revolution.”  They were part of state-sponsored manufacturing 
projects of the late-seventeenth century, as well as other expensive indicators of “power” and 
“nobility” that became signs of “wealth.” Many luxury goods decreased in price over the 
eighteenth century.  They were then increasingly available to a wider range of people and 
increasingly visible in boutiques and advertisements.  Moreover, by the French Revolution, 
many goods originally thought to be luxuries became “necessities.”274  The luxury debates were 
inseparable from the fluctuations and peculiarities of the French economy and the cultural 
pursuits of the “science of commerce” and “political economy.”   From the commercial 
enterprises inaugurated by Louis XIV and Jean-Baptiste Colbert to the internationally-known 
boutiques of the rue Saint-Honoré, luxury goods stood at the center of the French economy.  Its 
advocates and detractors pursued debates over the role of luxury through all avenues of the 
French economy and expressed themselves through innumerable tracts on morality, commerce, 
social theory, and political economy.   
Luxury became a critical social, moral, and economic issue in the second half of the 
seventeenth century as France developed into a commercial nation that traded globally and 
imported luxury products such as silk, porcelain, mahogany, sugar, coffee, and chocolate.  In 
1686, for example, the Café Procope opened its doors to Parisians and created an exotic, elegant 
                                                          
274The now classic statement of this position is Colin Jones and Rebecca Spang, “Sans-culottes, sans café, sans 
tabac: Shifting Realms of Luxury and Necessity in Eighteenth-Century France,” in Consumers and Luxury: 
Consumer Culture in Europe, 1650-1850, eds. Maxine Berg and Helen Clifford, 37-62 (Manchester and New York: 
Manchester University Press, 1999).  This point was put forward by the maîtresses lingères de Paris as an argument 
against the abolition of the guilds in 1776.  “Réflexions des Marchands et Maîtresses Lingères de Paris, sur le projet 
de détruire les Jurandes,” BNF, Coll. Joly, vol. 596, folio 101. 
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atmosphere of foreign drinks and treats worlds away from the beer-swilling, cigarette-smoking 
English coffeehouses.  Cotton, which began as a luxury good imported with other desirable 
products from India, was a consumer favorite and necessary part of French lives in the eighteenth 
century—eminently adaptable and capable of bearing designs and colors.275   
French commerce took shape under Louis XIV through a series of Crown-sponsored 
initiatives to compete globally with the English and Dutch.  Louis and his finance minister Jean-
Baptiste Colbert developed an economic strategy that Henry Clark has termed “royal patriotism.” 
The king defined the public interest and generated loyalty to it through the intertwining of his 
“dynastic affection” and his subjects’ concomitant love of the patrie.276  Curbing foreign imports 
and bolstering domestic industry, Colbert planned, would produce jobs and wealth for all French 
subjects.  Colbert regulated the manufacture of wool, silk, and lace in his ordinances of 1669, 
and he incorporated numerous guilds through the 1673 Ordinance of Commerce, empowering 
and commanding them to produce and sell luxury goods a certain way.277  He also founded the 
                                                          
275Joan DeJean, The Age of Comfort: When Paris Discovered Casual—and the Modern Home Began (New York, 
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276Henry Clark, Compass of Society: Commerce and Absolutism in Old-Regime France (Lanham, MD: Lexington 
Books, 2007), 42-5. 
 
277Clare Crowston, Fabricating Women: the Seamstresses of Old Regime France, 1675-1791 (Durham, NC: Duke 
University Press, 2001), 187-9.  For a general pitch on the French economy under Louis XIV, see David J. Sturdy, 
Fractured Europe, 1600-1721 (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 2002), 295-9. 
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French East Indies Company in 1664 and gave to the Company a monopoly on colonial trade.278  
Corporate privileges and exclusive monopolies doled out and sold to various commercial and 
manufacturing ventures would be a continual sore point for political economists, social critics, 
and merchants who viewed royal patronage as a series of collusive relationships between the 
court, financiers, and privileged elite.279 
The fashion industry also took flight in the late-seventeenth century.  Louis’ theatrical 
display of power and hierarchy at Versailles necessitated expensive, sartorial representations of 
rank and control over all aspects of la mode.280  In order to accomplish this task, Colbert and 
Louis set up and gave the privilege of monopoly to, for example, the Royal Mirror Manufactory 
at Saint-Gobain (1665) and the royal manufactory at Gobelins (1663)—collectively known as 
manufactures royales—which produced furniture, statues, and tapestries for royal palaces and 
the market.  The tapestries often depicted the glory of the king through both the luscious fabric 
and a detailed histoire du roi, a fundamental part of the king’s image.281 The economic policy 
developed by Louis and Colbert sought to protect French industry and export the Crown-
                                                          
278Colbert was equally responsible for creating the unsuccessful West Indies Company (1664), Northern Company 
(1669), and Levant Company (1670); though the WIC initially failed, France established a financially-profitable 
presence in Saint-Domingue and Guadeloupe. 
 
279Colbert’s efforts persisted into the eighteenth century, and two results of frustration with his reforms were the 
suspension of the East Indies Company’s privileges during the “affair of the Indies Company” (1769) and the 
temporary abolition of the guilds (1776).  For the “affair,” see Anoush Fraser Terjanian, Commerce and Its 
Discontents in Eighteenth-Century French Political Thought (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), chp. 
4, and John Shovlin, The Political Economy of Virtue: Luxury, Patriotism, and the Origins of the French Revolution 
(Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2006), 123-4.  During the crisis following Turgot’s abolition of the guilds 
(1776), both parlementaires and guild masters praised Colbert as the architect of the enviable French economy and 
preserver of privileges. See “Parlementary Remonstrance Against the Edict Suppressing Guilds and Communities of 
Arts and Trades (2-4 March 1776),” in Remontrances du Parlement de Paris au XVIIIe Siècle, ed. Jules 
Flammermont, vol. 3, 275-324 (Paris: Imprimerie Nationale, 1898), 314, and “Représentations du corps des 
Marchands de Vin,” BNF, Coll. Joly, vol. 596, folio 105.    
 
280Jennifer Jones, Sexing La Mode: Gender, Fashion and Commercial Culture in Old Regime France (New York: 
Berg, 2004), 9-25.  Louis was never truly successful in disciplining la mode. 
 
281Peter Burke, The Fabrication of Louis XIV (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992), chps. 4 and 11. 
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sponsored luxury goods indicative of French fashion.282  Louis prohibited the thousands of 
nobles and courtiers surrounding him at Versailles from wearing foreign fashions or imported 
luxury items, and he promoted the French production of textiles, lace, and other luxury products 
through the manufactures royales and the ordinances of 1669 and 1673.  One contemporary 
claimed that as fashion theoretically spread from Versailles to Paris to the provinces and then to 
foreign countries, French cultural influence and economic supremacy would be assured: “The 
more that fashions change and renew themselves, the more they give movement to our 
manufactures, the more outlet we will have and the less our merchants will be burdened with old 
material, because people will everywhere change their clothing and their finery more often.”283 
The French East Indies Company and the new focus on international trade gained 
impetus through Louis’ desire for profit and glory.  Louis and Colbert conceived of trade as a 
mercantile zero-sum game in which the winner profited at the loser’s expense.  There was a 
finite amount of gold and silver to be had, commerce was a form of battle, and Colbert ensured 
proper defenses with trade regulations and import duties.284  Louis’ militaristic zeal that 
accompanied his economic tactics stretched French finances to the breaking point.  The corporate 
privileges he bestowed upon the East Indies Company and manufactures royales, coupled with 
                                                          
282As Joan DeJean recently commented: “As soon as an exotic commodity became fashionable, merchants were 
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the swirling expenses of war, led many contemporaries to question the nature of the French 
economy.  Moreover, the escalating costs of war strained the people through new taxes, while 
Versailles continued to emit éclat (dazzling splendor) that was considered by Louis as much 
foreign policy as the wars.285   
The explosion of material goods, the excessive expenditures of the ultra-elite in constant 
competition at Versailles, Louis’ own subsidization of his most prized courtiers through favors 
and pensions, and the privileges given to the East Indies Company and manufactures royales 
were not the only issues with luxury at their heart.  Louis sought to control luxury, fashion, and 
hierarchy, but, in his attempts to bolster centralized authority and harness the power of socio-
economic symbols, he continued the practice of venality begun by his predecessors.  Louis 
created and sold royal offices, and he conferred honors and privileges, hoping to fill royal coffers 
for wars and éclat.  Many of these dispensations, which could lead to ennoblement, were 
purchased by an emergent, wealthy, non-noble class of merchants, financiers, and magistrates.286  
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Venality: The Sale of Offices in Eighteenth-Century France (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997), and David Bien, 
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Pergamon Press, 1987). 
136 
 
The practice of venality and distribution of honors threatened the traditional nobility.  Consumer 
culture and royal privileges spread through the ranks of society; both supposedly disrupted the 
socio-political hierarchy, which was based on expensive symbols designating rank.  Consumer 
culture also implicated luxury in a larger argument over the desire for France to be a commercial 
nation at all.   
Throughout the eighteenth century, contemporaries would fight fiercely over the 
following questions: What should be the role of the state in commerce?  Does commerce breed 
equality or inequality?  What happens to agriculture in a commercial society?  What should be 
the role of the nobility in commerce?  Can the traditional social taxonomy coexist with 
commerce? Does luxury promote or halt economic growth and morality?  Ultimately, "Was 
there…a way of embracing the growth potential of a vigorous commercial economy without 
giving comfort to a court culture increasingly seen as inadequate or even corrupt?"287  It is 
beyond the scope of this chapter to attempt a simplistic summary of French commercial thought 
throughout the eighteenth century.  For the remainder of this section, I will focus on one episode 
that captures the essence of French debates on commerce, the state, and the social order: the 
noblesse commerçante debate.   
The death of Louis XIV in 1715 coincided with France’s loss of the asiento as a result of 
the War of Spanish Succession (Treaty of Utrecht, 1713).288  With these two hallmarks of state-
sponsored commerce gone, the period between the death of Louis XIV and the 1750s was 
characterized by anxiety over the role of the state in commerce, the debacle of John Law’s 
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“System” in 1720, the persistence of state-sponsored trading monopolies that potentially 
hindered economic growth (e.g. the 1728 Exclusif), and the presumed ability of commerce to 
neutralize international military antagonisms.  In response, the French “developed a science of 
commerce, the central focus of which was reconciling a new political order founded upon 
commerce with the peculiarities of France’s government, social structure, and customs.”289  
Competing reactions to these developments culminated in 1756 with the noblesse commerçante 
debate.290   
Montesquieu, Jean-François Melon, J.-C.-M. Vincent de Gournay, and numerous others 
had argued for the civilizing capacity of commerce freed from governmental constraints, what 
Albert Hirschman called le doux commerce.291  In their view, commerce could overcome the 
myopic strategy of mercantilism by balancing the pursuit of wealth and virtue through the 
passion of “interest.”292  The drive to acquire was thought to be rational, controllable, and 
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virtually innocuous; it would force individuals, and thus nations, to practice commercial 
exchange peacefully and reciprocally.  Advocates of commerce as a softener of manners, 
polisher of mores, and ultimately new foundation for society, however, addressed the social 
hierarchy in competing ways.  Noble fears of losing their status to a budding, moneyed group of 
merchants and venal office holders crystallized in the question whether nobles should participate 
in commerce.293    
 The increasing necessity of commerce to the French economy, and the increasing 
presence of texts supporting commerce in the literary sphere, opened up a new arena in which to 
redefine French society.294  The texts that filled this space demonstrated that there existed 
varying strands of argument between the two poles of the “spirit of commerce” (esprit de 
commerce), espoused by Montesquieu in De l’esprit des lois (1748), and the “spirit of conquest” 
(esprit de conquête).  By the 1750s, the intendant of commerce Vincent de Gournay put forward 
a critique of French commerce, the foundation of which was a dichotomy between the productive 
and unproductive classes.  For Gournay and his colleagues, the idleness and parasitism of the 
privileged order explained French stagnation.295  The question whether or not the nobility should 
participate in commerce highlighted a number of ongoing debates: the role of luxury; the extent 
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Nobility Reimagined.  For Charles Taylor, commerce was a liberating process that created a “direct-access” society 
and annulled intermediary organization (e.g. corps) that separated individuals from each other and from the state.  
Taylor, Modern Social Imaginaries (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2004), chp. 10. 
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Melon’s Essai politique sur le commerce (1734). 
 
295For the most recent work on the Gournay Circle, see Loïc Charles, Frédéric Lefebvre, and Christine Théré, 
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to which France should be a commercial society; the homogeneity of the Second Estate; and a 
flexible political language that mixed the traditional values of honor and virtue with new 
definitions of patriotism, citizenry, social utility, and nobility itself.296  Importantly, there were 
two general ideas competing over the future of France: commerce would either mar the Second 
Estate, and thus undermine the social hierarchy, or commerce would revitalize the French 
economy, by redefining merchants and traders as patriots, and thus the Second Estate.   
With a groundswell of support behind him, including Vincent de Gournay, abbé Coyer 
commenced the debate in 1756 with La noblesse commerçante.  He contended that the nobility, 
especially the poorer nobility, should be encouraged to participate in commerce; those who chose 
this path should not be penalized, either legally by derogation of noble status or culturally 
through noble prejudice against commercial activity.297  Coyer did not seek to undermine the 
social hierarchy as much as redefine merchants as “noble” and “honorable.”  He observed 
society through the utility of its members and found that frivolous courtiers, idle landowners, and 
undeserving plutocrats contributed nothing productive to the ineluctable, modern commercial 
nation.  Commerce, Coyer asserted, “has begun to acquire nobility in the eyes of the public.”298   
In La noblesse militaire, ou le patriote françois (1756) and Histoire du commerce et de la 
navigation des peuples anciens et modernes (1758), Coyer’s opponent, chevalier d’Arc, also 
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Debate over noblesse commerçante,” Journal of Modern History, vol. 72, n. 2 (June 2000): 339-374. This section 
also draws from Cheney, Revolutionary Commerce, chp. 2 and 95-102; Clark, Compass of Society, chp. 4; Michael 
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modified the language of honor, glory, and utility, but his intent was to bolster traditional 
corporate privileges and the moral superiority of the nobility, as exemplified through the 
profession of arms.  In Histoire du commerce, Arc attempted to prove that in commercial nations 
of the past subjects or citizens lacked the courage and military zeal to protect la patrie.  He 
recoiled at the thought of nobles becoming “mere calculators,” pursuing only financial gain and 
constantly concerned with money and numbers.299  Arc chastised fellow members of the Second 
Estate for eschewing honor, self-sacrifice, and noble sentiment for the caprice and cupidity of 
luxury, a direct consequence of commerce.  Like Montesquieu, Arc argued that commerce was 
not the arena in which nobles should best express their honor, but unlike Montesquieu he 
challenged the importance of commerce to the French economy in general, as did the Physiocrats 
concurrently.300   
The debate over the commercial nobility aroused the French public and political 
economists to the instability of the traditional corporate system.  One of the long-term 
consequences of the death of Louis XIV and the failure of John Law’s “System” was that the 
“public” became more aware of both itself and its relationship to state finances, forcing members 
of the royal family and government officials to develop public confidence and heed “public 
opinion.”301  If, as abbé Coyer claimed, commerce had attained nobility in the eyes of the public, 
then it would behoove government officials to take note.  The noblesse commerçante debate 
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signaled too the creeping anxiety over what Jonathan Sheehan and Dror Wahrman called “free 
agents.”  Chevalier d’Arc and abbé Coyer both sought a directing hand to restructure or restore 
traditional French society, as commerce appeared to release individuals from their états and 
corps.  For d’Arc, the undesirable consequence of commerce was the dilution of the Second 
Estate’s natural moral status and military capacity, and, for abbé Coyer, commercial modernity 
provided new mechanisms to bolster and assess the traditional social structure: social utility and 
public opinion.  By the mid-eighteenth century, the stress that commerce put on the social order 
turned the question of a commercial nobility into a cause célèbre. 
The efforts to reconcile the privileges and prejudices of the corporate nobility, and the 
monarchy that sustained them, with a world governed more and more by commerce would 
continue to exercise the minds of French thinkers, particularly after defeat in the Seven Years’ 
War (1756-1763).  The commercial and manufacturing policies enacted by Louis XIV and 
Colbert continued to bear fruit, but they elicited criticism from two fronts:  those who demanded 
freedom of commerce to enhance the wealth and social polish of the French nation and more 
tradition-minded nobles who saw commerce as undermining the social hierarchy, extending an 
acquisitive ardor through society, and neglecting agriculture.   
The spread of commerce touched all facets of the French constitution: “social structure, 
forms of government, and even moeurs (customs, manners, or mores).”302  Montesquieu’s 
important De l’esprit des lois augmented the popularity of French commerce in the literary 
sphere, and the debates about luxury intertwined commerce and the social order.  Eighteenth-
                                                          
302Cheney, Revolutionary Commerce, 25 (see pg. 61 also).  For moeurs, see Shovlin, The Political Economy of 
Virtue, 22-23, 164-6, and Sarah Maza, “Luxury, Morality, and Social Change: Why There Was No Middle-Class 
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century “science of commerce,” or what would become “political economy,” never truly 
distinguished between the components of a modern conception of the economy—models of 
value, labor, supply, demand, and equilibrium, all under direct human control.303  It is for this 
reason that the early-modern linkage of the concept of “commerce” to social, moral, and political 
conditions is so important: “commerce came to refer not only to the activities of merchants...but 
to an increasingly resonant image of civil society as a whole, as in phrases such as ‘an agreeable 
commerce,’ ‘an easy commerce,’ the ‘commerce of letters,’ or the ‘commerce between the 
sexes’.”304  The idea of “commerce” became inseparable from a new idea of “society” and social 
interaction, and contemporaries performed commerce as consumers and sociable beings in the 
boutiques and streets of Paris. 
The Culture of Consumption 
The growth of literature on political economy beginning at midcentury was matched in 
the marketplace by an intensification of purchasing and consumption.  The état of consumers 
became less clear.  In fact, some historians have rightfully asserted that the publishing boom in 
economic affairs was in response to the swelling of consumption and changes in the material 
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realm.305  These two changes provided visual evidence to critics of luxury that new forms of 
social interaction driven by commerce would have pernicious moral consequences as the sensory 
network of human bodies would be overwhelmed.   
Moving from a macro perspective developed above to a micro perspective, the day-to-
day interaction of individuals as consumers and sociable beings will exemplify France as a 
consumer society.  There is no doubt that more French subjects consumed more in the eighteenth 
century than ever before, and that this growth of consumption fed the fruition of “society” as a 
realm of unrestrained human interaction.306  Although the state’s finances may have been in 
ruins by the late 1780s, this was not the case for the economy in general.307 
Daniel Roche described the growth of eighteenth-century consumption as “The 
Appearance of Luxury and the Luxury of Appearances.”  He linked a new “culture of 
appearances” to the rise of “individualism” and changes in social attitudes.308  The ability to 
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purchase a wide range of luxury goods increased in the eighteenth century, but the social practice 
of “appearance” had multiple motives.  One could wear an “appearance” as a mask or perform it 
as a diversion to distract from either one’s depleted finances or base background.  Roche focused 
on the emancipatory capacity of consumption.  In his words, “The quick succession of fashions 
which attracted observers’ notice...was thus part of a more considerable change, inducing and 
expressing a new relationship with the body, a new appearance in society (i.e. a new way of 
looking at people), that could be seen in the streets, places, markets...and at festivals.”309  Roche 
suggested what I have been describing as the social imagination: a set of corporeal-social 
principles that undergirded the perception of “society” in the second half of the eighteenth 
century.  Integral to this new social imagination was the ability to purchase more goods, to 
decorate and care for the body, and to interact with others through participation in commerce.  
This dynamic culture of consumption extended below the upper crust of the Second Estate, and 
commercialization of eighteenth-century culture imbricated all aspects of modern life.   
A short list of (luxury) goods includes sugar, coffee, tea, chocolate, silks, gold/silver 
brocades, bonnets/hats, ribbons, blouses, cuffs, stockings, perfumes, cosmetics, gloves, buttons, 
fans, shoes and buckles, wigs, snuffboxes, umbrellas, watches, mirrors, desks, pens, ink 
(inkstands), paper, seals/wax, indiennes, and chinoiserie (tea cups, porcelain, incense burners, 
folding fans, porcelain magots).  Most of these objects were considered luxury goods, consumed 
or purchased only by elites with significant disposable income.  They were capable of being 
transformed in order to match seasons, colors, or designs à la mode and were appropriated to the 
state’s manufacturing apparatus.  Alongside a surfeit of items for use and display emerged new 
expressions of taste and desires for comfort in the home.  Sofas, arm chairs, garments, bath 
                                                          
309Roche, “Between a ‘moral economy’ and a ‘consumer economy’,” 223. 
145 
 
fixtures, and new approaches to interior decoration and architecture united changes in the 
articulation of luxury to new forms of production and consumption irrespective of social 
hierarchy and courtly etiquette.310   
Whether expressive of commodité or the egoism of rank, luxury goods were “caught 
between pleasure and social competitiveness.”311  And, what began as luxury, the exclusive 
property of a few, became necessity by the French Revolution (e.g. sugar, coffee, tobacco, 
cotton, stockings).  Historians have shown that the demand for luxury goods not only made the 
border between the Second and Third Estate porous, but that the French “consumer revolution” 
was propelled by the lower classes purchasing “populuxe” goods, or “cheap copies of aristocratic 
luxury items.”312  Jewelry, gold watches, stockings, umbrellas, and fans were favorite populuxe 
accessories.  From 1700-1789, workers’ expenditures on clothing and undergarments rose 215% 
and those of nobles 233%, outpacing workers by only 18%.313  In his recent work on wigs, 
Michael Kwass addressed the economic and social limits of the “consumer revolution” and 
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found that “the wig’s diffusion demonstrates a dramatic expansion in an intermediate zone of 
consumption situated between aristocratic luxury and popular necessity.”314  The number of 
master wigmakers in Paris and provincial cities grew exponentially in the eighteenth century, as 
did consumers of this formerly-exclusive product.  The social diffusion of the wig, Kwass 
declared, does not support arguments for “mass” consumption, but it does support arguments for 
a marked growth in demand and purchasing power.  The Marquis de Mirabeau, well-known for 
his exaggerated rhetoric, was perhaps not off the mark when he complained, “everyone has 
become a Monsieur.”315 
A deepening consumer base learned of such products through a variety of media.  To 
create and channel demand, producers and sellers sought to capture the public’s attention in new 
ways.  In addition, as luxury items representative of status became populuxe goods available to 
the majority of consumers, they had to revitalize the elite market through advertising.316  New 
forms of marketing looked to stimulate desire and focus consumer energies toward their own 
distinguishable products.  In the process, they created a “culture of publicity.”317 
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The growth of the literary public sphere, which incorporated academies, essay contests, 
coffeehouses, and the periodical press, gave to shop owners, entrepreneurs, and merchants an 
outlet to make the public aware of their goods and the ability to shape usage.  Journals like the 
Mercure de France (formerly Mercure galant), Avantcoureur, and Cabinet des modes reported 
on the latest goods à la mode, ways to wear or apply those goods (e.g. clothes and cosmetics), 
and places in which to buy particular items.318  Advertisements for all varieties of consumer 
goods could be found in the weekly Affiches that reached a large readership in urban areas across 
France, as we saw in chapter four.319  Merchant trade cards merged text with detailed images of 
their (often exotic) merchandise to provide necessary information and suggest ways for 
consumers to display their wares; they were both seductive and practical.320  The expansion of 
almanacs and guides attest not only to the increased tourist interest in the monuments of Paris but 
also to a “commercial literature,” a veritable geography of shops and products.321  Finally, 
domestic servants became cultural intermediaries; they were “both spectators and actors, serving 
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as models to the affluent lower classes.”322  Servants and more prosperous workers were able to 
transmit new fashions, innovative goods, or modern concepts (e.g. comfort) to those unexposed 
to luxury items through other visual methods. 
Luxury and populuxe items did not necessarily sell themselves.  “Taste masters” or “taste 
leaders” shaped fashion and enticed consumers.  In the Affiches, advertisers often attached “de 
santé” to products as a way to highlight or fabricate the health benefits of commodities, thus 
“embodying” the consumer further and cementing the role of the body in the social 
imagination.323  “Taste leaders” shifted common perceptions of wigs away from the domain of a 
competitive, courtly aristocracy and promoted them as convenient (easy and pleasant), natural 
(though capable of fixing nature’s defects), and authentic representations of one’s subjectivity.324  
“Taste masters” redefined not only products but also consumers, sweetening the pitch by 
characterizing them as “modern” or “educated” or subtly disciplining them by competing with 
each other.325  Contemporary social commentators blamed or praised the marchandes de modes 
for setting la mode, as fashion, frivolity, and taste all came to be linked in print to women.  
Marchandes de modes were primarily female merchants who specialized in “finishing garments, 
decorating hats with feathers and artificial flowers, selling lace and ribbons, designing hairstyles, 
and making simple ready-made items such as capes and neckerchiefs.”326  The larger category of 
                                                          
322Roche, The People of Paris, 132.  See also Roche, France in the Enlightenment, 558; Roche, “Between a ‘moral 
economy’ and a ‘consumer economy’,” 223; Jones, The Great Nation, 358. 
 
323Jones, “The Great Chain of Buying,” 28. 
 
324Kwass, “Big Hair,” defined “taste leaders” as philosophes, critics of society, morality, and fashion, and producers 
of goods, but most importantly they were “self-proclaimed experts” who “used the printed word to influence 
consumer practices” (644). 
 
325Martin, Selling Beauty, 6-7. 
 
326Jones, Sexing “La Mode,” 91-2.  See also Crowston, Fabricating Women, 67-71 and her recent Credit, Fashion, 
Sex: Economies of Regard in Old Regime France (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2013). 
 
149 
 
marchand-merciers dealt in furniture and jewelry; they were a hub for exotic imports, and the 
marchands “finished” products to stimulate or satisfy fashion.327   
Many (men) feared that the grisettes who worked fashion boutiques exerted a dissolute 
influence over fashion, consumption, and sexuality, the latter often the selling point.  Their status 
as le petit peuple combined with the association of coquetry, caprice, commerce, and female 
independence added an acrimonious moral critique to the “consumer revolution.”328  Yet, the 
entirety of the shopping experience became another force driving the consumer revolution.  
Populuxe items could be purchased at fairs and markets throughout France, and colporteurs 
hawked merchandise on foot and through correspondence.  Chambrelans produced and sold 
goods illegally, skirting guild and corporate regulations, and the itinerant 
revendeuses/revendeurs sold second-hand clothes (fripiers possessed shops in Les Halles).  Both 
connected multiple worlds—production/consumption, urban/rural, supply/demand, upper/lower 
class—and exemplified the interlacing elements of commercial culture.329   
The most dazzling spaces of consumption were the shops and boutiques of Paris that 
combined shopping and sociability, commodity and spectacle.  Parisian shop windows 
shimmered in both the midday sun and the new, evening street lighting.330 The interactions 
between male shoppers and les grisettes, female shoppers and the galant male mercer, and 
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shoppers of both sexes and all socio-economic statuses became itself an event.  Parisian 
boutiques were central sites of exchange: social, economic, production, consumption.  Shopping 
became a socio-cultural activity indicative of leisure, diversion, and instruction.331  Parisians and 
tourists could promenade the Tuileries, sip coffee or chocolate in modern, elegant cafés (rather 
than seedy cabarets), and stroll through the Palais Royal or rue Saint-Honoré window-shopping 
or purchasing any number of goods.  Pleasure derived from these activities contributed to a 
culture of consumption and appearance, a rise in individual self-awareness and expression, and 
an attractive public space unfettered by the social laws of hierarchy or even the exclusivity of 
salons.  Likening Parisian culture to a “perpetual ball,” an experience that overwhelmed all the 
senses, became a key critique of luxury and its effects on the body.332 
Luxury debates took place within this context of accelerated consumption and continued 
dialogue over the role of the government and the nobility in commerce.  Texts on political 
economy positioned critiques of guild regulations and corporate privileges, for example, 
alongside moral analyses of the gradually more mixed social composition of France.  
Contemporaries did not just imagine the effects of consumer culture in their fearful or febrile 
writings; they observed on a daily basis new individuals with the purchasing power to obtain 
once exclusive goods and consumers of indeterminate social status performing the sociability of 
commerce.  The periodical press, Affiches, boutiques, “taste-makers,” grisettes, and chambrelans 
all linked French consumption, exchange, and manufacture in what Colin Jones has called a 
“Great Chain of Buying.”  Even if magistrates, social commentators, guild members, and the 
                                                          
331Coquery, Tenir Boutique, 23.  See also Coquery, “The Language of Success,” 77-80; Goodman, Becoming a 
Woman in the Age of Letters, 166-75, 191-2; Jones, Sexing “La Mode,” 150-69; Roche, France in the 
Enlightenment, 548-56.  These texts also detail spaces in which poorer members of society purchased goods, which 
was certainly not characterized by charm and sociability, and acknowledge that many of the wealthy still had clothes 
made to order and delivered. 
 
332For example, see A.-P. Lottin, Discours contre le luxe (1783; I have used the 1784 version), 10. 
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fashion press gendered feminine an entire package of modern consumer culture—desire, excess, 
frivolity, fashion, sexuality—it is clear that this prejudiced veneer did not hinder men from 
purchasing goods such as wigs, handkerchiefs, buckles, and cosmetics.  The new consumer was 
born in the eighteenth century and stood at the center of the luxury debates; he or she was sans 
état but distinctly corporeal.333 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
333For an investigation into the intertwining concepts of “consumer” and “citizen” in Europe and America from the 
eighteenth century to the end of the twentieth century, see Sheryl Kroen, “A Political History of the Consumer,” The 
Historical Journal 47:3 (2004): 709-736.  
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Chapter 6 
The Corporeal Critique of Luxury 
In 1755, Diderot wrote in the fifth volume of the Encyclopédie that the purpose of a 
universal dictionary was to fix the meaning of terms, to expose and correct the abuse of 
language.  He proposed "luxury" as a pertinent example of a term which "we say of a great many 
objects, without any of us ever getting it wrong."334  Diderot's choice of "luxury" indicates the 
far-reaching resonance of this term in mid-eighteenth-century France, and he was not the only 
writer to express discontent with its ambiguity or imprecision.  Earlier in the eighteenth century, 
Bernard Mandeville found "luxury" to lack any semantic force as an economic or moral category 
unless widely expanded to encompass everything “not immediately necessary to make Man 
subsist as he is a living Creature” (1714).335  Jean-François Melon too thought "luxury" to be a 
composite of “vague, confused, and false” ideas” (1736).336  Moreover, definitions of luxury 
changed over time.  As the abbé Morellet argued, "in defining luxury…[one] cannot but be an 
historian" (1786).337   
                                                          
334Denis Diderot, "Encyclopedia," The Encyclopedia of Diderot & d'Alembert Collaborative Translation Project, 
trans. Philip Stewart (Ann Arbor: MPublishing, University of Michigan Library, 2002). 
http://hdl.handle.net/2027/spo.did2222.0000.004 (accessed July 3, 2013). Originally published as "Encyclopédie," 
Encyclopédie ou Dictionnaire raisonné des sciences, des arts et des métiers, 5:635–648A (Paris, 1755). 
 
335Mandeville, The Fable of the Bees; or, Private Vices, Publick Benefits, ed. F. B. Kaye (Indianapolis: Liberty 
Fund, 1988), 107 (Remark “L”). 
 
336Melon, Essai politique sur le commerce (1734; I am using the second edition published in 1736), 113. 
 
337Quoted in Henry Clark, Compass of Society: Commerce and Absolutism in Old-Regime France (Lanham, MD: 
Lexington Books, 2007), 271.  
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Mandeville, Melon, and Morellet supported the growth of luxury as an economically- and 
socially-profitable enterprise, and they sought to defuse the controversy surrounding its meaning 
by demonstrating its pervasiveness.  The problem of luxury, though, was more than conceptual 
confusion or historical relativism.  To quote historians Maxine Berg and Elizabeth Eger, 
"Enlightenment culture adapted itself to luxury as a positive social force, viewing it with 
confidence as an instrument (and indication) of the progress of civilization.  On the other hand, 
[Enlightenment culture] feared luxury as a debilitating and corrosive social evil, clinging to 
classical critiques of excessive indulgence and wanton profligacy, urban chaos and plebeian 
idleness."338  Similar to the noblesse commerçante debate, arguing for or against luxury was a 
strategy to comment upon morality, the social and political order, commerce, and material 
culture.339 
La querelle du luxe captivated the minds of contemporaries precisely because it united so 
many facets of French society in flux.  From 1762-1791, there were forty-seven texts published 
with the word “luxury” (le luxe) in the title.340  Most importantly, the anxiety produced by 
commercial culture and luxury came to be conceived corporeally.  Opponents of luxury 
                                                          
338Maxine Berg and Elizabeth Eger, eds., "Introduction" to Luxury in the Eighteenth Century: Debates, Desires and 
Delectable Goods (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2003), 2.  Speaking of England, E. J. Clery remarks: "The term 
has been sometimes narrowly defined by twentieth-century commentators as excessive consumption, an outgrowth 
of selfish passions, which threatens to destabilize the polis.  But in context, in the writings of civic humanist and 
enlightenment authors, it is apparent that luxury represents much more than this.  It signifies change per se.  Its 
excess is of an historical nature: the supersession of a social and political order, and the inability to contain forces of 
transformation that subvert the existing parameters of the state…Almost invariably in the first half of the century, 
this change is understood as a decline."  E. J. Clery, The Feminization Debate in Eighteenth-Century England: 
Literature, Commerce, and Luxury (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), 7.  For the perspective of French army 
officers on the perceived effects of luxury, see David Bien, “The Army and the French Enlightenment: Reform, 
Reaction, and Revolution,” Past and Present, n. 85 (November 1979): 68-98, here pgs. 73-4. 
 
339Writing a text on luxury, or merely attaching a phrase to that effect, was perceived as a way into the literary 
world.  See Audrey Provost, Le luxe, les Lumières, et la Révolution (Paris: Champ Vallon, 2014). 
 
340Ibid., 159-162.  Provost provides a list of these texts, a list of works sparked by the Académie française from 
1770-1786, and excerpts from forty-two texts on luxury and commerce.  
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expressed their fears and anxieties about the deleterious effects of luxury through the sensible 
body.  They moved beyond corporeal metaphors of the social body in a diseased condition and 
generic references to the utility of the passions—a popular argument made by supporters of 
luxury—to more direct evidence of the destructive capacity of luxury on the body itself.  The 
human body was affected by new contact with material goods and other humans in a society 
gradually brought to fruition by commerce.  Fears that luxury could damage the body were 
compounded by the increasing flexibility of the social order in which people of uncertain rank 
interacted more and more.   
La Querelle du Luxe341 
In France, the luxury debates began as a reaction to the economic and foreign policies of 
Louis XIV and Colbert, simmered during the Regency, and were rekindled at mid-century.  Late-
seventeenth- and eighteenth-century thinkers engaged the luxury debates and used the question 
of luxury to criticize or reinforce the intricately-woven web of society, politics, and economics.  
Although famous supporters of luxury, such as Jean-François Melon, Voltaire, David Hume, and 
Montesquieu, were the most vocal, after mid-century the public sphere became glutted with 
                                                          
341Luxury has become a central and unavoidable topic in early-modern European history.  Alongside primary 
sources, I have crafted the following analysis on the luxury debates from the following: Ellen Ross, “Mandeville, 
Melon, and Voltaire: The Origins of the Luxury Controversy in France,” Studies on Voltaire and the Eighteenth 
Century 155 (1976): 1897-1912; Christopher Berry, The Idea of Luxury: A Conceptual and Historical Investigation 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994); Pierre Rétat, “Luxe,” Dix-Huitième Siècle, n. 26 (1994): 79-88; 
Sarah Maza, “Luxury, Morality, and Social Change: Why There Was No Middle-Class Consciousness in 
Prerevolutionary France,” The Journal of Modern History, 69 (June 1997): 221-23; Maxine Berg and Helen 
Clifford, eds., Consumers and Luxury: Consumer Culture in Europe, 1650-1850 (Manchester: Manchester 
University Press, 1999); Maxine Berg and Elizabeth Eger, eds., Luxury in the Eighteenth Century: Debates, Desires 
and Delectable Goods (Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press, 1999); John Shovlin, The Political 
Economy of Virtue: Luxury, Patriotism, and the Origins of the French Revolution (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University 
Press, 2006); Istvan Hont, "The early Enlightenment debate on commerce and luxury," in The Cambridge History of 
Eighteenth-Century Political Thought, eds. Mark Goldie and Robert Wokler, 379-418 (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2006); Clark, Compass of Society; Stéphane Castelluccio, ed., Le Commerce du Luxe à Paris aux 
XVIIe et XVIIIe Siècles (Bern: Peter Lang SA, 2009); Jeremy Jennings, “The Debate about Luxury in Eighteenth- and 
Nineteenth-Century French Political Thought,” Journal of the History of Ideas, vol. 68, n. 1 (January 2007): 79-105 
and his Revolution and the Republic: A History of Political Thought in France since the Eighteenth 
Century (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 140-6; Provost, Le luxe, les Lumières, et la Révolution. 
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critiques of luxury.  These critiques were based largely on the perceived, degenerative effects of 
luxury on the human body, and supporters of luxury were unable or unwilling to match the 
breadth and depth of their opponents’ physiological arguments.  Before identifying the context-
specific ways supporters of luxury integrated the body into their analyses, I want to briefly 
highlight the major positions in the luxury debate, which reflect the anxiety over the social order 
and spread of commerce. 
In the years surrounding the turn of the eighteenth century, François de Salignac de la 
Mothe-Fénelon spearheaded the critique of luxury with Les aventures de Télémaque, fils de 
Ulysse (1699).  On his heels, Bernard Mandeville unleashed a scathing attack on Télémaque’s 
idealistic vision of human behavior and moral virtue.342  In his extraordinarily popular work, 
Fénelon laced an epic adventure with a thorough critique of Louis XIV for abandoning his 
subjects, wasting the resources of the state, and prizing vanity and the corruption of Versailles 
over the public good.  Fénelon’s attack on Louis XIV was not necessarily an attack on absolute 
monarchy as a form of government but on the despotism and luxury under which the Bourbon 
regime had sunk.343  According to Fénelon, Louis had elevated the artificiality and dissimulation 
of flattery, ornamentation, and wealth over virtue, honor, and rank, which allowed courtiers and 
financiers to profit at the country’s expense.  To avoid the social confusion stimulated by the 
                                                          
342Even though Mandeville acknowledged Shaftesbury as his designated target in 1723, he still clearly had Fénelon 
in his sights early on.  His critique is even more biting when one considers the overlap of Fénelon’s “quietistic” 
theology and his political philosophy, both lauding disinterestedness and self-sacrifice to the greater good.  
Mandeville put forward his support of luxury primarily in two places: The Grumbling Hive: Or, Knaves Turn’d 
Honest (1705; a satirical pamphlet in verse most likely mocking Fénelon’s 1689 text The Bees), and The Fable of 
the Bees; or, Private Vices, Publick Benefits (1714, a republication of The Grumbling Hive with twenty additional, 
alphabetical Remarks expanding out his argument).  For the latter, see the still-relevant, two-volume edition of F. B. 
Kaye (1924) republished by Liberty Fund, 1988.   
 
343Fénelon, Telemachus, son of Ulysses, ed. and trans. Patrick Riley (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1994), book 10.  In his introduction, Riley stated that Fénelon combined monarchical rule with republican virtues, a 
potent mixture that would influence Jean-Jacques Rousseau and Marquis de Mirabeau. 
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bodily adornment of courtiers, financiers, and recent anoblis, he advocated sumptuary laws and a 
sartorial ranking system in order to present by exterior grandeur the class structure of the city.344  
Fénelon also criticized the mercantilist policies of Louis and Colbert, which neglected 
agriculture and gambled with French economic success in the ephemeral trade and manufacture 
of luxury goods.  Ultimately, in Fénelon’s account, Louis’s commitment to luxury and constant 
warfare would depopulate France and lure peasants from rural areas to cities searching for 
employment and the glamour of le luxe.345   
Bernard Mandeville’s mantra, “Private Vices, Public Benefits,” provided a new moral 
and psychological argument in support of luxury.  He presented the selfish and often 
dishonorable motivations of humans in society—observably passionate rather than hopefully 
virtuous—and the consequences of their actions as proper guides to economic policy.  Pride, 
envy, and vanity, Mandeville explained, propelled commerce and industry, and thus distributed 
wealth, as individuals defined themselves through their possessions.346  Modern commercial 
                                                          
344Ibid., 162-3.  Fénelon likened luxury to a poison that infected the entire nation: “[The] whole nation goes to 
wreck; all ranks are confounded...all live above their rank and income, some from vanity and ostentation, and to 
display their wealth; others from a false shame, and to hide their poverty” (297).  Étienne-Gabriel Morelly proposed 
a set of sumptuary laws based on age and with the goal of repressing vanity in his Code de la Nature (1755, part IV), 
in Oeuvres philosophiques (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, Éditions Coda, 2004), 360. 
 
345Ibid., 152-3, 165-8 (Mentor’s prescription for revitalizing agriculture and the population). Fénelon did not bemoan 
the attention to trade and industry but merely wanted it to accord properly with agriculture (See Book III for a 
discussion of the commercial city of Tyre and Book X for the changes Mentor made to Salente).  See Rousseau’s 
prediction in Discours sur l’origine et fondemens de l’inégalité parmi les hommes (1755): “To the degree that 
industry and the arts expand and flourish, the scorned farmer, burdened with taxes necessary to maintain luxury and 
condemned to spend his life between toil and hunger, abandons his fields to go to the cities in search of the bread he 
ought to be carrying there.  The more the capital cities strike the stupid eyes of the people as wonderful, the more it 
will be necessary to groan at the sight of countrysides abandoned, fields fallow, and main roads jammed with 
unhappy citizens who have become beggars or thieves...Thus it is that the state, enriching itself on the one hand, 
weakens and depopulates itself on the other.” Discourse on the Origin of Inequality, in On the Social Contract and 
Discourses, trans. Donald A. Cress, intro. Peter Gay (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1983), 201. 
 
346For Mandeville’s larger political economy and investigation of human behavior, see Jerrold Seigel, The Idea of 
the Self: Thought and Experience in Western Europe Since the Seventeenth Century (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2005), chp. 4; Edward Hundert, The Enlightenment’s Fable: Bernard Mandeville and the 
Discovery of Society (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994); Hundert, “Mandeville, Rousseau and the 
Political Economy of Fantasy,” in Luxury in the Eighteenth Century, eds. Berg and Eger, 28-40.  For Mandeville’s 
157 
 
societies benefitted from the self-interest of their members and their search for esteem and 
pleasure (physical, social, or moral).  Although deeply embedded in the socio-political context of 
early-eighteenth century England, Mandeville’s message would resonate in France during the 
1730s.347  Whereas Fénelon set a critique of luxury that would be repeated often during the 
eighteenth century, Mandeville provided one particularly strong argument in support of luxury.   
Jean-François Melon, Voltaire, and Montesquieu argued as steadfastly, though less 
provocatively, as Mandeville in support of luxury, and Melon and Voltaire praised the strategies 
of Colbert that theoretically spread wealth throughout France.348  Melon had been an associate of 
the Scottish financier John Law, working as secretary to the Compagnie des Indes, and his Essai 
politique sur le commerce (1734) defended some of Law’s financial schemes (e.g. public credit, 
devaluation).  Although a firm advocate of France’s agricultural strengths, Melon supported the 
development of a luxury trade that would advance the commercial success of France (esprit de 
commerce) as an alternative to military aggrandizement (esprit de conquête).349  Luxury would 
promote industriousness in the French people and thus solve the rampant problem of idleness and 
drunkenness.  It would circulate money, prevent hoarding, and would not render the French 
military weak because humans are moved by their passions to action: “the legislator must seek 
                                                          
debt to the works of Pierre Bayle, who he most likely studied under in Rotterdam, see John Robertson, The Case for 
the Enlightenment: Scotland and Naples 1680-1760 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 261-80.  
 
347See Ellen Ross, “Mandeville, Melon, and Voltaire: The Origins of the Luxury Controversy in France”; Berry, The 
Idea of Luxury, esp. 127-35; Istvan Hont, "The early Enlightenment debate on commerce and luxury;" Elena 
Muceni, “Mandeville and France: The Reception of the Fable of the Bees in France and Its Influence on the French 
Enlightenment,” French Studies, vol. LXIX, n. 4 (2015): 449-461.  
 
348For an examination of Melon as a mercantilist and opponent of Forbonnais, who later authored the entries 
“Commerce” and “Agriculture” for the Encyclopédie, see Catherine Larrère, L’Invention de l’économie au XVIII 
siècle (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1992), chp. 3.   
 
349Melon redefined both “commerce” and “luxury.”  “Commerce is the exchange of the superfluous for the 
necessary” (8), and, although relative to time and place, luxury is generally “an extraordinary sumptuousness that 
proceeds from the wealth and security of a government” (106).  
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ways to make the passions useful to society.  Ambition alone makes the soldier brave, and greed 
spurs the merchant to work.”350   
Voltaire augmented Melon’s economic case with a cultural argument that luxury and 
“progress” (intellectual, artistic, and scientific) were intertwined, and Montesquieu put forward 
the most comprehensive set of social, political, and economic principles with luxury and 
commerce at their center.351  Even though Montesquieu promoted le doux commerce, a softening 
of manners and increased socio-cultural interaction was not the first step toward a leveling of 
society.  Montesquieu built luxury into his typology of governments as a symbol and regulator of 
the social inequality necessary to a monarchy.352  For Melon, Voltaire, and Montesquieu, 
commerce and luxury would fuel national success at all levels. 
The years following Montesquieu’s De l’Esprit des Lois (1748) saw a reinvigorated 
critique of luxury.  Rousseau’s vituperative first and second discourses appeared in 1750 and 
                                                          
350Melon, Essai politique sur le commerce, 106 (see also chp. VII, “Du gouvernement militaire”). 
 
351Voltaire contributed to the luxury debates in a number of texts: Le Mondain (1736), La Défense du mondain ou 
l’apologie du luxe (1737), Anti-Machiavel (1740, with Frederick the Great), Le Siècle de Louis XIV (1751), and the 
entry “Luxe” in his Dictionnaire philosophique (1769, enlarged version).  According to Ellen Ross, Voltaire’s 
accomplishments were more groundbreaking than Melon and Mandeville’s: “But the earlier proponents of luxury 
did not make the search for a pleasurable existence a virtue.  This Voltaire did.  In his didactic poems, he presented 
nothing less than a new vision of civilisation, an alternative set of values.  For Voltaire, art and science replaced 
Christianity as authorities; pleasures supplanted virtue as the goal of private life; luxury replaced pious self-denial.” 
Ross, “Mandeville, Melon, and Voltaire,” 1911.  Darrin McMahon has located luxury and consumer society at the 
nexus of a long-term transition to the search for pleasure and happiness on earth and in society.  McMahon, 
Happiness: A History (New York: Grove Press, 2006), 205-8.  
  
352Montesquieu, The Spirit of the Laws, Anne M. Cohler, Basia Carolyn Miller, and Harold Samuel Stone, trans. and 
ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), Book VII, esp. chps. 1 and 4.  This is not to say that 
Montesquieu approved of the nefarious behavior of courtiers and flatterers at court (Book III, esp. chp. 5).  For a 
brief but poignant analysis of Montesquieu’s uncertainty regarding his own description of governments and the 
principles that best fit them (virtue, honor, and fear), see Jay M. Smith, Nobility Reimagined: The Patriotic Nation in 
Eighteenth-Century France (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2005), 67-78. For the question of equality and the 
leveling of society, see Annelien de Dijn, French Political Thought from Montesquieu to Tocqueville: Liberty in a 
Levelled Society (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 20-32.  And, for a helpful treatment of the furor 
unleashed by De l’Esprit des Lois due to surrounding political, intellectual, religious, and economics events, though 
couched within a problematic argument, see Jonathan Israel, Enlightenment Contested: Philosophy, Modernity, and 
the Emancipation of Man, 1670-1752 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 824-39. 
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1755, in which he ascribed the destructive capacity of luxury and the arts to vanity, idleness, 
inequality, and cowardice.  In 1754 Jean-Bernard Le Blanc published a translation of David 
Hume’s Political Discourses (Discours politiques de Monsieur Hume), which contained “the 
single most powerful and compelling argument made to date in favor of le luxe.”353 In L’ami des 
hommes (1756-8), the excitable Marquis de Mirabeau attacked both Melon and Hume’s 
appraisals of luxury, while his soon-to-be mentor François Quesnay denounced luxury in his 
entry “Grains” for the Encyclopédie (1757).   
As the public sphere bulged with opponents of luxury, Jean-François de Saint-Lambert’s 
entry “Luxe” for the Encyclopédie (1765) captured the polarized arguments for and against 
luxury and put forward a compromise.354  By the time of Saint-Lambert’s text, luxury had 
become the central issue of “modernity.”  On the one hand, the commercial and manufacturing 
infrastructure of luxury goods remained for many French subjects the only triumph of Louis 
XIV’s reign.  The less than spectacular results of the War of Austrian Succession (French 
territorial and commercial gains were minute) coupled with France’s failed efforts in the Seven 
Years’ War demonstrated that the “spirit of conquest” should finally be abandoned for the “spirit 
of commerce.”  “I believe,” Saint-Lambert declared,” that it is better for a people to obey 
frivolous Epicureans than savage warriors and to nourish the luxury of voluptuous and 
                                                          
353John Shovlin, “Hume’s Political Discourses and the French Luxury Debate,” in David Hume’s Political Economy, 
eds. Carl Wennerlind and Margaret Schabas, 203-222 (London and New York: Routledge, 2008), 205.  See also 
Loïc Charles’ contribution to the same volume: “French ‘New Politics’ and the Dissemination of David Hume's 
Political Discourses on the Continent.”  Contained in Le Blanc’s translation was Hume’s essay “Of Luxury,” the 
title of which he changed to “Of Refinement in the Arts” in the 1760 edition to avoid the baggage associated with 
the word “luxury.” 
 
354Not only did the burgeoning academies sponsor more and more essay contests regarding commerce and luxury, 
but Daniel Roche has suggested that between 1736 and 1789 “more than a hundred works were published in 
response to the issues raised by the debate among Christian economists, expansionist economists, and Mandeville.”  
Roche, France in the Enlightenment, trans. Arthur Goldhammer (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1998, 
orig. pub. 1993), 567. 
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enlightened rogues than the luxury of heroic and ignorant thieves.”355  On the other hand, by the 
time Saint-Lambert wrote, increased pressures to tax the privileged orders, the recent primacy at 
court of Madame de Pompadour (who crystallized fears of financier power), and a misguided 
belief that the French population was diminishing rapidly, and thus ruining agriculture and les 
moeurs, strengthened arguments against luxury.356 
Saint-Lambert identified good and bad luxury, and he approved of orderly luxury as a 
means to develop esprit de communauté.  It was the duty of governments to not only protect their 
citizens but to also channel their passions toward the communal good: “[Governments] must 
maintain and excite l’esprit de communauté, l’esprit patriotique; they must pay attention to the 
ways in which citizens enrich themselves and the ways they enjoy their wealth.”357  The French 
government had created an imbalance between luxury and l’esprit de communauté, leading 
luxury to become vicious, moved by “extreme greed,” and in conflict with the well-being of 
society. According to Saint-Lambert, depopulation and the inequality of wealth, for example, 
could be attributed to destructive governmental policies that sustained financiers, rentiers, and 
                                                          
355Saint-Lambert, “Luxe,” in Encyclopédie, vol. IX (1765): 770, accessed from Encyclopédie, ou dictionnaire 
raisonné des sciences, des arts et des métiers, etc., eds. Denis Diderot and Jean le Rond d'Alembert (University of 
Chicago: ARTFL Encyclopédie Project, Spring 2013 Edition), Robert Morrissey (ed). 
http://encyclopedie.uchicago.edu/.ARTFL Encyclopédie Project, Robert Morrissey, General Editor. 
 
356For taxes, see Kwass, Privilege and the Politics of Taxation in Eighteenth-Century France: Liberté, Egalité, 
Fiscalité (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000).  For the reaction of nobles to luxury, see Renato Galliani, 
Rousseau, le luxe et l’idéologie nobiliaire, in Studies on Voltaire and the Eighteenth Century, n. 268 (Oxford: 
Voltaire Foundation, 1989). For Madame de Pompadour’s connection to the world of finances and politico-
intellectual reactions to her ascendancy, see James B. Collins, The State in Early Modern France (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2009), 275-78, and Shovlin, The Political Economy of Virtue, 26-38.  And, for 
depopulation, see Leslie Tuttle, Conceiving the Old Regime: Pronatalism and the Politics of Reproduction in Early 
Modern France (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 151-61, and Carol Blum, Strength in Numbers: 
Population, Reproduction, and Power in Eighteenth-Century France (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 
2002).  According to Tuttle, “Population was understood as a measure of national strength, so contemporaries 
interpreted population decline as a harbinger of national doom.  It was a symptom of a hidden sickness that afflicted 
France, a ‘malady of declining’ (as the philosophe Montesquieu would put it) that demanded a response” (151). 
 
357Saint-Lambert, “Luxe,” 766.  Hume, Montesquieu, Diderot, Helvétius, and Vincent de Gournay all identified 
“good” versus “bad” forms of luxury. 
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privileges for trading and manufacturing.  Saint-Lambert adopted aspects of Fénelon’s critique of 
luxury, and he affirmed the need for a social hierarchy representing rank and represented by 
distinctive marks, but he maintained that luxury and proper governmental institutions could 
preserve the “positive, vivifying effects of commerce and consumption.”358  He ultimately 
sought to steer definitions of luxury away from excessive consumption and toward a more 
meaningful understanding of human nature and political economy.359  Saint-Lambert wanted to 
stabilize the shifting conceptions of “society” by encouraging the increasingly-unfettered 
interaction of individuals. 
After mid-century, the luxury debate consisted mostly of critiques of luxury.360  This 
trend can partly be explained by the fact that approaches to luxury became more nuanced, as 
indicated by Saint-Lambert’s “Luxe.”  Istvan Hont has suggested that the luxury debate took 
place on two levels: the ancients versus the moderns and among the moderns themselves 
(“unregulated” versus “well-ordered luxury”).  After the debacle of John Law’s “System,” “the 
flare-up of the luxury controversy in France in the 1730s was a result of the re-examination of 
the remaining options for restoring France to greatness and economic health.”361  Moreover, with 
each new crisis that beset the last decades of the Old Regime—the controversy over the French 
Indies Company, the Maupeou coup, the Turgot administration and the Flour War, etc.—writers 
                                                          
358Shovlin, “Hume’s Political Discourses and the French Luxury Debate,” 219. 
 
359Hont, “The early enlightenment debate on commerce and luxury,” 379. 
 
360There were a handful of notable texts supporting luxury: Butel-Dumont’s Théorie du luxe (1771), Marquis de 
Casaux’ Considérations sur quelques parties du méchanisme des sociétés (1785-8), an unpublished manuscript by 
abbé Morellet on the eve of the Revolution, and the publications of Jacques Necker.  For Butel-Dumont and 
Morellet, see Clark, Compass of Society, chp. 8.  Also, Maza, “Luxury, Morality, and Social Change in 
Prerevolutionary France,” 217.   
 
361Hont, “The early enlightenment debate on commerce and luxury,” 404.  As noted above, luxury was an integral 
part of both political economy and the upsurge of texts dealing with economic matters as the eighteenth century 
progressed. 
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challenged the perceived collusion between financiers and the court and fitted luxury and 
commerce into the French political economy in a variety of ways.   
Opponents of luxury, such as the Physiocrats and a budding group of middling elites—
those caught between the wealthier nobles and non-nobles— sought to regenerate virtue and 
patriotism by developing a political economy based on the “real” or “true” wealth of agriculture 
rather than the “unreal” or “imaginary” wealth of finances, speculation, and bonds.  Furthermore, 
the antiluxury discourse was essentially modular and fissiparous, applied better as a critical tool 
than a source of unification.  Advocates of this discourse turned all forms of spectacular 
consumption into symbols of parasitism by idle plutocrats, severing the centuries-old link 
between nobility, éclat, and socio-political authority.362  The antiluxury discourse, which 
disavowed the link between consumption and socio-political power, was not the only discourse 
available to contemporaries.  Opponents of luxury put forward a corporeal critique of luxury, 
adopting and adapting sensationalist physiology to elucidate the destructive effects of luxury on 
the human body. 
*** 
Even though opponents of luxury came to dominate the public sphere after mid-century, 
through a systematic use of sensationalist physiology and medical theories, they did not have 
exclusive priority over the body as a framework to analyze the effects of luxury.  The linking of 
the body to society characterized the eighteenth-century social imagination, and supporters of 
luxury did not dispute the central role of the body.  Unlike anti-luxury writers, advocates of the 
                                                          
362For “middling elites” and “antiluxury discourse,” see, alongside his The Political Economy of Virtue, Shovlin, 
“The Cultural Politics of Luxury in Eighteenth-Century France,” French Historical Studies, vol. 23, n. 4 (Fall 2000): 
577-606, and “Toward a Reinterpretation of Revolutionary Antinobilism: The Political Economy of Honor in the 
Old Regime,” The Journal of Modern History 72 (March 2000): 35-66.  See also Michael Kwass, "Consumption and 
the World of Ideas: Consumer Revolution and the Moral Economy of the Marquis de Mirabeau," Eighteenth-
Century Studies, vol. 37, No. 2 (Winter 2004): 187-213. 
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trade in and consumption of luxury goods found the sensible body to be affected positively by 
the growth of commerce; or, at least, they found more positive ramifications for society when 
individuals pursued their passions.  They used the language of sensations but did not articulate 
extensive or detailed arguments about the corporeal effects of luxury as did their opponents.   
Supporters found that the natural way to channel human nature, and simultaneously 
achieve economic prosperity, was through the pursuit of pleasure and resultant “agreeable 
sensations.”  As we saw in chapter two, the pursuit of happiness became one organizing principle 
for society in the eighteenth century, and the nascent society brought to fruition through 
commerce carved out the path to achieve happiness via the passions.  In her aptly-titled Discours 
sur le bonheur, Madame du Châtelet dismissed the “moralists” who demanded that humans 
repress their passions and master their desires in order to be happy; instead, humans must only 
seek out and procure “agreeable sensations and sentiments.”363  Proponents of luxury, primarily 
before mid-century, couched their arguments in a similar understanding of the passions without 
penetrating deeply into the sensory network.364  Their primary target was a Catholic and 
Classical tradition that equated the passions (e.g. self-love, interest) with irrationality, 
immorality, and a lack of virtue—a standard incommensurate with the actual behavior of 
individuals in society, according to thinkers like Pierre Bayle and Mandeville.  In contrast, 
                                                          
363Du Châtelet, Discours sur le bonheur (1746-7), préface Élisabeth Badinter (Paris: Editions Payot & Rivages, 
1997), 32-33.  In his Lettres sur les animaux (1768), the encyclopédiste and attendee of d’Holbach’s salon Charles-
George Leroy argued that in “‘order to be happy, we are thus forced either to change objects constantly or to 
experience sensations of the same kind to excess.  This produces an inconstancy by virtue of which our wishes can 
never reach an end, and a progression of desires which, forever extinguished by being satisfied, but reawakened by 
memory, stretch to infinity.  This disposition, which soon causes the disease of boredom to succeed the most 
interesting emotions, is the torment of idle civilized man’.”  Leroy’s comment had much in common with corporeal 
critics of luxury to be discussed below.  Quoted in E. C. Spary, Eating the Enlightenment: Food and the Sciences in 
Paris, 1670-1760 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2012), 237.   
 
364For a specific look at the transformation of the passions from a moral to a medical problem, see Philippe 
Huneman, “Montpellier Vitalism and the Emergence of Alienism (1750-1800): The Case of the Passions,” Science 
in Context, vol. 21, n. 4 (2008): 615-647.  
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supporters of luxury drew from various seventeenth-century views that individuals acted from 
their passions to redefine human nature.365   
Le doux commerce was predicated on the novel grounding of human nature on the 
passions, rather than simply reason, virtue, and the unrealistic expectations of living without 
sin.366  As François Véron de Forbonnais argued: luxury "humanizes mankind, polishes their 
manners, softens their humors, spurs imagination, [and] perfects their understanding."367  The 
emergent view that “interest” was a rationally-driven passion capable of uniting individuals in 
society via commerce guided supporters of luxury before the centripetal force of sensationalism 
united the physical and the moral in the corporeal critique of luxury.  Social fluidity, national 
prosperity, and the refinement of the senses could derive from a proper channeling of the 
passions.   
Forbonnais, Voltaire, Melon, and other French supporters of commerce and luxury drew 
from English arguments linking the trade in luxury goods to cultural and corporeal refinement.  
In A Discourse of Trade (1690), Nicholas Barbon wrote: “‘The wants of the Mind are infinite, 
Man naturally Aspires, and as his Mind is elevated, his Senses grew more refined, and more 
                                                          
365The most prominent example is Pierre Bayle, whose Various Thoughts on the Occasion of a Comet (1682) sought 
to prove that humans act from their passions more than their beliefs and, thus, the idealistic expectations of 
Christianity could not form the basis of a legal system.  The ideas of Epicurus were renewed by Pierre Gassendi and 
others and became a whipping post for moralists who argued that libertines and materialists simply revivified this 
ancient bogey man.  In his entry “Luxe,” Saint-Lambert declared: “I believe that it is better for a people to obey 
frivolous Epicureans than savage warriors and to nourish the luxury of voluptuous and enlightened rogues than the 
luxury of heroic and ignorant thieves” (770).  In his denunciation of luxury, Abbé Pluquet baldly stated that luxury 
led to philosophical materialism, and he primarily blamed adherents of the Classical philosopher Epicurus. Traité 
philosophique et politique sur le luxe (1786), vol. I, 11, 363-7.   
 
366Albert O. Hirschman, The Passions and the Interests: Political Arguments for Capitalism before its Triumph 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997, 20th anniversary edition); Susan James, Passion and Action: The 
Emotions in Seventeenth-Century Philosophy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997); the triumvirate of Michael 
Moriarty (all published by Oxford University Press): Early Modern French Thought: The Age of Suspicion (2003); 
Fallen Nature, Fallen Selves: Early Modern French Thought (2006); and Disguised Vices: Theories of Virtue in 
Early Modern French Thought (2011). 
 
367Quoted in Shovlin, The Political Economy of Virtue, 46.   
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capable of Delight; his Desires are inlarged [sic], and his Wants increase with his Wishes, which 
is for everything that is rare, can gratifie [sic] his Senses, adorn his Body and promote the Ease, 
Pleasure and Pomp of Life’.”368  Bernard Mandeville too found luxury to be a refinement of the 
senses and argued more forthrightly that “the lumpish machine” of the human body would be 
galvanized to action only by the “influence of the passions.”369  Similarly, David Hume defined 
luxury as a “great refinement in the gratification of the senses,” advocating a moderate pursuit of 
mental and physical pleasure to ward off the possibilities of excess.370   
Barbon, Hume, and Mandeville agreed that mankind was spurred by the passions and 
pleasure.  Mandeville highlighted the necessity of stirring even the nastiest passions of humans 
toward the profit of society, and Hume cut reason largely out of epistemology and the processes 
of decision-making.  In A Treatise of Human Nature, Hume famously stated that “Reason is, and 
ought only to be the slave of the passions, and can never pretend to any other office than to serve 
and obey them.”371  For Hume, it was through the passions and customs that his contemporaries 
developed habits, which consciously or unconsciously determined behavior.  While philosophers 
and theologians may pontificate on the virtues of reason, Hume argued that humans are driven to 
action by their passions.  It is for this reason that he could articulate a vision of le doux 
commerce; luxury and the refined arts advance together, increasing sociability and softening the 
                                                          
368Quoted in Berg and Eger, “The Rise and Fall of the Luxury Debates," in Luxury in the Eighteenth Century, 9.  See 
also Berry, The Idea of Luxury, 108-111. 
 
369Mandeville, The Fable of the Bees, Remark Q, 184.  Other Remarks deal with pride (M), envy (N), and 
courage/honor (R), which Mandeville explains as a product of an individual’s “constitution.” 
 
370Hume, “Of Refinement in the Arts,” in Essays: Moral, Political, and Literary, ed. Eugene F. Miller, 268-271 
(Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 1985), 268-70.  
 
371Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature (Mineola, NY: Dover Publications, Inc., 2003, orig. pub. 1739-1740), Book 
II, Part III, chp. III, 295. 
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tempers of humans.372  Behavior previously labeled a vice came to bear the mantle of 
“civilization” and refinement, as sensory pleasures and agreeable sensations became the 
necessary and useful consequences of luxury.  Supporters of luxury found that this former vice 
cultivated the pleasures of the mind and the body, and the “more men refine upon pleasure, the 
less will they indulge in excesses of any kind.”373  Opponents of luxury, however, feared that the 
pernicious effects of luxury would destroy the pleasure of sociability by vitiating the senses. 
Refining the pleasures of the senses was an optimistic approach to the possibilities 
engendered by luxury and the development of a society based on commerce.  According to 
Georges-Marie Butel-Dumont, who wrote after the landmark texts by Melon, Montesquieu, and 
Voltaire in support of luxury, the search for agreeable sensations stimulates industry, and the 
diversity of passions generated by luxury limits the ability of one passion to subdue the others.374  
What Butel-Dumont called “civil morality” would grow when “the taste for expenditures leads to 
dissipation [of the passions] and engages individuals to communicate continually.  By this 
commerce, the soul, feeling such distractions, is less susceptible to strong passions, and the need 
to please those with whom one communicates habitually accustoms one to exercise self-
control.”375  In an unpublished response to abbé Pluquet’s Traité philosophique et politique sur 
                                                          
372Jonathan Sheehan and Dror Wahrman make a similar point in Invisible Hands: Self-Organization and the 
Eighteenth Century (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2015), 199: Hume “had no doubt that the mind was a 
product of embodied experience in the world….Philosophy must understand what minds are by looking at what they 
do in the world—it must tell stories of how a mind and its qualities are generated in and through its encounter with a 
world.” 
 
373Hume, “Of Refinement in the Arts,” 268-71.  
 
374This argument in support of luxury fits into Sheehan and Wahrman’s new account of the language of self-
organization: a diversity of passions channels the individual toward the aggregate, thus creating a socially-useful, 
complex system out of particulars.    
 
375Butel-Dumont, Théorie du luxe, two. vols. (1771): II: 148-9.  Butel-Dumont adapted the language of the senses 
more than any other supporter of luxury, arguing that without the passions and luxury the body would submit to la 
mollesse, become numb and languid, and the soul uninspired (esp. I, 70, 76-77). 
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le luxe (1786), André Morellet too recognized the prevalence of the passions in dictating human 
behavior and the ability of luxury to dissipate them.  Morellet argued that the quest to obtain 
agreeable sensations propelled labor and sociability: “‘It is only to procure new or agreeable 
sensations that the farmer, the laborer or the members of any classes at any level of society will 
work.  There you have the principle of change and of progress in society’.”376  The limited, 
corporeal arguments of Butini and Morellet were similar to those of Mandeville and Hume.  
They all shared a view that society was in transition and the pursuit of happiness and national 
prosperity could be linked through commerce and luxury. 
Critics of luxury, however, shared a deeper concern to examine the devastating effects of 
luxury on the human body.  They feared that the habits developed by individuals would debilitate 
the sensory network on which social interaction depended; “the passions” had become a product 
of moral and physical “feeling.”  For Jean-François Butini, the “Creator” endowed humans with 
senses to experience pleasure and the drive to find pleasure in society, but the passions of avidity 
and social competition forged habits that prized inequality and became engrained in bodies.377  
The pursuit of agreeable sensations and the refinement of sensual pleasures could too easily 
overrun reason and fellow-feeling to take control of the human body.  The language of the senses 
and overlapping physical and moral characteristics of human organisations heightened the stakes 
of commerce and luxury as individual passions were not simply redefined according to social 
utility.  On the one hand, the antiluxury discourse succeeded politically after mid-century by 
criticizing all forms of spectacular consumption, targeting members of the Second and Third 
                                                          
376Quoted in Clark, Compass of Society, 271. 
 
377Butini, Traité du luxe (1774), 9-11.  Butini alternated between attributing omnipotence to god and nature. 
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Estates.378  On the other hand, the anxiety elicited by the faltering social structure combined with 
sensationalism and the ubiquitous concern over the human body to produce a corporeal critique 
of luxury that re-moralized the luxury debate based on the ability of individuals to “feel” 
sociability.379   
The Corporeal Critique of Luxury 
In 1786, abbé Pluquet published a two-volume diatribe against luxury that could be 
considered a companion to his previous De la sociabilité (1767):  Traité philosophique et 
politique sur le luxe.  In many ways, Pluquet’s text was a compendium of la querelle du luxe, a 
catalog of luxury’s devastation: “Luxury deprives society of all the advantages provided by 
religion,” he wrote; it prescribes le faste, la volupté, and vice over virtue.  Luxury destroys the 
“empire of conscience,” compels men to use violence and artifice to obtain their desires, depletes 
ratiocination, and produces scorn for and raillery toward religious ministers, ceremonies, and 
morality.380  As a society becomes ensnared by luxury, its members no longer teach their 
children the “truths” of religion; society breaks down as passions are unleashed, crime increases, 
and nobody feels duty-bound to their fellow citizens.381   
Pluquet also provided the most thorough corporeal critique of luxury, combining and 
extending the perspective that the deleterious effects of luxury could best be studied in the 
human body.  Whereas supporters of luxury argued that the pursuit of agreeable sensations 
                                                          
378See the works by John Shovlin. 
 
379In his important work The Idea of Luxury, Christopher Berry argued that luxury became “de-moralized” by the 
eighteenth century and incorporated more fully into international and domestic economic debates. 
 
380Pluquet named la conscience the “interior principle of strength and resolution” that nature placed in man in order 
to “render him capable of resisting those causes that carry him to transgress his duties” toward others (I, 417).  See 
Pluquet’s De la sociabilité (1767), vol. I, Section II, chp. II, article XI, §II-III. 
 
381Pluquet, Traité philosophique et politique sur le luxe, II, 161-66; I, 132, 336-45, 444-5. 
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through luxury and commerce was an important ingredient in the expansion of modern society, 
Pluquet and other opponents of luxury found that the goods and lifestyle associated with 
increased consumption worked through physiological processes to undermine the body.  The 
pernicious influence of luxury could be found in the insatiable pursuit of “agreeable sensations,” 
which diminished the power of the mind and the interior sentiment to forge proper social 
relationships and bind together society with an invisible string of sympathy.   
Critics of commerce and luxury accepted le doux commerce, but they found luxury 
worked too well at softening or altering the body.  They redefined this process as a numbing of 
the senses and a corporeal inability to experience the pleasures of social interaction.  Happiness 
must be found in society, but it required corporeal moderation and attention to “feeling” 
sociability.  At a time when society was being defined by the mixing of bodies as much as an a 
priori, socio-political hierarchy, opponents of commerce and luxury feared that both could 
anesthetize the body to social commerce.  For opponents of luxury, this was truly the crux of la 
querelle du luxe; it not only depleted courage and virtue, feminized men, confounded ranks, 
depopulated the countryside, and spread dissolute moeurs, but it also fundamentally degenerated 
sentimentality and sociability that subjects felt for each other. While Saint-Lambert focused on 
revitalizing the esprit de communauté by channeling the passions, opponents of luxury sought to 
ground social interaction in the physiological capacity to feel. 
Opponents of luxury drew on the body to criticize luxury in three ways.  First, opponents 
connected the spread of luxury to the feminization of society. They claimed that luxury softened 
and enervated the robust body (a quality known as la mollesse), which rendered men incapable 
of hardening, physical activity.  Men would be turned into women, they contested, and would 
become too inert to labor or defend their country.  Second, critics of luxury exposed the 
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physiological underpinnings of the ancien régime concept of représentation, an external display 
of power capable of dazzling (éblouir) the eyes of parvenus and therefore exuding the wrong 
“impressions.”  Visual representations of état and rank were built into the social hierarchy, but, 
as more wealth was generated through commerce, members of the Third Estate often competed 
with the nobility for symbols of power.  French subjects of lower orders succumbed to brilliant 
displays of ostentation (éclat), imagining themselves of a higher order, but they were also 
capable of claiming those symbols for themselves and challenging the system of états.  Third, 
alongside the problems of la mollesse and représentation, opponents of luxury detailed the 
processes by which luxury overwhelmed the senses, inflamed the imagination, and created 
physiological habits that render addicts of luxury beholden to the sensual pleasures of material 
objects.  Luxury threw the body into disequilibrium.  For critics of luxury, an overwhelmingly 
commercial society would be full of enervated men and benumbed machines actuated by 
disorderly impressions and sustained by a self-perpetuating series of desires and emptiness. 
Effeminacy and la Mollesse 
Critics of luxury generally structured the unstable space of emergent society by applying 
the Classical division of separate male and female spheres.  Male and female bodies were 
integral to the luxury debates because luxury was repeatedly said to effeminize, fatigue, and 
pervert the bodies of men.  Seventeenth- and eighteenth-century critics of luxury recycled the 
arguments of Roman moralists, historians, and philosophers—e.g. Sallust, Livy, Plutarch, 
Epictetus, Seneca—who explained the corruption and decline of Rome through luxury.  For 
them, a pattern emerged in which increased wealth led to luxury (learned from the conquered 
Asian territories), which conflated private and public affairs and rendered men weak, indolent, 
gluttonous, servile to women, and ultimately incapable of military virtue.  The emasculating vice 
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of avarice was conceptually linked to a substitution of dissolute carnal pleasures and feminine 
softness for the frugal, austere, and virtuous characteristics associated with Cicero and the 
Roman Republic (and later Stoicism).  Ambition too privileged private over public interest, 
usurping the role of civic virtue in a democracy or republic or leveling a social hierarchy in an 
aristocracy or monarchy.382  Luxury was responsible then for diluting military discipline, 
confounding social ranks, and blurring the public/private roles of men and women.  By the time 
of the Empire, and with the addition of Christian perspectives, luxury represented a lack of self-
control and became inextricably linked to concupiscence and sin.   
In the eyes of early-modern critics of luxury, the processes of emasculation and 
enervation were complete when women controlled le monde and les moeurs: men became idle, 
subservient to bodily pleasures and fashion, and ultimately impotent (another cause of 
depopulation).383  Even though by the end of the eighteenth century many observers associated 
economic growth with women’s inability to resist consuming fashionable goods, the same 
                                                          
382For Greek, Roman, and early Christian critiques of commerce and luxury, see Berry, The Idea of Luxury, chps. 2-
4, and John Sekora, Luxury: The Concept in Western Thought, Eden to Smollet (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1977), chp. 1. Both luxury and women were considered untamed, uncontrollable, and carnal, 
which is why Cato the Elder, according to Livy, likened luxury to a wild beast.   
 
383Rousseau was, of course, the most vocal advocate of this point of view.  Jean-Baptiste Moheau, Recherches et 
considérations sur la population de la France (1778), attempted to refute the depopulation thesis, but he still 
suggested that luxury effeminizes and sterilizes men (Book II, Part I, chps. 7-8, Part II, chp. 8).  Supporters of luxury 
attacked the argument that luxury led to effeminacy and enervation, though they did not necessarily attack the 
process or category of feminization itself.  See Mandeville, The Fable of the Bees, Remark L; Montesquieu, Lettres 
persanes, letter 106; Melon, Essai politique sur le commerce, 108; Hume, “Of Refinement in the Arts.”  See also 
Samia I. Spencer, ed., French Women and the Age of Enlightenment (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1984); 
Sylvana Tomaselli, “The Enlightenment Debate on Women,” History Workshop Journal, n. 20 (Autumn 1985): 101-
24; and the essays in Section Two of Women, Gender and Enlightenment, eds. Sarah Knott and Barbara Taylor 
(New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2005).   
What E. J. Clery has said about England’s “feminization debate” was echoed by Montesquieu (De l’Esprit 
des Lois, Book VII, chp. 9; Book XIX, chps. 5-15) and applies to France: the debate was “generated by the 
perception that the status of women in society was rising and that women were gaining an increasing influence over 
men and altering the manners and morals of the nation.  This growing status and influence was variously condemned 
as cause and symptom of national decline, or celebrated as an index of increasing refinement or civility.”  Clery, The 
Feminization Debate in Eighteenth-Century England, 1. For expectations of masculine behavior in early-modern 
and modern France, see Robert Nye, Masculinity and Male Codes of Honor in France (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1993). 
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overwhelming desire was still not supposed to exist in men.384  Out of numerous visions of 
society competing against the traditional, corporate social structure, as we saw in chapter two, 
gender proved a powerful conceptual tool capable of integrating luxury, consumer culture, and 
social interaction. 
In his didactic tale Télémaque, Fénelon went to great lengths to discourage effeminacy, 
clarifying that Telemachus’ advisor Mentor did not sing with an “effeminate softness” and 
having Mentor command Telemachus to love him in a “more manly” than “tender” way.385  
Fénelon lamented "that men of the highest rank should place their greatness in the dainties of a 
luxurious table, by which they enervate their minds, and quickly ruin the health and vigor of their 
bodies!"386  To avoid the softening or flabbiness of the body that Fénelon linked to effeminacy 
and encapsulated in the word la mollesse, Fénelon extolled the virtues of hard work, agricultural 
labor, and a frugal desire for only the necessities of life.387  The depopulation of rural areas and 
the corporeal decay of the peasants who remained had spent the land of Salente.  To overturn the 
years of luxury and despotism that the people of Salente had to endure, Fénelon's protagonist 
Mentor implemented a dietary regime, promoted wrestling and exercise, prohibited “soft and 
                                                          
384According to Nicolas-Toussaint Lemoyne Desessarts, Dictionnaire universel de police (1785-9), women’s 
consumption of luxury goods was “fed by coquetry” and thrived “as long as the taste for frivolity is the ruling 
passion.  To the eyes of the observer who seeks to discover the cause of moral corruption, the infinite number of 
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and Commercial Culture in Old Regime France (New York: Berg, 2004), 145. 
 
385Fénelon, Telemachus, 107, 155. 
 
386Ibid., 163. 
 
387In his Dictionnaire philosophique, ou introduction à la connaissance de l’homme (London, 1751), Didier Pierre 
Chicaneau de Neuvillé defined la mollesse in the following way: “La mollesse is the state of indolence and 
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form of ecstasy...but la volupté ceases to be pleasurable for the one who delivers himself totally to it: the senses, 
which are the organs of pleasure, become fatigued through too much use and soon feel only pain” (240). 
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effeminate music,” and curbed the magnificence of apartments, all toward the goal of improving 
the physical condition of the inhabitants of Salente.388  Furthermore, the noble youth should be 
sent to wars in order to maintain military strength and avoid the wasting away of physical 
bodies.389  Fénelon feared that France suffered from these debilitating effects of luxury under 
Louis XIV.  The bodies of his contemporaries were no longer able to work or defend themselves, 
having become soft, flabby, and idle. 
Jean-Jacques Rousseau was the most vociferous critic of luxury.  In the Discours sur 
l’origine et fondemens de l’inégalité parmi les hommes (1755), written in response to an essay 
competition sponsored by the Academy of Dijon and published a year later, Rousseau pilloried 
the modern, domesticated man who, "becoming habituated to the ways of society…becomes 
weak, fearful, and servile; his soft and effeminate lifestyle completes the enervation of both his 
strength and his courage."390  For Rousseau, luxury was born of inequality, idleness, and vanity; 
it grew in tandem with the sciences and arts, and together they corrupted the body, depleted 
courage and military virtues, and rendered citizens morally disingenuous and physically frail.  In 
the same Discours, Rousseau argued that man was not naturally sociable.  Initially, as solitary 
beings, men and women possessed two passions: pity and self-preservation (amour de soi).  With 
the gradual multiplication of societies, humans developed amour propre, a passion consumed 
with appearances and the judgment of others.  The “deceitful and frivolous exterior” that 
characterized the “spirit” of commercial, or civilized, society represented a moral psychology in 
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389Ibid., 154. 
 
390Discourse on the Origin of Inequality, in On the Social Contract and Discourses, 123.  The question posed for 
this academic concours was “What is the origin of inequality among men, and is it authorized by the natural law?”  
In Book I, chapter VIII (“On the Civil State”) of Du contrat social (1762), Rousseau briefly tallies up the gains and 
losses of man’s transition from the state of nature to the civil state. 
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which “the man accustomed to the ways of society is always outside himself and knows how to 
live only in the opinion of others.”391  Luxury became part of a physiognomy that concealed 
one’s true being but revealed to Rousseau the fundamental reshaping of both body and soul.  
Rousseau spoke often of the alteration to man’s “physical constitution” or “natural disposition,” 
which instantiated the physical effects of civilized man’s inequitable, immoral, and effeminate 
behavior.392   
Especially in the Discours sur les sciences et les arts (1750), Rousseau praised the virtue, 
transparency, and physical prowess of Spartan men and the “intrepid warriors” who followed 
Hannibal and Julius Caesar.393  He condemned the languorous nobles of his own era whose 
“delicate sensibilities” rendered them incapable of stomaching “odious pictures” or undertaking 
hardening labor or battle.394  Rousseau used physical, almost aggressive, language to promote the 
necessity of strong bodies to work and fight, and, according to his pedagogy, a student would be 
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392Ibid., 113, 116, 120-3, 144, 197.  Edward Hundert, “Mandeville, Rousseau and the Political Economy of 
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393Discourse on the Sciences and the Arts, in The Basic Political Writings, trans. Donald A. Cress, intro. Peter Gay 
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ancients, see Letter to M. d’Alembert on the Theatre in Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Politics and the Arts, trans. and 
intro. Allan Bloom (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1960), 60-2, 102-5.  Praising the robust bodies of ancient 
Greeks and Romans was another staple of the luxury debates.  See Helvétius, De l’esprit (1758), Discours I, Chp. 
III; A.-P. Lottin, Discours contre le luxe (1783), 55; Gabriel Sénac de Meilhan, Considérations sur les richesses et 
le luxe (1787), 24. 
 
394Ibid., 10.  “The healthy and robust man is recognized by other signs.  It is in the rustic clothing of the fieldworker 
and not underneath the gilding of the courtier that one will find bodily strength and vigor...The good man is an 
athlete who enjoys competing in the nude.  He is contemptuous of all those vile ornaments which would impair the 
use of his strength, most of which were invented merely to conceal some deformity” (4).  See also Jacques-Henri 
Meister, De la morale naturelle (1787), 54, for a similar position on athletes as paragons of physicality. 
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better educated outside on a tennis court, firming up his body, rather than inside learning dead 
languages.395  Cultivating the fine arts, so representative of the unnecessary ornamentation of 
bodies and buildings, corrupted the body and sapped the vigor of the soul.396   
In his Lettre à M. d’Alembert sur les Spectacles (1758), Rousseau developed further the 
idea that the arts led to luxury, specifically here the creation of a theatre in his hometown of 
Geneva.  Alongside despoiling the moeurs of a small republic and bankrupting Genevan citizens, 
the theatre would enervate and enfeeble Genevan bodies by lowering their resistance to the 
passions, blunting virtuous sentiments, and promoting inactivity and idleness.397  Excessive 
adornment and dissipation would emerge as women competed to outdo each other in society, and 
the centrality of love in theatrical performances would heighten the realm of women and reduce 
the relations between the sexes to satisfying women’s pleasures.  Women and girls would 
become “preceptors of the public,” bursting the natural and necessary public/private dividing line 
by commanding attention, eschewing modesty, and ruling imperiously over taste.398  In 
extending their empire, women would emasculate and eviscerate men who would be forced to 
abandon their moeurs and lose their naturally-robust constitution.399  Although in Rousseau’s 
conception the essential characteristics of women were modesty, domesticity, and maternal 
duties, luxury even reduced women’s sedentary life to a more violent form of torpor, making 
them more susceptible to the scourge of the eighteenth century—the vapors.   
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396Ibid., 15. 
 
397Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Politics and the Arts, 57, 64. 
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Rousseau extended the dystopian image of Geneva (his equivalent of eighteenth-century 
Paris) as a luxury-ridden, effeminate society in which women controlled social commerce by 
criticizing the education of boys.  They would be raised “exactly like the women,” sheltered 
from the environmental elements that forged sturdy bodies, deprived of exercise, and primped 
with “white teeth” and “piping voices.”400  The physical enervation and effeminacy brought on 
by luxury compounded the moral enervation of modern French subjects incapable of living 
transparently or authentically.  “For my own part,” Rousseau wrote in Émile (1762), “I know no 
more terrible fate than that of a pretty woman in Paris, unless it is that of the pretty manikin who 
devotes himself to her, who becomes idle and effeminate like her, and so deprives himself twice 
over of his manhood, while he prides himself on his successes and for their sake endures the 
longest and dullest days which human beings ever put up with.”401 
The Marquis de Mirabeau engaged the luxury debates and challenged the necessity of a 
commercial nobility in his two volume best-seller, L’ami des hommes (1756-8).402  Mirabeau 
extended the critiques put forward by Fénelon and Rousseau, advocating a return to the land to 
regenerate France and relentlessly criticizing the “mad spending” of his contemporaries.  Like 
Rousseau, Mirabeau lauded the physiques of his ancient and medieval forebears and even the 
butchers and blacksmiths of his own era.  He ridiculed the overconsumption and luxurious living 
that turned the elite into "pygmies" and "demi-hommes."403  In the past, men and women 
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401Rousseau, Émile, trans. Barbara Foxley, intro. P.D. Jimack (London and Vermont: Everyman, 1993), 378. 
 
402I will address Mirabeau at length in chapter seven.  In his own era, Mirabeau’s fame was nearly unmatched. 
 
403Victor de Riqueti, marquis de Mirabeau, L’Ami des hommes ou traité de la population, 2 vols. (Darmstadt: 
Scientia Verlag Aalen, 1970; reprint of Avignon edition of 1756–8), Part II, Chp. V., 115.  See also Saint-Lambert’s 
entry on luxury in the Encyclopédie, 768-9. 
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combined moderate luxury with a more active, hearty lifestyle, but by the mid-eighteenth century 
men and women both preferred leisurely comforts, indolence, and inactivity.  One woman could 
be found supine "in an armchair six inches from the ground, her posture almost necessarily 
indecent, she appears to return to bed, her shoulders draw together, her chest sinks in, her entire 
body sags."404 Mirabeau argued that luxury not only bred inaction, but the constant expectation 
to surpass one’s social competitors led to over-activity and exhaustion.  Parents dragged their 
children, particularly daughters, into le monde where they were overstimulated and left dizzy by 
a rush of sensations that their bodies could not handle.  In two ways then—idleness and 
excessive movement—luxury led to “the vapors,” “maladies of the nerves,” and la mollesse 
(afflictions gendered feminine), stunting the growth of bodies and rendering them as numb as 
dolls.405    
Examples of the supposed enervating influence of women and luxury could be multiplied 
endlessly.  According to critics of luxury, men of the eighteenth century in the throes of luxury 
were no different than their Roman predecessors, as Sallust complained in the Conspiracy of 
Catiline: “Sulla had sought to secure the loyalty of the army he commanded in Asia by allowing 
it a degree of luxury and indulgence...and the pleasures they enjoyed during leisure hours in 
those attractive lands soon enervated the men’s warlike spirit...Equally strong was their passion 
for fornication, guzzling, and other forms of sensuality.  Men prostituted themselves like women, 
and women sold their chastity to every comer.”406  Like Cato the Elder, eighteenth-century 
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406Sallust, The Jugurthine War, The Conspiracy of Catiline, trans. and intro. S. A. Handford (Baltimore: Penguin 
Books, 1963), 182-3 (chp. 1, Preface).  Like Rousseau and Mirabeau, abbé Pluquet, in his two-volume Traité 
philosophique et politique sur le luxe (1786), argued that the bodies of citizens or subjects of a state in which luxury 
dominates lose their robust constitution and suffer from a continuous malady; they are incapable of courage and 
military defense (II, 356-67).  Soldiers and citizens would be enervated, and the population would dwindle (II, 321-
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critics of luxury simultaneously mocked and feared the public presence of women, their 
“intractable nature” and “uncontrolled passions,” and their influence over men’s bodies in a 
society beholden to luxury.407    
“Do you want to know men?” Rousseau famously asked: “Study women.”408  In 
response, his disciple, an intendant of Champagne, Augustin Rouillé d’Orfeuil, found that luxury 
began with women’s vanity and jealousy, became inflamed by their overheated imaginations and 
fantasies, and then spread to men.  Unhappy with their constant inferiority (within a particular 
social class), women directed their efforts for socio-cultural equality (or superiority) toward 
forcing men into culturally-recognized feminine terrain: le salon, la toilette, le commerce 
agreeable, la politesse, and so on.409  In the process of establishing their empire over le monde, 
                                                          
2).  He also appealed to historical examples to demonstrate that bodies require an alternation of exercise and repos, 
which the Spartans mastered but not the Romans: “When luxury was established in Rome, one saw la mollesse 
banish the exercises on the Field of Mars and replace them with promenades on the streets, either in a carriage or 
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407Cato’s speech on the Oppian sumptuary law was “recorded” by Livy, The History of Rome, “Cato on 
Extravagance,” in The Portable Roman Reader, intro. Basil Davenport, trans. Cyrus Edmonds, 440-6 (New York: 
Viking Press, 1951), 442.  See also Juvenal, Satire VI, in Juvenal and Persius, trans. G. G. Ramsay (Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard University Press, Loeb Classical Library, 1965), 82-136, and Rousseau, Letter to M. d’Alembert on 
the Theatre, in Politics and the Arts, 111. 
 
408Rousseau, Politics and the Arts, 83. 
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Gabriel Morelly, Essai sur le Coeur humain (1745), in Oeuvres philosophiques (Paris: Presses Universitaires de 
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Paris” (tome 1), “De Paris” (tome 2), and “De Paris” (also tome 2), in the Physiocrats’ Ephémérides du citoyen, 
1765; Butini, Traité du luxe, chp. 5 and 7; and Sénac de Meilhan, Considérations sur les Richesses et le Luxe 
(1787), chp. XVI. 
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and after suffering an inexorable “excitation of the nerves,” women infected society with la 
mollesse, an irritation of the sweet and bitter bodily fluids (liqueurs douces et balsamiques), and 
a deadening of the organs of sensibility.410   
Rouillé d’Orfeuil’s explanation points toward a difference between Roman critics and 
their eighteenth-century successors.  While both were concerned with the body, eighteenth-
century opponents of luxury possessed a thorough, physiological language in which to detail 
their fears.  Through a language of the senses and the nerves, and corresponding theories of the 
cognitive faculties (i.e. reason and imagination), critics of luxury catalogued the ways in which 
their contemporaries’ minds and bodies were physically compromised by the sights, sounds, 
smells, tastes, and touches of their society.  They were able to add physiological precision to 
Classical and early-modern understandings of bodies debauched and enervated by luxury.   
The Problem of Représentation 
One staple of the Old Regime social system, and a popular point of criticism for 
contemporaries, was the privilege and necessity of marking one’s superiority through external 
ornamentation, magnificence, and pomp.  The social hierarchy communicated power and order 
through visual symbols: sigils, clothing, carriages, furniture, demeanor, and placement near the 
king.  To differentiate oneself socially by donning the garments or behavior of one’s superiors 
was the worst offense in a society based on représentation, or “the use of commodities to create 
a dazzling display of wealth and social distinction.”411  To secure the proper effects of 
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411Shovlin, “The Cultural Politics of Luxury,” 590.  For the ways in which Louis XIV and Colbert appropriated 
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représentation, the king, nobles, and wealthy interlopers used luxury to achieve éclat, which was 
a “keyword of the time, with meanings ranging from a ‘flash’ of lightning to a ‘clap’ of thunder, 
but always referring to something unexpected and impressive.  Magnificence was considered to 
be impressive, in the literal sense of leaving an ‘impression’ on the viewers like a stamp on a 
piece of wax.”412  In the process of both symbolizing and constituting power, représentation 
affected the senses and cognitive abilities of all French subjects.  In his Dictionnaire universel 
(1690), for example, Antoine Furetière defined représentation as an “image which brings back 
absent objects to mind and to memory.”413  
The system of représentation assumed a socio-political psychology that would render 
viewers awed and reverent and who, as spectators, would participate in the constitution of power.  
To illustrate the ubiquity of this practice and its epistemological construct, John Shovlin has 
shown that contemporaries brandished the methodological weapon of sensationalist philosophy, 
which I will distinguish from sensationalist physiology, to undergird their analyses of the 
semiotic chaos produced when spectacular consumption was used for the purposes of social 
distinction and the appropriation of political power by those of lowborn rank.  For 
sensationalists, Shovlin stated, "one of the primary sources of error was the human tendency to 
confuse signs with reality…[furthermore,] the tendency of the low to take the pomp of the great 
                                                          
see Erec Koch, The Aesthetic Body: Passions, Sensibility, and Corporeality in Seventeenth-Century France 
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for power or authority…is a false connection of ideas."414  Shovlin rightly read the Old Regime 
problem of spectacular consumption and chronic misrepresentation through the lens of 
sensationalism; however, he overlooked the ways in which writers expressed their fears through 
the physiological language of the senses.415  The cognitive error of misconstruing signs with 
power was compounded by a defect of physiological processes.    
In addition to a socio-political psychology and the potential for confusing signs with 
reality, représentation contained multiple layers of meaning and merged morality and 
physiology.  For Pierre-Joseph Boudier de Villemaire, in L’Andrométrie, ou examen 
philosophique de l’homme (1753), "the vain display, which decorated the Great, was taken for 
grandeur itself; everyone has strived to imitate it, and believed themselves great in proportion to 
their expenditure: a bizarre idea, which confounds things so little linked."416  Here is the core of 
contemporaries’ fears of “confounding ranks” and misreprésentation, but Boudier de Villemaire 
explained further that luxury, by spreading day by day, "has managed to blunt all our 
senses…the excess to which we have carried feeling will soon reduce us to the point of feeling 
nothing at all."417  Boudier de Villemaire's use of the words “blunt” (émousser) and “feeling” 
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(sentiment) signifies the physiological component of the language of sensationalism.418  Critics 
of luxury plumbed the physical processes by which the body imbibed images and interacted with 
material objects.  In so doing, they exposed the fault lines of harmless and harmful 
représentations.  The goal of luxury and éclat was to dazzle (éblouir), shock (frapper), and 
impress viewers, which affected not just aesthetic taste and the power of political symbolism but 
also the physiological sensory network.419  
Similar interpretations of the dangers implicit in éclat and représentation can be found in 
a variety of writers.420  The moralist, member of the Académie française, and official 
“historiographer of France,” Charles-Pinot Duclos, expressed frustration over the adulteration of 
nobility and honor in France and targeted deceit in society as the culprit, much like Rousseau in 
Discours sur les sciences et les arts.  It was not only “false politeness” that irked Duclos but the 
entire system of représentation so fraught with illusion.421  “The majority of those who pass for 
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great lords,” Duclos detected, “are only so in the opinion of the people, who see them without 
approaching them.  Struck [frappé] by their exterior éclat, they admire them from far away.”422  
Duclos abhorred unlimited luxury that, at a distance, affected and confused the sense of sight and 
thus cognitive processing.  More than that, the cultural connotation of possessing a “noble air” 
no longer meant physical strength, moral fortitude, or characteristics elevated to distinction; by 
his own era, having a noble air was defined by exterior “marks of dignity” and indicative of la 
mollesse, the enervation of the body, delicacy, and weakness.423  The progeny of well-honed 
ancestors plunged themselves into dissipation, expecting their éclat to project social and moral 
superiority and hide their corporeal frailties.   
During the financial crisis of the late 1780s, the longtime courtier, Intendant, and literary 
figure Gabriel Sénac de Meilhan, who wanted to become contrôleur général des finances after 
the expulsion of Calonne in 1787, explained the difference between le faste (“splendor”) and 
luxury in his Considérations sur les Richesses et le Luxe (1787):424 Le faste “announces the 
superiority of rank; it is expressed as pomp, l’éclat, la décoration...Luxury is more particularly 
an attribute of wealth...The former seems to indicate the love of greatness, the elevation of the 
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soul, the other a taste for la mollesse and the empire of volupté.”425  For Sénac de Meilhan, le 
faste was a necessary part of représentation in a society of orders.  He took up the cause of the 
robe nobility, positioned between les grands and financiers, and supported justes représentations 
as securing virtue and les moeurs.  Luxury, though, was the misappropriation of le faste and 
clearly linked to the vulnerabilities of the body.  Luxury corrupts all états, and the rapid 
accumulation of fortunes characteristic especially of financiers increased vanity, sensuality, and 
social disorder.426  Those enveloped in luxury were sensitive only to excess, l’amour propre, and 
the sweetness of pleasing others in society.  Sénac de Meilhan dwelled on the physicality of gold 
and silver as the primary, material objects of luxury that dazzled eyes, damaged bodies, and 
enervated minds by arousing their fantasies.427  The éclat emanating from représentation, and 
the desire for social and physical pleasures stimulated by luxury, worked through the body; 
luxury stroked the senses, activated sensuality, and rendered the sensory organs too supple to 
sustain durable impressions.428 
Women in particular were misled by the system of représentation.  As we will see in 
more depth below, women’s sensory network was considered different from men’s, livelier and 
hypersensitive.  Their vision especially created a physical attraction to material objects and the 
display individuals made of them because women were more impressionable.  Aesthetic 
theorists, art critics, and even the Royal Academy of Painting blamed the bad taste of women for 
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the decadence, frivolity, and artificiality of eighteenth-century art.429  Their inordinately-rapid 
sense of sight produced inconstancy, gullibility, and naturalized their love for fashion (la mode), 
leading Boudier de Villemaire to the following metaphor: “Man is the arm, he bears the weight 
of the work; but woman is the eye, she surveys everything all the time.”430 
Women’s peculiar ocular faculty meant they were more susceptible to the confounding 
effects of représentation.  Their attraction to a man, according to Boudier de Villemaire, 
stemmed from his éclat éxterieur, a visual representation of wealth that could belie his true 
état.431  Women’s thirst for la mode and the trappings of luxury combined with their quick, 
visual stimulation to produce competition with other women.  Luxury could not only be used by 
women to project éclat in their desire to outdo each other and conquer men, but, as Jean-François 
Butini argued, their obsession with luxury arose from a desire to mask deformities or old age.  
Women’s own impressionable vision led them to attempt to charm and deceive society, 
simultaneously using the process of représentation to their advantage and potentially becoming 
victims of it: “[During her youth,] she wants her finery to reflect her charms, but, in old age, she 
wants to dazzle the senses because she can no longer touch the heart.”432  Women who no longer 
felt a sentimental attachment to humanity or who greedily coveted attention looked to éclat to 
seduce others.  In a society of unregulated luxury, the bodies of elite men and women were 
meant to be decorated, in order to display their rank and beguile their contemporaries, but not 
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hardened for military readiness; they were certainly still not required for labor as members of the 
Third Estate. 
The enervating effects of luxury captured in the term la mollesse could be compounded 
by the sensory confusion of représentation and the desire to emit éclat.433  To take one example, 
the Parisian bookseller and often pseudonymous author Antoine-Prosper Lottin wrote Discours 
contre le luxe: Le Luxe corrompt les Moeurs, et détruit les Empires as a response to an essay-
contest question posed by the Academy of Besançon in 1782.  Lottin’s desire to enter the public 
sphere as an author led him to publish his text prior to the decision of the Academy, which 
violated the rules of the concours.434   
In the Discours contre le luxe, Lottin attributed nearly every ill of society to luxury: 
capriciousness of fashion, the decreasing appeal of the arts, morality, and civic duty, and the 
abandonment of agriculture and military valor.  He particularly pointed out the insufferable 
confounding of ranks, états, and even sexes in a society more akin to a theatrical performance 
than respectable order.435  According to Lottin, supporters of luxury considered its multiple 
forms at court to be the brilliant (éclatantes) markers of royal splendor and nationwide 
happiness.  When gold became more charming than courage and virtue, however, luxury 
                                                          
433According to the Physiocrat Nicolas Baudeau, the honors and exterior decorations paraded by the nobility and 
parvenus (“ces nouveaux Nobles”) were meant to project status and clout.  Their éclat was intended to stimulate 
respect, but more often they would be despised for contributing nothing to the public good, for not earning a 
“happier and more masculine virtue” by merit, or for valuing idleness as a quality to be emulated.  Moreover, their 
grandeur and leisure suffocated their bodies; they lived a “soft and useless” life and were addicted to sensual 
pleasures that sapped their bodies of energy.  Baudeau, “De Paris,” in Ephémérides du citoyen, tome 1 (1765), 153-
4.  For continued treatment of the same theme, see “Des Sciences et des Arts” (tome I) and two essays entitled “De 
Paris” in tome 2. 
 
434Provost, Le luxe, les Lumières, et la Révolution, 30-33.  
 
435Discours contre le luxe (or, Discours sur ce sujet): Le Luxe corrompt les Moeurs, et détruit les Empires (1783).  
Lottin wrote Discours contre le luxe under the name M. de Saint-Haippy.  The edition cited here is from 1784, 9-10, 
55-7.  For biographical information, see Louis-Gabriel Michaud, Biographie universelle ancienne et moderne, 
Nouvelle édition, tome 25 (Paris: Ch. Delagrave et Cie, Libraires-Éditeurs, 1843), 143. 
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weakened and enervated both body and mind.  His contemporaries were “seduced and enchanted 
by appearances, attached only to the outer shell of things, [and] they let themselves be dazzled by 
the éclat of a vain représentation, by that which flatters and abuses the senses[;] they will covet 
pleasures, voluptés, honors, and more still the wealth that brings all of this: in the conflict of so 
many different desires, virtue alone will be forgotten.”436  The strong, virtuous, and heroic 
actions of their ancestors, immortalized in centuries past, no longer dazzled the eyes of the 
eighteenth-century French; instead, the human species had become visibly bastardized, and 
patriotic virtues dissipated in bodies softened by la mollesse and in souls mired in voluptés.437  
“To the simplicity of our fathers,” Lottin lamented, “has succeeded le faste of our pleasures” and 
the blunting or hardening of sensibility.438 
Lottin agreed that représentation and éclat effectively dazzled the ignorant populace and 
poisoned the minds of its users, who sought to achieve a confounding of wealth and power.  
Additionally, he argued that those ensconced in luxury were incapable of overcoming lethargy, 
cerebral inconstancy, or la mollesse.  “Delicious and sensual pleasures, which always accompany 
opulence,” Lottin observed, “soften and enervate bodies: they soon become weak and 
effeminate...incapable of extensive labor; the species finally degenerates.”439  For Lottin and 
opponents of luxury, increased consumption, the innumerable spaces in which social and 
commercial interaction occurred, and the newly-widespread pursuit of pleasure exacerbated the 
                                                          
436Ibid., 47 (see also 24). 
 
437Ibid., 57. 
 
438Ibid., 31, 30. 
 
439Ibid., 55.  In De l’esprit, Helvétius similarly acknowledged the ability of luxury to enervate bodies and reduce 
men to lassitude: “Yet, these different causes of depopulation, by plunging the whole country into misery, must 
necessarily weaken the constitution of bodies. The people given over to luxury are never robust: of all its citizens, 
some are enervated by la mollesse and others are exhausted by need.” De l’esprit (Paris: Chez Durand, 1758), 26. 
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effects of luxury: “the assemblage of all the pleasures to which luxury gives birth—music, the 
theatre, the baths, perfumes, exquisite food—by attacking the soul through all of the senses, 
weakens it and takes away all of its energy.”440   
Lottin’s analysis incorporated the work of his predecessor Fénelon and his 
contemporaries: Rousseau, Mirabeau, Jean-François Butini, and Sénac de Meilhan.  He echoed 
Boudier de Villemaire’s juxtaposition of luxurious women steeped in languor and those in 
“perpetual movement” in society.441  From these critics, it is clear that luxury destroyed the body 
in two ways.  Through la mollesse it sapped the body of its vigor and reduced the body’s taut 
fibers and solid organs to pulp, and by overstimulation it overwhelmed the sensory network, 
reducing it to numbness and dizziness.  Butini identified precisely this problem: “As soon as a 
man possessed a fortune that previously would have made one hundred men happy, no longer 
being constrained to earn his living by work, he soon drifts to sleep in the heart of idleness [and] 
submits without reserve to all his desires: soon his organs fatigue either from repose or from the 
monotony of his incessant need for new pleasures.”442  When the sensations of le doux commerce 
transcended the merely “agreeable,” individuals became addicted to the pleasures of luxury and 
forged physiological habits that stymied the corporeal connectivity of society. 
The Processes of Corporeal Decay 
Luxury destroyed the body by three natural, physiological processes: impressions on the 
senses; acceleration of the imagination; and, formation of habits.  The material objects used to 
create éclat, the noise of society, and the bumping of bodies during social and commercial 
                                                          
440Ibid., 8. 
 
441Boudier de Villemaire, L’ami des femmes (1758), chp. 3. 
 
442Butini, Traité du luxe, 17. 
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exchange worked through the sensory and nervous systems.  As Boudier de Villemaire stated: 
"All that exists outside of us is known to us only by the impressions made on us."443  And, 
according to Rouillé d’Orfeuil, "The different ways of thinking…seeing…and feeling that we 
adopt, depend on the impressions that the exterior objects that surround us, and have surrounded 
us, make, and have made, on us."444  The "impressionability" of humans was in no way a 
figurative term.  It corresponded to the contemporary physiological conception of brain activity 
and sensory reception, and it was the physiological expression of (mis)représentation, described 
as the "false and seductive association of ideas that luxury forges."445  Although doctors and 
natural philosophers weighed the importance of different elements of the body more heavily than 
others, in general the sensory network was a composite of brain and sensory fibers, liquids, 
organs, nerves, and animal spirits (rarefied fluid in the nerves that transmitted sensations).  The 
latter two carried out the will of the brain, and sensations were thought to be channeled in one of 
two ways.  Nerves were considered to be either hollow tubes through which animal spirits 
flowed to the brain and vital organs according to the impact of sensory data, or fibers were 
considered to be analogous to taut strings whose vibrations transmitted sensory data throughout 
the body.446  Importantly, in either model, traces or impressions were left on the brain and 
                                                          
443Boudier de Villemaire, L'Andrométrie, 57.  
 
444Augustin Rouillé d'Orfeuil, L'Ami des François (1771), 636. 
 
445Shovlin, "The Cultural Politics of Luxury," 594.  Remember too the words of Burke above: “Magnificence [éclat] 
was considered to be impressive, in the literal sense of leaving an ‘impression’ on the viewers like a stamp on a 
piece of wax.”  Burke, The Fabrication of Louis XIV, 5.  For the use of auditory and visual stimuli in educational 
theory and political festivals, see Mona Ozouf, Festivals and the French Revolution, trans. Alan Sheridan 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1988); Sophia Rosenfeld, A Revolution in Language: The Problem of 
Signs in Late Eighteenth-Century France (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2001); and, in the early American 
context, David Waldstreicher, In the Midst of Perpetual Fetes: The Making of American Nationalism, 1776-1820 
(Chapel Hill, NC: The Omohundro Institute of Early American History and Culture, 1997), esp. chp. 2. 
 
446In a chapter titled “The Physiology of Thinking and Acting,” John Yolton identified four physiologies used to 
explain mental operations in Britain: “(1) the scholastic theory of species, (2) the physiology of animal spirits and 
brain traces, (3) the physiological application of Newton’s subtle elastic fluid (the aether), and (4) the Hartleian 
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sensory fibers, carving out channels or imprints according to the frequency, duration, or level of 
impact of sensory input.   
Impressions were therefore crucial in epistemology and carried an especially heavy 
weight in criticisms of luxury.  Impressions initiated a chain of cause and effect in the body that 
merged external sensory information with the internal organs and transformed that data into 
knowledge.  Since the majority of people “neither think, observe, nor feel except by the 
impressions to which they are exposed,” d’Orfeuil commented, “it is essential that they be 
surrounded by appropriate ideas [i.e. not luxury, debauchery, confounding of ranks, or even 
sentimental novels that promoted dissolution].”447  Twenty years prior to d’Orfeuil, Didier Pierre 
Chicaneau de Neuvillé defined complaisance as “a condescendence to the will of 
others...complaisance comes also from a weakness of mind, and announces a man incapable of 
thinking for himself, and who avidly receives all the impressions that one gives to him: these 
sorts of characters are insipid in the commerce of society.”448  Social commerce should be an 
exchange of ideas and behaviors that impressed bodies, according to Chicaneau de Neuvillé.  
While impressions were not visible to the naked eye, it was clear that external stimuli affected all 
                                                          
theory of vibrations.”  Yolton, Thinking Matter: Materialism in Eighteenth-Century Britain (Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 1983), 153.  Numbers two, three, and four co-existed in eighteenth-century France, 
and in 1746 Condillac was still uncertain whether animal spirits or vibrations were experimentally proven: “Here 
and elsewhere I suppose that the perceptions of the mind have their physical cause in the shock to the fibers of the 
brain, not because I take this hypothesis to be demonstrated, but because I find it best suited to support my thought.  
If the thing is not caused in this manner, it must be in some other not very different manner.  The brain can work 
only by motion.  Thus, whether one accepts that the perceptions are occasioned by shock to the fibers, by the 
circulation of animal spirits, or by some other cause, that is all the same in regard to the purpose I have in mind.” 
Condillac, Essay on the Origin of Human Knowledge, trans. Hans Aarsleff (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2001), 30, n. 14. 
 
447D’Orfeuil, L’ami des Francois, 637-9. D’Orfeuil would go on to outline an intricate sartorial system to 
demonstrate social ranking and to assert the importance of the interior sentiment. 
 
448Chicaneau de Neuvillé, Dictionnaire philosophique, ou introduction à la connaissance de l’homme (London, 
1751), 69.  In the 1762 edition, he defined “impressions” as “the effect that an object makes on our senses and on 
our soul.” 
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five senses and altered the composition of bodies.  Lacking the self-awareness to recognize the 
physiological changes happening internally, most people did not realize that a frivolous or 
indolent lifestyle could weaken their bodies or that imbibing too much visual stimuli from éclat 
could impress the wrong association of ideas.   
 The ability to draw ideas from sensations, which did or did not correspond to reality, 
relied on the delicacy, coarseness, moisture, and pliability of the fibers, which were affected by 
age, sex, and usage.  Not all natural philosophers, medical doctors, and social commentators 
agreed distinctly on the physiological processes—some emphasized impressions and traces and 
some vibrations of nerves—but contemporaries did find that the physical connected to the moral 
via sensibility.449  Despite the universality of sensibility, with each different physiological 
organization came varying abilities to take in sense data and sustain balanced levels of cognitive 
activity.  Most critics of luxury identified women’s bodies as the most easily seduced.  In his 
Dictionnaire philosophique, ou introduction à la connaissance de l’homme (1751), Chicaneau de 
Neuvillé perpetuated the connection between women and luxury using current physiological 
conceptions of gendered bodies.450  He wrote: "The difference which one remarks in the man and 
                                                          
449Karl M. Figlio, “Theories of Perception and the Physiology of the Mind in the Late Eighteenth Century,” History 
of Science 12 (1975): 177-212; G. S. Rousseau, “Nerves, Spirits, and Fibres: Towards Defining the Origins of 
Sensibility,” in Studies in the Eighteenth Century, III: Papers Presented at the Third David Nichol Smith Memorial 
Seminar, Canberra 1973, eds. R. F. Brissenden and J. Eade (Canberra: Australian National University Press, 1976); 
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450Although Katherine Hamerton has proven that Malebranche espoused similar gendered theories of the body in the 
last quarter of the seventeenth century, it was truly by the mid-eighteenth century that the view expressed by 
Chicaneau de Neuvillé became mainstream.  Katharine J. Hamerton, "Malebranche, Taste, and Sensibility: The 
Origins of Sensitive Taste and a Reconsideration of Cartesianism's Feminist Potential," Journal of the History of 
Ideas, vol. 69, no. 4 (October 2008): 533-558.  See also Londa Schiebinger, The Mind has no Sex? Women in the 
Origins of Modern Science (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1989); Thomas Laqueur, Making Sex: Body 
and Gender From the Greeks to Freud (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1990); Lieselotte Steinbrügge, 
The Moral Sex: Woman’s Nature in the French Enlightenment, trans. Pamela E. Selwyn (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1995); Elizabeth Williams, The Physical and the Moral: Anthropology, Physiology, and philosophical 
medicine in France, 1750-1850 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), chps. 1-2; Ludmilla Jordanova, 
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the woman, comes not only from education, but also from their nature.  The fibers of the woman 
are ordinarily more slender, which makes the senses more fine, and the interior sentiment more 
delicate.  This natural disposition makes them prefer perceptible objects to metaphysical 
realities…the brilliant to the solid, luxury and ostentation to cleanliness and commodity."451  
Chicaneau de Neuvillé found women's bodies to be naturally constituted in such a way that they 
were drawn to luxury.  It is perhaps for this reason that he stated in the entry "expenditure" 
(dépense) the need for sumptuary laws.452   
Boudier de Villemaire espoused a similar position in his L’ami des femmes (1758).453  A 
jurisconsulte by trade, Boudier was also a prolific writer, though Melchior Grimm considered 
                                                          
“Sex and Gender,” in Inventing Human Science: Eighteenth-Century Domains, eds., Christopher Fox, Roy Porter, 
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la fin du Premier Empire (Oxford, England: Voltaire Foundation, 2000); Ann Thomson, Bodies of Thought: Science, 
Religion, and the Soul in the Early Enlightenment (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), chps. 6-7. 
 
451Chicaneau de Neuvillé, Dictionnaire philosophique (London, 1751), "Femme. Homme." 147-8 (see also 
“Finesse”).  See also Jones, Sexing “La Mode,” 134-8.  Similarly, the médecin-philosophe La Mettrie wrote: “In the 
fair sex, the soul also follows the delicacy of the temperament; hence the tenderness, affection, lively feelings based 
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La Mettrie, L’Homme machine, in Machine Man and Other Writings, ed. and trans. Ann Thomson (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1996), 8.  
Chicaneau de Neuvillé published at least two further editions of his Dictionnaire.  In 1756, he published the 
Dictionnaire philosophique portatif, and in 1762 he published a much augmented edition in which he acknowledged 
in the Avertissement plagiarizing from other authors in order to create “un livre utile, plutôt qu’un ouvrage 
agréable.”  In the 1762 edition, for example, he took part of his entry for luxury from Saint-Lambert’s entry in the 
Encyclopédie.  
 
452He would define luxury as "the love of splendor and magnificence.  The luxury of buildings, of clothes, etc. is a 
sparkling veil, which often hides pettiness well” (225).   
 
453Boudier de Villemaire republished L’ami des femmes numerous times after 1758 (the edition I use) with different 
subtitles and additional material: L’ami des femmes, ou la philosophie du beau sexe (1774); Le Nouvel Ami des 
Femmes (1779, with an alphabetical list of famous French women); and L’ami des femmes, ou morale du sexe 
(1788, with an “Epitre aux Femmes,” a Preface, a “Question préliminaire,” an added chapter on women and religion, 
and a concluding chapter, “De l’éducation et des devoirs des femmes,” extracted from Fénelon).  The spelling of 
Villemert/Villemaire is a slight source of confusion.  Most spell his name “Villemert,” but I adhere to “Villemaire” 
because this is how his named appeared on L’Andrométrie.   
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him a hack.454  Boudier participated in the Academy of Dijon’s essay contest on the arts and 
sciences that won Rousseau such acclaim, and he contributed to the expansion of the periodical 
press by creating and editing Feuille nécessaire in 1759, which became the weekly Avantcoureur 
through 1773.  L’ami des femmes clearly mimicked Mirabeau’s immensely popular L’ami des 
hommes, and Boudier sought to endear himself to critics of le monde, particularly its exclusivity, 
frivolity, and gender inversion.455  The repeated publication, modifications, and various editions 
of L’ami des femmes in France, Britain, Austria, and America remind us that philosophes like 
Voltaire and Rousseau were not the only ones able to capture the stresses, strains, and anxieties 
of the eighteenth century. 
Boudier subscribed to a vision of females as the complement to males, a seemingly 
“progressive” view but one that limited women’s characteristics to those of a charming modesty, 
polisher of manners, and domestic sovereign.  “Each sex has a particular destination that derives 
from its physical constitution and cannot be transported to the other,” Boudier de Villemaire 
proclaimed.456  Like Chicaneau de Neuvillé, he praised women’s vivacity of senses and their 
ability to “seize objects” and the “connections between objects” quicker than men.457  This talent 
                                                          
454George B. Watts, “Pierre-Joseph Boudier de Villemert: L’ami des femmes, the Feuille Nécessaire, and L’Avant-
Coureur,” Tennessee Studies in Literature, vol. 16 (1971): 169-173, here 170.  
 
455For biographical information on Boudier de Villemaire, his writings on women, and his popularity in America, 
see Watts, “Pierre-Joseph Boudier de Villemert: L’ami des femmes, the Feuille Nécessaire, and L’Avant-Coureur;” 
David Williams, “The Fate of French Feminism: Boudier de Villemert’s Ami des Femmes,” Eighteenth-Century 
Studies, vol. 14, n. 1 (1980): 37-55; Jones, Sexing “La Mode,” 117, 135-6, 149, 181.  Watts stated that Boudier was 
a lawyer of the parlement of Paris, but Williams did not confirm this.  Boudier put forward an image of 
domesticated daughters and wives, but, unlike Sophie in Rousseau’s Émile, Boudier wanted women to be educated 
(primarily to be suitable companions to men, as in Benjamin Rush’s famous post-American Revolution contention). 
 
456Boudier de Villemaire, “Question préliminaire” to L’ami des femmes (1788), xii.  Although Boudier de Villemaire 
references without citation François Poulain de la Barre’s maxim “L’esprit n’a point de sexe,” it is clear that he did 
think the mind had a sex and a particular physiological consistency.  L’ami des femmes (1758), 155.  It is possible 
that Boudier was familiar with Florent de Puisieux’ La Femme n’est pas inférieure à l’homme (1750), which 
reproduced a number of passages from Poulain’s De l’égalité des deux sexes (1673). 
 
457Boudier de Villemaire, L’ami des femmes (1758), 23, 26.  Similar to the vivacity of the senses, the vitalist 
physician Théophile de Bordeu wrote that “the natural pulse of women is, in general, quicker [than men’s] and 
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inherent to their physiological organization, however, made them susceptible to the corrupting 
influence of luxury and the corresponding, interminable pursuit of pleasure.  Having a more 
delicate sensibility, women were more easily led astray by the éclat of luxury or the gallantry of 
men.  By necessity and habit, women became addicted to the noise and turbulence of society, 
and as a result the shock to their bodies of constantly refining and varying pleasurable sensations 
overheated their imaginations and left them immobile from dizziness.458   
Chicaneau de Neuvillé's entry on "women" reveals a further assumption about women's 
corporeal organization and the physiological foundations for a critique of luxury: their natural 
disposition also "makes them sensitive to piety, inconstant and light, and often capricious.  The 
trace which objects leave there not being deep enough, it is easily effaced by a new impression: 
in such a way that in their minds the present object often sweeps away that which is absent."459  
Both Boudier de Villemaire and Chicaneau de Neuvillé coated women's impulsiveness, love of 
fashion, and addiction to ornamentation in the authority of nature, thus bridging the natural and 
social order.  The inability to sustain durable impressions and a delicate sensibility, then, were 
further examples of feminization brought on by luxury.   
As impressions were embedded in the brain and sensory fibers, "the imagination," to 
quote Boudier de Villemaire, "increases still their charm by perpetuating them and by easing the 
imagination's ability to renew the images that luxury stamped."460  The imagination was a 
notoriously-tricky faculty of the mind that could be a source of creativity or disorder.  As it relied 
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458Ibid., 138, 53-7. 
 
459Chicaneau de Neuvillé, Dictionnaire philosophique, "Femme. Homme." 148. 
 
460Boudier de Villemaire, L’Andrométrie, 45.  See also Chicaneau de Neuvillé, “Extase.” 
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only on the traces left by sensations, characterized as the “faithful depository of sensations” by 
Boudier de Villemaire, the imagination could skid off the grooves carved into the brain fibers 
and misconnect ideas.461  The influential, Cartesian philosopher Nicholas Malebranche, who was 
disdainful of the frivolity and “noise” of society, differentiated between sensing and 
imagining.462  Sensing was the agitation of the brain fibers by an external object upon the 
exterior surface of the nerves, and imagining was caused by the ruffling of the internal fibers by 
an absent cause through the flow of animal spirits.463  In Malebranche’s words: “Since the 
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imagination consists only in the soul’s power to form images of objects by imprinting them, so to 
speak, in the fibers of its brain, the greater and more distinct the traces of the animal spirits, 
which are the strokes of these images, the more strongly and distinctly the soul will imagine 
these objects.”464  The éclat of luxury and crafty bon ton of le monde particularly imprinted the 
brain fibers, binding the imagination to the degenerative aspects of society.  Women, whose 
delicate brain fibers made them most susceptible to flights of the imagination, “cannot use their 
imagination for working out complex and tangled questions.  They consider only the surface of 
things…because insignificant things produce great motions in the delicate fibers of their brains, 
[which] necessarily excite great and vivid feelings in their souls, completely occupying it.”465   
In his 1746 Essai sur l'origine des connaissances humaines, Condillac argued that the 
imagination conserved and revived perceptions, which he defined as “impression[s] occasioned 
in the mind by the action of the senses...supplied only by reflection on what we experience when 
we are affected by some sensation...[and are] the first and least degree of knowledge.”466  As 
perceptions are embedded in the brain fibers, roused to action generally by a shock (frappé) to 
the senses, they become familiar through repetition and can often be revived with no external 
stimulation, as Malebranche noted.  The imagination can also be brought to action by 
“unexpected impressions,” so “solidly embedded” yet naturally occurring that “they act on our 
                                                          
Sensibility (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2010),  24-30, 104-7, 140-7, 170-84, and 392-3; John 
W. Yolton, Locke and French Materialism (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991). 
 
464Ibid., 89.  
 
465Ibid., 130. See also Boudier de Villemaire, L’Andrométrie, 54, and L’ami des femmes, 79. 
 
466Condillac, Essay on the Origin of Human Knowledge, 27, quote from 19-20 (see also Part I, section 2, chapters 2, 
9, and 10).  According to John O’Neal, Condillac only fully developed his “sensationism,” in which 
reason/reflection became truly subordinate to sensations, eight years later in Traité des sensations (1754).  O’Neal, 
The Authority of Experience, 18-9. For the importance of the body in Condillac’s theory of language, see David 
Hagan, “Connections: Body and Sympathy in 18th- and 20th-Century Language Theory” (University of Iowa 
doctoral thesis, 2006), chp. 2. 
 
197 
 
minds with greater vivacity.”467  Butini extended Condillac’s analysis to the problem of luxury: 
“When the imagination is shocked by some brilliant objects, [it becomes] ardent in its projects 
and attempts to do anything to satisfy them.”468  He observed the contagious desire to imitate the 
luxurious éclat of the wealthy spread from the highest to the lowest ranks and inflame the 
imaginations of those unlucky enough to be occasionally welcomed into elite circles. 
By repeatedly shocking the fibers, or forcing the animal spirits rapidly through their 
tubes, luxury could also disorient the natural processes of information-gathering.  The 
imagination would feed off the ingrained perceptions, tentatively connected to reality, and 
reproduce the sensations caused by luxury without provocation.  Condillac outlined the 
reciprocal interaction of the senses and the “organ of the imagination” in a way that critics of 
luxury repeated:   
[A]s the senses act on the organ of the imagination, this organ reacts on the senses...I say 
that this organ’s reaction is more lively than the action of the senses, because this organ 
does not act on them with the mere force of the perception they produced, but with the 
united forces of all those that are closely linked to this perception and which for this 
reason have invariably been revived...In the same manner a pleasure I have pursued 
revives all the agreeable ideas to which it can be connected.  The imagination returns 
several perceptions to the senses for every one that it receives.  My spirits are moving 
with a force that dissipates all that could deprive me of the sentiments I am having.  In 
this state, being entirely absorbed by the perceptions I receive from the senses and by 
those which the imagination reproduces, I enjoy the most lively pleasures.  But arrest the 
action of the imagination, and it is all gone as if I had been bewitched; I have before my 
eyes the objects to which I attributed my happiness; I pursue them, but I no longer see 
them.469  
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Describing a representative elite woman in the throes of luxury, Butini provided an 
instance of Condillac’s theoretical explanation:  
She passes half her life in bed, she divides the other half between balls, grand assemblies, 
gambling, the theatre, and concerts.  Everyday has the éclat of grandiose fêtes...Is [this 
woman] happy?  Without a doubt, she receives some delicious sensations for her senses 
and her amour-propre, but one should recall that turbulent [bruyans] pleasures become 
blunted [s’emoussent] by continuity...Today triumphant, tomorrow eclipsed, by turns in 
anguish and in laughter, she flutters in perpetual agitation, she lives in a stormy milieu.470   
 
The imagination heightened the feeling of external sensations and brought a welter of stored 
sensations to bear on the body of this woman.  Butini’s hypothetical socialite was like all of 
those who wasted the vivacity of their sensations on éclat and pomp.  Their imaginations became 
overheated, exhausted, and insensible to simple pleasures because they wanted to satisfy all their 
tastes simultaneously.471 
Abbé Pluquet too equated overstimulated senses to dizziness and a persistent, but 
fruitless, chase for corporeal happiness.472  The body became bereft of reason and subject to the 
imagination whose “unruly creations” were considered “errors of construction...not reflected in 
sensation.”473  In Pluquet’s “Christian version of natural law theory,” man was a unique creature, 
blending a corporeal organization physically-inferior to other animals with a superior faculty of 
reason that led humans to unite socially.474  Pluquet defined luxury specifically as a disruption to 
natural, corporeal processes: luxury is “the usage of objects, which produce agreeable sensations, 
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that man has rendered necessary to his happiness even though by the laws of nature the usage of 
these objects and the agreeable sensations that they produce are neither necessary nor useful to 
life or health nor necessary to the happiness of man.”475  The imagination inflamed by luxury 
snuffed out the “principle that thinks in man,” rendering individuals incapable of fixing attention, 
comparing ideas, judging, and ascending to higher truths.476  Pluquet feared that the man of 
luxury would create a world out of residual sensations, recoiling into himself and constructing 
fantasies out of disconnected traces.  He feared also that the imagination required a continual 
source of new sensations.  The man of luxury lived only for the constant replenishing of 
agreeable sensations, enhanced by the frenetic activity of the imagination.477   
Pluquet preserved the sociable virtues of amitié and reconnaissance and reinforced the 
primacy of the corporeal so crucial to De la sociabilité (1767), but the intervening twenty years 
demonstrated to him that the various economic and philosophical guises of materialism had only 
increased their hold on French society.  From Mandeville, Montesquieu, Melon, Hume, and 
Jacques Necker to Forbonnais, Helvétius, Condillac, and d’Holbach, luxury was still not truly 
understood.  Each of these thinkers, Pluquet contended, defined luxury to suit their vision of 
society.  For Pluquet, luxury must be understood as part of man’s nature, and its degenerative 
properties known only through the body.478   
By working through the sensory processes, luxury replaced rationality with imagination 
and constantly pulled men and women toward those objects that initially established the 
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impressions.  Like Pluquet, Boudier de Villemaire feared that the imagination usurped the role of 
leading cognitive faculty, deafening the cry of reason.  The majority of people became 
“habituated to the vibrant action of [the imagination], they suffer impatiently the tranquil 
operation of reason, and finding more ease in seizing objects by their brilliant colors in which the 
imagination adorned them, rather than studying them deeply, they give to them a preference.”479  
The imagination thus worked involuntarily, exhausting the body to the point of either la mollesse 
or a state of shock and dizziness.   
The repetition of impressions and the activity of the imagination formed habits, the last 
stage of luxury’s disorderly effects on the body, which induced fantasy, egoism, and anti-social 
behavior.  As the Idéologue Pierre-Jean-Georges Cabanis wrote in his Rapports du physique et 
du moral de l’homme (1802), “organized bodies are able...to contract particular ways of being 
which are then perpetuated or reproduced even in the absence of the causes upon which they 
depend; that is to say, they are able to contract habits.”480  Or, in a simpler explanation given by 
d’Holbach, habits are a “disposition in our organs caused by the frequency of the same 
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movement, which results in the ease of reproducing them.”481  Habits were physiological states, 
circumscribing the behavior of individuals through internal motions.   
Habits bound people to objects of luxury, created ideas that no longer corresponded to 
external sensory data, isolated individuals from each other, and ultimately splintered society. 
Many individuals did not develop physiologically-ingrained habits, though.  Yet, they still 
experienced the physiological impulse to constantly pursue material pleasures because their 
fibers were too delicate and their sensibility was too quick to sustain durable impressions.  Habits 
were not imprinted in these individuals, but the liveliness of their senses nevertheless rendered 
them subservient to the physical effects of luxury.  Luxury, therefore, not only depleted courage 
and virtue, feminized men, obscured ranks, depopulated the countryside, and spread depraved 
moeurs, but it also degenerated the fundamental physiology of sentimentality and sociability that 
citizens or subjects were expected to feel for each other.   
Prior to the 1750s, la querelle du luxe was primarily an offshoot of larger socio-economic 
questions.  After midcentury, however, it became its own driving force, as a multiplicity of 
authors used luxury itself, and wrote in an array of formats, to take up questions of “happiness, 
artifice, nature, the place of women in society, social confusion, inequality, the arts and sciences, 
celibacy, depopulation, or breast feeding.”482  Contributors to la querelle du luxe repeated these 
themes, often to honestly scrutinize the socio-economic order and often to merely obtain public 
recognition as authors.  Even as contemporaries complained of the repetitive character of these 
texts, commentaries and reviews of them regularly appeared in the periodical press: Mercure de 
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France, Année littéraire, Journal des beaux-arts et des sciences, Journal encyclopédique, and 
Correspondance littéraire.  Academies across France sponsored essay competitions to address 
the destructive or productive aspects of luxury.  “The characteristic of this chameleon concept,” 
according to Audrey Provost, “is to allow one to speak of everything, all that touches the 
harmony of the social and political body.”483  Whether an author focused on depopulation, 
promoted Greco-Roman virtues, or decried the visible role of women in society, the health of the 
social body or body politic was located in the corporeal.  The authority of natural philosophy and 
the dual language of sensibility held together la querelle du luxe and provided an organizing 
principle for the moral assessments of social interaction.  
According to Sénac de Meilhan, the constant search for stimulation, either through 
physical objects or sensual pleasures, led to a society of individuals puffed up from amour-
propre and lacking sentiment.484  “The spirit of luxury and frivolity strips man of his first 
virtue,” Lottin implored; “it extinguishes in him the softest penchant, the first sentiment of well-
born souls...goodness [bonté], sensibility [sensibilité].  The taste for pleasures, the habit of ease 
and opulence smothers or hardens the best of his nature.”485  Human nature was contained in the 
body, which was a sensing, feeling object, capable of translating external sensations into 
knowledge upon which humans reflected, judged, and ultimately acted.  The “delicacy” of 
sensibility could be understood as a physiological defect rendering one submissive to sensations 
or a positive attribute suggesting one’s ability to sympathize, reciprocate affection, and channel 
one’s desires toward the betterment of society.  Physical sensibility and the ability to absorb 
                                                          
483Ibid., 15. 
 
484Sénac de Meilhan, Considérations sur les richesses et le luxe, 132-3 (chp. XV). 
 
485Lottin, Discours contre le luxe, 30. 
 
203 
 
sensations formed a “continuous and simultaneous” process with moral sensibility and 
sentimentality.486 
Although John Locke first illustrated the primacy of sensation in modern epistemology, 
and physiologists and physicians performed experiments to uncover the processes of sense 
operations, it was writers of fiction, moralists, and, I would add, critics of luxury and society 
who provided the groundwork for the social and moral valences contracted by "sentiment" and 
"sensibility."487  To return to a quote from Boudier de Villemaire cited above, by spreading day 
by day, luxury "has managed to blunt all our senses…the excess to which we have carried 
feeling will soon reduce us to the point of feeling nothing at all."488  Boudier de Villemaire's 
references to “blunt” (émousser) and “feeling” (sentiment) indicated the physiological and moral 
components of the language of sensationalism.  The innate capacity to react to stimuli became 
both the mainspring and the connective tissue of physical and moral life.489 The hardening of 
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one’s heart or the stifling of nature were metaphorical expressions for the physical course of 
becoming insensible.  Boudier de Villemaire, then, was not just concerned with "symbolic 
anarchy" distorting ranks, just as d’Holbach was not merely worried that the rich idler sought out 
vices and volupté to ease his boredom; both were equally concerned that the numbing of our 
senses and the vertigo induced by luxury would have a concomitant effect on our rational and 
moral faculties.490  Boudier de Villemaire, Chicaneau de Neuvillé, and others linked the moral to 
the physical through the mediating activities of the senses.491  The morality of sensibility—
exhibited by sympathy, benevolence, pity, and sociability—combined with an epistemology 
grounded in sensationalist physiology to situate the ability to feel at the center of new visions of 
society.  The deleterious physical effects of luxury struck those looking to reform society, to 
maintain the esprit de communauté so necessary to Saint Lambert, as a crucial obstacle to 
overcome.   
Butini wrote positively of l’homme sensé, who avoids superfluity, respects his état, and 
prefers virtuous labor over urban debauchery.  He wrote negatively of l’homme insensé, who 
struts around at the head of an army of servants and whose body luxury had deadened to 
sensibility and the plight of others.  The pursuit of luxury and unending pleasures encouraged 
avidity, frivolity, and insensitivity, and competition for éclat and prestige created an increasing 
inequality.  Luxury was a malady that closed the hearts of the wealthy to the pleasures of 
goodwill (amitié) and reduced the poor to a state below savages.492  The inheritors of fertile land, 
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Nicolas Baudeau envisioned, no longer felt patriotic sentiments to plant and harvest for the 
betterment of society; they only wanted to abandon fields for the sensual pleasures of the city.493  
Baudeau, Butini, and Pluquet all noted further that luxury disturbs the sentiment of conjugal 
fidelity and ruins families because men are too addicted to the variety of sensual pleasures and 
no longer feel tenderness toward their children or wives. 
The children of les hommes and les femmes insensés did not fare much better than their 
parents.  Young girls, in particular, were intoxicated by the constant hum of praise and flattery 
that evaporated as they aged.  For Rouillé d’Orfeuil, “cursed luxury,” vice, and debauchery 
numbed and blunted all the senses, dazed the bodies of adolescents, weakened the organs even 
before the soul developed, and turned contemporaries into enemies.494  Luxury and “all the 
poisons of society” silenced the most important sense; they prevented people from listening to 
“the just and true censor that the Supreme Being deigned to put in us, which never misleads 
us.”495  No longer able to hear the interior sentiment that spoke of utility and the common good, 
those devoted to luxury stymied social cohesion. 
Since man was uniquely organized to feel both physical and moral affections, he 
experienced the dual meaning of sensibility. Pluquet assured his readers that nature did not 
abandon man to his senses and the impressions left by physical objects because she endowed him 
with reason.496  Nature also fused into humans a safeguard against excess; they were equipped 
with pleasurable sensations when they achieved the proper levels of nourishment and passion 
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and painful sensations when they exceeded the necessary and useful.497  Yet, the body was 
fallibly physical, and luxury could extinguish amitié and sociability:  
[When] the exercise and practice of the social virtues no longer produce pleasurable 
sensations, in order to avoid boredom and apathy humans only have the impressions of 
external bodies on their senses...they struggle to prolong the duration of the physical 
needs, to reactivate them when they are satisfied or weakened by creating new sensations 
and looking for means to give to all that which strikes their senses a delicacy and activity 
capable of being felt.498   
 
The physical attraction to pleasures of the senses, epitomized in the objects and activities of 
luxury, was unnecessary and unnatural in Pluquet’s conception of nature, but it was nevertheless 
born from the organisation and sensory network of humans. 
Moral sensibility remained buried in luxury addicts because they never achieved physical 
satiety.  By elevating superfluous, agreeable sensations to the point of necessity, they 
recalibrated their bodies to constantly feel an insatiable hunger.499  Pluquet and the other critics 
of luxury shared this view of le doux commerce gone terribly wrong.  The desire to fill 
unnecessary needs— excessive nourishment, clothing, sumptuous apartments, glittery trinkets— 
forged habits that required incessant novelty: “there is no interval for the needs of a man of 
luxury: as each type of sensation lasts for only a short time, and since agreeable sensations are 
necessary to his happiness, he is in extreme and continual need of feeling new sensations.”500  
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These men subsist only on the physical sensibility of organisation and blunt the moral sensibility 
of the soul.  The corporeal development of habits affected both the individual and those with 
whom he would have engaged in social commerce or sympathy.  In addition, since by his 
organisation man imitates the actions of others—a natural principle of sociability and 
perfectibility according to Pluquet—the example of a frivolous, sensual person could influence 
the behavior of others.501  “Is it not evident,” Pluquet demanded, “that if you efface these 
principles [divine natural law] from the mind of man, he becomes the toy of all the impressions 
[made] by objects on his organs; that he is dragged by all of the passions and desires raised in his 
heart...that he is no longer anything but a sensible automaton, and that he can become a monster 
of cruelty?”502  
Although Butini, Sénac de Meilhan, Boudier de Villemaire, d’Holbach, Pluquet, and the 
others discussed in this chapter did not agree on the divine nature of sentimentality and 
sociability or the proper socio-political structure to incorporate individuals, they all pointed out 
the fundamentally negative effects that immoderate luxury had on the human body.  The 
corporate, social hierarchy teetered unstably by the mid-eighteenth century and wide fissures 
opened up where boundaries separating états used to be.  Whether one wanted to tear down, 
modify, or strengthen the social system of états, it was necessary to address the motion and 
contact of physical objects and human bodies in multifarious social spaces.503  Those living 
under the tyrannical rule of luxury submitted to overheated imaginations, became slaves to their 
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passions, and felt either the constant need to experience pleasurable sensations or were rendered 
indolent by them.  Society could be neither reformed nor remade if its members idled their time 
away in la mollesse or required constant sense stimuli because their fibers were either hardened 
or too delicate.  At a time when an abundance of social, political, moral, and natural causes were 
called upon to unite individuals together in society, addicts of luxury recoiled into a state of 
material selfhood, neglecting any collective identity found in social interaction and unable to 
reflect clearly on their own existence.504   
*** 
By the time Pluquet and Sénac de Meilhan wrote their treatises critical of luxury, the 
surge of commercial culture had become relentless.  The increasing visibility and tangibility of 
luxury goods, “populuxe” items, and consumers of all états illustrated to them the destructive 
tendencies of a society of unregulated commerce.  Each individual approached the abrogation or 
expansion of the corporate system and series of états differently, but they all agreed that the 
general direction taken by their society was dangerous.  Embracing luxury confounded ranks, led 
to depopulation, and raised the empire of women.  Significantly, opponents of luxury pointed to 
changes in the human body as the essential space to observe the devastation intrinsic to a 
burgeoning commercial society.  The body harbored the capacity for physical and moral 
sensibility; the latter often termed “sentiment” was, according to Henri Fouquet, the first 
consequential movement elicited by a physical sensation.505  Whether or not moral sensibility 
constituted a divine impulse toward sociability or the interior sentiment or an inclination of 
human nature toward amitié, it was clearly inseparable from the corporeal organisation.  People 
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who abandoned themselves to luxury severed this connection.  The habitual pursuit of 
superfluous, agreeable sensations would eat away at the organisation, sacrificing the constitution 
and vigor of organs and numbing physical and moral sensibility.506   
Critics of luxury decried supporters of doux commerce, especially Mandeville, Melon, 
and Hume, who wrongly believed that men could be capable of great things by the mechanism of 
a “violently shaken temperament.”507  Luxury made humans neither more sociable, loyal, 
dignified, reverent, nor inspired to reciprocally please each other.  Les moeurs were neither 
softened nor polished, according to Lottin, and André-François Boureau-Deslandes claimed that 
luxury consisted of trifles (bagatelles), ostentation, and foolishness, the pursuit of which 
corrupted moeurs.  In a witty turn of phrase, he defined luxury as “a series of bagatelles 
metamorphosed into things of consequence.”508  Opponents of luxury consistently used language 
that connoted metamorphosis, artifice, and deception to describe eighteenth-century French 
society.  Instead of calming the passions, luxury heightened them.  The grand cities were a 
theatre, a stage, a spectacle on which subjects displayed themselves as costumed actors in front 
of an audience.  Women in particular imagined eclipsing their rivals by their elegance and éclat, 
competing for the most successful form of dissimulation.509  Luxury had made of society a 
masquerade, “where nobody wears outfits that conform to their character but that conform to 
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their fantasies, and under which one is least likely to be recognized.”510  Rousseau’s descriptions 
of amour propre and artifice found able promoters in Boudier de Villemaire and Butini.  The 
new social spaces opened up by a fledgling society combined with luxury to create an endless 
loop: they unleashed the passions, provided an increasingly novel set of physical objects in 
which to decorate and disguise oneself, then habituated the body to both. 
The luxury debates occurred at a time when new social practices and a vibrant material 
culture existed alongside, and contributed to, an anxiety over the foundations of society, which 
elicited a willingness to explore new options for the social order.  In particular, opponents of 
luxury focused on the destabilizing effects that luxury and the growth of commerce would have 
on society, and they articulated their fears through sensationalist physiology.  Critics of luxury 
utilized scientific concepts at the same time as physiologists and physicians rigorously applied 
their own physiological theories to society.  If society was a solution to some of the pressing 
political and cultural problems of the period, and sociability and sensibility were the fundamental 
ways to reach a new understanding of society, then the ability to feel, to have a properly 
functioning sensory network, was indispensable for a durable society.511  We see the corporeal 
critique of luxury and commitment to the importance of the human body in society in a most 
unlikely place: the political economy promoted by the Physiocrats. 
 
 
 
                                                          
510Boudier de Villemaire, L’ami des femmes (1758), 81.  
 
511This sentence is a modification of Yair Mintzker's: "If société was a solution to some of the pressing political and 
intellectual problems of the period (as Baker argued), the question of sociability—of how to form or reach that 
realm—was the fundamental way of solving it (Gordon)."  Mintzker, "'A Word Newly Introduced into Language': 
The Appearance and Spread of 'Social' in French Enlightenment Thought, 1745-1764," History of European Ideas 
34 (2008): 504. 
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Chapter 7 
 
“Cet état d’étourdissement continuel”: 
(Dis)Embodying Society in Physiocracy512 
Throughout the 1760s, the Physiocrats built a complicated system of political economy 
that incorporated a new vision of society and the reproduction of wealth, new concepts of 
workers and productivity, new roles for taxation, commerce, and luxury, as well as a complete 
overhaul of the responsibilities of government; all of it was undergirded by the physical laws of 
nature.513  They challenged the financial institutions of France, including the court culture of 
Versailles, and were met with both loyal support and vehement criticism.  My focus in this 
chapter will be the documents written by the fountainhead of Physiocracy, François Quesnay 
(1694-1774), and his most devoted pupil, the Marquis de Mirabeau (1715-89), whose L’ami des 
hommes helped to shape contemporary arguments against luxury and commerce.  Quesnay and 
Mirabeau crafted the tenets of Physiocracy during the Seven Years’ War, which confirmed their 
fears that the entire French economic and colonial system was disorganized and “unnatural.”514  
                                                          
512“This continual state of dizziness.”  Quote from Marquis de Mirabeau and François Quesnay, Traité de la 
monarchie (1757-1759), ed. Gino Longhitano (Paris: L’Harmattan, 1999), 30. The footnotes for this chapter are 
purposefully extensive at times.  When possible, I try to provide multiple citations for physiocratic texts in order to 
show the repetition and insistence of their ideas. 
 
513Because Physiocracy “covered a vast array of knowledge and conferred scientific status on that knowledge,” 
Philippe Steiner has supported Pierre Samuel Du Pont de Nemours’ 1768 contention that Physiocracy was indeed a 
“New Science.”  Steiner, La “Science Nouvelle” de l’Économie Politique (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 
1998), 5-28.  
 
514Pernille Røge, “A Natural Order of Empire: The Physiocratic Vision of Colonial France after the Seven Years’ 
War,” in The Political Economy of Empire in the Early Modern World, eds. Sophus A. Reinert and Pernille Røge, 
32-52 (Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), and Røge, “The Question of Slavery in 
Physiocratic Political Economy,” in Governare il mondo: l’economia come linguaggo della politica nell’Europa del 
Settecento, ed. Maneula Albertone, 149-169 (Feltrinelli, 2009). 
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Together, their critique of commercial modernity produced an economic school of thought 
predicated on the need to avoid luxury and its degenerative, physical effects.   
Chapter seven is divided into four sections.  After a brief explanation of physiocratic 
political economy in the first section, I treat Mirabeau’s pre-Quesnay work, which contained a 
robust vision of the body that continued throughout his relationship to Quesnay and the 
Physiocrats.  In his bestseller L’ami des hommes, Mirabeau fitted a corporeal critique of luxury 
into a wide-ranging political economy and plan for society.  Like the critics of luxury examined 
in chapter six, Mirabeau argued that the fundamental effects of cupidity could be found in the 
weakened body, which rendered his fellow subjects insensible to sociability.  The third section 
takes up Quesnay and Mirabeau’s first collaborative effort that came in the unpublished 
manuscript “Traité de la monarchie.”  It is at the origins of Physiocracy where we see Quesnay 
and Mirabeau working out their ideas; they were at their most critical of contemporary society.  
A critique of luxury and a desire to merge the “moral” with the “physical” helped bridge 
Mirabeau’s conversion to Quesnay’s political economy, making the transition to working with 
Quesnay virtually seamless in these aspects.  Both shared a commitment to reading the negative 
effects of commerce in the human body, but here they extended their concern to the morality 
inherent in humans: an interior sentiment.  An imperfect monarchy and a political culture of 
competition and greed bred individuals motivated only by physical satiation.  The natural 
organisation suffered as a consequence, and the French would soon no longer be able to “feel” 
sociability. 
Finally, the last section looks at a wider array of physiocratic texts.  Further writings by 
Quesnay, Mirabeau, and newly-acquired acolytes reaffirmed the central role of the body in 
Physiocracy.  The corporeal organisation was as inseparable from nature as the weather and 
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grounded the Physiocrats’ conception of human nature, Quesnay’s reading of the discipline of 
history, and physiocratic epistemology.  If the French turned their bodies away from natural 
needs to the excessive and unessential, according to the Physiocrats, then society would 
inevitably deteriorate.  While the Tableau Économique has often been the focus of historians and 
economists, in order to fully understand the Physiocrats we must read them within their broader 
cultural contexts.515  Their works were in dialogue with Montesquieu, Condillac, and materialists 
like La Mettrie, who all addressed the social implications of human physiology.   
Before Physiocracy, Quesnay practiced medicine full-time, and many historians have 
sought out the connections between his medical knowledge and political economy.516  My 
argument hinges on the fact that there is more than a superficial layering of political economic 
principles over medical ones.  Quesnay’s understanding of the body and his theory of knowledge 
pervaded Physiocracy; although he and Mirabeau made strategic use of metaphors, their 
language expressed the physicality of corporeal knowledge.  Furthermore, their concern for the 
                                                          
515To this end, see the following works: Michael Kwass, Privilege and the Politics of Taxation in Eighteenth-
Century France: Liberté, Égalité, Fiscalité (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), and "Consumption and 
the World of Ideas: Consumer Revolution and the Moral Economy of the Marquis de Mirabeau," Eighteenth-
Century Studies, vol. 37, no. 2 (Winter 2004), 187-213; Jessica Riskin, Science in the Age of Sensibility: The 
Sentimental Empiricists of the French Enlightenment (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2002); Liana Vardi, 
The Physiocrats and the World of the Enlightenment (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012); and, the 
recent series of essays by Christine Théré and Loïc Charles in the journal History of Political Economy: “François 
Quesnay: A Rural Socrates in Versailles?” 39 (2007, supplement): 195-214; “The Writing Workshop of François 
Quesnay and the Making of Physiocracy,” 40:1 (2008): 1-42; “From Versailles to Paris: The Creative Communities 
of the Physiocratic Movement,” 43:1 (2011): 25-58; and “The Economist as Surveyor: Physiocracy in the Fields,” 
44 (2012, supplement): 71-89. 
 
516Margaret Schabas, The Natural Origins of Economics (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005), 45-50; Loïc 
Charles, “The Tableau économique as Rational Recreation,” History of Political Economy 36:3 (2004): 445-474, 
and his “The Visual History of the Tableau Économique,” European Journal of the History of Economic Thought, 
10: 4 (2003): 527-550; Peter Groenewegen, "From prominent physician to major economist: some reflections on 
Quesnay's switch to economics in the 1750s," in Physicians and Political Economy: Six Studies of the work of 
doctor-economists, ed. Peter Groenewegen, 93-115 (London and New York: Routledge, 2001); H. Spencer Banzhaf, 
“Productive Nature and the Net Product: Quesnay’s Economies Animal and Political,” History of Political Economy 
32:3 (2000): 517-551; Paul P. Christensen, “Fire, Motion, and Productivity: The Proto-Energetics of Nature and 
Economy in François Quesnay,” in Natural Images in Economic Thought, ed. Philip Mirowski, 249-288 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994). 
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role of the body in generating knowledge did not dissipate as the tide of Physiocracy slowly 
ebbed by the early 1770s.517  Bodies experienced two-way traffic with the outside world; they 
projected desires and actions outwardly and in return were affected by other bodies and a 
mélange of sensory data.  The threats of commerce, luxury, and court culture sapped France of 
its physical and economic strength by debasing the bodies of its inhabitants. To effect change 
through a comprehensive political economy, the Physiocrats sought to return the human body to 
its natural functions by reducing the corporeal pull toward luxury and the superfluous.   
Physiocratic Political Economy 
Although the term “Physiocracy” was not created until 1767, the principles to which the 
Physiocrats subscribed were first articulated by Quesnay in his articles for the Encyclopédie in 
1756-7 (“Fermiers” and “Grains” primarily).518  In these articles, Quesnay put forward not only a 
set of ideas, but also a language with which to talk about them.  Beginning with the name 
Physiocracy itself, meaning “rule of nature,” terms such as net product, impôt unique, sterility of 
trade/industry, exclusive productivity of agriculture, legal despotism, the “gift of nature,” laissez-
faire (originally enunciated by Vincent de Gournay), and the Tableau Économique came to 
represent specific devices in the complex machinery of physiocratic political economy.  The 
Physiocrats took seriously both terms in the category “political economy” by insisting “on the 
governmental dimensions of economic science.”519  Ultimately, though, government and politics 
                                                          
517See Charles, “The Tableau économique as Rational Recreation,” 452-4, for a brief explanation of Quesnay’s final 
work Recherches philosophiques sur l’évidence des vérités géométriques (1774). 
 
518Before 1767, and after, supporters of Quesnay’s political economy were known as économistes.  “Physiocracy” 
first appeared in Pierre-Samuel Du Pont de Nemours’ collection of Quesnay’s writings, La Physiocratie ou 
constitution essentielle du gouvernement le plus avantageux au genre humain. 
 
519Arnault Skornicki, L’économiste, la cour et la patrie: L’économie politique dans la France des Lumières (Paris: 
CNRS Éditions, 2011), 150. See also, Steiner, La “Science Nouvelle” de l’économie politique, 17-9, 117-8. 
According to Ronald Meek, “Economics was for Quesnay, as it was later to be for Smith and Marx, an integral part 
of a more general system of sociology in which the structure and development of human society were conceived to 
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sprang from Quesnay’s view of nature and his quest to clarify the true source of a nation’s 
wealth and how it was (re)produced.  For Quesnay, “Economic events are not mere accidents; 
there are general laws which link together and regulate the actions of men.”520 
The ability to measure, predict, and regulate the economy and actions of men rested upon 
an assumption about “nature”:  “In nature everything is intertwined, everything runs through 
circular courses which are interlaced with one another.”521   There is a natural order to the earth 
that directs all that which rests upon it: economics, politics, and social relations.  The physical 
and the moral are inherently connected; while the latter is a product of the former, both constitute 
the immutable and indisputable natural law.  As Quesnay wrote in the essay “Natural Right,” “I 
am here taking physical law to mean the regular course of all physical events in the natural order 
which is self-evidently the most advantageous to the human race.  I am here taking moral law to 
mean the rule of all human action in the moral order conforming to the physical order which is 
self-evidently the most advantageous to the human race.”522 The Physiocrats based their critique 
of eighteenth-century France on the disruption of the natural order and the artificiality of 
economic and social conditions displayed at Versailles.   
                                                          
be essentially dependent upon the mode of subsistence.” Meek, The Economics of Physiocracy: Essays and 
Translations (London: Allen and Unwin, 1962, see especially his five interpretive essays, 265-398), 376.  See also, 
Sylvana Tomaselli, “Political Economy: The Desire and Needs of Present and Future Generations,” in Inventing 
Human Science: Eighteenth-Century Domains, eds. Christopher Fox, Roy Porter, and Robert Wokler, 292-322 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995). 
 
520Gianni Vaggi, The Economics of François Quesnay (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1987), 17. 
 
521Quesnay, “Dialogue on the Work of Artisans,” in Meek, The Economics of Physiocracy, 204. 
  
522Quesnay, “Natural Right,” in Meek, The Economics of Physiocracy, 53. See also Despotisme de la Chine in 
Auguste Oncken, ed. and intro., Oeuvres économiques et philosophiques de F. Quesnay (New York: Burt Franklin, 
1969 [originally published 1888]), 637.  There is an English translation found in Lewis A. Maverick, China, A 
Model for Europe (San Antonio, TX: Paul Anderson, 1946). For the “physical-moral” dyad in the context of the 
“science of man,” see Elizabeth A. Williams, The Physical and the Moral: Anthropology, Physiology, and 
philosophical medicine in France, 1750-1850 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), and Sergio Moravia, 
“‘Moral’ – ‘Physique’: genesis and evolution of a ‘rapport’,” in Enlightenment Studies in honour of Lester G. 
Crocker, eds. Alfred J. Bingham and Virgil W. Topazio, 163-174 (Oxford: The Voltaire Foundation, 1979).   
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According to the Physiocrats, agriculture is the only sector that provides a financial 
surplus (output trumps input in both physical and value terms).  As Du Pont de Nemours stated, 
in De l’exportation et de l’importation des grains (1764), “agriculture is the only human labor 
with which the Sky cooperates without ceasing and which is a perpetual creation.  We strictly 
owe the net product to the soil, to Providence, and to the beneficences of the Creator, to his rain 
that beats down and changes it to gold.”523  The net product (produit net) is the primary source of 
a state’s wealth because it is the only source a state should tax.524  The net product derived from 
the rents owed landowners, but it was also considered a free gift of nature, not an extra cost, 
because nature renews and helps cultivate the earth through rain, sun, and the labor of animals.525  
Quesnay did not deny the profitability of manufacture and trade, but he argued that these sources 
of wealth were uncertain, ephemeral, and not part of the natural order.  In his article “Grains” for 
the Encyclopédie, Quesnay lamented this emphasis in the French economy:  
For a long time the production of luxuries has seduced the nation...we are engaged in an 
industry that is extraneous to us; and we have employed there a multitude of men at a 
time when the kingdom became depopulated and the countryside abandoned...agriculture, 
the most fruitful and noble part of our commerce, the source of our kingdom's revenue, 
has not been considered as the primary foundation of our wealth.526 
                                                          
523Quoted in Banzhaf, “Productive Nature and the Net Product,” 519.  See also Mirabeau (and Quesnay), Théorie de 
l’impôt (1760), 50-1, 251-2. 
 
524The net product is the difference between the revenue of a farmer and the costs of production (prix fondamental).  
For an interpretation of the single tax on land rent, see Meek, The Economics of Physiocracy, 392-5. 
 
525Quesnay first suggested this in his article “Impôt” (1757) not published in the Encyclopédie but later published in 
Du Pont de Nemours’ Physiocratie (1767).  See also Banzhaf, “Productive Nature and the Net Product,” 518, and 
Vardi, The Physiocrats and the World of Enlightenment, 114.  According to Dan Edelstein, the Physiocrats’ 
commitment to the “natural and essential order” provided the framework for Revolutionaries’ articulation of 
“natural republicanism” and justification for the Terror.  The Terror of Natural Right: Republicanism, the Cult of 
Nature, and the French Revolution (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2009), 14, 101-11. 
 
526The Encyclopedia of Diderot & d'Alembert Collaborative Translation Project, trans. Stephen J. Gendzier (Ann 
Arbor: MPublishing, University of Michigan Library, 2009).  http://hdl.handle.net/2027/spo.did2222.0001.308  
(accessed January 24, 2013). Originally published as "Grains [abridged]," Encyclopédie ou Dictionnaire raisonné 
des sciences, des arts et des métiers, 7:812–831 (Paris, 1757).  See also Philosophie rurale (chp. 8, “Rapports des 
Dépenses avec la Population”), parts of which are translated by Meek, The Economics of Physiocracy, 57-65. 
 
217 
 
How, then, to turn the “free gift of nature” into wealth?  By what mechanisms can a state 
ensure the wealth and happiness of its inhabitants?  The first act was to return agriculture to its 
rightful, natural position in the French economy.  To facilitate this action, one of the fundamental 
tenets of Physiocracy was the liberalization of the grain trade: open markets, competition, and an 
abolition of taxes, tolls, tariffs, and duties.  They demanded lifting all constraints on domestic 
and international trade in the hopes of achieving the bon prix. Moreover, the Physiocrats opposed 
all privileges doled out to elites, guilds, and other corporate entities and argued for a single tax 
placed on the net product.  The impôt unique, proposed most thoroughly in Mirabeau and 
Quesnay’s Théorie de l’impôt (1760), would free farmers from a variety of prohibitive taxes—
corvée, capitation, taille, dixième, vingtième, gabelle—which would then allow both farmers and 
landlords (propriétaires) to reinvest in agriculture.  The key to physiocratic political economy 
was circulation, a pattern of consumption and expenditure illustrated most famously by the 
Tableau Économique.  For France to become a financially successful country, the landlords must 
reinvest in the land and domestic manufacturing, rather than foreign luxury goods, and farmers 
should reinvest in the tools and equipment necessary for agricultural production.  Prosperity 
would be secured through the constant circulation of money, rather than the hoarding of 
aristocrats or the mercantilist practices of the Crown.  Elite property holders who spent their time 
in Paris would be more likely to return to their land if the tax system was overhauled and if 
France recommitted itself to agriculture.527  Moreover, the Physiocrats advocated a concerted 
                                                          
527John Shovlin argued that this political economic plan would appeal as much to the “middling” or “provincial” 
nobles as to those of Paris and Versailles.  See his The Political Economy of Virtue: Luxury, Patriotism, and the 
Origins of the French Revolution (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2006), 67-68.  Jessica Riskin labels a 
similar group “reform-minded agricultural entrepreneurs” (Science in the Age of Sensibility, 110).  It is worth noting 
too that Quesnay and Mirabeau—like Montesquieu and chevalier d’Arcq, though for different reasons—
fundamentally opposed the nobility’s participation in commerce in the noblesse commerçante debate of the 1750s.  
See Longhitano’s introduction to Traité de la monarchie, “La monarchie française entre société d’ordres et marché: 
Mirabeau, Quesnay et le Traité de la monarchie (1757-1759),” vii-xvii, and Shovlin, “Political Economy and the 
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state effort to repair the infrastructure of France, which would make the transportation of goods 
more efficient, and to educate the people in the laws of natural order.528   
All of these changes to increase the prosperity of France demanded a new vision of 
production, consumption, and the shape of society based on the laws of nature.  Quesnay began 
with the physical needs of humans; the foundation of society was thus subsistence and the 
property to obtain it.529  The Physiocrats did not subscribe to a traditional social contract theory, 
nor were they convinced by the stadial theory of human civilization.  Instead, the social roles of 
individuals were guided by their economic roles, and the state’s primary function was the 
protection of property in land.  Because “property in land is the basis of all society [and] 
sovereignty is physically founded only on this,” the Physiocrats elevated property over privilege 
in the social order.530  In order to accomplish the goal of refounding society on a natural footing, 
Quesnay argued that the “advantages of agriculture depend, therefore, to a considerable extent on 
                                                          
French Nobility, 1750-1789,” in The French Nobility in the Eighteenth Century: Reassessments and New 
Approaches, ed. Jay M. Smith, 111-40 (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2006). 
 
528In Henry Clark’s words, “since the people are not educated in such economic science, they cannot really know 
their interests.” Clark, Compass of Society: Commerce and Absolutism in Old-Regime France (Lanham, MD: 
Lexington Books, 2007), 171.  However, according to Quesnay, “In such a nation [that understands these supreme 
laws] an unwise law would not be put forward, for the government and the people would immediately perceive its 
absurdity.”  Quesnay, “Natural Right,” 54-5. 
 
529It is for this reason that many have labeled the Physiocrats “materialists,” though in the Marxist not metaphysical 
mold.  Quesnay began “Natural Right” with the statement “The natural right of man can be loosely defined as the 
right which man has to things suitable for his use” (43), and he explained further that “The foundation of society is 
the subsistence of men and the wealth necessary to provide the authority required to defend them” (55).  See also 
Philosophie rurale (Amsterdam: Les Libraires Associés, 1763), chp. 8, page 156: “All the moral and physical parts 
which strengthen society derive from subsistence and are subordinated to it.  All the networks of political order are 
dependent on the means of subsistence.”   
 
530Mirabeau (and Quesnay), Philosophie rurale, 9.  The full title of Philosophie rurale provides a nice example of 
the Physiocrats’ agenda: Philosophie rurale, ou Économie Générale et Politique de l’Agriculture, Réduite à l’ordre 
immuable des Loix physiques et morales, qui assurent la prospérité des Empires. 
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the bringing together of separate pieces of land into big farms to be highly developed by rich 
farmers.”531   
The new social order would reflect this change.  Landowners and farmers constituted the 
“productive class” of subjects who owned and worked the land and thus generated the net 
product from which taxes were extracted.  Those in trade, manufacture, and commerce 
constituted the “sterile class.” The Physiocrats did not mean to imply uselessness because the 
sterile class was ultimately responsible for the transportation and selling of goods whose 
fundamental value stemmed from agricultural products.  The sterile class, though, was 
responsible for the (over)production of luxury items to which the court at Versailles and nobles 
in general were addicted.  Commerce, trade, and manufacturing were necessary facets of the 
economy, but they produced fictitious or artificial wealth; they reshaped “the products of the soil, 
without adding anything to their value.”532  The Physiocrats set their sights also on financiers, 
rentiers, négociants, and recently-ennobled venal officeholders whose parasitical practices 
exploited the French people, drained the Crown of resources, held potential national wealth in 
ransom as public debt, and adulterated the title of nobility.  Quesnay was largely responsible for 
transferring the term “class” from natural history and taxonomy to political economy, and he 
prescribed a social theory based on economic class rather than social status.533  He clearly sought 
                                                          
531“Grains,” The Encyclopedia of Diderot & d'Alembert, trans. Stephen J. Gendzier.   
 
532Vaggi, The Economics of François Quesnay, 53-4.  See also the “Analysis of the Arithmetical Formula of the 
Tableau Economique of the Distribution of Annual Expenditure in an Agriculture Nation,” in Meek, The Economics 
of Physiocracy, 150-67, and Mirabeau (and Quesnay), Théorie de l’impôt, 135-6.  In Despotisme de la Chine (1767), 
Quesnay wrote: “Foreign commerce is perhaps more harmful than favorable to the prosperity of nations who deliver 
themselves up to it, disregarding merchants who make grand fortunes from this commerce largely at the expense of 
their fellow citizens.  The merchandise for which they travel so far is hardly more than expensive frivolities that 
support a damaging luxury.”  Quesnay, Despotisme de la Chine, in Oncken, Oeuvres économiques et philosophiques 
de F. Quesnay, 605 (211; see also 655-6 [295-6]).  
  
533Skornicki, L’économiste, la cour et la patrie, 187. 
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to direct landowners’ eyes to the necessity of agriculture, which for many contemporaries and 
later commentators simply reinforced inequality and the social hierarchy of orders.534 
Finally, the Physiocrats gave a natural explanation for the role of the sovereign to protect 
landed property and ensure the proper circulation of goods.  Physiocrats invested political power 
in a term coined by Quesnay, “legal despotism.”535  The sovereign’s primary duty was to rid the 
country of all obstacles preventing the natural order from flourishing; his power was 
simultaneously absolute and necessarily minimal.  As Quesnay stated in Despotisme de la Chine 
(1767), “The prince must not ignore that his authority is instituted in order to make the people 
know and observe the laws of the natural order, and that it is as much in his interest as that of the 
nation itself that the clear observation of these laws forms the indissoluble link of society.”536  
The sovereign must not intervene in the natural order by taxing improperly, hindering trade, or 
distributing exemptions of any sort.  The sovereign would also require an advisory committee 
made up of magistrates knowledgeable in the laws of natural order (“custodians of the 
fundamental laws of the realm”) and eventually a public attuned to the intricacies of the natural 
                                                          
534Simon-Nicolas-Henri Linguet (and abbé Mably) was particularly acerbic on this point: “A ruthless heart dictates 
your doctrine...You mock human tragedy, telling the human race that it is a pity that it is experiencing hard times, 
but that, based on evidence, this is their lot; it claims that God has essentially decided that the few will have 
everything, and the remainder nothing...[You] embrace the loved one simply to cut his throat.”  Quoted in Vardi, 
The Physiocrats and the World of the Enlightenment, 143.  
 
535Quesnay’s choice of China as an exemplar of legal despotism was particularly odd since Montesquieu had 
recently denounced “Oriental Despotism” in his L’Esprit des lois (1748).  Three alternative labels had been put 
forward. In L’ami des hommes, Mirabeau made use of a perhaps more digestible term, roi pasteur, abbé Baudeau 
put forward the term monarchie économique in his Première introduction à la philosophie économique; ou, Analyse 
des états policés (1767), and Quesnay himself used autorité tutélaire in Despotisme de la Chine (1767).  See Clark, 
Compass of Society, 153-91, for an analysis of the terms, and Pernille Røge for an argument that “legal despotism” 
emerged against the backdrop of colonial political economy: Røge, “‘Legal Despotism’ and Enlightened Reform in 
the Îles du Vent: The Colonial Governments of Chevalier de Mirabeau and Mercier de la Rivière, 1754-1764,” in 
Enlightened Reform in Southern Europe and its Atlantic Colonies, c. 1750-1830, Gabriel Paquette, ed., 167-182 
(Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2009). 
 
536Quesnay, Despotisme de la Chine, 646.  For physiocratic political and economic influence on early America, see 
Manuela Albertone, National Identity and the Agrarian Republic: The Transatlantic Commerce of Ideas between 
America and France (1750-1830) (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2014). 
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order.537  Social roles, the structure of the economy, and political authority were therefore all 
products of the natural order.  Morality itself was commitment to the physical laws of nature, and 
a society could thrive only by observing the “physical laws of the perpetual reproduction of the 
goods necessary for the subsistence, for the preservation, and for the comfort of men.”538  Below 
this superstructure lay a critique of society and an interpretation of human behavior apprehended 
through the human body.  The Marquis de Mirabeau provided the most eloquent rendition in his 
well-known L’ami des hommes.    
Marquis de Mirabeau, L’ami des hommes (1756-1758)539 
The debate over luxury, which captivated French culture at mid-century, was not merely 
a parenthetical subject to the Marquis de Mirabeau.  In fact, Mirabeau refuted the supposed 
virtues of commerce and luxury with the same passion and fecundity as Rousseau.  In his 1763 
text Philosophie rurale, written with Quesnay, Mirabeau noted: “One must not be surprised that 
in a work of this sort, luxury recurs often in our discussions.”  Luxury recurred often because the 
trade in luxury goods connected a variety of themes: morality, the social order, the duties of 
                                                          
537“Custodians...” comes from Elizabeth Fox-Genovese, The Origins of Physiocracy (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University 
Press, 1976), 49.  Beginning with Quesnay and Mirabeau, there was always a division between supporters of a more 
“muscular version” of legal despotism and supporters of a set of representative institutions (provincial assemblies) 
consisting of landowners, which would unite interest and loyalty in a new fiscal and political relationship.  In fact, 
the need for provincial assemblies or estates, and the centrality of the nobility in them, was at the heart of 
Mirabeau’s pre-physiocratic work Mémoire concernant l’utilité des Etats provinciaux (1750, republished in L’ami 
des hommes, 1758). For provincial assemblies, see Vardi, The Physiocrats, chp. 5 (“muscular version” comes from 
page 149); T.J. Hochstrasser, “Physiocracy and the politics of laissez-faire,” in The Cambridge History of 
Eighteenth-Century Political Thought, eds. Mark Goldie and Robert Wokler, 419-442 (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2006), 420-1, 434; Keith Michael Baker, Inventing the French Revolution (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1990), 238-41; Stephen Miller, “Provincial Assemblies, Fiscal Reform, and the Language of 
Politics in the 1770s and 1780s,” French Historical Studies, vol. 35, n. 3 (Summer 2012): 441-75. 
 
538Quesnay, Despotisme de la Chine, 642. 
 
539I will provide parenthetical citations for L’ami des hommes.  Although I used a two-volume edition, I will only 
cite from the first volume.  Therefore, I will leave out the volume number, and the citations will be ordered by 
“Part” in Roman numerals, “chapter” in Roman numerals, and page number in Arabic numerals. Victor de Riquetti, 
marquis de Mirabeau, L’Ami des hommes ou traité de la population, 2 vols. (Darmstadt: Scientia Verlag Aalen, 
1970; reprint of Avignon edition of 1756–8). 
222 
 
princes and kings, the wealth of a nation, commerce, material culture, and the human body.  
From his mid-century bestseller, L’ami des hommes, to his final work thirty years later, 
Entretiens d’un jeune prince avec son gouverneur, Mirabeau criticized the trade in and 
consumption of luxury goods. For him, the economic health of France was measured as much in 
bodies as profits.  His critique centered on what he perceived to be the harmful corporeal effects 
stemming from an addiction to luxury goods—an addiction that was destructive to individual 
bodies and thus society writ large.     
*** 
 L’ami des hommes brought Mirabeau instant fame and a moniker he kept for the rest of 
his life.540  After midcentury, Mirabeau’s commentary of the commercial nobility debate, the 
moral underpinnings of an agricultural society, and the pernicious effects of commerce and 
luxury were read more than any other text in the glutted field of political economy.  His weighty 
tome went through twenty editions by 1760 and perhaps twice that by the end of the century.  
From 1750-1780, more individuals owned a copy of L’ami des hommes than Diderot’s 
Encyclopédie and Rousseau’s Discourse on the Arts and Sciences.541  As mentioned in chapter 
six, Boudier de Villemaire titled his 1758 work L’ami des femmes to profit from Mirabeau’s 
popularity, and Boutroux de Montcresson cited L’ami des hommes and the works of Rousseau 
more than any commentator on commerce and luxury in his Le cultivateur à son fils, sur les 
inconvénients du luxe et les avantages de l’agriculture (1770).542  Both Mirabeau’s arguments 
                                                          
540Mirabeau used the initials “L.D.H” often in published and unpublished dialogues: Archives nationales (henceforth 
AN), M 778, n. 14, “Dialogue entre l’intendant d’O. et L.D.H.” and M 782, manuscript material for the published 
text Les Economiques par. L.D.H. (1769-71).  He also wrote under “L.D.H” for his immense text Lettres sur la 
législation, ou l’ordre légal, dépravé, rétabli et perpétué (1775) and La science ou les droits et les devoirs de 
l’homme (1774). 
 
541Kwass, “Consumption and the World of Ideas,” 188, and Shovlin, The Political Economy of Virtue, 2. 
 
542Audrey Provost, Le luxe, les Lumières, et la Révolution (Paris: Champ Vallon, 2014), 55. 
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and his extensive corporeal language reached a wide audience and helped shape the corporeal 
critique of luxury generally, as we saw in chapter six, and particularly with Physiocracy. 
Mirabeau’s work was a nostalgic, yet anxious, nobleman’s call for reform.  L’ami des 
hommes was an unhoned writer’s rhetorical flourish and a fervent plea for the patriotic 
regeneration of France through a return to the land.543  Mirabeau’s argument was two-pronged. 
Agriculture provided the most reliable source of physical and moral wealth, but, in order to 
capitalize on the natural climatic and geographical advantages of France, the French needed 
more able-bodied workers.  The land and the workers were the two pivots of society, and 
Mirabeau likened agriculture to “matter” and labor to “form” (I.VI.70-1; I.I.10).  “The measure 
of subsistence is that of population,” Mirabeau titled his second chapter.   
Underneath Mirabeau’s insistence on labor and agriculture ran a theory of human nature 
to which he returned often.  Man, according to Mirabeau, was a particular kind of animal.  Man 
was sociable rather than solitary, and, even though men inherently feel the advantage of 
numbering together, they simultaneously calculate personal gain.544  Thus, Mirabeau positioned 
mankind as constantly pulled by sociability and cupidity.  His contemporaries bent toward the 
latter, overtaken by avidity, pride, vice, opinion, la mode, and the pitfalls of consumption.  To 
this mix, Mirabeau added an interpretation of the notion of commerce.  Commerce was not 
                                                          
543Mirabeau’s impassioned style is well-known, and he apologized for it in his “Avertissement.”  As Kwass 
presented Mirabeau’s view of consumption: “For the ‘friend of man’, the simplest act of over-consumption could 
constitute the most horrendous crime against humanity: owning too many carriage horses, for example, ‘was 
tantamount to murder and homicide’ because one nourished horses only at the expense of feeding men.” 
(“Consumption and the World of Ideas,” 193, also 208, n. 27).  For other examples of his fevered, bombastic pitch, 
see Vardi, The Physiocrats, 48, 117-121; Jay M. Smith, Nobility Reimagined: The Patriotic Nation in Eighteenth-
Century France (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2005), 90-9; Fox-Genovese, The Origins of Physiocracy, 
chp. 4. 
 
544Mirabeau builds from the position that man is a sociable animal in “The Friend of Women; or, Treatise on 
civilization” (1757-8) (AN, M 780, no. 3², folio 1). 
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simply the transportation and exchange of goods or activities of the market; for Mirabeau, it was 
akin to sociability: “Commerce is the useful and necessary connection of all sociable beings with 
each other.  In this sense, the territory of commerce is moral as well as physical; all is commerce 
here below” (II.I.5).  As soon as there were two men, Mirabeau insisted, there was the reciprocal 
commerce of services and utility.  Both moral and physical goods were exchanged; physical 
goods consisted of “health, youth, strength, beauty, wealth, and honors (dignités),” and the more 
important moral goods consisted of “selflessness (désintéressement), honor, glory, 
generosity...probity, justice, fidelity...and all the sentiments that truly link society” (II.III.50).  
Through agriculture—the most admirable, profitable, and sociable of the arts (I.III.32-3)—the 
simplicity and selflessness of rustic mores (moral goods) would be restored and mankind would 
come to see the value of “commerce” and public utility.  Mirabeau’s approval of agriculture, 
then, was as much cultural as economic.  He wanted landowners to spend money on the land and 
subsistence, rather than on luxury goods and social performances, which would keep both 
families and the nation bound together and restore the noble aura of the Second Estate.545   
Despite the often hopeful tones, L’ami des hommes forecasted doom because 
depopulation, the decline of agriculture, and the increase of luxury and consumption by a small 
number of subjects desiccated the physical roots of agriculture and the seeds of new citizens 
(I.II.12).546 Mirabeau separated goods into the necessary, abundant, and superfluous, which 
corresponded to agriculture, commerce, and “treasures” respectively (I.I.7-8).  France’s decline 
was precipitated by the inversion of this pyramid.  Too many contemporaries prized the 
                                                          
545In an unpublished manuscript, “Institutions des femmes” (written after the publication of L’ami des hommes but 
before 1768), Mirabeau casted domestic bonds as true society—the most welcoming and joyful place in which les 
moeurs and education were transmitted—against the bedlam characteristic of “society” (AN, M 780, n. 4, folio 7). 
  
546See also, I.VII.119. 
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superfluous and sought riches in physical objects whose value was artificial, fashionable, and 
subject to whim. The king contributed to this decline by selling offices, handing out sinecures 
and pensions, and devaluing the traditional nobility by valuing rising financiers, rentiers, 
magistrates, and courtiers whose money bought them a spot in the Second Estate and an entresol 
in Versailles.  According to Mirabeau, physical goods became the currency of exchange at the 
Bourbon court rather than moral goods (II.IV.53, 80).  It was necessary for the king to set an 
example by returning to the traditional nobility its prestige and rewarding its merit, honor, and 
sacrifice. Emulation would spread from the king to the nobles and from the nobles to the 
laborers, which would restore sociability and suppress cupidity (II.IV.96; II.V.102).  After all, 
“the power of the government is infinitely more extended in the moral than in the physical” 
(II.III.50), and “les moeurs have infinitely more influence on society than the laws” (II.III.56).547 
Mirabeau’s vision of the social consequences of “mad spending” (les dépenses folles) and 
a surplus de consommation (I.VI.74-5) involved more than a critique of the prodigal habits of the 
eighteenth-century French elite; he addressed the larger question of the origins and maintenance 
of society.  Mirabeau was extremely critical of what became known as “civilized society” or 
“civilization,” terms that were both used in the eighteenth century to celebrate the historical 
progress of European culture.   Mirabeau, in fact, was the first to give “civilization” its modern, 
Western meaning in an unpublished work, but he used the term to denigrate the exact culture and 
narrative of progress celebrated by Voltaire, d’Alembert, and others.548   
If I were to ask most people of what civilization consists, they would reply, the 
civilization of a people is a softening of its manners, an urbanity, politeness, and a 
                                                          
547In Théorie de l’impôt, Mirabeau also wrote that les moeurs were the grandest treasure of a society (7, see also 
169-70 for the need to regenerate virtues formerly pervasive). 
 
548Mirabeau’s unpublished manuscript was titled, “The Friend of Women; or, Treatise on civilization” (1757-8).  See 
Jean Starobinski, Blessing in Disguise; or, the Morality of Evil, trans. Arthur Goldhammer (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 1993), 1-36. 
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spreading of knowledge so that the observation of decencies takes the place of laws of 
detail...Civilization has done nothing for society unless it gives it both the form and the 
content of virtue, and the corruption of humanity is born in the breast of societies 
softened by all the previously cited ingredients.549    
 
Like the opponents of luxury treated in the previous chapter, Mirabeau argued that luxury  
blurred the social hierarchy and would eventually bankrupt the state as financiers, merchants, 
and courtiers competed for social notoriety by spending exorbitant funds on signs of 
distinction—symbolic, though not historical, markers of nobility—rather than reinvesting in the 
agricultural economy (II.IV.96).550  Their ardeur d’acquérir (II.III.49) stemmed from cupidity 
and led them away from the moral goods of sociability.  “The mirage of moneyed wealth had 
mesmerized the nation,” according to one historian, but Mirabeau’s language was even more 
pointed.551  Luxury directly affected the body; it was a soporific—numbing the French to 
sleep—and an illusion, physically hypnotizing them (I.VII.110, 113, 119).  Mirabeau positioned 
the corporeal between the very abstract dyad of cupidity/sociability.  The attitudes and actions of 
his contemporaries debilitated their bodies, as they became obsessed with the material goods 
circulating through French society (bagatelles, colifichets, parures).   
Mirabeau’s language registered his concern over the fate of the human body.  References 
to the organic saturate his texts.  In L’ami des hommes, Mirabeau invoked the fears of 
degeneration and the promise of regeneration of the body politic, metaphors that would become 
                                                          
549AN, M 780, no. 3², folio 3, “Traité de la civilisation.”  This sentiment is also expressed in Mirabeau’s 
“Commentary on Marquis d’Argenson’s Considérations sur le gouvernement de France” (AN, M 752, no. 6, folio 
10). See Michael Sonenscher’s analysis and translation (with which I agree) in Before the Deluge: Public Debt, 
Inequality, and the Intellectual Origins of the French Revolution (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007), 219.  
See too “The Old Man’s Speech” in Diderot’s Supplement to Bougainville’s Voyage (1772): “We do not want to 
barter what you call our ignorance for your useless civilization...Do we deserve contempt, because we have not 
known how to develop superfluous wants?”  
 
550Kwass, "Consumption and the World of Ideas,” and Privilege and the Politics of Taxation, 222-252.  See also 
John Shovlin, “Political Economy and the French Nobility, 1750-1789,” 120-5. 
 
551Smith, Nobility Reimagined, 98. 
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fundamental to revolutionaries’ understandings of their actions at the end of the century.552  He 
called upon the image of Paris as an engorged head drawing blood and life-giving fluids from the 
provinces (I.V.47-8), while constantly relating the importance of the circulation of physical 
goods, moral goods, and money (I.VIII.154; II.I.11; II.II.13-5): “From this disruption of 
circulation would necessarily come a state of suffocation and obstruction in the head, of languor 
in the limbs, which would lead to the numbness, weakness, and moral abuse that we cited above” 
(I.VII.113).  Mirabeau described France as in a diseased condition (II.II.32) and diagnosed the 
various maladies which beset the French constitution, temperament (I.VII.121), disposition 
(II.VI.151), and organization (II.II.17, 32), all terms drawn from contemporary anatomy and 
physiology.553  France needed multiple palliatifs (I.VII.113) but also general vivification 
(I.VIII.154; II.II.32).554   
Mirabeau’s use of metaphors to depict the organic nature of society and the state were not 
always consistent or necessarily coherent, but he constantly had recourse to this language.  
Mirabeau was fond of labeling the Prince the “soul” of society (I.VII.132) and the state 
(I.VIII.138); the Sovereign or government was the principle of life (II.III.38), and finances were 
the nerves of the state (I.VIII.155).  He compared the state to a tree, connecting the soil, roots, 
sap, trunk, branches, and leaves to facets of society, the economy, and government that required 
appropriate cultivation (I.II.17; II.I.7-11; II.III.33).  Properly circulating “blood” 
(métaux/l’argent) was the principle of universal nutrition (I.VIII.154), and it was the job of the 
                                                          
552See Kwass, “Consumption and the World of Ideas;” Julia V. Douthwaite, The Wild Girl, Natural Man, and the 
Monster: Dangerous Experiments in the Age of Enlightenment (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2002), chp. 5; 
Mona Ozouf, L'homme régénéré: Essais sur la Révolution française (Paris: Editions Gallimard, 1989). 
 
553See “Conformation” in Didier-Pierre Chicaneau de Neuvillé, Dictionnaire philosophique ou introduction à la 
connoissance de l'homme (London: 1751), 65. 
 
554See Fox-Genovese, The Origins of Physiocracy, 147-151. 
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heart (sovereign/government/capital) to take in and redistribute alimentary fluid (Justice) to the 
extremities.  Too many obstructions or disproportion would result in l’engourdissement or death 
(II.III.37-9).  More importantly, Mirabeau often wrote of the need to “animer les ressorts” 
(II.II.15) or “organis[er] les ressorts” (I.VII.128), building from the mechanical understanding 
of the body; les ressorts were springs of life or that which generates life in a body.555  This 
metaphorical coupling of the human body and the functions of government worked structurally, 
as organs, tissues, nerves, and fibers, and their political analogs, were physical springs poised for 
action in the body politic. 
Mirabeau was engaged with medical and natural philosophical theories of the potential 
properties of the body and matter, the role of the passions in society, and the effects of sensory 
stimuli on bodies.  He understood the weight of terms like organisation or corps organisés, 
which incorporated debates over the inherent movement or sensitivity of matter or the possibility 
that life itself was simply a product of a particular physiological organization.556  For example, 
Mirabeau tacitly addressed the ideas of mid-century materialists.557  Having established early on 
                                                          
555See Erec R. Koch, The Aesthetic Body: Passion, Sensibility, and Corporeality in Seventeenth-Century France 
(Newark, DE: University of Delaware Press, 2008), and François Duchesneau, La Physiologie des Lumières: 
Empirisme, Modèles, and Théories (The Hague, Boston, and London: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1982), 156-68. 
 
556For physiology, see Charles T. Wolfe and Motoichi Terada, “The Animal Economy as Object and Program in 
Montpellier Vitalism,” Science in Context 21.4 (2008): 537-79, and Roselyne Rey, Naissance et Développement du 
vitalisme en France, de la deuxième moitié du 18e siècle à la fin du Premier Empire (Oxford: Voltaire Foundation, 
2000).  For heterodox thought and the blending of metaphysics with physiology, see Ann Thomson, Bodies of 
Thought: Science, Religion, and the Soul in the Early Enlightenment (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008); Yves 
Charles Zarka, ed., Matérialistes français du XVIII siècle: La Mettrie, Helvétius, d’Holbach (Paris: Presses 
Universitaires de France, 2006); Harmut Hecht, ed., Julien Offray de La Mettrie: Ansichten und Einsichten (Berlin: 
BWV, Berliner Wissenschafts-Verlag, 2004); Kathleen Wellman, La Mettrie: Medicine, Philosophy, and 
Enlightenment (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1992).  The three works of Jonathan Israel are of inestimable 
value but must be used cautiously as his overarching argument suffers from a number of setbacks (all published by 
Oxford University Press): Radical Enlightenment: Philosophy and the Making of Modernity, 1650-1750 (2001); 
Enlightenment Contested: Philosophy, Modernity, and the Emancipation of Man, 1670-1752 (2006); Democratic 
Enlightenment: Philosophy, Revolution, and Human Rights, 1750-1790 (2011). 
 
557Michael Sonenscher initially made the suggestion that Mirabeau referred to La Mettrie (Before the Deluge, 195). 
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that man was superior to animals because of his sociability and agricultural capacity, Mirabeau 
began the third chapter of part I by challenging some “madly presumptuous” men who recognize 
in humans only a superior body to animals (une construction mieux organisée) and who chafed 
at the thought of constraint on human passions.  Mirabeau dismissed this “delirium” as hardly 
worth countering, but he built from this point to show that the material quest for happiness and 
pleasure was linked instinctively to, or overpowered by, the disquieting effects of hunger and 
inventive capacity to sate this need (I.III.24-5).  The allusion was most likely to the work of 
Julien Offray de La Mettrie (1709-51), whose Histoire naturelle de l’âme (1745) and L’Homme-
machine (1747) scandalously envisioned man as “only an animal or a construction made of 
springs [ressorts]...[and] consequently the soul is only a principle of motion or a tangible 
material part of the brain that we can, without fear of error, consider as a mainspring of the 
whole machine.”558  La Mettrie also seems to be the likely target because Mirabeau used the 
phrases âme intellectuelle and la machine in the same passage (see also I.VIII.150, II.V.114).  
The latter clearly meant to recall La Mettrie’s L’Homme machine, and the former linked back to 
Histoire naturelle de l’âme in which La Mettrie appropriated the Scholastic division of the soul 
into the sensitive, vegetative, and rational/intellectual in order to ground all faculties of the body 
in matter. 
While Mirabeau’s choice of words, analogies, metaphors, and reading material is 
important because it gives us insight into his own thought processes and his awareness of 
contemporary physiological language and theories of natural philosophy, it was not simply 
                                                          
558La Mettrie, Machine Man and Other Writings, ed. and trans. Ann Thomson (Cambridge: University Press, 1996), 
31.  La Mettrie republished an amended version of Histoire naturelle de l’âme under the title Traité de l’âme in 
1750.   
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language that was at the heart of Mirabeau’s analysis.559  Mirabeau openly advocated the Stoic 
ideal of “living in conformance with nature,” and he sought “to reawaken an old system of the 
mind...[by preaching] Stoicism” (II, 100).560  In order for Mirabeau to sustain an argument for 
the centrality of the mind and a morality based on a natural or interior sentiment (II.III.50-1, 
II.IV.95-8), however, he chose to demonstrate the multiple ways in which the body, anchored in 
society and the world of sense data, could be the cause of such social, political, and moral 
distress.561  
Mirabeau vehemently rejected the arguments of Hume and Melon, whom he had 
identified as the most forceful advocates of luxury and commerce.  In so doing, he diagnosed 
French bodies with nervous disorders.562  Melon’s Essai politique sur le commerce (1734) and a 
translation of Hume’s Political Discourses (1754) both endorsed the trade in luxury goods as 
                                                          
559For work on the interaction of the life sciences and political economy, see Schabas, The Natural Origins of 
Economics; Schabas and Neil de Marchi, eds., Oeconomies in the Age of Newton (Durham, NC: Duke University 
Press, 2003); Catherine Packham, “The Physiology of Political Economy: Vitalism and Adam Smith’s Wealth of 
Nations,” Journal of the History of Ideas, vol. 63, No. 3 (July 2002): 465-481. 
 
560Mark Hulliung has argued that “[n]o philosophical figure fares worse in the writings of the philosophes than the 
Stoic, no philosophy comes under attack more often than Stoicism.  It was the strategy of the encyclopedists to 
expose the Stoic ideal as impossible, inhuman, and as less the vision of a wise man than the fool.”  Hulliung, The 
Autocritique of Enlightenment: Rousseau and the Philosophes (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1994), 
88. 
 
561For epistemological constructions and moral applications of the sentiment intérieur and sens intime, two different 
faculties, see Jeffrey D. Burson, The Rise and Fall of the Theological Enlightenment: Jean-Martin de Prades and 
Ideological Polarization in Eighteenth-Century France (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2010).  
Vardi, The Physiocrats and the World of the Enlightenment, 65, argued that the “Marquis de Mirabeau’s recourse to 
sentiment retained its seventeenth-century religious and aesthetic dimensions.” In this vein, some of Mirabeau’s 
turns of phrase, showing that one’s character depends on sensibility: “Sentiment is like money; one can only enjoy it 
if one spends it;” “Sensibility opens the mind and the appetites of the soul.” (AN, M 780, no. 4, “Institutions des 
femmes” folio 2, 3).  Mirabeau also identified a god-given instinct to know “the good,” and it was “civilization” that 
confused being “good” with being “civilized.” “The Friend of Women; or, Treatise on civilization,” (AN, M 780, 
no. 3², folio 5).    
 
562Kwass has put forward a similar understanding of Mirabeau as a clinical diagnostician.  Kwass, “Consumption 
and the World of Ideas,” 195. 
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commercially, socially, and morally advantageous.563  They were immensely influential in 
France, so much so that Mirabeau, respectfully, dared to “shake these trophies” (II.V.100).  More 
importantly, Mirabeau identified a pervasive cultural ailment attached to a lifestyle of luxury, 
“the vapors and maladies of the nerves” (II.V.100). Maladies of the nerves were the result of 
simultaneous inaction and an “excessive manifestation” of sensibility in which the body was 
overwhelmed by sensory data (éblouir, étourdir, accabler, frapper).564 Mirabeau’s assertion 
gained medical support in 1768 when the Swiss doctor Samuel-Auguste-André-David Tissot 
claimed that “maladies of the nerves are a lot more frequent and varied than they were sixty 
years ago.”  For Tissot, this was due to an increase in reading (inactivity) and luxury, “harmful 
passions that destroy health and produce all sorts of nervous disorders.”565  The negative effects 
of luxury were not only that bodies were “dazzled” to the point of illness, but that the French 
also felt compelled by the intensifying process of consumption and display to repeat their 
behavior (II.IV.85).   
Mirabeau continued on to identify two “children” spawned by luxury: la mollesse and le 
désordre (II.V.102).  By the latter, Mirabeau meant the mad spending discussed above (la 
                                                          
563For the reception of Hume’s Political Discourses in France, see John Shovlin, “Hume’s Political Discourses and 
the French Luxury Debate,” in David Hume’s Political Economy, eds. Carl Wennerlind and Margaret Schabas, 203-
222 (London and New York: Routledge, 2008). 
 
564Anne C. Vila, Enlightenment and Pathology: Sensibility in the Literature and Medicine of Eighteenth-Century 
France (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998), 10. 
 
565S-A-A-D Tissot, De la santé des gens de lettres (Lausanne: Franç Grasset et Comp., 1768), 182-86.  Tissot was 
only the most famous médecin-philosophe to connect nervous maladies to luxury and the insalubrious conditions of 
urban environments (primarily Paris).  Vila locates the debate on vapors in medical discourse from 1756-1789 and 
finds it to be intimately bound to a critique of luxurious living. Vila, Enlightenment and Pathology, chp. 7.  For an 
insightful analysis of one eighteenth-century salonnière’s daily concerns over her own body, including the vapors, 
see Suzanne Cornand, “Le corps exhibé: les propos sur la santé dans la correspondance de Mme. de Graffigny,” 
Studies on Voltaire and the Eighteenth Century, v. 362 (1998): 93-107, and Robert Weston, Medical Consulting by 
Letter in France, 1655–1789 (London: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2013).  For the English context, see Roy Porter, 
“Consumption: Disease of the Consumer Society?” in Consumption and the World of Goods, eds. John Brewer and 
Roy Porter, 58–81 (London and New York: Routledge, 1993). 
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dépense folle), and with regard to the former Mirabeau extended the tradition voiced by Fénelon 
and Rousseau of considering bodies soft, flabby, limp, and effeminate when living luxuriously.  
La mollesse provided a larger conceptual underpinning for nervous maladies. Women were 
thought to be more susceptible to the vapors, and the cultural valuation of luxury combined with 
the increasing “education” of the youth around women (II.V.115) meant subtly that the French 
were becoming corporeally weak and effeminized.566  Mirabeau responded to a question posed 
by Melon—“In what sense can one say that luxury softens [or weakens, amollit] a nation?”—by 
revealing his conception of the human body: the singular material part of us is the body, while 
the intellectual part is divided into the heart, the soul, and the mind (II.V.104).567  These four 
parts make up a complete human, and luxury works through all four components of individuals 
in order to weaken a nation.  For Mirabeau, then, luxury engendered la mollesse because it 
“enervates the body, debases the heart by hardening it, collapses the soul by carrying its ambition 
toward base objects, and weakens the mind through hope, fear, and avidity” (II.V.104).  
Mirabeau clearly valued the immaterial side of man more than the material, but he also found the 
degeneration of the body to be an immense obstacle to achieving happiness, virtue, and a 
reformed social order.  Mirabeau claimed that “les hommes réfléchis” who sought the effects of 
luxury on “la masse physique” mistook what was clearly a “dérangement dans les moeurs” 
(II.V.106); yet, he spent more time discussing the body than the other components combined.   
                                                          
566In the third part of L’ami des hommes, Mirabeau would remark that, in Liana Vardi’s words, “Mankind had been 
at its strongest, most vigorous, and most spiritual at the dawn of civilization,” so modern culture needed to “recover 
its potency by abandoning its feminine affectations.”  Vardi, The Physiocrats and the World of the Enlightenment, 
109 (see also pgs. 224-227 for other gendered elements in Physiocracy). 
 
567He referred to these same four components in an hypothetical conversation with an hypothetical despot in “Traité 
de la monarchie,” 28.  See also Mirabeau (and Quesnay), Théorie de l’impôt, 17.  Melon posed this question in his 
chapter on luxury in Essai politique sur le commerce. 
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Like Rousseau, Mirabeau lauded the physique of ancient athletes, the forceful knights of 
the medieval era, and even the hard-working butchers, blacksmiths, tailors, and tapestry makers 
of his own day, but he ridiculed the overconsumption and luxurious living that turned the elite 
into "pygmies," "demi-hommes,” or “dried-up, malnourished plants” (II.V.115).568   In the past, 
men and women would pair luxury with exercise, sports, horse riding, and warfare, a more 
active, vigorous lifestyle overall.  Exercise kept the body in shape and ensured proper 
circulation.  By the mid-eighteenth century, Mirabeau observed that men eschewed sport to 
stretch out on lounge chairs and read pamphlets, more concerned with the propriety of their wigs 
than a respectable wager on the tennis court (II.V.115).  No longer as robust and formidable as 
their ancestors, the French worked and lived in tighter spaces; their cramped rooms could not 
house the great sword of Balafré (II.V.114), and Mirabeau himself found that he would pale 
physically and morally in comparison to his imposing great-great-grandfather (I.VIII.146).  
Mirabeau privileged souls, hearts, and minds, but bodies, although “united in destination” with 
souls, were “estimable in proportion as they serve to elevate the soul and the heart of citizens, 
scornful if they corrupt them” (I.VIII.142).569  The body could only corrupt the spirit when the 
ardor for military and patriotic glory had been extinguished (II.IV.85). 
Women too were susceptible to lassitude and bodily harm.  In the past, in Mirabeau’s 
assessment, they had been much stronger and had displayed more maleness (plus mâle) in their 
dispositions.  One contemporary woman in particular could be found supine "in an armchair six 
inches from the ground, her posture almost necessarily indecent, she appears to return to bed, her 
                                                          
568This paragraph expands on Kwass, "Consumption and the World of Ideas," 195-7.  Kwass labeled L’ami des 
hommes a “social pathology of consumption” (192) and found Mirabeau to believe he was making a “clinical 
diagnosis” (195). 
 
569In his notes for a course on economics, Mirabeau (and Quesnay) wrote: “Education is only the initiation of the 
youth to the exercises of the mind and the body that will become necessary to him in the course of his life” (AN, M 
784, 73, folio 1). 
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shoulders draw together, her chest sinks in, her entire body sags" (II.V.116). When women did 
leave the house for a multitude of social engagements, they were so preoccupied with their 
fashionable appearance and comportment/posture (taille) that they suffered through a rigid diet 
in order to heighten (and highlight) their breasts by constricting their kidneys and waist 
(II.V.116). Their lifestyle spread to their children, whose growth was stunted and vigor 
suppressed.  Bodies thus resembled dolls (poupées), languid and enfeebled. 
Mirabeau adopted the principles of sensationalist physiology to explain the physical 
effects of luxury.  He argued that the glitter of trinkets and the ubiquitous stimuli of refinement, 
such as music, perfumes, and elegant dining, attacked the senses simultaneously, rendering them 
soft and incapable of transmitting sensory information (II.V.118).570  Young girls, for example, 
whose parents surrounded themselves in the social and material trappings of luxury, were forced 
out into society before their bodies had time to firm up.  By age eleven, they could no longer 
bear their bodies, and the torrent of sensory data left them scatterbrained and incapable of 
concentrating on a single thought or image.571  Married off at age fifteen or sixteen, young girls 
were virtually abandoned to the perpetual movement of society: their bodies emaciated, their 
eyes dizzy, their aristocratic “blood” degenerates into an asthmatic state. Luxury and 
                                                          
570The capacity for sense data to overwhelm the mind and body was an integral argument for those who found the 
blind to be more capable of intellectual labor and concentration.  See Riskin, Science in the Age of Sensibility, 52-67, 
and Sophia Rosenfeld, A Revolution in Language: The Problem of Signs in Late Eighteenth-Century France 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2001). 
 
571Mirabeau was not necessarily wrong to fear the introduction of children to “luxury,” as seen in the prospectus for 
a journal that never developed, Le Courrier de la Nouveauté, Feuille hebdomadaire à l’usage des Dames (1758): 
“Dans le troisième [édition], on donnera avis des nouveaux bijoux, de leurs usages et commodités, des noms et 
demeures des Marchands and des Ouvriers, des Peintres et des Graveurs, des bijoux pour les enfans et des petits 
meubles à leur usage”  (Bibliothèque nationale de France, LC14-1; italics mine). 
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overconsumption, according to Mirabeau, conditioned women's bodies to mishandle sensory 
material and thus reduced them to mental and physical torpor (II.V.116).572 
Mirabeau also combined the principles of sensationalist philosophy with that of 
physiology to underscore the importance of visual stimuli and marks of distinction.  Similar to 
Boudier de Villemaire, Sénac de Meilhan, and Duclos, Mirabeau developed a corporeal critique 
of représentation.  Louis XIV had inaugurated an age of éclat in which the exterior of bodies and 
buildings symbolized power (II.IV.80-1).573  The impressions made by sensible signs were too 
prompt and too durable, and people mistook “precious furniture, magnificent clothes, sumptuous 
houses, [and] les équipages” for power rather than simply wealth (II.V.106).  Mirabeau lamented 
that “man is moreover shocked [frappé] only by the senses.”  His contemporaries no longer 
interiorized painful mourning; “public inspection only has interest in the exterior” of clothing 
and ceremonies (II.IV.89).  Mirabeau believed that virtue, morality, and the decency of moeurs 
were “felt” according to the moral valence of the term sentir (II.IV.95).  He nevertheless knew 
the power of the senses—the physical valence of sentir—and wanted rites, ceremonies, clothing, 
and behavior to properly reflect the venerable hierarchy. The result, in sum, was “that le faste, la 
magnificence even, exterior ornaments, and the dignity of moeurs, far from being an 
                                                          
572It was not just young girls who suffered the effects of society.  Lecherous elderly men and fathers made fools of 
themselves in front of young girls at dinners and dances, reducing the natural sentiment of respect and admiration 
for authority and rendering their own ability to discipline their children baseless (II.V.117). Mirabeau demanded a 
little restraint in order to regain authority and les moeurs, rather than “these beautiful axioms of tolerance that one 
finds today in the mouth of everyone: that it is necessary to live for oneself, neither hampered by others nor 
hampering others” (II.V.118).  In “Institutions des femmes,” Mirabeau claimed that les femmes du grand monde had 
a particular obstacle to attaining domestic, rural tranquility: “Their husbands are dedicated to an idle and troubled 
way of life [in the city],” neglecting knowledge of their revenues and debts and deliriously spending money on 
fantasies that ruin their patrimoines (AN, M 780, n. 4, folio 11). 
 
573See Mirabeau’s “Commentary on Marquis d’Argenson’s Considérations sur le gouvernement de France” (AN, M 
752, no. 6, folio 10).  Mirabeau found Louis XIV to have a “noble soul, just mind, and coeur droit,” perhaps 
attributing the negative qualities of government and culture at Versailles to his body.  Louis monopolized political 
authority and presided over a shift in moeurs: He gave the court over to “the passions of les grands...politeness 
replaced loyalty, le faste banished economy, ministers flattered [Louis] rather than his subjects.” 
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inconvenience in a powerful monarchy, of draining or harming it, are proof that everything is in 
its place provided that the luster and brilliance of expenditure is distributed relatively and can be 
found exactly where it is supposed to be” (II.IV.99).  Mirabeau demanded that the French 
collectively strip “signs” of the fabricated values that habit and public consent had given them in 
order to achieve a society in which visual sensory data expressed the true symbols of a virtuous 
socio-political order (II.V.106). 
Mirabeau clearly yearned for a “feudal” past in contrast to the artificiality of balls, 
operas, extravagant dinner parties, and markets of unrestrained commerce and consumption 
characteristic of urban social environments.  He disdained the confusion of mistaking the 
bewigged and silk-clothed son of his blacksmith or saddler for a seigneur; in Paris, “everyone 
has become a Monsieur” (I.VIII.152).  Mirabeau’s goal of improving the inherent, sociable 
human passions, while channeling the negative passions of cupidity toward public utility, went 
through the bodies that populated society.  Mirabeau saw indecent interaction all around him.  
Bodies reveled in volupté (II.III.55), participated in “the monstrous fêtes of Saturnalia” 
(II.IV.80), and were carried away by an acquisitive ardor (II.III.49).  If this was “civilization,” 
Mirabeau preferred the antique simplicity of a bygone era.  Mirabeau may have defined “luxury” 
in the most basic way—“le luxe est l’abus des richesses” (II.V.101)—but the register in which he 
intoned “abuse” was wide-ranging.  Mirabeau hoped to prevent the rapacity awakened by luxury 
(II.V.122) from becoming an irreversible part of les moeurs, and he imagined that the bodies of 
his contemporaries, whose faculties were dazed and numbed but not yet extinguished (II.III.50-
1), could be revived.  The reciprocal commerce so necessary to unite the physical to the moral 
demanded properly functioning bodies not enslaved to the stimulation of their senses.  
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“Notre molle urbanité”:  
Mirabeau and Quesnay’s “Traité de la monarchie”574 
“We must not lose heart,” Quesnay wrote to Mirabeau, “for the appalling crisis will 
come, and it will be necessary to have recourse to medical knowledge.”575  In the unpublished 
“Traité de la monarchie,” Mirabeau returned to his perspective on the body from L’ami des 
hommes, bolstered by his new mentor.  Mirabeau met the medical doctor at Versailles in the 
summer of 1757, where Quesnay served as royal physician to the Marquise de Pompadour.576  
Quesnay had read L’ami des hommes and invited Mirabeau to discuss political economy.  The 
Marquis was familiar with Versailles, meeting often with various ministers and relaying 
correspondence from his brother, the Chevalier de Mirabeau and governor of Guadeloupe from 
1754-55.  By 1759, after a series of meetings with Quesnay, Mirabeau became convinced that 
Quesnay’s political economy was sounder than L’ami des hommes.  He was recruited to 
disseminate Quesnay’s ideas and became the leading publicist in Quesnay’s “writing 
workshop.”577   
Mirabeau and Quesnay’s observations at Versailles, combined with the Chevalier’s cry 
that Versailles itself was the obstacle to good colonial governance, provided the impetus for 
                                                          
574“Our soft urbanity.” Marquis de Mirabeau and François Quesnay, Traité de la monarchie (1757-1759), ed. Gino 
Longhitano (Paris: L’Harmattan, 1999), 67.  As in the previous section, I will provide page numbers in parentheses 
to reduce the number of footnotes. 
 
575“Letter from Quesnay to Mirabeau,” (late 1758 or early 1759) in Meek, The Economics of Physiocracy, 108.  
Meek seems to accept, to a degree, the overlap between Quesnay’s medical knowledge and political economy.  He 
explained his translation of “productif, stérile, renaître, reproduction, etc.”: “Fairly literal translations which 
preserved so far as possible the important biological analogy seemed in order here” (40). 
 
576After her death in 1764, Quesnay would continue on as médecin du roi, despite a number of uncharacteristic 
instances of political meddling.  Vardi, The Physiocrats and the World of the Enlightenment, 45. 
 
577See Christine Théré and Loïc Charles, “The Writing Workshop of François Quesnay and the Making of 
Physiocracy.”   
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Mirabeau and Quesnay’s first collaboration.578  Mirabeau began writing the “Traité” at the 
suggestion of Quesnay to serve as an introduction to Mémoire sur les états provinciaux, a 
republication of his previous 1750 work attached to the end of L’ami des hommes.   Their 
collaboration allows us to read the “Traité” through the eyes of both Mirabeau and Quesnay (As 
Mirabeau’s name appeared on the title page as author, I will more often refer to him).  
Physiological language is scattered throughout the “Traité,” and since we have the extensive 
editorial remarks of Quesnay, we can chart his satisfaction or dissatisfaction with Mirabeau’s 
text.  Quesnay rarely criticized Mirabeau’s corporeal terminology.579  The “Traité” evinces a 
distinct fear that corporeal deterioration will render the French numb to the natural feelings of 
sociability or deaf to the voice of the interior sentiment. 
*** 
Mirabeau and Quesnay exchanged multiple drafts from 1758-60, but the “Traité” 
ultimately went unpublished.  Mirabeau had been “converted” by Quesnay, but Physiocracy 
itself was still in its infant stage.  The two disagreed on the ultimate foundation and purpose of 
the text.  Mirabeau intended it to be a theoretical and historical work on the monarchy that would 
highlight the necessary socio-political role played by the nobility and religion, whereas Quesnay 
hoped to ground the monarchical political system on the necessity of natural law.580  Mirabeau 
conceived the structure of the “Traité” to follow the origin, progress, perfection, and 
abuse/decadence of the monarchy, reflecting his analysis of eighteenth-century French 
                                                          
578Røge, “‘Legal Despotism’ and Enlightened Reform in the Îles du Vent,” 174. 
 
579It is the case that the “Introduction,” placed at the end of the text by Longhitano (170-90), represented Mirabeau’s 
attempt to integrate more themes suggested by Quesnay.   
 
580For information on the “Traité,” see Vardi, The Physiocrats and the World of the Enlightenment, 164-6; 
Sonenscher, Before the Deluge, 210-15; Longhitano, “La monarchie française entre société d’ordres et marché,” 
xxxvii-lxx; Fox-Genovese, The Origins of Physiocracy, chp. 5. 
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corruption but perhaps too his view of the cyclical nature of human civilization.581  Mirabeau 
viewed the monarchy as composite in nature: “the institutions, les corps, and privileges were 
‘different parts’ of a ‘whole’ which constituted le corps of the French monarchy.”582   
The necessary cooperation of the sovereign and his subordinate powers led Mirabeau and 
Quesnay to define monarchy as an “organized state” or “organized body” (181, état/corps 
organisé), in which power resided in a single person but was exercised by a multitude.  Mirabeau 
and Quesnay borrowed the sweeping, yet peculiar, term organisation and its derivations from 
physiology and natural philosophy.  Organisation was both a mechanical means of describing 
the arrangement of the organs and a more active way of linking that arrangement to larger vital 
properties in humans and animals.  Organisation, as noted above, conjoined anatomical 
completeness to the property of life; it was often used by “radical” thinkers to attribute life to the 
physical arrangement of parts (organs, solids, liquids, etc.), rather than a soul or unobserved vital 
principle.  According to an editorial remark by Quesnay, “the monarchy is an organized body 
that continually changes its head, which renders this form of government very formidable” (181, 
n. 409).583  The sovereign was equally the soul and the motor of “this vast body,” which “is born 
from the union of forces that compose it and from their facility to move together at the order of 
the sovereign” (17).  In a political corps organisé, the monarch ruled singularly but gained its 
                                                          
581Kwass, “Consumption and the World of Ideas,” 196-7.  Quesnay disagreed with this structure of the “Traité” as 
well.  Physiocracy, under Quesnay’s tutelage, would not consider a cyclical view of history or governments: “It is 
too generally believed that governments of empires can take only temporary forms, that everything here below is 
subject to continual vicissitudes, that empires have their beginning, their progress, their decadence, and their end.  
This view prevails so generally that the irregularity of governments is attributed to the natural order” (Despotisme de 
la Chine, 303, trans. by Lewis Maverick). 
 
582Longhitano, “La monarchie française entre société d’ordres et marché,” xiii.  See Mirabeau’s own words in the 
Traité, 110-11, 136-7. 
 
583In the second, extended edition of his Essai physique sur l’oeconomie animale (1747), Quesnay only addressed 
organisation as a mechanical placement of parts subject to the laws of nature and its role in generation (t. 3, 140-2). 
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power and vivification from the appropriate coordination of parts.  Quesnay and Mirabeau’s 
description of an état organisé bore a resemblance to Didier-Pierre Chicaneau de Neuvillé’s 
definition of organisation:  “organization is connected to the operations of the mind, which 
depend on the nature and arrangement of the organs.”584   In both conceptions, the head (tête, 
esprit, âme) depended on the body, conceived either anatomically or politically.  In Mirabeau’s 
view, “the monarch is the soul and the nation is the body...the soul can act regularly only in 
conformance with the constitution and the organization of the body.  If the soul wants to force 
the body to execute violent or excessive movements, it finds resistance or exhaustion in the 
organs and falls itself into languor and passivity” (40).  The concept of organisation provided an 
heuristic and a vocabulary through which Mirabeau and Quesnay could produce a theory of 
monarchy based on medical knowledge.585  A well-organized state, like a well-organized body, 
required physical communication via “the senses,” which activated moral sensibility, allowing a 
shared corporeal behavior between sovereign and subjects. 
For Mirabeau and Quesnay, the “perfect” monarchy must be “bien organisé” (74).  The 
“true constitution” (169) of a state could only be healthy when the prince/monarch, nobles, laws, 
agriculture, la police, and les moeurs were in proper order and were properly respected.  
Consistent with Mirabeau’s reactionary politics, one could achieve perfect organization in a 
                                                          
584Neuvillé, Dictionnaire philosophique, 65.  Neuvillé’s actual definition of organisation was “voyez conformation” 
in which he defined together conformation, complexion, constitution, organisation, and tempérament. 
 
585For the multiple valences in which organisation was understood, see Karl Figlio, “The Metaphor of Organization: 
An Historiographical Perspective on the Bio-Medical Sciences of the Early Nineteenth Century,” History of Science 
14 (1976): 17-53; Joseph Schiller, La notion d'organisation dans l'histoire de la biologie (Paris: Maloine S. A. 
éditeur, 1978); Rey, Naissance et Développement du vitalisme en France; Mariana Saad, "Machine et sensibilité: la 
question de l'organisation de l'homme chez La Mettrie et Cabanis," in Julien Offray de La Mettrie: Ansichten und 
Einsichten, Harmut Hecht, ed. 141-52; Thomson, Bodies of Thought (Although not indexed, “organization” and its 
derivatives pervade her monograph).  Also, see Quesnay’s “Évidence” in the Encyclopédie, vol. 6, pg. 147 (§ 3) for 
his argument about the limited powers of organisation regarding matter and the human body. 
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decaying monarchy “by reestablishing the old order, which would spread vigor, strength, health, 
and authority” (168).  There must be no straining of the nerves of the political body or 
derangement of the organs (115).  In the process of reimagining the monarchy, Mirabeau and 
Quesnay reanimated the theory of the king’s two bodies by defining the sovereign as the physical 
embodiment of moral law, the keeper of the natural order (15, 4-7), but virtually eliminated his 
sacrality; the head changed but the natural laws and social order remained the same.586  Mirabeau 
also made use of the early-modern curiosity for monsters, labeling that which was against nature 
as monstrous.587  He described a paternal society that enslaved its “children” (read: “subjects”) 
as disorderly, unnatural, deformed, and monstrous; it would be a body politic “composed of 
fantastic and hideous members” (25).  Finally, Mirabeau provided his own version of the 
traditional body-politic metaphor: “The body politic has, like the human body, its dimensions 
and proportions.  Up to a certain point of growth, the body is not a man but a child; similarly, a 
state too restricted is not a monarchy but a principality...A child has the same organs as a man, 
and subsists equally by the same connections between these organs, but it is not with the same 
force; the same can be said of the state” (74).588  The human body, like the body politic and the 
                                                          
586See above the Physiocrats’ conception of natural law and role of the sovereign.  This is absolutely not to say that 
Mirabeau reduced the role of religion in society or the creative hand of God.  Religious worship, respect for heritage 
and hierarchy, and virtue were interlocking parts. Religion, “politically speaking, is the most sure brake that contains 
the people” (“Traité de la monarchie,” 83). 
 
587See Marie-Hélène Huet, Monstrous Imagination (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1993); Lorraine 
Daston and Katherine Park, Wonders and the Order of Nature (New York: Zone Books, 1998), chp. 5; David Bates, 
Enlightenment Aberrations: Error and Revolution in France (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2002), chp. 8; 
Jay M Smith, Monsters of the Gévaudan: The Making of a Beast (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2011), 
esp. chp. 2. 
 
588A. N., M 778, 1³.  This passage was entered into the second draft of chapter three (“Perfection de la monarchie”) 
of “Traité de la monarchie” and moved from the third paragraph to the second paragraph following a brief 
introduction.  I would suggest that Mirabeau (and Quesnay) needed this paragraph-long metaphor up front in order 
to transition the reader with a familiar trope and build off the body-politic analogy for the remainder of the chapter. 
The language and imagery used here recurs often in this section.  In fact, “Traité de la monarchie” teems with 
references to machines, cogwheels, forces, impulsions, springs, members, dismemberment, etc.   
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state, experiences growth, but too much or too little could be detrimental.  Not only did the 
monarchy need to be bien organisée but so did individual bodies.  What did bodies look like, and 
how did they behave, when they were deranged, disordered, and disorganized?   
As in L’ami des hommes, Mirabeau found the moral, rather than physical, aspect of 
humans to be the most important to happiness and to be consistent with a socio-political order 
functioning according to natural laws.  Morality meant listening to one’s interior sentiment—a 
gift from the divinity— respecting les moeurs, duties, and hierarchy, and obeying the monarch; 
this applied to the monarch as well, whose example filtered down the social order.  In a decaying 
monarchy, these features break down: “physical beings are substituted for moral beings” 
(153).589  When the ferment that pushes morality to action goes too far, obedience turns to 
slavery, and corrupt authority “numbs talents, extinguishes all activity, ruins subjects, brings 
sterility, and disrupts les états” (103).  When monarchy turns into despotism, “slavery smothers 
and suffocates the moral being, leaving only the physical being” (103).  Mirabeau’s theoretical 
and historical analysis of monarchies was but a thin veil for his view of eighteenth-century 
France.590  He spoke heatedly of slavery, but his target was not the plight of ancient helots or 
“medieval” serfs.  He was far more concerned with his contemporaries’ enslavement to their 
passions and their bodies: an enslavement only bolstered by the Bourbon kings.   
 The corruption of bodies began at court.  The degenerate monarch had come to expect 
certain etiquette at court, the symbolic value of which was inverted (102).   Rites and ceremonies 
of flattery replaced those of duty and virtuous obedience.  Courtiers wheedled the king for 
                                                          
589This idea is repeated in Théorie de l’impôt, 27. 
 
590Fox-Genovese argued too that Mirabeau (and Quesnay) were clearly critical of eighteenth-century French 
political culture, calling the “Traité” an “incredible political indiscretion” that suggested the monarchy already 
displayed “the first two symptoms of tyranny [the divorce between the interests of the prince and his people and the 
favoring of those who merely possess wealth].”  Fox-Genovese, The Origins of Physiocracy, 171 and 177.   
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financial privileges, they expected to be rewarded with sinecures and pensions, and some 
convinced him that commerce alone was domestically and internationally advantageous.591  If 
allowed to continue, collusion between the king and various administrative organs would lead to 
despotism, and the king would no longer be the embodiment of moral laws (111 n.234; 172 
n.383).   
In Bourbon France, the king’s body was the center of rituals of the state, and courtiers’ 
bodies became planes upon which the king could exercise control (or courtiers could subtly 
resist).592  Whether through demeanor, dress, or dance, courtiers’ bodies bore the imprint of the 
king’s power.  Mirabeau expected this form of behavior, to a degree, but he did not find it 
necessary for courtiers to make a habit of going around “bent” (courbé) to demonstrate their 
reverence (95). Since the monarch is not God and does not have the power to peer into men’s 
souls, the exterior must represent the interior.  This ability could only be found in “men of merit” 
or the most distinguished nobles (95), who were able to control themselves in solemn respect.  
The necessity of “empressements extérieurs” could be exploited like the semiotic chaos 
unleashed by luxury.   Organisation deteriorates in a monarchy when its leader is surrounded by 
the vapid gestures of courtiers, “the most base valets, the most vile wandering minstrels, and the 
most superficial buffoons (les plus plats bouffons),” who supplant the men of great merit (94).  
Mirabeau despised the servile flatterers whose tortured bodies were incapable of noble propriety.  
                                                          
591The fear of flattery and dissimulation is evident in the first pages, and throughout, of Mirabeau and Quesnay’s 
Théorie de l’impôt (1760; e.g. Entretien VI), which was written in the form of conversations between a sage and an 
aging king unaware of the fiscal and moral corruption of his kingdom.      
 
592The works of Norbert Elias provide the groundwork for the study of bodies, behavior, and power at the court of 
Bourbon kings: The Court Society (1982) and Power and Civility: The Civilizing Process (1983), trans. Edmund 
Jephcott (New York: Pantheon Books).  For support and criticism of Elias’ conclusions, see Michel Foucault, 
Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison, trans. Alan Sheridan (New York: Vintage Books, 1977), and Sara E. 
Melzer and Kathryn Norberg, eds., From the Royal to the Republican Body: Incorporating the Political in 
Seventeenth- and Eighteenth-Century France (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998). 
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They used their bodies to absorb corporeal expectations and project the discipline and 
obsequiousness of the court.  Mirabeau’s particular disdain for courtiers is captured well in the 
biting satire of Baron d’Holbach:  
It is by these heroic efforts [of subjugating nature], these combats, these victories that a 
clever courtier distinguishes himself and reaches this point of insensibility that leads to 
crédit, to the honors, and to the grandeur that are the objects of envy of his fellow 
courtiers and the objects of public admiration...From the tender age of childhood, he must 
learn to command his physiognomy for fear that it will betray the secret movements of 
his heart or reveal an involuntary bitterness to which an affront could give birth.593   
 
For Mirabeau, it was not the body that conveyed social status, and when such profound 
dissimulation could be rewarded, physical bodies and bodies politic were disorganized.  
 Mirabeau continued the declamations he began in L’ami des hommes against luxury, 
over-consumption, commerce, cupidity, and other harmful aspects of “civilization” in the “Traité 
de la monarchie” (61, 136, 140-150).  Advisors, financiers, and les commerçants peddled 
commerce and luxury—Mirabeau’s primary culprit of disorder—to the king as the principle of 
wealth, while they simultaneously floated loans to the crown.  Fantasies, vanity, and le faste 
possessed an empire over needs when the king confuses appearance for reality and, for example, 
allows cufflinks to become an affair of state (143).  Expressions of true honor and “ancient 
gravity” are sacrificed to the pleasures his administrators (sénateurs modernes) derive from 
seeing their “clients” and their “gussied-up” (pomponnées) wives “display the fashions of the 
day” (136).   This behavior mixed the physical and the moral, and it deranged the body to the 
point that “all [these] accidents...have altered the human constitution” (7).  The “Traité de la 
                                                          
593Baron d’Holbach, Essai sur l’art de ramper à l’usage des courtisans (Paris: Éditions Allia, 2010, orig. pub. 
posthumously in Baron Grimm et Denis Diderot, Correspondance littéraire, philosophique et critique, adressée à 
un souverain d’Allemagne, 1790 or 1813), 14, 17.  Although Mirabeau recommended sport and exercise to 
strengthen both body and mind in L’ami des hommes, he must have found Pierre Rameau’s The Dancing Master 
(1725)—a remedy “for enhancing one’s bodily position and consequently one’s social position”— to be a 
disgraceful instance of the physical body triumphing over morality.  See Susan Leigh Foster, “Dancing the Body 
Politic: Manner and Mimesis in Eighteenth-Century Ballet,” in From the Royal to the Republican Body, 168. 
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monarchie,” then, reveals a parallel between commercial economies and “civilized bodies” that 
would nourish Physiocracy.  Commercial economies were unnatural because their focus on the 
trade in and consumption of luxury goods generated artificial wealth, fabricated social privileges, 
and splintered society.  “Civilized bodies” were unnatural because their “networks of frail desires 
and false pleasures...have enervated and nearly annihilated [their] sensations by dividing them” 
(7). Mirabeau analogized the kinds of bodies produced by “civilized society” to a “bird 
nourished from the nest in a cage, chirping at every instant of a new air, from which the last 
erases the trace of the one which preceded it, and who never acquired the luster of its true 
plumage or the sweetness of the song of which it was endowed by nature or the force to raise 
itself in the air” (7).  Civilized bodies were either drained of sensitivity or physiologically 
habituated to anti-social behavior.   
Mirabeau argued, then, that the ostentation and dazzle of luxury products, and the 
lethargic lifestyle to which they led, overstimulated and blunted the network of senses on which 
social interaction was based.  A body too affected by the overpowering sensations of luxury 
items formed tastes and passions, which subjugated reason and the interior sentiment, and could 
only be assuaged by the perpetuation of those same sensations.  As Quesnay explained in his 
article “Évidence” for the Encyclopédie, “when the mechanism of the senses and the memory 
cause some affective sensations, too lively and too dominant, these sensations form tastes, 
passions, and habits, which subjugate reason; we aspire then only to a happiness which satisfies 
those dominating tastes and pressing passions.”594  Habits are physiological states, and, in the 
                                                          
594François Quesnay, “Évidence” (vol. 6, pg. 150) accessed from http://encyclopedie.uchicago.edu/  Compare this 
with Malebranche: “Since the imagination consists only in the soul’s power to form images of objects by imprinting 
them, so to speak, in the fibers of its brain, the greater and more distinct the traces of the animal spirits, which are 
the strokes of these images, the more strongly and distinctly the soul will imagine these objects.” Nicolas 
Malebranche, The Search after Truth, trans. and ed. Thomas M. Lennon and Paul J. Olschamp (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1997), 89.  See Vardi, The Physiocrats and the World of the Enlightenment, 68-78, for 
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words of abbé Etienne Bonnot de Condillac, “habit is only the ability to repeat what one did, and 
this ability is acquired by the reiteration of acts.”595  Once a habit is formed, it can be 
reawakened simply by the memory of the actions, desires, thoughts, or feelings.  The impression 
of traces from the sensory organs to the brain either ruined the body by the punishing vivacity of 
multiplicity or the constant repetition of sensory data that formed habits.  The body responded 
physiologically to its environment, and dissolute habits became physiologically embodied in 
Mirabeau’s contemporaries.   
 To Mirabeau and Quesnay, the most detrimental consequence of insatiable physical 
appetites was the adulteration, or at worst extinction, of natural sociability and the interior 
sentiment (le sentiment intérieur, 30).596  Society is based on commerce and a “fellow-feeling;” 
it is the grandest expression of morality and precedes political organisation.  “The father, son, 
brother, spouse, friend, parent, citizen, compatriot, mankind as a whole, are the physical objects 
of a cult of action commanded and received by the great moral being.  Among these duties, some 
are more present or more marked, but they all are indispensable; and voilà, [the duties] which 
engages us, links us, submits us to society...these truths, which rumble in the bottom of the heart 
of even those who would verbally deny them” (81).  Bodies as physical objects either help or 
hinder the soul and morality, as Mirabeau wrote in L’ami des hommes; they become enmeshed in 
                                                          
a thorough analysis of Quesnay’s epistemology that combined sensationalism with a rational faculty all guaranteed 
by god (Essai physique sur l’oeconomie animale, III, 1747). 
 
595Condillac, Traité des sensations (1754; book I, chp. 2, § 13), excerpted in Condillac, Traité des animaux, présenté 
et annoté par M. Malherbe (Paris: J. Vrin, 2004), 246.  For habit-formation according to Cartesian principles, see 
Koch, The Aesthetic Body, 71-6.  
 
596Mirabeau also used phrases such as écouter notre coeur and “instinct” to reflect his understanding of an interior 
sentiment that binds humans together, recognizes “justice,” and is a natural gift from God.  In a characteristically 
ambiguous statement, Mirabeau wrote: “I am not saying that privileged souls are made in order to sense; they have 
the best of all guides, because the true sentiment will never mislead them, but those only who have the time to think” 
(29). 
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a “sympathetic web of feeling” in which bodies communicate passions.597  The body is, in a 
sense, a vessel or carrier of an interior sentiment that connects humans.  It requires upkeep, 
sustenance, and exercise but should not be allowed to follow unrestrained desires.  When it does, 
the body acts as a shield or husk, insulating the interior sentiment from communication with 
others. 
 The interior sentiment was intimately attached to the body, even if conceived in an 
abstract manner and even if Mirabeau did not have a robust metaphysical or epistemological 
apparatus to structure his ideas.  What Mirabeau and Quesnay witnessed around them, 
nevertheless, indicated that the necessary physical dimensions of amour de soi no longer 
sufficed, and that their contemporaries preferred amour propre (terms that pulsated with 
relevance as Rousseau had recently used both to ground his Discourse on Inequality).  They 
sought sociability only as a means of display, self-fashioning, and sating desire rather than as a 
foundation for human cooperation and happiness.598  This behavior had become physiologically 
ingrained in their bodies.  Bodies were no longer “shocked” because luxury had intoxicated them 
(136).  The passions, “formerly combated by a return to sentiment, order, and arrangement,” 
were only excited by a taste for le faste, ostentation, and excess (151).  Mirabeau’s rhetoric 
crescendoed in the following outburst:  
It is this continual state of dizziness, which substitutes actions for thoughts, the sensations 
of [animal] instinct for the sentiments of the soul and the heart, which [replaced serious 
                                                          
597Susan James, Passion and Action: The Emotions in Seventeenth-Century Philosophy (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1997), 119. 
 
598Rousseau voiced most clearly the critical distinction between amour propre and amour de soi in his Discours sur 
l’origine et fondemens de l’inégalité parmi les hommes (1755).  According to Pierre Bayle, it is pride (amour-
propre), “that passion inseparable from our nature that makes us greedy.  For this accursed passion, causing us to 
find pleasure in all that flatters our vanity, in all that distinguishes us from other men, in all that can procure for us 
the fulfillment of our desires, leads us ardently to desire to possess wealth because we hope to find all these 
advantages in the possession of riches.  As a result of the manner in which men are made, and through I know not 
what mechanical constitution of their nature, they rejoice in thinking they possess wealth.” Bayle, Various Thoughts 
on the Occasion of a Comet, trans. Robert C. Bartlett (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2000), 210-211. 
248 
 
ideas] with momentary illusions and opinions of the day...all of which are revealed as lies 
by the interior sentiment as soon as one is alone...I would not be able to believe that there 
existed a man who had never felt any of these sentiments [of love, tenderness, trust, 
esteem], and if there were, unless he was an imbecile from birth, I would be obliged to 
pronounce upon him a curse to cut him out of society (30-1).599 
 
According to Mirabeau, justice is “inherent in our substance” and can be both known and 
sensed (61, 64).  The interior sentiment, love of country and compatriot, and respect for the 
authority of the past was “imprinted in the heart of man by the finger of his Creator and whose 
ineffaceable traces we revere today” (60).600  Like the traces forcefully carved out by habitual 
anti-social or degenerate behavior, the ineffaceable traces of the interior sentiment were 
strengthened by continued application.  Unfortunately, for Mirabeau, “man is always ready to 
fall back under the empire of the senses” (64).  In the “Traité de la monarchie,” Mirabeau 
continued his approach from L’ami des hommes, guided now by the hand of Quesnay.  Society 
was both the source of corporeal ills and the goal toward which human life points; man was not 
only naturally sociable, he was also naturally sensible.  The body, too easily corrupted, acted as a 
boundary between the reciprocal commerce of interior sentiments.  Mirabeau and Quesnay 
condemned their own society, pronouncing it too attracted and addicted to physical sensations.  
The bodies of their contemporaries needed to be stripped of their attachment to material 
embellishments. 
 
 
                                                          
599In a different political context, Benjamin Constant would use a similar analogy in decrying “[t]his modern 
condition of vertigo.”  K. Steven Vincent, Benjamin Constant and the Birth of French Liberalism (New York: 
Palgrave MacMillan, 2011), 139. 
 
600See also Mirabeau, Lettres sur la législation, ou l’ordre légal, dépravé, rétabli et perpétué “Premiére Lettre de M. 
B. à M.” (1769), 2-3.  Du Pont de Nemours would similarly claim that natural law, buoyed by the Creator, “is so 
basic that we find traces of it lodged in our minds.”  Quoted in Vardi, The Physiocrats and the World of the 
Enlightenment, 136. 
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Physiocracy, or (Dis)embodying Society 
Although Mirabeau and Quesnay never completed the “Traité de la monarchie,” 
Physiocracy soon flourished with the publication of Quesnay’s Questions intéressantes sur la 
population (included in Mirabeau’s L’ami des hommes), three versions of the Tableau 
Économique, Théorie de l’impôt (1760), and Philosophie rurale (1763).601  By the mid-1760s, 
Quesnay had acquired a vast network of colleagues, both ardent supporters and vaguely-
interested individuals, and in 1767 Du Pont de Nemours collected Quesnay’s central economic 
works in La Physiocratie, ou constitution essentielle du gouvernement le plus avantageux au 
genre humain (Quesnay remained anonymous in most printed writings to protect his privileged 
status at court).602  Quesnay’s last anonymous collaboration came with Pierre-Paul Le Mercier de 
la Rivière in 1767, L’ordre naturel et essentiel des sociétés politiques, which promoted the new 
socio-political shape of France if it followed natural laws.  As the relationship between Quesnay, 
Mirabeau, and the other Physiocrats intensified, the responsibility for certain texts became 
unclear.603  Even though their writings became more technical, the body was still privileged as a 
                                                          
601Mirabeau was neither Quesnay’s only pupil nor was he Quesnay’s first co-author.  Charles-George Le Roy, 
Pierre-Michel Hennin, and Etienne-Claude Marivetz all worked with Quesnay before Mirabeau, the latter co-
authoring the Questions intéressantes.  See Théré and Charles, “The Writing Workshop of François Quesnay,” for 
the distribution of duties assigned to Quesnay’s colleagues.  For example, it was Charles de Butré who prepared the 
calculations for Philosophie rurale.  See also Théré and Charles, “From Versailles to Paris: The Creative 
Communities of the Physiocratic Movement,” for the “composition” of the physiocratic movement.   
 
602Jacqueline Hecht made a point to state that this text was published in 1767 rather than 1767-8 as is wrongly 
indicated on the first published volume.  Hecht, “La vie de François Quesnay,” in François Quesnay et la 
Physiocratie, 2 vols., Jacqueline Hecht, ed. vol. 1, 211-294 (Paris: Institut national d’études démographiques, 1958), 
271.  
 
603Christine Théré and Loïc Charles have said that in Philosophie rurale Quesnay and Mirabeau’s “contributions are 
so deeply merged that it is very difficult to be sure who imagined such and such sentence.  Even when we can 
establish that a particular sentence was ‘written’ by Mirabeau on the first draft, more thorough research may show 
that he had simply borrowed and rephrased Quesnay’s words.”  Théré and Charles, “The Writing Workshop of 
François Quesnay,” 30. 
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critical foundation for a new social order and hindrance to the corporate social order.604  The 
physiocratic understanding of human nature and natural law prized the corporeal aspects of 
subsistence and desires, while publicizing an interpretation of the body and society that 
challenged Montesquieu’s view of the role of climate and geography in shaping socio-political 
institutions and materialist conceptions of organisation.  Finally, the epistemological procedures 
that undergirded the process of conversion to Physiocracy—évidence—rested on assumptions 
about the human body.  Although Quesnay highlighted the faculty of reason, his epistemology 
relied on the link between the material body and the environment.  To the Physiocrats, the 
prevailing addiction to luxury stymied not only the feelings of sociability but also the 
epistemological process of understanding the laws of nature and Physiocracy itself.  
*** 
At the base of Mirabeau and Quesnay’s political economy stood a concern for luxury’s 
effects on the human body.  This critique was made possible by an elemental assumption about 
humans that Quesnay advanced.  Humans are as much a part of nature as the earth and the trees, 
but if they desire to be happy, as nature intended, then they must not disrupt the influence of 
nature.605  Moving from a critique of to a prescription for society, Quesnay planted his stake on 
the physicality of human bodies and needs.  Rather than the imagined desires of luxury that had 
been ingrained in the bodies of their contemporaries, it was the “quest for corporeal satisfaction” 
through “quasi-biological drives [that] connected human beings to fundamental realities.”606  It is 
                                                          
604As Physiocracy matured and expanded, the vociferous denunciations of commerce and luxury gave way to more 
thoughtful incorporation and definition.  See Shovlin, The Political Economy of Virtue, 105-9. 
 
605For “happiness,” see “Traité de la monarchie,” 168.  
 
606Shovlin, The Political Economy of Virtue, 111. We can see Quesnay’s insistence on the primacy of subsistence in 
his comments to Mirabeau in drafts of the “Traité de la monarchie,” 53 n.86, 55. 
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for this reason that Du Pont de Nemours placed Quesnay’s article “Natural Right” first in his 
compilation Physiocratie; it fit theoretically, not chronologically, in their political economy.  
And, according to Guillaume-François Le Trosne in De l’ordre social (1777), “[i]t was by 
studying the constitution of man, his needs, and the means that he has for achieving them...that 
[Quesnay] seized upon the first strand of this science, and, by a series of deductions and a 
perfectly-linked chain of reasoning, was the first to establish its foundations on the physical laws 
of nature.”607   
The basis of the physiocratic social order was subsistence, which was the first, 
instinctive, physical appetite, paired with human labor to satisfy physical needs.  The physical 
components and drives of humans combined with their “mental capacity” and morality to form 
the natural law.  Natural right, or the “natural principle of all the duties of man,” pre-exists 
humans but is instilled in everyone by a “feeling” and “recognized through the light of 
reason.”608  When physical bodies strive for more than satiation, when they are corporeally 
compelled toward superfluity, then their bodies are no longer in conformance with nature.  
“Transgressions of natural laws are the most widespread and usual causes of the physical evils 
that afflict men,” Quesnay wrote; “even the wealthy...bring upon themselves through their 
ambition, their passions, and even their pleasures, many evils for which they can blame only 
their own irregular acts.”609  For the Physiocrats, then, the exercise of one’s natural right would 
                                                          
607Le Trosne, De l’ordre social (1777), 447.  Le Trosne’s text can also be found in Eugène Daire, ed., Physiocrates, 
2 vols. (Paris: Librairie de Guillaumin, 1846).   
 
608Quesnay, “Natural Right,” 44-5, 51.  
 
609Ibid., 48.  
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reach an apex when humans enter into a society that observes the natural law and allows them to 
make use of their bodily and mental faculties to labor on their property and attain subsistence.610  
In Philosophie rurale (1763), Mirabeau and Quesnay introduced another dimension to 
human behavior beyond the instinctual drives for subsistence, preservation, and reproduction of 
the species: desire.  “Man has more wide-ranging views about happiness [than beasts],” 
Mirabeau declared, “and appetites only distract him from his dominant inclination, which is to 
desire the pleasure of a full and continual happiness without necessarily being able to disentangle 
the object of his desire from the goal of his enjoyment.”611  It is in the often grey area between 
the latter that politics ought to affect human behavior.  Desire can too easily poison the physical 
and moral in humans, as it is the “most active and flexible spring of action,” and therefore it is 
necessary for the sovereign to conjoin need (subsistence) and desire (happiness).612 “The whole 
magic of well-ordered society,” Mirabeau clearly stated, “is that each man works for others, 
while believing that he is working for himself.”613  Bodies are compelled by an interior drive for 
happiness (pleasure) and aversion to pain; they must be brought into harmony in order for 
society to function smoothly according to natural laws.614 
                                                          
610Ibid., 47, 50-2.  Quesnay made a similar point about the exercise of free will, to be discussed below. 
 
611Mirabeau, Philosophie rurale, 158.  In the “Traité de la monarchie,” Mirabeau wrote that fear, hope, and desire 
were the three primary passions felt by humans from which derived an infinite variety of others (36).  Moreover, 
Mirabeau wrote that the passions “are useful, they are necessary; the law that it is necessary to impose on them is 
not a law of terror because this would extinguish the passions; it must be a law of reason and conviction” (97).  It 
was the duty of political leaders to properly sharpen and channel the passions in the right direction. 
     
612Ibid., 158. 
 
613From Philosophie rurale, but quoted in Meek, The Economics of Physiocracy, 70.  See also Steiner, La “Science 
nouvelle” de l’économie politique, 59, 94-5. 
 
614According to the Physiocrat abbé Nicolas Baudeau, “Man is born to seek his preservation and his well-being.  His 
heart is avid and even insatiable for the enjoyments which form his felicity; he flees and detests pain.  The Author of 
nature has placed in all our souls this universal spring, primary motivation of human actions: it was necessary to the 
perpetuation, to the multiplication, to the happiness of the species.  It is through it that the reasonable and free man 
may know the principles of the moral and political order, the natural Law and the social Laws, evidently derived 
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The Physiocrats’ examination of the physical characteristics of society meant that they 
competed with two alternative notions of the body and society.  First, in 1748, Montesquieu 
published the monumental De l’esprit des lois (1748), one feature of which matched his three 
forms of government and corresponding laws to particular geographies and climates.  
Montesquieu baldly stated that “[m]an, as a physical being, is governed by invariable laws like 
other bodies.”615  When bodies inhabit different climates, Montesquieu surmised, the passions 
and the physiology of those bodies changed and thus so should the laws.  Mirabeau and Quesnay 
did not think in terms of coupling laws with a particular climate or a particular body because the 
“rule of nature” was uniform; climate may affect the ability to obtain sustenance, but it did not 
affect the initial physical law.  Moreover, as Mirabeau noted, “The science of good government 
applies to all climates.  The different climates can give to nations different inclinations, different 
physical qualities, and diverse characters; but the different governments influence much more 
powerfully conduct and les moeurs.”616  Climate therefore had no empire over les moeurs, and, 
to further demonstrate the power of the sovereign, Mirabeau subsumed under the category 
conduite and moeurs “liberty, the faculties, education, habits, passions, [and] the mutual 
commerce of men.”617  The job of the sovereign to lead by example and not hinder the operation 
                                                          
from the physical order, instituted by the Supreme Being.”  Quoted in Shovlin, The Political Economy of Virtue, 
112.  
 
615Baron de Montesquieu, The Spirit of the Laws, trans. and ed. Anne M. Cohler, Basia Carolyn Miller, and Harold 
Samuel Stone (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 5.  Montesquieu discussed the relationship between 
the laws and climate in Part 3, Books 14-18.  For an examination of Montesquieu’s “theory of climate,” see John C. 
O’Neal, Changing Minds: The Shifting Perceptions of Culture in Eighteenth-Century France (Newark, DE: 
University of Delaware Press, 2002), chp. 4, and, for a contemporary agreement with Montesquieu, see the work of 
the Parisian doctor Louis La Caze, L’Idée de l’homme physique et morale (1755), chp. 8, article 8. 
   
616Mirabeau and Quesnay, “Traité de la monarchie,” 54 (see Quesnay’s agreeable remark, 176, n. 395, and 
Despotism de la Chine, 578).  See above Mirabeau’s comments about the powerful role of government in L’ami des 
hommes. For other Physiocrats’ engagement with Montesquieu, see Paul Cheney, Revolutionary Commerce: 
Globalization and the French Monarchy (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2010), 145-6.  
 
617Ibid., 55. 
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of the laws of nature, combined with the interior sentiment so crucial to L’ami des hommes and 
“Traité de la monarchie,” meant that the marginal effects of climate on physical bodies were 
secondary to that exercised by the sovereign.   
The Physiocrats also disagreed with materialists, like La Mettrie, Diderot, and d’Holbach, 
who championed both the determinative role and malleability of the body, and those like 
Helvétius and Rousseau who found humans to be malleable and thus perfectible.  Physiocrats did 
not argue that individuals were predestined by their constitution.  Neither did they engage in the 
hypothetical possibility of perfectibility, avoiding the kind of corporeal intervention discussed by 
the médecin-philosophe Charles Vandermonde in Essai sur la manière de perfectionner l’espèce 
humaine (1756). 
The Physiocrats lived and wrote at a time in which debates over the kind and number of 
substances in the world were shifting to questions over the multitudinous properties of the body 
(e.g. irritability and sensibility), as shown in chapter two.  The Physiocrats expounded a clear 
relationship between the physical and the moral, but it was not the psycho-physiology so 
necessary to monist-materialists.  Since only matter existed in the world—there were no 
immaterial substances, a divinity, or a soul—materialists tried to explain all intellectual, social, 
physical, and moral aspects of life through the aggregation and organization of matter.  In 
L’homme machine (1747), La Mettrie argued that “the soul is merely a vain term of which we 
have no idea and which a good mind should use only to refer to that part of us which thinks.  
Given the slightest principle of movement, animate bodies will have everything they need to 
move, feel, think, repent, and in a word, behave in the physical sphere and in the moral sphere 
which depends on it.”618  In contesting the future revolutionary Jean-Paul Marat’s medical 
                                                          
618La Mettrie, Machine Man, 26.  La Mettrie argued here for the inherent activity of matter, a minority position 
debated often during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. 
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treatise De l’homme (1775), Diderot asserted that “if he had looked more closely, he would have 
seen that the action of the soul on the body is the action of one part of the body on another, and 
the action of the body on the soul is the same thing.”619  Mental states thus depended on physical 
states, and mental faculties such as thought, reflection, memory, imagination, judgment, and will 
were material processes.  There was no innate moral force or set of principles waiting to be 
discovered.  The mind and body interact physiologically, and they are galvanized to action by 
sensory reception.  In contrast to Mirabeau and Quesnay, materialists relied on neither an 
“interior sentiment,” a transcendental notion of good and evil, nor a natural law of morality.620   
One did not necessarily have to subscribe to an entire system of materialism to conceive 
of the mind as a “plastic entity responding to the senses.”621  Condillac and Charles Bonnet were 
not full-blown materialists, but they found the body to be the avenue through which humans 
could be perfected or molded to meet certain socio-political or spiritual needs.622  By exploring 
the interaction of human bodies with the physical world of sensory data, and by demonstrating 
the reciprocal interaction of mind and body in cognitive functions, Condillac’s and Bonnet’s 
versions of the “animated statue” contributed to the debate over man’s perfectibility so 
widespread by the mid-eighteenth century. The human body was either malleable, as Condillac 
and Bonnet illustrated, or nearly impossible to overcome, as La Mettrie and Diderot argued.   
                                                          
619Diderot, Éléments de physiologie, in Oeuvres Philosophiques, tome I, ed. Laurent Versini, 1255-1317 (Paris: 
Éditions Robert Laffont, 1999), 1283.   
 
620In fact, La Mettrie abandoned the idea of natural law, exemplified in feelings of remorse, between writing 
L’homme machine and Anti-Sénèque. 
 
621Douthwaite, The Wild Girl, Natural Man, and the Monster, 70.  
 
622Bonnet drew connections between the transcendental soul, cognitive functions, and the power of the soul to shape 
a hierarchy of beings.  See Douthwaite, The Wild Girl, Natural Man, and the Monster, 80-2; Sonenscher, Sans-
Culottes, 120-5; Gary Hatfield, “Remaking the Science of Mind: Psychology as Natural Science,” in Inventing 
Human Science: Eighteenth-Century Domains, eds. Christopher Fox, Roy Porter, and Robert Wokler, 184-231 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995), 206-8.  
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Physiocrats clearly wanted to improve mankind through an examination of the human 
body. They sought to “comprehend” natural functions, but they did not seek to “intervene” in 
nature.623  Their intervention in nature’s operations was a non-intervention.  As Mirabeau wrote 
in a 1767 letter to Rousseau,  
You believe that we seek to pursue the improvement [perfectibilité] of the human mind 
and to extend its limits.  But far from wanting this, we want solely to bring it back to 
what is simple, to the primary notions of nature and instinct.  All our laws can be reduced 
to conforming to the laws of nature with respect to the arrangements surrounding our 
labor and to the self-evident character of the right of property as it applied to the 
enjoyment of its fruits.624   
 
The physiocratic perspective on the body, nature, and the physical/moral dyad resembled that of 
Condillac, Bonnet, and their materialist contemporaries, but it did so as a mirror image. Nature 
was the animating principle for all these thinkers.  For the Physiocrats, though, nature unified 
bodies, linking together bodies, society, economics, and politics.  For the others (excluding 
Bonnet), however, nature created unique, individual bodies whose desires, passions, and moral 
and cognitive capabilities were particular to each physiological organization.625  They viewed 
humans as material parts of nature, potentially only better “organized” than animals, but they did 
not envision humans, as did Mirabeau, as part of the “essences of things...[or the] grand 
whole...[,] endowed with an intelligence through which [man] can discover...the routes and rules 
                                                          
623“Comprehend” and “intervene” are Douthwaite’s words, though she was not speaking of the Physiocrats. Ibid., 6.  
 
624Quoted in Sonenscher, Before the Deluge, 204.  Moreover, Mirabeau argued that “Humans customarily have in all 
of their actions only l’évidence physique which defines them and governs them despotically...l’évidence physique, in 
a word, governs all of us in every instant of our lives.” Mirabeau, Lettres sur la législation, ou l’ordre légal, 
dépravé, rétabli et perpétué, Douziéme lettre: “L’évidence” (1769), 879-80 (and “Premiére Lettre,” 7). 
 
625La Mettrie, for example, determined that “‘A trifle, a tiny fibre, something that the most subtle anatomical study 
cannot discover,’ would have made of Erasmus and Fontenelle two idiots.”  La Mettrie, Machine Man, 10.  See also 
Riskin, Science in the Age of Sensibility, 50-5, and, for a succinct summary of the physiological and social issues at 
stake in Helvétius’ and Diderot’s divergent readings of the body, see Thomson, Bodies of Thought, 219-23, 231-2, 
237-38, and Stephen Gaukroger, The Collapse of Mechanism and the Rise of Sensibility (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2010), 417-419.   
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that fix his conduct.”626  Mirabeau’s “magic of a well-ordered society” was a corporeal sleight-
of-hand.  In Mirabeau and Quesnay’s conception, it was not through the body that mankind 
could be perfected; the body had to be overcome.627  Instead of embracing the total embodiment 
of humans, Mirabeau and Quesnay sought to disembody humans, to reduce the influence of the 
body by letting the laws of nature manage individual behavior and social interaction.   
*** 
Physiocracy allowed its supporters to discuss human bodies on physical (physiological) 
and moral grounds, and Mirabeau and Quesnay showed that social, political, and economic 
disorders manifested in the human body.  The body was the site from which they could read the 
maladies that beset society.  Aligning the body with its natural functions was the first step in 
implementing their new system of political economy.  The innate physical need for subsistence 
and minimal pleasure had to be sated, and the interior feelings of social commerce and sentiment 
had to be allowed to vitalize bodies.  The “sentiment” of justice, so necessary to a political 
community, also linked the physical to the moral.  For Mirabeau, justice was a “universal 
convention between men...[and] an irresistible and invincible sentiment.”  Consistent with his 
                                                          
626Mirabeau, “Éducation Économique des filles, Par M.B., November 1767,” in Éphémérides du citoyen, tome III 
(1768), 144-5.  A version of this text can be found in manuscript form at A.N. M 780, no. 53, alongside manuscripts 
of similar subject matter: “Traité sur l’éducation du sexe” (51), “Traité sur l’éducation des filles” (52), and “Sur 
l’éducation du sexe” (54).  In “Natural Right,” Quesnay noted another way that he and the Physiocrats differed from 
thinkers like La Mettrie: “The natural order which is most advantageous to men is perhaps not the most 
advantageous to the other animals; but included in man’s unlimited right is that of making his lot the best possible.  
This superiority appertains to his intelligence; it is part of natural right, since man inherits it from the Author of 
nature, who has determined it in this way through the laws which he has instituted in the order of the formation of 
the universe” (54, n.1). 
 
627Philippe Steiner astutely observed that, according to the Physiocrats, “it was not a question of combating the 
passions by other passions but rather of placing the passions within the ordered frame of reason.” Steiner, La 
“Science nouvelle” de l’économie politique, 57.  Liana Vardi’s view of Quesnay is similar: “For the Doctor, 
however, human weakness [self-interest, passions] endangered the natural order, and only reason could restrain 
disordered inclinations...Quesnay rarely addressed self-interest (of any sort), preferring to base his system on 
reason’s highest capacities, but Homo economicus lurked in the shadows.”  Vardi, The Physiocrats and the World of 
the Enlightenment, 133.   
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four-part division of humans, the sentiment of justice imbued hearts, minds, and souls, binding 
people to the natural law, but it ultimately hinged on the growth of our organs to develop these 
precepts.  Nevertheless, in Mirabeau’s representation of humans, the “divine flame” ignited the 
sentiment of justice and simmered within us despite the “corruption and weakness” of our 
bodies.628 
In Physiocracy, the “physical” consisted as much in the body as it did the world of goods 
and finances, and the central role of the sovereign was to cultivate morality according to the laws 
of nature.  There is no doubt that the inner “moral” world took precedence in physiocratic 
thought, especially in Mirabeau’s writings.  Still, to achieve moral uniformity and thus social 
stability, Mirabeau and Quesnay ruminated on the role of the body as a hindrance to natural law.  
Quesnay and Mirabeau attempted to marginalize the body by constructing an epistemological 
passage to Physiocracy, while simultaneously focusing a large amount of attention on 
physiological processes (physical and mental).  Quesnay’s sensationalist epistemology, as 
outlined in the pre-physiocratic works Essai physique sur l’oeconomie animale and the 
Encyclopédie article “Évidence,” dealt thoroughly with the body and the ways in which external 
stimuli became knowledge.629  His understanding of the body continued to serve as an 
epistemological linchpin fastening the tenets of Physiocracy to the rational faculties contained 
                                                          
628Mirabeau (and Quesnay), Théorie de l’impôt, 17.  
 
629I will not discuss Quesnay’s Essai physique because there are numerous other works that do a superb job, but also 
because Quesnay published “Évidence” at the exact same time his focus shifted from medicine to political economy.  
If he had something important to change from the Essai physique, it would have shown up here.  For analyses of the 
Essai physique, see Akiteru Kubota, “Quesnay, disciple de Malebranche,” in François Quesnay et la Physiocratie, 
vol. 1, 169-196; Paul P. Christensen, “Fire, Motion, and Productivity: The Proto-Energetics of Nature and Economy 
in François Quesnay”; Steiner, La “Science nouvelle” de l’économie politique; Groenewegen, "From prominent 
physician to major economist"; Vardi, The Physiocrats and the World of the Enlightenment, 38-40, 68-78. 
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within bodies and the loftier aspirations of free will.630  Quesnay’s conception of évidence and 
free will subordinated, but did not extinguish, corporeal operations, and his criticism of the 
methodology of history reveals further the essential place of the body in Physiocracy.  Thus, for 
the Physiocrats, corporeal addictions to the physical environment stymied the epistemological 
process of achieving the rational clarity of évidence.   
Although the notion of évidence pervaded Physiocratic thought, Quesnay first articulated 
the meaning of it in his entry “Évidence” for the Encyclopédie (1756).  The first twenty-five 
paragraphs dealt intently with proving that the origin of our knowledge comes from the senses, 
paragraphs twenty-five through forty-three outlined the multiple ways we can be in error, and the 
remainder of the entry considered human morality, the relationship between humans and 
animals, and a distinctive understanding of free will.631  Over a century ago, Georges Weulersse 
observed that “there is hardly a word that Physiocrats used with greater affectation than the 
substantive evidence, the adjective evident, and the adverb evidently…It is evidence that 
reconciles the individual to the general interest and allies it with justice; and it is evidence that 
orders man’s submission to and cooperation with the natural order.”632   
                                                          
630Quesnay was committed to calculations but not abstract mathematics that had no basis in sensory material.  
Quesnay stated in “Évidence” and in the following quote from “Natural Right” (55) that reason was a corporeal 
function: “What we are concerned with here is reason which is exercised, extended, and perfected by means of the 
study of natural laws.  For reason alone does not raise man above the beasts; it is in its essence only a faculty or 
aptitude by means of which man can acquire the knowledge which is necessary for him, and by means of which he 
is able, with the aid of this knowledge, to procure for himself the physical and moral benefits essential to the nature 
of his being.”   
 
631Steiner, La “Science nouvelle” de l’économie politique, 35-6. 
 
632Quoted in Vardi, The Physiocrats and the World of the Enlightenment, 52.  See also Riskin, Science in the Age of 
Sensibility, 111, and Meek, The Economics of Physiocracy, 40, for translation of the term. 
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According to Quesnay, évidence “signifies a certitude so clear and so manifest by itself 
that the mind cannot refuse it.”633  Évidence was not a transcendental or spiritual faculty; it was 
deeply connected to the body and sensory data: “The certitude of our natural knowledge consists 
only in the évidence of real truths,” which are those truths that “consist in the exact and clear 
connections that real objects have with the sensations they produce” (§37).  Quesnay used the 
terms mind (esprit) and soul (âme) virtually interchangeably in “Évidence” and “Aspect de la 
psychologie,” an unpublished outline extending metaphysical and physiological discussions from 
the Essai physique and “Évidence.”  Quesnay characterized the soul as “a substance that has the 
property of sensing; the property of sensing is the foundational principle of all the affections and 
faculties of the soul.”  And, in a note to the word “perceptions,” Quesnay wrote that “perceptions 
are born from sensations; they are all the ideas that can be indicated or called to the soul by the 
sensations.”634  Regarding cognitive faculties, then, Quesnay found mental states to depend on 
physical states.   
The process of achieving évidence clearly relied on a physical relationship between 
material objects, human bodies, and modes of thought such as attention and discernment, but the 
process and desired goal was a “certainty in the mind rather than a demonstrable proof.”635  In 
Liana Vardi’s insightful reading of Quesnay’s epistemology and the “psychological conversion” 
                                                          
633Quesnay, “Évidence” (vol. 6, pg. 146) accessed from http://encyclopedie.uchicago.edu/  For a perspective similar 
to mine regarding Quesnay’s epistemology, see Fox-Genovese, The Origins of Physiocracy, 85-92. 
 
634Quesnay, “Aspect de la psychologie,” in Christine Théré, Loïc Charles, and Jean-Claude Perrot, eds., François 
Quesnay: Oeuvres Économiques Complètes et Autres Textes, 2 vols. (Paris: L’Institut National d’Études 
Démographiques, 2005), vol. 1, 93. 
 
635Vardi, The Physiocrats and the World of the Enlightenment, 53.  Évidence demanded a connection between 
sensory data (“experience”) and mental operations, which is why Quesnay eschewed abstract mathematics and 
metaphysics.  In a fascinating reading of the Tableau Économique, Loïc Charles has argued that it served as a 
“medium of communication,” or an “economic picture,” capable of “being perceived and at least partly understood 
without recourse to reasoning.”  Charles, “The Tableau économique as Rational Recreation,” 470, 454, 465. 
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involved in becoming a Physiocrat, it was necessary for prospective converts to “let the evidence 
penetrate their minds,” and “[o]nce they had done so, its truths would become self-evident and 
cohere into the same set of relations that Quesnay had so clearly perceived.”  She characterized 
Quesnay’s achievement as a “vision” obtained through “flashes of insight” and disseminated by 
“cognitive training.”636  Quesnay appealed to the self-evident character of natural law, as stated 
above, in “Natural Right” to sustain the foundation of Physiocracy, but the process of becoming 
a Physiocrat through the attainment of évidence did not earn as many adherents as Quesnay 
hoped.637 
Countering critics of their techniques, Mirabeau argued that “our metaphysics does not 
indulge in scholastic exercises, which extend beyond the light of human reason; it is limited to 
the certitude of the existence of our ideas when we have a corresponding sensation and the 
certitude of the direction of causes and effects.”638  Évidence then necessitated grounding in the 
corporeal, material world.  Mirabeau maintained that the Physiocrats did not “create” évidence, 
but that through a clear  
series of inductions...our Science conducts human reason to admit as évident that not a 
single person on earth could exist without knowing that one’s interest is fundamentally 
connected to those of others, that this point of union is the cultivation of the earth, and 
that the essential, necessary, and sufficient condition of success and progress of 
agriculture is liberty [of commerce], the immunity of rights and duties toward all: La 
Propriété, La Liberté, La Sûreté.639   
                                                          
636Ibid., 4, 78, 123. 
 
637Évidence would continue to be an integral part of Quesnay’s epistemology through his last publication 
Recherches philosophiques sur l’évidence des vérités géometriques (1773), “where he assures that his principle 
object is l’évidence, which must characterize the certitude of our knowledge.”  Hecht, “La Vie de François 
Quesnay,” 278. 
 
638Mirabeau, Lettres sur la législation, ou l’ordre légal, dépravé, rétabli et perpétué, Douziéme lettre: “L’évidence” 
(1769), 828.  In much of this “letter,” Mirabeau repackaged the tenets of Physiocracy.  
 
639Ibid., 877-8.  Évidence, moreover, was the “truly efficacious means of assuring the observation of the social order, 
the respect of rights, the performance of duties, and of halting the terrible scourge of disunion, instituted and 
perpetuated by counsel and the absurd code of cupidity” (814-5). 
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True to Weulersse’s claim, évidence connected all aspects of Physiocracy.  More than that, 
évidence necessitated a healthy, functioning sensory network to provide the mind/soul with 
sound connections between sensory data and that which the data represented.  The ability to 
reason upon the assortment of material contained in the memory required the vigorous operation 
of all faculties, and, in a fit of rhetorical flourish, Mirabeau claimed that the clarity of évidence 
joining the moral to the physical could rule in a country of the blind.  Mirabeau returned to his 
original bête noire, cupidity, in order to demonstrate how misplaced liberty forged in his 
contemporaries “thousands of diverse, opposed, and contradictory passions;” their lives of 
abundance separated the stimulation of the organs from the rational functions and precluded the 
“uninterrupted study” necessary to discern évidence.640  Although the rational faculties were 
intimately bound to the organs of the body and were physiological operations, Mirabeau and 
Quesnay still subtly spoke of achieving évidence as a solely mental process; in this form of 
intellectual labor, the body was a necessary but not sufficient condition.641 
In “Évidence,” Quesnay put forward a sensationalist epistemology that he followed 
through the sensory networks and into the channels of the brain.  As a result, morality, which 
Physiocrats linked to an adherence to the physical laws of nature, also stemmed necessarily from 
the proper ordering of bodies and intelligence.  Poor physiological organization was the first 
source of error, but there were numerous other ways that sensory data could be obscured or 
confused.  One example can be found in Quesnay’s interpretation of historical epistemology, 
                                                          
640Ibid., 815, 825, 819. 
 
641Mirabeau spoke of évidence as a super or supra organ: “If I was blind, my other senses would be the organs of 
évidence.  When évidence strays from me, I attempt to lengthen my organs in order to attain it, e.g. I make glasses 
and speakers [porte-voix].  Finally, where I am without the help of my organs, évidence governs me still by the 
means of my faculties.  My memory recalls the memories of several successive évidences and constructs the 
experience of them.  My intelligence conceives the évidence that my senses are unable to reach.”  Mirabeau goes on 
to name sentiment, imagination, and reason as they are affected by and participate in évidence.  Ibid., 823-4. 
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which links physiocratic self-references of having found “scientific” knowledge through 
évidence to the body or to overcoming the body.  Quesnay scorned the historians of his day who 
focused on the “senseless, tumultuous, violent, and disorderly actions of nations,” and who were 
neither observers, nor philosophers, nor politicians.  Their superficial concentration on the 
spectacular neglected the “most fundamental objects of history”—subsistence, population, 
behavior, and composition of government—and generally lacked intellectual depth.642  Quesnay 
developed a critique of the content of history, but he also developed a critique of historical 
method from his understanding of memory and his insistence on the scientific certainty of 
Physiocracy.  The procedures of accumulating historical knowledge relied on memory and the 
sensory operations of retrieving that data, which ran counter to Physiocratic évidence. 
Quesnay’s critique of history did not arise solely from his “uncovering” of the laws of 
nature or from Diderot and d’Alembert’s “tree of knowledge.”643  His assessment was shaped 
instead by his corporeal critique of memory set out earlier in his article “Évidence.”644  Memory 
was central to Quesnay’s epistemology because it preserved sensory data, and it worked 
                                                          
642Note from Quesnay to Mirabeau in “Traité de la monarchie,” 175, n. 392.  Quesnay’s insistence on subsistence 
here reinforces the notion that he was constantly prodding Mirabeau toward his new vision of political economy. 
 
643Paul Cheney has recently argued that the Physiocrats’ perspective on history derived from the Encyclopédie’s 
“Système figuré des connaissances humaines” (1751) in which human understanding (“mental faculties”) was 
separated into three categories—Memory, Reason, and Imagination. The discipline of history fell under the category 
of “memory,” and, in contrast to the “profound and transhistorical” truths of la science nouvelle, history was 
“disordered, subject to error, and altogether unscientific.” Cheney, Revolutionary Commerce, 142-4.  Like many 
aspects of physiocratic political economy, theory did not always translate to practice, especially as the number of 
physiocratic publications increased.  See Ibid., 148-62.  For an examination of the “tree of knowledge,” which 
highlights the incongruities of Diderot and d’Alembert’s model, see David Adams, “The Système figuré des 
connaissances humaines and the Structure of Knowledge in the Encyclopédie,” in Ordering the World in the 
Eighteenth Century, eds. Diana Donald and Frank O’Gorman, 190-215 (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2006), and 
Robert Darnton, “Philosopher Trim the Tree of Knowledge: The Epistemological Strategy of the Encyclopédie,” in 
his The Great Cat Massacre and Other Episodes in French Cultural History, 191-215 (New York: Vintage Books, 
1985). 
 
644Vardi, The Physiocrats and the World of the Enlightenment, 127, also argued that Quesnay did not follow the 
Encyclopédie’s “tree of knowledge” regarding the placement of grammar and logic. 
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alongside the senses to recognize the differences between new, old, and false sensations.  A body 
with faulty or no memory would be subjected constantly to sensory stimulation and would be 
incapable of either ratiocination or reflectivity.645  Without “the certitude of the fidelity of the 
memory,” our knowledge, judgment, attention, and évidence could be incomplete or based on 
false relationships between sensory objects stored in the brain.646  Essentially, the memory was 
the corporeal depot from which the soul/mind could draw reliable information in order to 
complete the applications of association, discernment, judgment, and contemplation.  Attention 
and concentration—and by extension free will—were the hallmarks of human cognition.  The 
physical process of memory, like the body noted above, was a necessary but not sufficient 
condition to ascend to the highest intellectual level of évidence.  The problem with history and 
historians, for Quesnay, was their continued submission to the corporeality of knowledge.  Du 
Pont de Nemours suggested as much in De l’origine et des progrès d’une nouvelle science 
(1768): “The habit [historians] developed in their childhood to use exclusively their memory has 
snuffed out the power to make use of their judgment.”647  Similar to Mirabeau’s argument in the 
                                                          
645For the difference between “reflectivity” and “reflexivity” in conceptions of the “self,” see Jerrold Seigel, The 
Idea of the Self: Thought and Experience in Western Europe since the Seventeenth Century (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2005), 12-13.  For a general assessment of the mental production of errors, see Bates, 
Enlightenment Aberrations, chp. 2. 
 
646Quesnay, “Évidence,” §40 (see §22 also).  Unlike Locke, who famously claimed in his Essay Concerning Human 
Understanding (1690; Book I, chp. I, §2) to avoid the kind of physiological analysis of sensations and ideas put 
forward by Descartes before and Condillac after, Quesnay used his medical training and knowledge of the body to 
advance his views of the physiological operations responsible for thought.  On Locke’s conception of the 
mind/brain, see François Duchesneau, “Locke and the Physical Consideration of the Mind,” in The Philosophical 
Canon in the 17th and 18th Centuries: Essays in Honor of John W. Yolton, eds. G. A. J. Rogers and Sylvana 
Tomaselli, 9-32 (Rochester, NY: University of Rochester Press, 1996).   
 
647Quoted in Cheney, Revolutionary Commerce, 146. Mirabeau too claimed that his contemporaries’ desire for “a 
good education in a smattering of all the sciences [led to the] poor application of our mind,” which meant they only 
exercised their memory and “never truly conceived or combined ideas.”  Mirabeau, Lettres sur la législation, ou 
l’ordre légal, dépravé, rétabli et perpétué, Douziéme lettre: “L’évidence” (1769), 821.  See Sonenscher, Sans-
Culottes, 200-1, for more information on the publication history of the Lettres, which began as contributions to the 
physiocratic journal Éphémérides du citoyen in 1767. 
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“Traité de la monarchie,” the physiological formation of habits determined behavior and 
restricted intellectual abilities.  Contemporary historians added to the harmful reliance on the 
corporeal, and Physiocrats demonstrated further the primary place of the body in their political 
economy by challenging the activities of historians. 
Quesnay ended “Évidence” with a discussion of free will in which he introduced the 
ideas of “la liberté animale (determined by current sensations) and la liberté d’intelligence 
(founded on the knowledge of the laws of the natural order),” which corresponded respectively 
to short-term (“the immediately agreeable”) and long-term (“advantageous for the future”) 
decision making.648  The guiding principle of free will required a body capable of reason, of 
properly culling together sensations to achieve évidence, and of contemplating one’s individual 
advantages, which, when done correctly, would reveal the inextricable, natural connection of 
human interests.649  Tumultuous passions, perverse wills, naturally-disorganized bodies, and 
bodies physiologically-addicted to the material goods of society all followed la liberté animale.  
This was the ultimate dystopia into which Mirabeau, Quesnay, and the Physiocrats feared their 
society was plunging.  For Quesnay, the will must control the passions; however, this was not 
simply a case of corporeal restraint or mastering the passions.  Quesnay developed a grander 
metaphysical picture:  
Man is not a simple being; he is composed of a body and a soul, but this perishable union 
does not exist alone.  These two substances do not act on each other.  It is the action of 
God that vivifies all animated bodies and produces continually all active, sensitive, and 
intellectual forms.  Man receives his sensations through the organs of the body, but the 
sensations themselves and his reason are the immediate effect of the action of God on the 
soul.  It is thus in the action of the soul that consists the essential form of the reasonable 
                                                          
648Steiner, La “Science nouvelle” de l’économie politique, 36.  Steiner made these two versions of the will the 
center-piece of his analysis of Quesnay and economic behavior. 
 
649In Liana Vardi words, “Reason and free will allow human beings to plan and make decisions regarding their long-
term survival, and this is how Quesnay approaches economic rationality.  Reason is able to control passions aroused 
by poorly processed sensations.”  Vardi, The Physiocrats and the World of the Enlightenment, 71. 
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animal.  The organization of the body is the conditional or instrumental cause of the 
sensations, and the sensations are the motives or determinant causes of reason and the 
decisive will.650 
 
 Man’s ability to know good from evil and to develop a robust understanding of the 
natural order from which to act was guaranteed by his union with the supreme being.  “Faith 
teaches us that the supreme wisdom is itself the light that illuminates all men coming into this 
world,” and this union “raised man to a higher degree of knowledge, which distinguishes him 
from animals, making him aware of moral rights and wrongs through which he is able to direct 
himself with reason and equity in the exercise of his liberty.”651  Quesnay did not follow La 
Mettrie and argue that humans were simply better organized animals.  In his approach to 
epistemology and morality, animals were capable of the same rational and moral functions as 
humans because these actions were tied to sensations and the body; animals were able to 
concentrate, be attentive, love, hate, etc.  The difference, for Quesnay, was the solely human 
attribute of free will, which consisted in cogitating about, rather than immediately consenting to, 
the flurry of sensations.  To want was simply to agree or disagree to a sensation, and confusion 
arose when people mistook the agreeable sensations for future advantages.  Immorality was a 
                                                          
650Quesnay, “Évidence,” §56 (see also §52 and the last three paragraphs of the entry).  This is likely influenced by 
Malebranche’s Occasionalism.  Historians have commented on the relationship between Quesnay and Malebranche.  
I submit here only that the quote from Malebranche’s Traité de morale used by Mirabeau and Quesnay at the 
beginning of Philosophie rurale was intended not simply to demonstrate the shared understanding of “order,” but to 
also indicate the suspicions that Quesnay, Mirabeau, and Malebranche shared regarding the role of the body in the 
production of knowledge and the social interaction of humans.  All three feared the corrosive effects of “society,” or 
le monde in Malebranche’s case, on the human body.  See the following for information on Malebranche and 
Quesnay and the ways in which aspects of Malebranche’s philosophy and theology (might have) made its way into 
Physiocracy through Quesnay.  Hecht, “La Vie de François Quesnay,” 215 (Théré, Charles, and Perrot, pg. 1336); 
Akiteru Kubota, “Quesnay, disciple de Malebranche;” Fox-Genovese, The Origins of Physiocracy, 83-5; Catherine 
Larrère, “Malebranche Revisité”; Paul P. Christensen, “Fire, Motion, and Productivity: The Proto-Energetics of 
Nature and Economy in François Quesnay”; Steiner, La “Science Nouvelle” de l’économie politique, 21-3, 37-45, 
90, 98-9; Banzhaf, “Productive Nature and the Net Product”; Peter Groenewegen, "From prominent physician to 
major economist"; Schabas, The Natural Origins of Economics, 45-50; Sonenscher, Before the Deluge, 217-22; 
Vardi, The Physiocrats and the World of the Enlightenment, 69, 74-8.  For Malebranche, Anthony J. La Vopa’s 
manuscript essay, “Malebranche: The Christian Philosopher and the bel esprit,” is especially profound and explores 
Malebranche’s epistemological criticism of le monde. 
 
651Quesnay, “Évidence,” §56. 
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product of unregulated or disorderly sensations, and the soul was incapable of single-handedly 
controlling the vivacious and unruly sensations without “supernatural aid.”  For Quesnay, la 
liberté animale was a false liberty; it was a “conflict between affective sensations [and 
‘instructive’ sensations] that limits the attention of the soul to illicit passions...[and] must be 
distinguished from the moral liberty, or intelligence, which is not obsessed with disorderly 
affections but recalls to everyone their duties to God, to himself, to others.”652  Ultimately, we 
are free only when we achieve union with the divine intelligence, live according to the natural 
law, and avoid corporeal déréglements that shatter the combination of physical and moral laws in 
the natural order.   
 Quesnay’s epistemology was no simple mind/body dichotomy.  Reason for Quesnay was 
as much a corporeal activity as memory, both relying on sensory data for activation, but the 
higher cognitive functions and the quest for union with the divine required intellectual labor that 
was seemingly beyond the body.  To attain évidence, and thus entry into Physiocracy, a 
necessary connection between external sensory data (experience) and internal ideas needed to be 
established; one must then concentrate one’s mind on the data.653  Since the mind/soul is 
connected to God, this epistemological procedure obscured the physicality of bodies while 
simultaneously relying on them for sensory data.   
                                                          
652This information comes from Quesnay, “Évidence,” (§54-6; quote from §56).  See also Quesnay, “Natural Right,” 
48-9, n.1. 
 
653Loïc Charles has described Quesnay’s methodological intention of the Tableau Économique in the following way: 
“According to Quesnay, the zigzag left an imprint on the mind (imagination) of the reader that facilitated his 
understanding (intelligence) of the theory.  Moreover, the action of the image bypassed conscious reasoning; it was 
obtained before the reader applied his mind actively to the understanding of the economic theory embodied in the 
tableau and its explanation.”  The visual stimulation of the Tableau was to precede, but did not preclude, the 
application of the mind.  Charles, “The Tableau Économique as Rational Recreation,” 466.  
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Followers of Quesnay expressed ill-defined positions regarding évidence.  In L’ordre 
naturel et essentiel des sociétés politiques (1767), Pierre-Paul Le Mercier de la Rivière relied on 
the assurance of évidence to convince his fellow Frenchmen of physiocratic truths, but 
“dispersed here and there are reminders that the mind may not reign supreme.”654  According to 
Vardi, paraphrasing Le Mercier de la Rivière, “once we have accepted that evidence is true, we 
feel uplifted and shaken (transports et secousses) out of ourselves.  We have reached, as he puts 
it, a ‘sublime understanding of justice and injustice,’ which conforms to the immutable, essential 
order or, put more simply, to universal reason.”655  The body, in a sense, received a new 
vivifying principle after achieving évidence; it has been activated in a new, immaterial way 
transcending the corporeal state.  This sentiment of mutual association was already inherent in 
Mirabeau’s work from L’ami des hommes and “Traité de la monarchie” to Lettres sur la 
législation.  The body, in all cases, housed a radiating principle that could only spread by 
limiting other corporeal effects.656   
By 1780, Mirabeau’s training was fully complete.  Whether he had only finally been 
“converted” by Quesnay’s epistemology or he hoped to slow the splintering of Physiocracy, 
Mirabeau shifted his emphasis to the role of reason even when examining “magnanimity.”  “I 
know that men of feeling [hommes sensible],” Mirabeau proclaimed, “will tell me that true 
sentiments come from the heart, but, if no other organ is involved, I will call this an emotion.  
                                                          
654Vardi, The Physiocrats and the World of the Enlightenment, 139. 
 
655Ibid., 139.  
 
656See L’ami and “Traité” above, and Mirabeau, Lettres sur la législation, ou l’ordre légal, dépravé, rétabli et 
perpétué, “Premiére Lettre de M. B. à M.” (1769).   
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Feelings cannot last unless they engage the mind.”657  Mirabeau’s move to prize reason over the 
imagination and emotion, though, still placed the body in an uneasy position.  One had to either 
quiet the body in order to listen to the interior sentiment or overcome and correct the body 
through rational processes.      
*** 
In his memoir, comte d’Angiviller portrayed Quesnay as a “disembodied brain” capable 
of rising above the “whirlwind of intrigue” that daily characterized court society at Versailles.658  
Like his ability to silence the noise at Versailles, Quesnay created an epistemology ensconced in 
the material world of sensations but which strove toward a virtually immaterial goal.  He sought 
to harness the powers of the mind, while balancing the tensions of bodies eager “to fall back 
under the empire of the senses.”659  Although he denied the existence of innate ideas, he placed 
inside each human an intangible, though imprinted, link to the divine: “In the tranquil exercise of 
liberty, the soul almost always acts without examination and deliberation because it is instructed 
of the rules that it must follow without hesitation.”660  Quesnay perhaps not only found in 
Mirabeau a fellow supporter of the centrality of agriculture and a useful publicist, but also a 
contemporary who recognized that justice is “inherent in our substance” and that the Creator 
“imprinted in the heart of man” a set of divine creeds.661   
                                                          
657Quoted in Vardi, The Physiocrats and the World of the Enlightenment, 140. See also Mirabeau, Lettres sur la 
législation, ou l’ordre légal, dépravé, rétabli et perpétué, “Premiére Lettre de M. B. à M.” (1769), 13-16, for the 
role of reason in parsing sensory data for reality.   
 
658Ibid., 49, 45.  See also Théré and Charles, “The Writing Workshop of François Quesnay,” 6, 9-10. 
 
659Mirabeau and Quesnay, “Traité de la monarchie,” 64.  
 
660Quesnay, “Évidence,” §56. 
 
661Mirabeau and Quesnay, “Traité de la monarchie,” 61, 60. All of this is, of course, speculation because Quesnay’s 
true religious feelings are not entirely clear.  The line between “nature” and “God,” and “God” and “reason,” is often 
blurred, and Quesnay certainly preferred the moniker “Author of nature” to indicate the more important aspect of 
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 Mirabeau and Quesnay built Physiocracy on a physiological foundation from which they 
attacked luxury, commerce, and the entire socio-political order.  Both demonstrated contempt for 
the body’s addiction to material goods and susceptibility to irrepressible habits.  The king, his 
ministers, and a retinue of courtiers bolstered the artificiality of society through a dedication to 
commerce and luxury.  As Physiocracy took shape, the body became a fundamental site in which 
nature worked to demand subsistence and security.  To prove the unassailability of their 
principles, Mirabeau and Quesnay challenged other theorists of society and the body.  They 
dismissed Montesquieu’s premise that bodies were affected by environments and therefore 
needed particular forms of government and laws, and they criticized the unsound epistemology 
of history, which was based on the mental operation memory.  In opposition to materialists and 
supporters of the perfectibility of mankind, the Physiocrats argued that the physical 
characteristics of the body needed to be suppressed in order to make room for the sentimental, 
spiritual, sociable, or “natural” foundations of human behavior.662  Just as the task of the 
sovereign was to ensure the proper flow of the natural order, individuals needed to avoid the 
corporeal obstructions that would interfere with the intellectual labor necessary to understand 
Physiocracy or the communication with the divinely-inspired, natural order. 
 Although Mirabeau abandoned the dichotomy of cupidity/sociability, around which he 
structured L’ami des hommes, for Quesnay’s analysis of the material conditions of life—
subsistence, labor, property, security, and the natural order—the core of his dyad persisted in 
                                                          
God.  There is no disputing the fact that Quesnay relied on a transcendental or supernatural morality. For the 
complexity of Quesnay’s metaphysical views, see Fox-Genovese, The Origins of Physiocracy, 69, 75-6, 83-92. 
 
662See Vardi, The Physiocrats and the World of the Enlightenment, chps. 6-7, for Du Pont de Nemours’ commitment 
to sensationalism and “sentimental contagion” (4). 
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Physiocracy.663  According to Le Mercier de la Rivière, “The manner by which man is organised 
proves that he is destined by nature to live in society.”664  This statement is pregnant with 
meaning for the Physiocrats.  We have seen the conceptual role played by organisation and its 
derivatives, and we know that one understanding of the body in physiocratic terms extended to 
the base level of bodies needing subsistence and sharing the duties to obtain it.  Poised between 
the fountainhead and his oldest disciple, Le Mercier de la Rivière would go on to highlight the 
emotional bonds of society, so central to Mirabeau, and the development of human intelligence 
so important to Quesnay.  He continued: “It is evident...that man, being capable of compassion, 
pity, friendship, benevolence, glory, emulation, and of a multitude of affections that can be 
experienced only in society, was destined by nature to live in society.”665  Le Mercier de la 
Rivière identified a range of social affections, binding fellow citizens together in a relationship 
that could triumph over the purely physical and delight the soul.  This was the utopia, or rather 
the natural order, that the Physiocrats envisioned.  In order to excite sentiments of human 
bonding and encourage their contemporaries to exercise their free will, the Physiocrats 
demanded that their society be re-embodied. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
663Mirabeau returned to cupidity in the Avertissement (iii-iv) to Lettres sur la législation, ou l’ordre légal, dépravé, 
rétabli et perpétué. 
 
664Quote from L’ordre naturel et essentiel des sociétés politiques (1767) found in Sonenscher, Sans-Culottes, 250. 
 
665Ibid., 250. 
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Conclusion 
The social and economic processes set in motion during the late-seventeenth and early-
eighteenth centuries converged around the mid-eighteenth century to produce a new focus on 
society as the realm of human interdependence and interaction.  The notion that society consisted 
of individuals, which amended or overturned the hierarchy of corps and états, combined with the 
spread of commerce and luxury to create an increasing anxiety that the traditional, corporate 
social order no longer truly represented French society.  Opponents and proponents of commerce 
and luxury, alongside supporters of what would soon become the Ancien Régime, looked to 
stabilize society by grounding it in mankind’s corporeal nature.  Sensationalist physiology and 
attention to the materiality of bodies provided the tools to reconceptualize social commerce.  The 
Enlightenment may still be considered the “Age of Reason,” but responses to the prospect of 
abolishing the corporate order and privileges, fears of the degenerative impact of luxury, and 
efforts to revitalize French political economy demonstrate that the physical body occupied an 
equally important plank in social reform.   
I have traced three overlapping themes, building first an argument that the traditional 
corporate order was based on a set of corporeal principles.  The social order appeared unstable, 
as the independence of social beings from religious and political strictures challenged the 
philosophical underpinnings of eighteenth-century French society.  In addition, the growth of 
commerce and luxury put into practice the theoretical visions of a new society.  Each was 
expected to replace the corporate vision of the body with another, as commerce created a new set 
of conditions for social interaction.  The 1776 crisis revealed corporate claims about human 
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nature and the corporeal, about how individual, physical bodies fit into a system of hierarchical 
corps.  Wide-ranging, body-politic metaphors, which incorporated individuals and their états as 
organs into an animated corps, contested and upheld the conventional order.  Writers such as 
Rousseau, Turgot, and the Physiocrats sought new ways to understand the links between 
individuals in society and thus the foundation for a new political and economic order.  The 
human body, though, was not simply used metaphorically; society itself came to be seen as a 
product of the corporeal properties.  Thinkers who imagined new bases for society focused on 
the corporeal, particularly the dual language of moral and physical sensibility.  Contemporaries 
representative of different socio-political points of view (e.g. Diderot, Meister, Garat, Pluquet) 
all found in the human body the means of forging a unified society.  A new form of the social 
imagination emerged by the 1780s.  The growing recognition by reformers of public health and 
the urban environment that the body could be harmed by visible and invisible agents exemplifies 
the numerous avenues through which the French thought about the health of society through the 
health of individual bodies.  In multiple ways and through multiple sources, the corporeal 
became as important to ideas of the social order as the corporate system of privileges and the 
application of “reason” to reform it. 
Critics of increasing commerce, the spread of luxury, and the rise of consumerism 
charged not only that the social order would collapse if états no longer guided behavior, but also 
that the human body, which undergirded the order of états and corps, would be forever changed.  
French writers reignited la querelle du luxe at midcentury, and critics enunciated a corporeal 
critique of luxury.  Making use of sensationalist physiology, they argued that addiction to luxury 
items and the correlative incessant, yet misguided, pursuit of pleasure would disrupt the entire 
sensory network.  Their contemporaries would be physiologically dazzled by luxury goods, 
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blinded to their natural états, and would eventually become numb to the sensibility necessary for 
social interaction.  A corporeal critique of luxury could be found as the bedrock for Physiocracy, 
the most robust and comprehensive political economy of the eighteenth century.  Quesnay, 
Mirabeau, and their acolytes framed both their critique of a society mobilized by commerce and 
luxury and their constructive procedure to achieve évidence around the physical body. Although 
the Physiocrats did not seek to prop up the traditional corporate order, they nevertheless argued 
that the deleterious effects of an unstable society could be best located in the human body. 
The French Revolution would not dissipate the primacy of the corporeal in competing 
visions of society.  I have not sought to explain the causes of the French Revolution, but the 
threads that I have woven certainly help to understand the shape of the Revolution.  The social, 
political, and economic fluctuations in France before, during, and after the revolutionary period 
have been a perennial example of the historian’s task of identifying continuity versus change.  It 
is clear that debates over commerce, luxury, and the necessary guiding hand of the corporate 
order persisted.  The importance of commerce, especially with the colonies, in defining French 
society and political liberty galvanized individuals who lived from 1789-1815.  In fact, Benjamin 
Constant took esprit de commerce to be a pillar of modernity already in 1806, in opposition to 
the esprit de conquête exhibited by Napoleon, for which any new political system must 
account.666  It is clear too that the principles of sensibility, sentimentality, and the passions 
became essential to understanding human behavior and thus reordering society.  Revolutionaries 
brought to fruition many of the theoretical plans for social and political intercourse promulgated 
                                                          
6661806 represents the initial drafting of “Principes de politique applicables à tous les gouvernements.”  See the 
introduction by Biancamaria Fontana, Constant: Political Writings (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 
33.  In many ways, Constant’s work marks a culmination of this dissertation, as he not only dealt with the socio-
political ramifications of commercial society, but he also sought to forge a society out of the eighteenth-century 
elements of sympathy, empathy, and moral sensibility.  As K. Steven Vincent has written: “The implication is that 
sociability is important for emotional health.”  Vincent, Benjamin Constant and the Birth of French Liberalism 
(New York, NY: Palgrave MacMillan, 2011), 157. 
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during the previous fifty years.  In the process, they used the body as a fundamental point of 
departure.  The dual meaning of corps in the corporate order, the debates over appropriate attire 
in the new Republic, the widespread use of organisation in the socio-political vocabulary of the 
1790s, and the political application of sensationalism by Revolutionaries—especially the 
Idéologues and the Société médicale d’émulation—solidified the trends developed from 
midcentury.  While Physiocrats, critics of luxury, and writers such as Diderot, abbé Pluquet, and 
Meister could only envision new forms of social interaction through the corporeal, 
Revolutionaries became the builders of a new society armed with a plethora of corporeal ideas.  
 The decapitation of Louis XVI transformed the entire socio-political structure and 
replaced one set of symbols and metaphors with another.  Not only did Revolutionaries 
physically sever the head of the king’s “two bodies,” but they also metaphorically severed the 
head from the body of the body politic (the monarchy as the sacred symbol of the body politic).  
Revolutionaries then instituted a new metaphor that political power lay not in the head but in the 
body itself; the will of the citizenry directed the body and served as its source of movement and 
cognition.667  Before 21 January 1793, however, the Déclaration des droits de l’homme et du 
citoyen gave political expression to the new authority of the nation and preserved the individual 
from harm: “The source of all sovereignty resides essentially in the nation.  No body [corps], no 
individual can exercise authority that does not proceed from it in plain terms.”668  The traditional 
                                                          
667See Antoine de Baecque, The Body Politic: Corporeal Metaphor in Revolutionary France, 1770-1800, trans. 
Charlotte Mandell (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1997), and Joan B. Landes, Visualizing the Nation: Gender, 
Representation, and Revolution in Eighteenth-Century France (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2001). 
 
668Laura Mason and Tracy Rizzo, eds., The French Revolution: A Document Collection (Boston and New York: 
Houghton Mifflin Company, 1999), 103 (Article III).  Although Article III used the term “nation,” there is a 
questionable difference between la nation and société.  As we have seen, society was discursively invented prior to 
the Revolution, but it was with the Revolution that society come to be transformed into a self-reflexive institution 
capable of internal, rather than “extra-social,” change.  Revolutionaries had to create society before they could give 
it shape, whether through the conception of la nation or another.  See Brian C. J. Singer, Society, Theory, and the 
French Revolution: Studies in the Revolutionary Imaginary (New York: St Martin’s Press, 1986). 
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corporate order that constrained individual corps within a hierarchical system of corps and états 
no longer had authority.  The early stages of the French Revolution not only inverted the core 
metaphor of the body politic, but it also reshaped the relationship between individual bodies in 
society and between individual bodies and the body politic. 
With the diffusion of political sacrality from the king to the people, "the social came 
more closely into focus, and the bodies of individuals were even more intensely invested with 
significance."669  Society was now emancipated from a divine hierarchy, tradition, and the will of 
the king, but individuals nevertheless embodied the new social order.  In a discussion of sartorial 
politics during the French Revolution, Lynn Hunt noted that  
each individual body now carried within itself all the social and political meanings of the 
new political order, and these meanings proved very difficult to discern.  With 
sovereignty diffused from the king's body out into the multiple bodies of the nation, the 
old codes of readability broke down and new ones had to be elaborated…The body 
assumed such significance in the French Revolution because the long-term shift from a 
sacred to a secular framework of legitimacy made the workings of the social both more 
visible and more problematic.670   
 
Clothing the body became a political act, and new, egalitarian symbols came to replace the 
system of représentation so central to the Ancien Régime.  The wars over the cockade and the red 
liberty cap were just two political manifestations of debates over external adornment, fashion, 
and luxury during the Revolution.  After the Thermidorian Reaction, les incroyables and les 
merveilleuses eschewed the social and sartorial rigors of virtue.  Against classical republican 
demands for political virtue expressed through frugality and sober living, reactionaries looked to 
reactivate sociability and the economy based not on republican principles but on commerce, 
                                                          
669Lynn Hunt, “Freedom of Dress in Revolutionary France,” in From the Royal to the Republican Body: 
Incorporating the Political in Seventeenth- and Eighteenth-Century France, eds., Sara E. Melzer and Kathryn 
Norberg, 224-49 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998), 232. 
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fashion, and self-interest.  Moreover, items that began the eighteenth century as luxury goods 
became by the Revolution “populuxe.”671  Rhetoric denouncing the superfluous often did not 
match reality, and bodies undergirded a new system of socio-political meaning that differed only 
in intent from the traditional corporate order.  
Article III of the Déclaration des droits de l’homme et du citoyen was not the only article 
that directly or indirectly addressed the corporeal relationship between individuals and society.  
Article VI stated:  
Law is the expression of the general will.  All citizens have the right to take part 
personally, or by their representatives, in its formation.  It must be the same for all, 
whether it protects or punishes. All citizens, being equal in its eyes, are equally eligible to 
all public dignities, places, and employments, according to their capacities, and without 
other distinction than that of their virtues and talents.672 
 
Underneath the seemingly meritocratic vision of “virtues and talents” lay the foundation for 
exclusion.  “Talents” preserved the idea that there were distinctions between individuals; some 
were innately more qualified to rule because they were gifted by nature a better-organized 
body.673  Revolutionaries challenged the privileges of the nobility, clergy, and trade corporations, 
but in the place of privilege many articulated a corporeal superiority based on nature.  For 
example, the Committee of General Security (October 1793) prohibited revolutionary women’s 
associations because of their unstable bodies: “There is another sense in which women’s 
associations seem dangerous...women are disposed by their [corporeal] organization to an over-
                                                          
671Colin Jones and Rebecca Spang, “Sans-culottes, sans café, sans tabac: Shifting Realms of Luxury and Necessity 
in Eighteenth-Century France,” in Consumers and Luxury: Consumer Culture in Europe, 1650-1850, eds., Maxine 
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excitation which would be deadly in public affairs and that interests of state would soon be 
sacrificed to everything which ardor in passions can generate in the way of error and 
disorder.”674  Individual organisations were imbued with the authority of nature, and, for some 
revolutionaries, the physical body became a natural barrier to democracy.  The term organisation 
diffused seamlessly across the border of metaphor and ontology.675  Distinctions of organisation 
directed new visions of society and politics during both the First Republic and the Directory 
Pierre-Louis Roederer survived the various stages of the Revolution through the Terror 
and determined that a stable French social and political identity could be had through an 
understanding of the human body.  For Roederer, social organisation was the foundation for 
political organisation.  To this stage of history, he argued, politics has neglected two crucial 
ingredients: the “moral and physiological study of man.”  The “spring” of social organisation 
could be found in “the physical, intellectual and moral faculties,” and “it is necessary to know 
man himself, that is to say the qualities that can ensure the action of the social machine.”676  Like 
Garat, Meister, Pluquet, Diderot, the Physiocrats, and others, Roederer argued that the moral and 
                                                          
674Quoted in Joan Landes, Women and the Public Sphere in the Age of the French Revolution (Ithaca, NY: Cornell 
University Press, 1988), 144. 
 
675By the Revolution, organisation had clearly passed into general use, as observed in the work Principles of 
Government simplified and reduced to seven natural units, conditions for a good Constitution that combined 
“constitution” and organisation: “What we call the constitution of the human body is the totality, the intimate union 
of all the parts; they say that a man is ‘well-constituted’ when he enjoys a healthy, vigorous organization, without 
deformity...It must be the same for a political body.”  Quoted in de Baecque, The Body Politic: Corporeal Metaphor 
in Revolutionary France, 1770-1800, 104.  See also Jean-Baptiste Salaville, De l'organisation d'un état 
monarchique, ou considerations sur les vices de la monarchie française et nécessité de lui donner une constitution 
(1789).  Antoine Barnave also used organisation frequently in his discussions of politics, often in conjunction with 
other polysemous terms, like constitution and corps (social), and physiological terms, such as ressorts, mouvement, 
and tempérament.  See the following pages in Réflexions politiques, in Œuvres de Barnave, v. 2 (Paris: Challamel et 
Compagnie, 1843), 26, 84, 102, 167, 184, 201, 225, and 332. He contested the growth of republicanism during the 
Revolution by putting forward the idea of une monarchie organisée, one that resembled American Federalism.  The 
latter can be found in Barnave’s papers, Archives nationales, W15, no 1er, folio pages 80-81, 101-105.  See also Paul 
Cheney’s analysis of Barnave’s work in Revolutionary Commerce: Globalization and the French Monarchy 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2010), chp. 7. 
676P.-L. Roederer, Cours d’organisation sociale, in Oeuvres du Comte P.-L. Roederer, ed. A.-M. Roederer, 8th tome 
(Paris: Typographie de firmin didot frères, imprimeurs de l'institut, 1859), 131. 
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the physical were inextricably linked.  To understand social organisation, through an analysis of 
the “moral elements” or “moral qualities of man,” “we will have to look for the origin of the 
human passions.  We will see how the passions all proceed from a similar principle, a principle 
of physical sensibility in all moments and in all well-organized [bien organisés] men.”677  
Roederer sought a comprehensive view of social organisation that began with the corporeal and 
could explain everything from domestic relationships and human interaction to political 
governance.   
Similarly, the creation of the Class of Moral and Political Sciences, particularly the works 
of the Idéologues and the Parisian Société médicale d’émulation, demonstrated a commitment to 
creating a new society based on medicine and physiology—the “science of man.”  In his   
“Discours sur les rapports de la médicine avec les sciences physiques et morales,” J.-L. Alibert, 
the permanent secretary for the Société from 1796-1802, put forward a prospectus for medicine 
similar to d’Alembert’s mighty Discours préliminaire de l’Encyclopédie.678  Alibert outlined not 
only a history of medicine, but he expressed repeatedly the interconnectivity of the physical and 
the moral that made medicine of crucial importance to nearly every “science” and field of study.  
Doctors of the late eighteenth century were the successors to Locke and Condillac, he argued, 
and they possessed the “universal key to the human mind” in sensationalism.679  The sensory 
dyad of moral/physical meant that society had to be based on the corporeal principles of 
sympathy and sociability, the former a natural impulse directing the latter.  Alibert praised the 
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678Elizabeth Williams, The Physical and the Moral: Anthropology, Physiology, and Philosophical Medicine in 
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eighteenth-century physician and médecin-philosophe Pierre Roussel for recognizing that 
sympathy was to animated beings what gravity was to inanimate matter.  According to Alibert, 
society must necessarily function according to the ability of each individual to “feel” sociability 
through sympathy.680  It was the role of politics to then channel individual happiness toward 
public happiness, and Alibert found the role of doctors to be indispensable in the creation of a 
new political order: “The reciprocal dependences of these two sciences [politics and medicine] is 
so much admitted and noted that nobody would doubt that a treatise on the organic constitution 
of man would make an excellent introduction to the difficult study of the social body; this 
treatise would give to politics a degree of certitude that it surely needs.”681   
Revolutionaries created a political culture that put into effect Alibert’s notion that politics 
and knowledge of the human body should be merged.  Civic festivals, theatrical performances, 
political symbolism, “semiotic initiatives” before and after the Terror, and the quest to regenerate 
both individuals and la nation hinged on sensationalist ideas.682  By 1789, the sensationalist 
epistemology summarized by Rouillé d’Orfeuil was commonplace: "The different ways of 
thinking…seeing…and feeling that we adopt, depend on the impressions that the exterior objects 
that surround us, and have surrounded us, make, and have made, on us."683  Revolutionaries 
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recognized that le peuple could be led astray when visual stimuli did not correspond with socio-
political truth (as in the case of misreprésentation).  They took care to ensure that visual 
representations of political principles, such as the Festival of the Supreme Being, promulgated a 
particular political philosophy based on the idea that humans can be and are guided by 
impressions, reiterated sensory data, and inherent sensibility.  As the Abbé Grégoire wrote in his 
Rapport sur les sceaux de la République (1796):  
When rebuilding a government anew, everything must be republicanized.  The legislator 
who failed to recognize the importance of the language of signs would be remiss; he 
should not omit any opportunity to impress the senses, to awaken republican ideas.  This 
way the soul is penetrated by ever reproduced objects; and this composition, this set of 
principles, facts and emblems that ceaselessly retraces before the eyes of the citizen his 
rights and duties, shapes the republican mold that gives him his national character and the 
bearing of a free man.684   
 
Revolutionary political culture was didactic at its core, and the sentimentality of theatrical 
performances combined the moral and physical qualities of sensibility, allowing “the beliefs of 
the private and the natural [to be] joined with the political and patriotic.”685  Regeneration of the 
decaying French corps politique came through the senses of individual corps, and the human 
body served as the focal point of revolutionary political culture. 
During the tumult of the 1790s, revolutionaries often substituted physiological principles 
for political principles in their attempts to redefine the social order, basing their views on 
different perspectives that had developed and hardened over the course of the eighteenth century. 
Once the revolutionaries dismantled the corporate order (1789-91), the task of rebuilding 
remained. We can read the Déclaration des Droits de l'Homme et du Citoyen de 1789, 
Roederer’s Cour d’organisation sociale, and Alibert’s “Discours” as a continuation of the 
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685Feilla, The Sentimental Theater of the French Revolution, 91.  Feilla wants to distinguish between ideas of 
“sensibility” and “sentimentality” in her work, finding in the latter a set of “aesthetic conventions and practices.” 
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themes developed from midcentury.  They all emphasized new corporeal foundations for society.  
The Declaration destroyed the political system of corporate privileges, and, through Loi Le 
Chapelier (June 1791), revolutionaries abolished trade corporations, thus stripping away some 
corporeal limitations inherent in the social order.  Previous members of the Third Estate were no 
longer bodies to labor, and previous members of the Second Estate were no longer bodies 
defined through représentation.  Roederer and Alibert revealed the natural foundations of the 
social order through the human body.  Individual corps were released momentarily into a world 
where they could define themselves by their sympathy and sensibility.  The ability to feel would 
replace the restraints of the corporate order, even if the idea in Article VI persisted that “talents” 
and “well-organized” bodies were not equally distributed.   
*** 
Eighteenth-century responses to socio-economic changes remind us of both the distance 
between our centuries and nearness.  Prior to the nineteenth century, when disciplinary 
boundaries would come to separate the economic, political, biological, and sociological sciences, 
observers critical of incipient market capitalism and its social vicissitudes argued that the 
negative effects of competition, commerce, and consumerism could be found in the human body.  
They put forward a corporeal critique of what Thorstein Veblen would later call “conspicuous 
consumption” (1899) by marshaling contemporary medical and physiological theories.686  The 
individuals and groups analyzed here did not seek the organic unity of Romantics, post-
Revolution conservatives, and proto-biologists; instead, individual bodies captured the social 
imagination.  The capacity of each human body to “feel” became the critical framework to 
                                                          
686Thorstein Veblen, The Theory of the Leisure Class: An Economic Study of Institutions (New York: Macmillan 
Co., 1899), chp. 4. 
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understand not only morality and sociability but also the intertwining of society and the 
economy.687   
Yet, we are still asking similar questions about the nature of human relationships and the 
defining features of society.  The eighteenth century bequeathed to us a nascent understanding of 
empathy and the recognition that human passions and emotions are natural and diverse.  The 
approach of eighteenth-century writers to social and economic developments merged modern 
academic fields that are now being encouraged to realign.  The human body is back at the center 
of questions about individuals’ psychological and physiological responses to social interaction.  
Cognitive psychologists, neurologists, anthropologists, and evolutionary biologists, among 
others, are mapping the corporeal reactions to social intercourse over time.  Exploration of the 
physical need for social bonds, as demanded by thinkers like Diderot and abbé Pluquet, forms 
the basis of sizable, international research programs.  To give a twenty-first century voice to an 
eighteenth-century problem, two authors recently wrote: “It should not be surprising, then, that 
the sensory experience of social connection, deeply woven into who we are, helps regulate our 
physiological and emotional equilibrium.  The social environment affects the neural and 
hormonal signals that govern our behavior, and our behavior, in turn, creates changes in the 
social environment that affect our neural and hormonal processes.”688  For historians who cannot 
resist a modest amount of moralizing, surely the idea that empathy and sociability are necessary, 
physiologically-embedded features of humanity is a salutary legacy of the Enlightenment.    
                                                          
687For nineteenth-century connections between the life sciences, affectivity, emotion, and social theory, see Tiina 
Arppe, Affectivity and the Social Bond: Transcendence, Economy and Violence in French Social Theory (Surrey, 
UK and Burlington. Vt.: Ashgate, 2014), and Claude Blanckaert, La nature de la société. Organicisme et sciences 
sociales au XIXe siècle (Paris: L’Harmattan, 2004). 
 
688John T. Cacioppo and William Patrick, Loneliness: Human Nature and the Need for Social Connection (New 
York and London: W.W. Norton & Company, 2008), 11.  Cacioppo and Patrick expressed their goals as unraveling 
“how our brain and body are intertwined with our social responses [and trying] to understand the links between our 
physiological responses and our social and even spiritual strivings” (8-9). 
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